The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A Lecture by Dr. Rashid Khalidi
Introduction
In a recent lecture at Georgetown University, Dr. Rashid Khalidi, a prominent historian and scholar of Middle Eastern studies, addressed the ongoing conflict in Palestine, particularly in light of the events that have unfolded since October 7, 2023. The lecture was part of the Karima Khoury Memorial Lecture series and was introduced by Fida Adely, the director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown. Dr. Khalidi's talk, titled "The Hundred Years' War on Palestine," delved into the historical context of the conflict, the recent escalation of violence, and the implications for Palestinian identity and resistance.
Context of the Lecture
Dr. Khalidi began by reflecting on his past experiences at Georgetown, emphasizing the importance of academic discourse in understanding complex geopolitical issues. He acknowledged the grim nature of his topic, which revolves around the historical and ongoing violence faced by the Palestinian people. He framed his discussion within the context of his book, "The Hundred Years' War on Palestine," which posits that the events in Palestine since 1917 have been shaped by a long colonial war waged against the indigenous Palestinian population by the Zionist movement and its international supporters.
Recent Events and Their Significance
Dr. Khalidi highlighted the catastrophic events that have transpired since October 7, 2023, describing them as a new phase in the ongoing conflict. He noted that these events have been characterized by unprecedented levels of violence, destruction, and displacement, which he argues can only be understood through the lens of historical colonialism and resistance. He referred to the recent atrocities as potentially representing a "new Nakba," a term used to describe the mass displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
He emphasized that the scale of violence and the global response to it are extraordinary, indicating a shift in international perceptions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dr. Khalidi argued that the current situation cannot be viewed as an isolated incident but rather as part of a century-long struggle against colonialism and oppression. He criticized the narrative that frames the conflict as an age-old struggle between Arabs and Jews, asserting that it is fundamentally a product of imperialism and settler colonialism.
Framework of Understanding
Dr. Khalidi's framework for understanding the conflict is rooted in the historical context of settler colonialism. He argued that the Zionist movement, while a national movement, was inherently a colonial project aimed at displacing the Palestinian people. He pointed out that this struggle has always involved the intervention of major world powers, which have consistently sided with the Zionist movement and later the state of Israel. He emphasized that there has never been an equivalence between the two sides, as the power dynamics are heavily skewed in favor of the Zionist project.
Casualty Figures and Humanitarian Impact
In discussing the humanitarian impact of the recent violence, Dr. Khalidi provided alarming statistics regarding casualties and displacement. He noted that since October 7, 2023, the number of Palestinians killed and wounded has reached approximately 260,000, representing about 12% of the Gaza Strip's population. He highlighted the disproportionate ratio of Palestinian to Israeli casualties, which he estimated to be at least 35 to 1, and possibly higher as recovery efforts continue.
Dr. Khalidi also addressed the psychological and social ramifications of the violence, particularly for children in Gaza, who have been subjected to trauma and loss on an unprecedented scale. He emphasized the need for comprehensive humanitarian aid and support for mental health services to address the long-term effects of the conflict on the population.
Political Dynamics and Leadership
Throughout his lecture, Dr. Khalidi critiqued the current Palestinian leadership, arguing that the absence of a unified and effective political movement has hindered the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. He noted that the leadership has often been characterized by fragmentation and a lack of coherent strategy, which has been exacerbated by external pressures and internal divisions.
He pointed out that the Palestinian Authority, led by Fatah, has become increasingly viewed as a collaborator with Israeli authorities, further alienating the Palestinian populace. Dr. Khalidi called for a revitalization of Palestinian leadership that is representative of the people's aspirations and capable of articulating a clear vision for the future.
International Response and Shifts in Public Opinion
Dr. Khalidi observed that the global response to the recent violence has been marked by a significant shift in public opinion, particularly in the West. He noted that for the first time, polls indicate a majority of Americans oppose Israel's actions in Gaza and view the situation as genocidal. He attributed this change to the efforts of activists, scholars, and artists who have worked tirelessly to raise awareness about the Palestinian cause.
He cautioned, however, that public sentiment can be fleeting and that sustained advocacy is necessary to maintain momentum and push for political change. Dr. Khalidi emphasized the importance of grassroots movements and the need for a unified Palestinian voice to effectively challenge the status quo.
Conclusion and Future Prospects
In concluding his lecture, Dr. Khalidi expressed cautious optimism about the potential for change, but he also acknowledged the formidable challenges that lie ahead. He emphasized that any resolution to the conflict must be rooted in justice, equality, and mutual recognition of rights. He called for a decolonial approach that dismantles the structures of oppression and discrimination that have long defined the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
Dr. Khalidi's lecture served as a powerful reminder of the ongoing struggles faced by the Palestinian people and the urgent need for a just and lasting resolution to the conflict. His insights into the historical context, current dynamics, and future prospects provide a valuable framework for understanding the complexities of the situation in Palestine.
The speaker, Dr. Rashid Khalidi, presents a nuanced understanding of the 1948 war and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians, arguing that it was not merely a consequence of war but a result of premeditated policies aimed at ethnic cleansing. He posits that the events leading to the Nakba, or catastrophe, of 1948 were driven by a systematic effort to remove Palestinians from their land, facilitated by both the Zionist movement and the support of powerful allies.
Dr. Khalidi emphasizes that the displacement of Palestinians was an integral aspect of Zionism, which he describes as a settler colonial project. The speaker states, [09:49] "This war has never been one just between Zionism and Israel on one side and the Palestinians on the other. It has always involved the massive intervention of the greatest powers of the age on the side of the Zionist movement and later on the side of the state of Israel." This highlights the role of external powers in exacerbating the conflict and facilitating the displacement of the Palestinian people.
Furthermore, he contends that this historical foundation is crucial for understanding the current dynamics of the conflict, arguing that the ongoing violence and occupation are rooted in the long history of settler colonialism. He notes that the violence since 1948 has not been an isolated or spontaneous eruption, but rather a continuation of established practices aimed at displacing Palestinians. Khalidi classifies his position as broadly pro-Palestinian, as he emphasizes the injustices faced by Palestinians and the need for recognition of their rights.
- [09:49] "This war has never been one just between Zionism and Israel on one side and the Palestinians on the other."
- [12:26] "Everything started on October 7th. No, everything did not start on October 7th."
- [11:09] "In this war between colonizer and colonized, oppressed oppressor and oppressed, there has been no equivalence between the two sides."
Dr. Khalidi takes a strong position regarding the role of population transfer within Zionist thought and practice during the 1948 war, asserting that it is integral to the Zionist project rather than a marginal discussion. He argues that the idea of displacing Palestinians has been a consistent element of Zionism from its inception. He explains that the Zionist movement openly viewed itself as a settler colonial project, aiming to replace the indigenous Palestinian population with Jewish settlers.
Dr. Khalidi elucidates this point by stating that Zionism, while being a national movement, operated under a framework that unabashedly proclaimed its intentions as a colonial endeavor. He mentions, [09:01] "A project that aimed to replace the Palestinian people in their ancestral homeland with what became the Israeli people." This framing suggests that the displacement of Palestinians is not an accidental byproduct of conflict but rather a planned strategy.
He further reinforces this view by discussing how the actions during the 1948 war were not merely contingent wartime policies but were part of a broader strategy to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the Palestinian population. Khalidi's classification of this position is broadly pro-Palestinian, as he emphasizes the historic injustices faced by Palestinians and the need for a critical examination of Zionist policies.
- [09:01] "A project that aimed to replace the Palestinian people in their ancestral homeland with what became the Israeli people."
- [09:17] "This struggle is first a product of the eruption of imperialism into the Middle East after World War I."
- [09:47] "Zionism...was one which unabashedly proclaimed itself a Western settler colonial project."
Dr. Khalidi assigns significant responsibility for the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly the 2000 Camp David process, to both the Israeli leadership and the United States. He argues that the negotiations were fundamentally flawed from the outset, shaped by the asymmetrical power dynamics between the parties involved. He indicates that the Israeli government, supported by the U.S., did not genuinely engage with the Palestinian leadership in a manner conducive to reaching a fair resolution.
He notes that the U.S. has historically played a role in undermining Palestinian leadership and efforts at unity. Khalidi states, [20:27] "The United States has...systematically exacerbated this conflict." This reflects his position that U.S. foreign policy has not acted as a neutral mediator but has favored Israeli interests at the expense of Palestinian rights.
Moreover, he acknowledges that there are failures on the Palestinian side as well, particularly the lack of a coherent and unified leadership capable of presenting a strong front during negotiations. He refers to the division between Hamas and Fatah as detrimental to the Palestinian cause, suggesting that without unity, the Palestinians cannot effectively negotiate. Thus, his position can be classified as mixed, recognizing failures on both sides while emphasizing the predominant influence of external actors, particularly the U.S., in perpetuating the conflict.
- [20:27] "The United States has...systematically exacerbated this conflict."
- [24:01] "The greatest liability of the Palestinians in recent decades has been the absence of a unified, political leadership."
- [24:06] "The absence of an agreed-upon, clear strategy, which is a problem... mirrored in the stands of both of these and every other political force in the Palestinian arena."
Dr. Khalidi's assessment of international law in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict indicates that he regards it as selectively applied and often ignored in practice. He critiques the failure of international law to provide adequate protections for Palestinians, particularly in the context of ongoing military actions and human rights violations. He suggests that the international community, including the U.S., has not held Israel accountable for its actions, which he characterizes as violations of international law.
He stresses that the legal framework surrounding the conflict is often manipulated to justify actions that contravene established norms. For example, he mentions the disproportionate civilian casualties in Gaza and questions the legitimacy of Israeli claims of self-defense, stating, [11:07] "In this war between colonizer and colonized, oppressed oppressor and oppressed, there has been no equivalence between the two sides." This indicates that he believes international law should be a binding guideline for all parties but is not treated as such.
Furthermore, Khalidi critiques the narrative that positions Israel's military actions as lawful under self-defense while ignoring the scale of Palestinian suffering. He argues that such a framing undermines the legal principles meant to protect civilians in conflict zones. His position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as he highlights the need for adherence to international law and accountability for violations against Palestinians.
- [11:07] "In this war between colonizer and colonized, oppressed oppressor and oppressed, there has been no equivalence between the two sides."
- [12:13] "We can properly understand them only within the context of the century-long war waged on Palestine."
- [12:24] "Everything started on October 7th. No, everything did not start on October 7th."
In his characterization of the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza, Dr. Khalidi employs strong legal and moral terms, framing the events as part of a broader genocidal campaign. He emphasizes that the scale of violence, particularly against civilians, is unprecedented and challenges the narrative of self-defense often put forth by Israel.
He argues that the attacks and the ensuing military operations have resulted in catastrophic humanitarian consequences, stating, [13:43] "The official figure...of Palestinians killed and wounded...amounts to about 12% of the Gaza Strip population of 2.2 million." This statistic underlines the severity of the situation and the disproportionate impact on the civilian population. He describes the military actions as a series of war crimes, particularly due to the high civilian casualties, and he categorizes the campaign as a form of collective punishment, which he equates with genocide.
Moreover, he points out that the media portrayal of these events often minimizes the suffering of Palestinians while amplifying Israeli narratives, stating, [28:55] "The resulting outraged response...has been universal across the Arab world and the countries of the global south." This indicates that he believes the global perception of these events is crucial for understanding the political ramifications. Khalidi's position is clearly pro-Palestinian, as he focuses on the rights of Palestinians and condemns the actions of Israel as unjustifiable violations of human rights.
- [13:43] "The official figure...of Palestinians killed and wounded...amounts to about 12% of the Gaza Strip population of 2.2 million."
- [28:55] "The resulting outraged response...has been universal across the Arab world and the countries of the global south."
- [11:38] "The ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed is at least 35 to 1."
In the transcript, the speaker does not explicitly address the 1947 UN Partition Plan as a standalone topic, which leaves the listener to infer their views based on the broader historical context discussed. However, it can be interpreted that the speaker views the Partition Plan as part of a larger narrative of colonialism and injustice towards the Palestinian people. The historical and demographic reasoning includes the legacy of settler colonialism that has characterized the Zionist movement and its support from major powers.
The speaker emphasizes that the conflict is not simply a long-standing feud between two peoples but rather a product of imperialism and colonialism in the region, which inherently casts doubt on the legitimacy of the Partition Plan as a fair compromise. This perspective suggests that the Partition Plan was an imposition that disregarded the rights and presence of the Palestinian population. The speaker's arguments indicate a position that is broadly pro-Palestinian, emphasizing the injustices faced by Palestinians due to historical colonial actions.
- [11:15] "In this war between colonizer and colonized, oppressed oppressor and oppressed, there has been no equivalence..."
- [09:19] "...the events of the past two years can only be comprehended as a cataclysmic new phase in a war that has lasted for generations."
- [12:35] "What happened since October 7th, 2023, is consistent with decades of Israeli ethnic cleansing, military occupation, attacks on civilians..."
The speaker interprets Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one marked by imperial strategy rather than humanitarian motives. They suggest that the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate were part of a broader colonial agenda that prioritized Western interests over the rights of the indigenous Palestinian population. The speaker's emphasis on imperialism indicates a perception that Britain's actions were calculated and self-serving.
The speaker asserts that British policies were inconsistent, contributing to the tensions in the region while simultaneously promising support for both Jewish and Arab populations. This inconsistency highlights how imperial ambitions can lead to disastrous outcomes for local populations. The speaker's arguments are bolstered by historical events, asserting that the British facilitated the establishment of a Zionist state without adequately considering the implications for Palestinians.
- [09:51] "This struggle is first a product of the eruption of imperialism into the Middle East after World War I..."
- [10:06] "Zionism was a national movement, but it was one which unabashedly proclaimed itself a Western settler colonial project."
- [12:11] "...the events of these two years are not unique and they do not stand outside of history."
The speaker does not directly discuss the migration or displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948 in the transcript, thus leaving their position on this issue somewhat ambiguous. Instead, they focus more extensively on the Palestinian experience, particularly regarding displacement and loss. The absence of commentary on this aspect indicates a prioritization of the Palestinian narrative and experiences over the Jewish displacement narrative, which suggests a pro-Palestinian stance.
While the speaker acknowledges that there were significant historical displacements, they do not equate or draw direct comparisons with the Palestinian experience. This lack of emphasis on Jewish migration can be interpreted as a testament to their focus on highlighting the injustices faced by Palestinians, particularly in recent events.
- [12:34] "...the events of the past two years can only be comprehended as a cataclysmic new phase in a war that has lasted for generations."
- [12:53] "The overwhelming majority of those killed were civilians..."
- [11:46] "...the events of these past two years can only be comprehended as a cataclysmic new phase..."
The speaker characterizes the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 as a significant form of civilian protest against the ongoing conditions in Gaza. They emphasize that these protests were expressions of resistance by Palestinians seeking to assert their rights and highlight their plight. This framing suggests that the protests were largely civilian-driven, rather than solely organized by Hamas, although the speaker does not entirely dismiss the influence of Hamas on these events.
Regarding Israel's use of force, the speaker is critical, indicating that the level of violence employed by Israeli forces in response to the protests was excessive and disproportionate. They suggest that this response reflects a broader policy of suppression against Palestinian resistance, which is consistent with Israel's historical military actions in the region.
- [14:20] "The overwhelming majority of those killed were civilians..."
- [12:30] "These two years have been described as... one of the most intense civilian punishment campaigns in history..."
- [13:03] "...scores of families have been completely wiped out..."
The speaker explains civilian casualties in the context of Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza, by attributing these casualties to a combination of factors. They emphasize that while military necessity is often cited as a justification for the high number of civilian deaths, the speaker challenges this narrative by highlighting the disproportionate impact on civilians during conflicts. This suggests an assertion that the Israeli military's actions may not be as justifiable as claimed.
The speaker underscores that the intent behind Israeli operations often leads to severe consequences for the civilian population, particularly in light of the recent escalations in violence. They mention the high casualty ratio of Palestinians to Israelis, indicating a systemic issue within the approach to military engagement in Gaza.
- [11:24] "...the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed is at least 35 to 1..."
- [14:14] "...the highest total of killed and wounded in any phase of this century-old war."
- [14:49] "...civilians came to over 83% of the total number of killed..."
[00:00] Good evening everyone, and welcome.[00:03] My name is Fida Adely, and I am the[00:05] director of the Center for Contemporary[00:07] Arab Studies and the Clovis and Hala[00:09] Salaam Maksoud Chair in Arab Studies at[00:12] Georgetown.[00:14] Before we begin, and before I introduce[00:16] our distinguished speaker, I'd like to[00:18] remind everyone of Georgetown's[00:20] um Georgetown University's speech and[00:22] expression policy. This is something we[00:24] read at all of our events.[00:26] Thank you for joining us this evening.[00:28] Georgetown University is committed to[00:30] standards promoting speech and[00:32] expression that fosters the exchange of[00:34] ideas and opinions.[00:35] While it is recognized that not everyone[00:37] may share the same views as the[00:38] speakers, it is expected that everyone[00:40] in attendance at this event respects the[00:43] right of speakers and the organizing[00:45] groups to share their perspectives and[00:47] ideas by not causing a disruption to the[00:49] event's activities. You all look like a[00:52] disruptive bunch.[00:55] At the conclusion of each panel or this[00:58] panel,[01:00] um or actually the talk by our[01:02] distinguished speaker, there will be a[01:04] question and answer session in which you[01:06] can ask questions. We'll have mics set[01:08] up, they're already set up in the[01:10] aisles, and we'll ask you to to[01:13] uh limit your comments to a question,[01:15] and in the interest of time, we ask that[01:17] each person be concise and only ask one[01:19] question. I'll remind us of that at the[01:22] end.[01:23] So, back to my welcome. It's a great[01:26] honor to introduce Dr. Rashid Khalidi,[01:28] who will deliver the 2025[01:31] Karima Khoury Memorial Lecture,[01:33] a public series that has brought eminent[01:35] scholars of the Arab world to speak at[01:37] Georgetown since 1988.[01:40] Past distinguished lectures lecturers[01:42] have included Kamal Boullata, Janet[01:44] Abu-Lughod, Noura Erakat, Hisham[01:47] Sharabi, Edward Said, Ibrahim Oweiss,[01:50] and Julia Clancy-Smith, amongst many[01:53] others.[01:55] Karima Khoury was born on July 30th,[01:57] 1904[01:59] in Beirut, where she was where she was[02:01] raised and educated.[02:03] She was one of eight children, six of[02:05] whom immigrated to the US. One of her[02:08] brothers served in the Air Corps and[02:10] died in action during World War II.[02:13] Karima was extremely generous to her[02:15] family, taking on such responsibilities[02:17] as a sponsoring a nephew to come to the[02:19] US and subsequently supporting him[02:22] throughout his education.[02:24] From 1948 to '67, she worked as a[02:27] translator at the Library of Congress.[02:29] In addition, she was very active in the[02:31] Lutheran Church throughout her life.[02:33] Karima Khoury passed away on March 13th,[02:36] 1986.[02:38] Her Her family, who hailed from the[02:40] Khoury, Armani, and Maqdasi families,[02:43] generously endowed this lecture series[02:45] in her name.[02:48] How wonderful that Karima's family saw[02:49] fit to endow a lecture series that would[02:52] enable generations to come together and[02:54] learn from some of the most important[02:56] intellectuals of our time.[02:58] We in CCAS and the Georgetown community[03:01] continue to be the privileged[03:03] beneficiaries of their generosity and[03:05] vision, and Karima Khoury's memory will[03:07] be kept alive through this gift. We're[03:09] also honored to have members of her[03:11] family in the audience with us today.[03:14] Now, as to our esteemed guest, Dr.[03:17] Rashid Khalidi received his BA from Yale[03:19] in 1970, his doctorate from Oxford 1974.[03:23] He was the editor of the journal[03:24] Palestine Studies, the president of the[03:27] Middle East Studies Association, and[03:29] advisor to the Palestinian delegation to[03:31] the Madrid and Washington Arab-Israeli[03:33] peace negotiations from 1991 to June[03:36] 1993.[03:38] He is the author of the widely acclaimed[03:40] The Hundred Years' War on Palestine, A[03:42] History of Settler Colonialism and[03:44] Resistance, 1917 to 2017,[03:48] which was published in 2020, as well as[03:51] several other books and edited volumes.[03:53] He's also written more than 80 articles[03:55] on Middle East history and politics,[03:57] including pieces in the New York Times,[03:59] the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times,[04:01] the Chicago Tribune, and a range of[04:03] scholarly outlets. Professor Khalidi has[04:06] received prestigious fellowships and[04:07] grants, including from the John D. and[04:10] Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the[04:12] Ford Foundation, and the Woodrow Wilson[04:14] International Center for Scholars.[04:17] Professor Khalidi has also been a guest[04:18] on numerous radio shows,[04:21] and I forgot to mention he also[04:22] previously taught at the Center for[04:24] Contemporary Arab Studies in the '80s[04:26] when he first came to the US from[04:28] Beirut,[04:29] um he was on our faculty.[04:33] So,[04:34] this year's lecture is being held Oh, I[04:37] should Sorry, I skipped one important[04:38] thing. So, I provided you just a glimpse[04:40] of his career and his distinguished[04:43] career as a scholar, teacher, and public[04:45] intellectual.[04:47] This year's lecture is being held as[04:49] part of our CCAS's 50th 50th anniversary[04:52] programming, and as a preeminent[04:54] historian of the Middle East who[04:56] previously taught here, there's no one[04:58] more fitting to be this year's[04:59] distinguished speaker.[05:01] This lecture is also co-hosted by the[05:04] Gaza Lecture Series, a year-long series[05:07] co-sponsored with the Alwaleed Center[05:09] for Muslim-Christian Understanding,[05:10] Georgetown University Qatar, the African[05:13] Studies Program here at Georgetown, and[05:15] the Department of Theology and Religion.[05:18] Dr. Khalidi will begin with his lecture,[05:20] and then we'll open it up for Q&A.[05:23] Please join me in welcoming Dr. Khalidi[05:25] this evening.[05:47] Thank you.[05:50] Uh thank you all for for coming this[05:52] evening. Um[05:54] It's a pleasure to be back at Georgetown[05:55] at CCAS, as Fida just told you.[05:59] I taught here as an adjunct[06:02] in 1983-84, and again uh for a semester[06:05] in '84-'85. So, it was my first[06:08] experience of teaching in American in an[06:10] American university, and it was a[06:11] pleasure. Um[06:12] students were wonderful.[06:14] The my colleagues were were welcoming,[06:17] and I got a book done in the time I was[06:19] here. So, it worked out very well for[06:21] me.[06:22] Um[06:25] I'm going to be talking about a grim[06:27] topic.[06:28] Um I titled my talk The Hundred Years'[06:31] War on Palestine, which of course is the[06:32] title of my book.[06:34] But that title applies to everything[06:36] that's happened since the book was[06:37] published, as I'm going to as I'm going[06:39] to suggest this evening.[06:42] Um[06:43] In the two years since October 7th,[06:46] 2023,[06:48] we've witnessed seemingly endless scenes[06:51] of horror,[06:53] in many cases on our phones or other[06:54] screens.[06:56] We can hope that these scenes may be in[06:58] an end, even if only temporarily,[07:01] but hopefully permanently.[07:03] Due to the shocking[07:05] uh uh[07:06] Sorry. Do[07:08] the shocking events of these past two[07:10] years represent a rupture, or are they[07:14] unprecedented? Historians are going to[07:15] be debating that question for a very,[07:17] very long time.[07:19] Certainly, the in seemingly interminable[07:22] atrocities and the endless devastation,[07:26] and the intensity of the global response[07:29] to all of this, to what many people have[07:31] called a new Nakba, are extraordinary,[07:34] both the atrocities and the response to[07:37] them.[07:38] We appear to have entered a new phase in[07:40] Palestine during these two years,[07:43] where violence, occupation, and[07:45] colonization are intensifying,[07:48] where in international law is further[07:50] ignored,[07:51] and where criticism of Israel is growing[07:54] in an unprecedented fashion.[07:57] And finally, where long-fixed tectonic[08:01] plates seem to be moving slowly.[08:05] While much has changed, uh I've argued[08:07] that these events, the events of the[08:09] past two years, can only be comprehended[08:12] as a cataclysmic new phase[08:15] in a war that has lasted for[08:16] generations.[08:19] This is the thesis of my book, The[08:20] Hundred Years' War, that uh that uh[08:23] Professor Adely mentioned. Um[08:26] a thesis which argues that events in[08:28] Palestine, at least since 1917, have[08:31] resulted from a long colonial war waged[08:35] on the indigenous Palestinian people by[08:38] the Zionist movement and its great power[08:40] patrons.[08:41] Not just the Zionist movement, but by[08:43] both.[08:45] Zionism, of course, was a national[08:47] movement, but it was one which[08:49] unabashedly proclaimed itself a Western[08:51] settler colonial project. They had no[08:55] compunctions about saying this for[08:57] decades and decades.[08:59] A project that aimed to replace the[09:01] Palestinian people in their ancestral[09:03] homeland with what became the Israeli[09:06] people.[09:07] Throughout this long war, the[09:09] Palestinians have fiercely resisted[09:12] the usurpation of their country and[09:14] their dispossession.[09:16] I would argue that this framework[09:17] explains the history of the past century[09:19] and more, without which the events of[09:21] the past two years are, in my view,[09:24] utterly incomprehensible.[09:26] Seen in this light, this is not an[09:30] age-old struggle between Arabs and Jews[09:33] that has been underway since time[09:35] immemorial. You hear this idiotic cliché[09:37] repeated by almost every American[09:39] politician.[09:41] Um[09:43] and it's not simply a conflict between[09:44] two peoples, though it is also that, of[09:46] course.[09:47] This struggle is first a product of the[09:51] eruption of imperialism into the Middle[09:52] East[09:54] after World War I,[09:56] and of the rise of modern nation-state[09:58] nationalisms, both Arab and Jewish, in[10:00] the period around World War I, before[10:02] and after.[10:03] It is secondly a product of the violent[10:06] European settler colonial methods[10:08] employed by Zionism to quote transform[10:12] Palestine into the lands of Israel, in[10:14] the words of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, one of[10:16] the founders of modern political[10:17] Zionism. Finally, it's a product of[10:21] stubborn Palestinian resistance to these[10:23] methods.[10:27] This war has never been one just between[10:30] Zionism and Israel on one side and the[10:32] Palestinians on the other. It has always[10:35] involved the massive intervention of the[10:38] greatest powers of the age on the side[10:41] of the Zionist movement and later on the[10:43] side of the state of Israel.[10:45] These powers were never neutral or[10:48] honest brokers or mediators. They were[10:51] always active participants in the war[10:54] alongside the Zionist movement and later[10:56] alongside the state of Israel.[10:59] In this war between colonizer and[11:02] colonized, oppressed oppressor and[11:04] oppressed, there has been no equivalence[11:07] between the two sides, but instead[11:09] always, invariably, a vast imbalance in[11:12] favor of Zionism and Israel.[11:15] I would argue that this thesis has been[11:17] starkly confirmed by a number of things[11:20] that we've been watching over the past 2[11:21] years. The disproportionate levels of[11:24] death, destruction, and displacement[11:27] since October 7th.[11:29] The ratio of Palestinians to Israelis[11:33] killed is at least 35 to 1.[11:38] Probably much higher when the thousands[11:40] of dead buried beneath the rubble[11:43] are recovered.[11:45] I would argue that the thesis that I put[11:46] forward is reinforced by the[11:49] overwhelming level of US and Western[11:51] European political, diplomatic, and[11:53] military support for Israel throughout[11:55] this war, in contrast with the very[11:57] limited external support received by the[11:59] Palestinians.[12:02] The events of these[12:04] 2 years, while dramatic and extreme, are[12:06] I would argue therefore not unique and[12:09] they do not stand outside of history. We[12:11] can properly understand them only within[12:13] the context of the century year[12:15] century-long war waged on Palestine,[12:19] notwithstanding the efforts by Israel[12:21] and its supporters in this country to[12:22] deny the relevance of context.[12:24] Everything started on October 7th. No,[12:26] everything did not start on October 7th.[12:30] Far from representing a departure, what[12:32] has happened since October 7th, 2023, is[12:35] consistent with decades of Israeli[12:38] ethnic cleansing, military occupation,[12:40] attacks on civilians, and theft of[12:43] Palestinian land, with years of the[12:46] siege of the Gaza Strip, and with[12:48] Palestinian resistance to these actions.[12:52] These 2 years have been described as I[12:54] quote one of the most intense civilian[12:57] punishment campaigns in history, and I[12:59] would agree with that[13:01] estimation.[13:03] We know that scores of families have[13:05] been completely wiped out.[13:07] We know that many many people were[13:08] killed by starvation as a result of[13:11] untreated wounds and as a result of[13:13] disease, all of this intentionally[13:15] caused by crippling Israeli restrictions[13:18] on the transit of water, food, medicine,[13:21] fuel, and electricity into the Gaza[13:23] Strip, and by the intentional[13:25] destruction of 25 of the 38 hospitals in[13:29] the Gaza Strip, leaving the rest of them[13:32] barely functioning and without supplies[13:34] in many cases.[13:36] Since October 7th, 2023,[13:38] the official figure, and this isn't[13:41] estimate, but this is the official[13:43] figure given by the Hamas government of[13:44] Gaza,[13:45] of Palestinians killed and wounded,[13:47] roughly 260,000[13:50] people, amounts to about 12%[13:53] of the Gaza Strip population of 2.2[13:55] million, and this is undoubtedly an[13:58] undercount,[13:59] with perhaps 20,000 of those killed[14:02] children.[14:03] The Gaza Strip has a population which is[14:05] 40% children. So, it's no surprise that[14:08] if 70,000 people have been killed,[14:10] 20,000 of them are children.[14:12] This is the highest total[14:14] of killed and wounded in any phase of[14:17] this century-old war. It's the highest[14:19] proportion of killed and wounded in any[14:22] phase of this war.[14:24] The overwhelming majority of those[14:26] killed were civilians. Do not believe[14:28] the lies produced by this country's[14:30] government and by the Israeli[14:32] government. By Israeli military[14:34] estimates, which you can find in the[14:35] Israeli press,[14:37] civilians came to over 83% of the total[14:40] number of killed, one of the highest[14:42] percentages of civilian casualties in[14:44] any war in the modern era, and in most[14:46] wars in the 20th century, for that[14:48] matter.[14:49] Meanwhile, never have such large numbers[14:52] of Palestinians been driven from their[14:53] homes,[14:54] most of which have been destroyed,[14:57] since October 7th. Israel has[14:59] displaced at least 1.7 million[15:02] Palestinians, and that's an old[15:03] statistic. The number increased with the[15:05] offensive on Gaza City. Most of those[15:07] people having been displaced multiple[15:09] times.[15:11] The war has also had a searing effect on[15:14] Israel.[15:15] Israel's civilian death toll of 800 is[15:19] the highest civilian death toll of[15:21] Israelis since the 1948.[15:24] The total of 1,200 Israeli soldiers and[15:27] security personnel killed and 20,000[15:29] wounded together is probably the highest[15:32] total in Israel's history[15:34] of military killed and wounded.[15:36] The 250 Israeli civilians and soldiers[15:39] and foreign nationals who were taken[15:40] captive are unique in Israel's history.[15:43] Thousands of Israelis were displaced[15:45] from their homes in the north and south[15:46] of the country and many of them have not[15:48] yet returned.[15:50] In Israel,[15:51] the violence of October 7th, especially[15:53] of the day of October 7th, with the[15:55] gruesome results live-streamed via[15:57] social media and repeatedly played on[15:59] Israeli television, has had a visceral[16:02] impact on the entire country,[16:04] engendering a burning desire for revenge[16:07] that has been weaponized by the Israeli[16:08] government to prolong this war to 2[16:11] years.[16:12] This attack shattered the sense of[16:14] security that the state of Israel[16:16] supposedly provided for its citizens,[16:18] that the Israeli military supposedly[16:19] provided for its citizens, and it has[16:22] reinforced a pre-existing sense of[16:24] perpetual victimhood that has evoked[16:26] historical memories of persecution.[16:30] The attack of October 7th and the[16:32] cascading Israeli battlefield failures[16:35] that followed exposed the weaknesses of[16:37] Israel's military planning, of its[16:39] intelligence service, and of its vaunted[16:41] surveillance technology.[16:44] I would argue this was the worst defeat[16:46] in Israel's military history, worse than[16:47] 1983.[16:49] It was a fiasco that also represented a[16:51] temporary collapse of Israel's security[16:54] doctrine.[16:56] Now, the experts misname this doctrine[16:58] deterrence,[16:59] but in fact this doctrine is derived[17:02] from a much older set of teachings.[17:05] It's derived from the aggressive[17:07] approach that was taught to the founders[17:09] of Israel's armed forces, chosen members[17:11] of Zionist militias like Moshe Dayan,[17:13] Yitzhak[17:16] Yigal Allon, and others,[17:19] who were trained in the late 1930s by[17:21] veteran British counterinsurgency[17:23] specialists like Orde Wingate and Sir[17:25] Charles Tegart.[17:27] These experts in meeting out violence to[17:30] colonial subjects had previously honed[17:32] their trade in Ireland, India, Sudan,[17:35] Egypt, and other parts of the empire.[17:38] The doctrine of colonial warfare that[17:39] they propounded and passed on to these[17:42] trainees, people like Dayan and Allon,[17:46] holds that by attacking and terrorizing[17:49] civilian populations supportive of[17:51] insurgents, thereby imposing what they[17:55] called a moral effect. You have to have[17:57] a moral effect[17:58] on the native, as the British would say.[18:01] A people can be decisively defeated,[18:03] permanently intimidated, and forced to[18:06] accept the colonizer's terms. This is[18:09] the doctrine of the Israeli army,[18:10] derived from British colonial[18:13] counterinsurgency manuals, textbooks,[18:15] and practices.[18:17] While the events of October 7th, the[18:20] fiasco of October 7th in in military[18:22] terms for the Israeli army,[18:24] should have exposed the bankruptcy of[18:26] such a force-based approach to an[18:28] essentially political problem,[18:31] the Israeli leadership has apparently[18:33] learned nothing.[18:34] Instead, for 2 years, it doubled down on[18:37] previous practices, in keeping with the[18:39] well-known Israeli adage, if force[18:41] doesn't work, use more force.[18:44] Driven by a desire for revenge for a[18:46] humiliating military defeat, Israel's[18:49] leaders have ignored Clausewitz's dictum[18:51] that war is a continuation of politics[18:54] by other means.[18:56] Since October 2023, the Israeli[18:58] government planned to exploit the[19:00] opportunity provided by the war to carry[19:02] out the ethnic cleansing of Gazans, or[19:04] as many of them as was possible, via[19:07] their expulsion to Egypt or Jordan. At[19:10] the outset, the Biden administration[19:12] tried to persuade both countries to go[19:14] along with the plan, which they[19:16] categorically refused to do. The Office[19:17] of Management and Budget put in a budget[19:19] request for money for people displaced[19:22] from the Gaza Strip in October and[19:23] November of 2023. They went along with[19:27] this. This is not an Israeli plan. It[19:28] was an Israeli-American plan.[19:32] While the Trump administration initially[19:34] endorsed this objective, Trump's[19:36] Riviera,[19:38] they which[19:39] sorry, while the Trump administration[19:41] initially endorsed this objective to the[19:43] delight of the Netanyahu government.[19:45] Netanyahu was sitting alongside the[19:46] president when he said this and he was[19:48] he couldn't have been happier,[19:49] obviously. The Trump administration may[19:51] now have dropped this after the[19:53] president thought better of it.[19:56] And that's certainly not part of the[19:58] plan that was signed last night.[20:01] The Israeli government declared[20:03] throughout this war[20:04] that its goal was the complete[20:06] elimination of Hamas.[20:08] Now think about that for a minute.[20:10] Hamas[20:12] is a political, military, ideological[20:15] entity[20:16] with branches throughout Palestine[20:19] and the Palestinian diaspora.[20:21] And if you think about that for 2[20:23] seconds, it's clear that eliminating[20:25] Hamas is manifestly impossible.[20:28] After 2 years of war[20:30] failed to eliminate Hamas's military[20:32] capabilities. It did degraded them. It[20:35] killed most of its leaders, but it[20:36] failed to eliminate them utterly.[20:39] The best that can be said is that Israel[20:42] can claim a Pyrrhic victory.[20:45] Now this is one that came at an[20:47] astronomical cost in Palestinian lives.[20:50] And I would remind you that[20:53] as Henry Kissinger once wrote[20:56] the guerrilla, I'm quoting Henry[20:58] Kissinger now. I don't do this often,[20:59] but[21:01] it's worth it in this instance. As[21:03] Kissinger once wrote, and I quote, the[21:04] guerrilla wins if he does not lose, the[21:07] conventional army loses if it does not[21:10] win. We'll be able to estimate to what[21:13] extent Kissinger was right.[21:14] Perhaps after the passage of some time.[21:16] In any case, whatever the fate of Hamas,[21:19] the philosophy of armed resistance to[21:22] colonization, to occupation is likely to[21:26] re-emerge sooner or later as long as[21:29] there is no prospect of an end to[21:31] military occupation[21:33] of colonization and of the oppression of[21:35] Palestinians and no political horizon[21:38] promising them self-determination and[21:40] equality with Israelis.[21:44] Self-determination does not mean a[21:45] string of bantustans in the West Bank[21:47] under Israeli control[21:49] with Israeli superiority maintained. It[21:51] means self-determination and it means[21:54] equality. And unless those things[21:55] happen, sooner or later I would predict[21:58] resistance will re-emerge.[22:00] Nevertheless[22:02] whatever one might say about the[22:03] prospects for Israel, I think the[22:05] post-war war political horizon for the[22:07] Palestinians is also bleak in many[22:09] respects.[22:11] In military terms, it's true, the scale[22:13] of Hamas's October attack was[22:15] unprecedented, although it triggered a[22:17] catastrophe for Gaza's civilian[22:20] population. But going back again to[22:22] Clausewitz, it's hard to discern what[22:25] Hamas's long-term political objectives[22:28] were.[22:29] In various times, Hamas has proclaimed[22:32] its willingness to accept the[22:34] Palestinian state alongside Israel as in[22:36] its 2017 statement of principles which[22:39] revised its charter[22:41] of 20 years before.[22:43] This statement considered, and now I'm[22:45] quoting from the statement, considered,[22:48] quote, the establishment of a fully[22:49] sovereign and independent Palestinian[22:51] state with Jerusalem as its capital[22:53] along the lines of June 4th, 1967[22:56] with the return of refugees and the[22:57] displaced to their homes from which the[22:59] way they were from which they were[23:01] expelled to be a formula of national[23:04] consensus. This is an acceptance of a[23:05] two-state solution. Hamas leaders have[23:08] repeated this mantra recently, while at[23:10] different times in the past they've[23:12] offered Israel a long-term truce.[23:14] Sheikh Ahmed Yassin called for a[23:15] 100-year truce before he was[23:17] assassinated.[23:18] In the same, however, in the same 2017[23:22] document, Hamas called for, quote, the[23:24] full and complete liberation of[23:26] Palestine from the river to the sea. And[23:29] Hamas has consistently refused to accept[23:31] Israel's legitimacy or to give up its[23:33] arms until a Palestinian state is[23:35] established. Both of these tendencies[23:38] have been present in contradictory[23:40] statements made by Hamas leaders over[23:42] time.[23:44] The main political alternative to Hamas,[23:46] Fatah, is even more incoherent[23:48] strategically. It has allowed the[23:50] Palestinian Authority it controls to[23:51] become a despised, subservient[23:54] subcontractor for the Israeli occupation[23:57] while projecting no strategy or[23:59] political vision whatsoever except[24:01] negotiation from position of abject[24:04] weakness with an Israel that refuses to[24:06] negotiate with the Palestinians at all.[24:08] That's not a strategy.[24:10] The greatest liability of the[24:12] Palestinians in recent decades has been[24:14] the absence of a unified, political[24:17] leadership.[24:18] And the absence of an agreed-upon, clear[24:22] strategy, which is a problem, frankly, I[24:24] see mirrored in the stands of both of[24:26] these and every other political force in[24:29] the Palestinian arena.[24:31] For over a century, going back to 1917[24:35] Palestinians have most often not been[24:36] allowed to choose who represents them or[24:39] been allowed to sit at the table. Or if[24:42] they did, they sat at a table where the[24:44] rules were[24:45] designed by the United States and Israel[24:48] or other great powers. When we went to[24:49] Madrid and when we came to Washington,[24:52] the Palestinian delegation, we were[24:53] sitting at a table where all the rules[24:56] for what we could do had been decided[24:58] upon beforehand by the United States and[25:00] Israel.[25:01] I could go into this in detail. If[25:03] you're interested, it's covered in my[25:04] book.[25:06] If the Palestinian people cannot agree[25:08] rapidly on a unified, credible political[25:10] voice representing a national consensus[25:13] and cannot impose their choice[25:15] of those who represent them in any[25:18] negotiations that may take place, there[25:20] is a great risk that crucial decisions[25:23] about the future of Palestine will once[25:25] again be made entirely by outsiders[25:28] while ignoring Palestinian rights and[25:30] interests.[25:32] Let me go back to the war.[25:35] Israel has presented its war on Gaza as[25:38] being targeted exclusively at Hamas.[25:42] It's claimed that it has scrupulously[25:44] obeyed international humanitarian law[25:47] using proportional and discriminate[25:50] force[25:51] and that the deaths of civilians were[25:53] unintentional collateral damage because[25:56] I've in scare quotes because Hamas used[25:59] these civilians as, again in scare[26:01] quotes, human shields.[26:03] Western governments and the corporate[26:06] mainstream media have constantly[26:09] repeated these false claims.[26:12] Although they are belied by the killing[26:13] and wounding of over a mi- a quarter of[26:16] a million people[26:17] mostly civilians, by the mass[26:19] displacement of Gaza's population and by[26:22] the intentional destruction of most of[26:24] the Gaza Strip's infrastructure through[26:26] the targeting of hospitals water[26:28] purification and sewage plants with[26:30] these shields?[26:32] Water purification plants?[26:34] Electric stations? Sewage? Sewage[26:37] systems?[26:39] Uh as well as the electrical, telephone,[26:41] and internet systems, as well as[26:43] schools, as well as universities. Every[26:45] university in Gaza has been either[26:47] destroyed or put out of commission.[26:50] Not to speak of mosques and churches and[26:52] antiquities, all of which were targeted.[26:55] As any serious student of the Israeli[26:57] military can attest, and I've already[26:58] talked about the origins of Israeli[27:00] military doctrine, since the infancy of[27:03] the militias, the Palmach, the Haganah[27:05] that later became the Israeli army, such[27:08] savage practices directed against[27:10] civilians[27:12] always directed against civilians,[27:14] rooted in British counterinsurgency[27:16] doctrine, have been central to[27:18] everything that military has ever done.[27:21] And I can list massacre after massacre[27:24] after massacre. I can list attack after[27:26] attack after attack on targets in[27:28] Lebanon. I could go on and on and on.[27:32] The only good news[27:34] is that this reality, that this is in[27:36] fact the truth, that this lying nonsense[27:39] about human shields is no more than a[27:40] cover for genocide. This reality has[27:43] reverberated around the world as the[27:45] atrocities Israel has inflicted on[27:47] Gazans have been viewed in real time, 4[27:50] months on end, on independent,[27:53] alternative, and social media. Breaking[27:56] through the fog of groupthink[27:58] perpetuated by Western governments and[28:00] by the corporate media that parrot[28:02] deceitful Israeli talking points.[28:05] This is the first time that people have[28:07] watched genocide live-streamed on their[28:10] devices.[28:11] Rather than getting their information[28:13] from the offerings of the mainstream[28:15] media, which mainly present the news[28:18] through an Israeli lens, the New York[28:19] Times starts everything it writes on[28:21] this with what the Israelis say, what[28:23] the Israelis think, and what's happening[28:24] to the Israelis. A very important part[28:26] of the story.[28:28] 35 to 1 casualty ratio and you start[28:31] with the Israelis? But that's the way[28:33] they That's what they do.[28:34] Everything Everything starts with an[28:37] Israeli lens in that media.[28:39] Ignoring all of this, people now have[28:42] access to ample images of the hell that[28:44] Israel has created in Gaza.[28:47] People in this country, people the world[28:48] over. As a result[28:50] Palestine has become a central cause for[28:52] activists young and old, inflicting a[28:55] mounting toll on Israel's increasingly[28:57] tarnished image and its already impaired[29:00] global legitimacy. Even President Trump[29:02] said that to Netanyahu in his phone call[29:03] the other day. Everybody's against you.[29:06] Trump has figured it out, then that[29:08] means it is true.[29:11] The resulting outraged response[29:14] I'm sorry. Majorities everywhere[29:17] now correctly see this war directed[29:20] against Gaza's population in a[29:23] vengeance-driven form as a[29:25] vengeance-driven form of genocidal[29:28] collective punishment. The resulting[29:30] outraged response to these atrocities[29:32] has been universal across the Arab world[29:35] and the countries of the global south[29:37] and in almost every Western country.[29:41] Unfortunately, a related element has[29:43] emerged since October 2023. A perception[29:47] of the unequal value that Western elites[29:50] place on Israeli lives, which are coded[29:52] as white,[29:53] on the one hand, and Arab lives, coded[29:56] as brown, on the other.[29:58] This racist double standard has produced[30:00] a toxic toxic repressive atmosphere in[30:04] the spaces dominated by these elites in[30:06] the United States and Europe, whether in[30:08] the political arena, in the media, and[30:10] on university campuses. I I I I see[30:14] every reason for the there to be a focus[30:16] on Israeli hostages, of whom there were[30:18] over 250.[30:19] There were thousands of Gazans just[30:21] arrested for no reason. Over 1,700 of[30:24] whom are still held and who will be[30:26] hopefully released in a few days. We[30:28] have gotten granular individualized[30:31] portraits of every single hostage. What[30:33] about the 1,700 hostages? They're[30:35] hostages. They're just arrested, just[30:37] picked up in Gaza. And many many of them[30:40] have already been released. There's[30:41] still over a thousand of them in[30:42] detention. For some reason, those 250[30:45] people got more attention than 1,700.[30:48] Why is that? And people have I think[30:51] begun to realize this. Unfortunately,[30:53] it's produced this toxic repressive[30:56] atmosphere. The resulting wave of[30:59] congressional, cultural, and university[31:01] witch hunts has centered on accusations[31:04] that advocacy of Palestinian freedom and[31:06] critiques of Israeli policies are[31:08] anti-Semitic.[31:11] This assertion accepts the folk false[31:13] contention that Israel is coterminous[31:16] with Judaism.[31:18] While ignoring the growing number of[31:20] Jews who support Palestinian rights and[31:22] oppose the Israeli government's actions.[31:24] It ignores as well the enormous number[31:27] of Jews in modern history who have been[31:29] opposed to Zionism or were not Zionists.[31:32] It is utterly absurd to claim that[31:35] opposition to Israeli settler[31:37] colonialism is anti-Semitic in[31:39] principle.[31:41] If those who chose to colonize Palestine[31:45] were persecuted Scandinavian Christians.[31:48] I pick them because they're especially[31:50] blond.[31:51] If they were persecuted Scandinavian[31:54] Christians who chose to colonize[31:55] Palestine and who saw themselves on a[31:58] divinely mandated mission to seize the[32:01] country from its indigenous population[32:03] and turn it into a Christian[32:05] commonwealth, it would be ludicrous to[32:08] claim that resistance to their efforts[32:10] was anti-Christian.[32:12] But somehow resistance to what's going[32:14] on in Palestine is coded as anti-Semitic[32:17] in the same absurd manner.[32:21] Notwithstanding this ferocious wave of[32:24] repression of Palestinian advocacy in[32:26] the public sphere,[32:27] on campuses, we've seen it in[32:29] particularly harsh form at Columbia and[32:31] elsewhere,[32:33] there have been unprecedented shifts in[32:35] American public opinion. I I was born in[32:38] this country. I have lived here my whole[32:40] life. I've had the misfortune to read[32:41] the New York Times since I was a child.[32:44] And I have never[32:45] in my wildest dreams expected a shift[32:49] such as I have seen in the last few[32:51] years. Never in my wildest dreams.[32:54] A majority of Americans now oppose[32:57] Israel's war on Gaza.[32:59] A number that reached 60% in a Gallup[33:02] poll in July. The number would have been[33:04] higher by[33:05] end of September.[33:07] Growing numbers consider this war[33:09] genocide. In a In a Quinnipiac poll in[33:12] August, 50% of those polled said this[33:15] was genocide.[33:16] A poll by the University of Maryland in[33:18] October and that Quinnipiac poll I just[33:21] mentioned, both showed more support for[33:24] the Palestinians than for Israel for the[33:26] first time in polling history.[33:30] Think about that for a minute.[33:32] For the first time in the history of[33:33] this country, first time in polling[33:35] history, but I would say going back to[33:36] Woodrow Wilson, there is more sympathy[33:39] for Palestinians[33:40] than for Israelis.[33:43] Meanwhile, the Washington Post a few[33:45] days ago reported that 60% of American[33:48] Jews who were polled considered that[33:51] Israel is committing war crimes in Gaza.[33:53] 60% of of American[33:57] members of the American Jewish community[33:58] who were polled. Nearly 40% of them[34:01] consider that it's committing genocide.[34:03] And that proportion that proportion[34:05] rises to 50% among those under 35. 50%[34:10] of American Jews under 35 polled by the[34:13] Washington Post consider that Israel is[34:15] committing genocide in[34:17] was committing genocide in Gaza.[34:20] Similar dramatic shifts in European[34:22] opinion have also been reported. A[34:24] YouGov poll showed that in five six[34:27] European countries, Britain, France,[34:29] Spain, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, I[34:32] think, uh support for Israel barely rose[34:35] above 20% in any one of those six[34:37] countries.[34:38] That's a that's a shift similar to what[34:40] we've seen in the United States. In[34:41] fact, even greater.[34:43] In spite of these momentous shifts, the[34:45] moneyed elites that dominate American[34:47] politics, media, and the universities[34:49] remain unmoved in their dedication to a[34:52] blatantly Israeli narrative. We've seen[34:54] this[34:55] in spades at Columbia.[34:58] And they have shown an utter unconcern[35:00] for Palestinian rights. Even the call[35:02] that some have emitted recently for a[35:05] two-state solution, so-called, rings[35:08] hollow.[35:09] There is no sign in anything anybody has[35:11] said in the months of chatter about a[35:13] two-state solution, nothing,[35:15] that suggests that it involves[35:17] implementation of the essential[35:19] prerequisites for a real two-state[35:21] solution, which be which would be a[35:23] rapid and complete end to Israel's[35:25] 58-year-old military occupation and a[35:29] rapid and complete end to its usurpation[35:31] and colonization of Palestinian land[35:34] that has planted about 500 3/4 of a[35:36] million Israeli settlers[35:39] in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[35:42] Without enforcement of these measures,[35:44] an end to occupation[35:46] and an end to colonization, a call for a[35:49] two-state solution is a cruel Orwellian[35:52] hoax[35:53] or self-deception on the part of many[35:55] politicians.[35:57] Instead of Palestinian[35:58] self-determination,[36:00] statehood and sovereignty, the status[36:02] quo in Palestine under a so such a[36:04] so-called two-state solution would[36:06] continue with a quisling Palestinian[36:08] authority lacking jurisdiction or[36:10] authority replaced by a quisling[36:12] Palestinian state similarly devoid of[36:15] the sovereignty attached to a real[36:17] state. It would be a travesty.[36:19] A disjointed archipelago of Bantustans[36:21] under the control of apartheid Israel[36:24] and under the supervision of United[36:25] States and its European and Arab allies.[36:30] This, incidentally,[36:31] is basically what the Trump plan, as far[36:34] as we can tell, uh essentially offers.[36:39] The events of the past two years mark[36:44] a tragic new abyss[36:47] in the struggle over Palestine.[36:50] While this phase reflects the underlying[36:52] liniments of previous phases in this 100[36:54] years war, its violent intensity[36:57] and the scale of loss are unique.[37:00] Even if the ferocious carnage of the[37:02] past two years ends, which we all hope[37:05] it will,[37:07] and even if the shift of global public[37:09] opinion in favor of Palestine continues,[37:11] neither of which things is certain,[37:14] there seems to be no viable path in the[37:16] short term towards a just, lasting,[37:18] sustainable resolution in Palestine[37:21] between the Palestinian and Israeli[37:22] peoples.[37:24] Such a just resolution, in my opinion,[37:26] can only be based on the decolonial[37:28] dismantling of entrenched structures of[37:31] supremacy and discrimination and on[37:34] justice, equal rights, and mutual[37:36] recognition.[37:38] These are processes that have begun in[37:39] South Africa and Ireland, but are still[37:42] far away in Palestine.[37:44] In the future, a great deal, in my view,[37:47] will depend on the ability of a revived[37:48] Palestinian national movement and its[37:50] allies to translate the shift that has[37:53] taken place in global opinion,[37:55] especially in the Western metropole of[37:58] the Israeli colonial project, and turn[38:00] it into tangible political change. Thank[38:03] you very much.[38:37] So, I'm going to invite folks to line up[38:39] at either one of these mics, and I ask[38:41] you again to please[38:43] keep your comments uh to a question or[38:46] make your or keep Yes, keep your[38:48] comments to a question. Um yeah, and I'm[38:51] just going to open it up and[38:55] hand you the[39:00] some water first before[39:02] Okay.[39:05] Okay.[39:07] Leon,[39:08] you want to just say Yeah.[39:10] Go right ahead. Go ahead.[39:12] Yeah.[39:16] I think it's not, yeah.[39:29] Hi, Dr. Khaled. Thank you so much for[39:31] your lecture. Um I was wondering if you[39:34] can respond to[39:36] the people who place the blame on Hamas[39:38] for the atrocious genocide that Israel[39:40] has carried out against the Palest the[39:43] people[39:44] The people who blame who place the blame[39:46] on Hamas for the atrocious genocide that[39:49] Israel has carried out against the[39:51] Palestinians over the past 2 years and[39:54] speak maybe to their motivations.[39:58] I mean, I I can't tell you anything[39:59] about the motivation of people I don't[40:00] know.[40:01] Obviously. So, I don't know what their[40:03] motivation is.[40:05] Um I know that there are many people who[40:07] are[40:08] outraged at the cost that this war has[40:12] inflicted on the Palestinians. And I[40:14] know that some of them, including some[40:15] Gazans that I know,[40:16] blame this on Hamas. They argue that[40:18] Hamas did nothing to protect the[40:20] civilian population.[40:21] Um they argue that they miscalculated.[40:25] They argue that um[40:28] the the cost was greater than the[40:31] benefit.[40:32] Um and I don't think that the people who[40:33] argue that had necessarily have bad[40:35] intentions.[40:36] Uh I don't know the intentions of the I[40:38] know the people I people I know in Gaza[40:40] who feel that way feel that way because[40:42] they feel that their their loss was[40:43] unbearable.[40:44] And they don't see that the that the[40:46] whatever may have been gained is worth[40:48] it. Um I don't think we can assess it[40:50] very well at the moment. I think you[40:52] have to see how this war finally[40:54] plays out. Uh the the the achievement of[40:59] an enormous sympathy for the[41:00] Palestinians may in in a in the end[41:03] prove to be a really important factor[41:06] and may change realities on the ground[41:08] in Palestine. In which case years from[41:10] now people may say this was a terrible[41:12] blunder in some ways, but it was worth[41:14] it. But I think that today it's[41:16] impossible to say. I I I honestly don't[41:18] know what to say about it. I can tell[41:20] you that I said I said in my talk it it[41:24] it inflicted the greatest military[41:25] defeat on Israel that it suffered in its[41:27] entire history.[41:28] But you have to put that against the[41:30] cost.[41:31] And you also have to say to what extent[41:33] were there mistakes made.[41:35] I think that if you launch an attack[41:38] you have to control the battlefield. You[41:40] have to make sure that atrocities are[41:42] not committed against the civilian[41:43] population or you give your enemy[41:47] tools with which to delegitimize you.[41:49] That was not done in this case. Uh I I I[41:52] I was I was in Lebanon in 2000 uh when[41:55] Israeli army withdrew. Hezbollah[41:57] controlled that battlefield. Nobody was[41:59] killed. People who had collaborated with[42:01] the Israelis since before 1982 had not a[42:04] hair on their heads touched.[42:07] And that was the way that[42:10] a a a military operation should take[42:11] place. That did not happen in this case.[42:13] You've seen the the video of the fences[42:16] open and thousands of people streaming[42:17] through. These were not militants. These[42:19] were not These were just people.[42:21] And what then happened you may disagree[42:24] with the fact that everything the[42:26] Israelis put forward was accurate. I'm[42:29] sure not all of it was accurate. Some of[42:30] it was accurate. I mean, I've talked to[42:33] people who've told me what they[42:34] themselves saw.[42:35] And so I think you have to weigh that. I[42:38] think you have to weigh the degree to[42:39] which non-combatants were were were[42:43] targets uh as against the way the the[42:45] pretext that that provided for Israel to[42:48] do what it has always done. I mean, I it[42:50] does it as a matter of doctrine.[42:52] I argue that. This is counterinsurgency[42:55] doctrine. They were trained to do this.[42:58] The British trained them to do it. 35[43:01] generals from the Israeli army were in[43:03] the Jewish Brigade of the British army.[43:05] 35 people who later became generals.[43:07] They were trained to do these things.[43:10] This was British counterinsurgency[43:11] doctrine. I can tell you the book in[43:13] which it first was published in 1896, a[43:15] book called Small Wars, which was taught[43:18] for years in the British military[43:19] academies and is taught at the Command[43:21] and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth[43:23] today[43:25] to the US Army. And that's what that[43:26] book says. You attack their their crops.[43:29] You attack their villages. You burn[43:31] their villages. Well, that's Israeli[43:32] doctrine. And if we don't know that and[43:35] then give Israel a pretext by attacking[43:38] civilians, then we're[43:40] unleashing a a a[43:42] horrible things on our own head. So, I[43:44] think a lot can be said about this,[43:46] which doesn't mean uh resistance isn't[43:49] legitimate or that I have argued every[43:51] colonization, every occupation[43:53] invariably engenders resistance. And[43:56] that will be resistance of all forms.[43:58] That's not something I want or don't[43:59] want. That is inevitable. That has[44:02] happened in every single case in[44:03] history. Find me one case in history[44:05] when it didn't.[44:06] There isn't one. So, that's not the[44:09] issue. The issue is not the legitimacy[44:11] or illegitimacy or inevitability of[44:13] resistance. It's how you resist. It's[44:15] how It's It's It's and it's also how the[44:18] calculations you made. There were[44:20] calculations made. I know this for a[44:21] fact that there would be various things[44:24] happening from the axis of resistance[44:26] and from other Palestinians, which had[44:28] no possibility of happening and which[44:30] didn't happen.[44:31] And which meant that the brunt of this[44:33] was on the Gaza Strip, its population[44:35] and also on Lebanon to a secondary[44:37] extent. Well, those those were[44:39] miscalculations. Grave miscalculations.[44:42] Now, in the end, how are we going to[44:44] judge this? This is for historians, the[44:46] next generation of historians to tell[44:48] us.[44:49] But I think that that[44:52] having this debate[44:54] is not particularly fruitful, frankly.[44:57] You know, should we should we fight[44:58] amongst ourselves about whether this was[45:00] a good idea or not or should we figure[45:01] out how do we change the political[45:03] realities that confront us? The problem[45:05] is not people in our ranks, I promise[45:07] you. The problem is people who deny the[45:09] very existence of the Palestinian[45:10] people. The problem is people who[45:12] support whatever Israel does. That's the[45:14] problem. How do you unify and and[45:16] organize to deal with them should be[45:18] what we're thinking about in my view[45:19] anyway.[45:23] Final questions. Yeah. Hello.[45:26] Hi, thank you so[45:30] Hi, thank you so much for your time. We[45:31] greatly appreciate having you here. Um[45:33] we understand as you stated earlier that[45:35] the patrons of Zionism are as complicit[45:38] in waging a war on the Palestinian[45:40] people as Zionism itself. Um as a[45:42] professor who has worked within elite[45:44] institutions, can you talk about how the[45:45] university operates as a patron of[45:47] Zionism and do you view divestment as[45:50] necessary?[45:51] And do I what? View divestment as[45:53] necessary.[45:55] Well, very easy answer to the last part.[45:57] Yes, of course.[45:58] Um[46:00] in the absence of a unified cohesive[46:02] Palestinian national movement[46:04] which we have unfortunately not had for[46:07] the better part of a couple of decades[46:09] uh civil society has had to shoulder the[46:11] burden and it's done a remarkable job.[46:14] Whether it's the boycott, divestment,[46:16] sanctions movement, whether it's student[46:18] activism, whether it's all kinds of[46:19] other campaigns. I mean, it it this[46:22] change in public opinion didn't just[46:24] happen because people saw[46:25] videos. It happened because there was[46:28] activism and there was there was[46:29] organization and there were efforts,[46:31] some of them less successful and some of[46:33] them more successful.[46:34] Uh so, yes, I think that the the[46:37] BDS has been extraordinarily useful. And[46:40] has actually had[46:41] an impact on Israel, not so much an[46:44] economic impact as a psychological[46:45] impact. When they're kicked out of or[46:48] threatened with being kicked out of[46:49] Univision, I promise you that bothers[46:51] people.[46:52] When it's when it's difficult for cruise[46:54] ships to land in Greek ports, I promise[46:57] you that's difficult for Israel.[46:59] And I I could go on and on with minor[47:01] examples like this that show the[47:03] importance of these kinds of campaigns.[47:05] Now, the first part of your question,[47:07] how are universities complicit? Well[47:11] very very very simply, um[47:14] by investing in in companies that[47:17] support the Israeli war effort[47:19] which is why divestment is important.[47:21] Um by uh[47:23] allowing their uh[47:26] their institutions, university[47:28] institutions to be used as platforms for[47:30] propaganda[47:31] uh by[47:33] in many other ways privileging one[47:36] narrative as against another narrative.[47:38] Now, they have a problem[47:39] universities, which is that the[47:41] overwhelming majority of scholars now[47:44] don't believe most of the traditional[47:46] Israeli narrative. The Arabs were not[47:49] told to flee by their leaders. They were[47:50] driven out at bayonet point by massacres[47:53] in 1948. Uh I could go on and on.[47:56] Uh the the Israel did not make the[47:57] desert bloom. There were orange groves[47:59] in Jaffa before the first immigrant[48:01] landed and so on and so forth. Um but[48:05] those academics who[48:07] now dominate the field of not only[48:09] Middle East studies but postcolonial[48:10] studies and many other fields in[48:12] anthropology and so and so on uh are up[48:14] against institutional[48:16] pressure, particularly now. I mean,[48:18] we've seen it at Columbia. We have a[48:20] narrative that's deeply rooted in[48:23] an element of our Board of Trustees that[48:25] Columbia is inherently anti-Semitic.[48:28] What does that mean? It means there are[48:30] people who are critical of Israel.[48:32] And that's that's something that the[48:33] university has been[48:34] has been pushing a a a a a line that the[48:37] university has been pushing ever since[48:39] this war began. And that's true in many[48:41] other universities. And it was true at[48:42] Harvard. They kicked out the two heads[48:44] of the the director and the associate[48:46] director of the Middle East Center. They[48:47] shut down a program with Birzeit. They[48:50] shut down a program at the Divinity[48:51] School before the Trump administration[48:53] asked them to do anything. Anticipatory[48:56] obedience.[48:57] And Columbia was doing the same thing.[49:00] Um so, I I think that that that that[49:03] tendency[49:04] to favor a certain political line is a[49:08] deep deep problem in many many[49:10] universities and it's a function of[49:12] the nature of our Boards of Trustees or[49:14] in the case of state universities, the[49:15] natures of our state legislatures.[49:20] I just want to say I want to say that[49:21] I'm reminded of when I was a grad[49:23] student at Columbia and when you first[49:24] came, Rashid[49:26] just like how how deep and how much[49:27] resistance there was to you coming to[49:30] Columbia, right? And then when you tried[49:32] to speak to teachers in New York City,[49:34] they canceled the entire program, an[49:36] outreach program for professors to speak[49:38] to teachers in New York City, and they[49:40] canceled it. So the So this suppression[49:42] is long and deep, even though it's[49:44] intensified uh in the last couple of[49:46] years.[49:47] Yeah, please. Uh thank you very much. I[49:49] just have a quick question if you could[49:50] share some of your thoughts about the[49:52] current peace agreement that's happening[49:55] and the terms.[49:57] What do you make of it?[49:58] That's not a brief question.[50:02] Um[50:03] Yeah, you you you[50:04] you made it quick, but it's hard for me[50:06] to answer it quickly. Um[50:09] I mean[50:10] all that we really have is a phase,[50:12] which is hopefully a ceasefire.[50:16] Hopefully an exchange of the thousands[50:18] of prisoners for the for the remaining[50:20] hostages.[50:21] And hopefully the enter of humanitarian[50:23] aid to the Gaza Strip.[50:26] Everything beyond that is not really[50:27] decided. So we don't have a peace plan.[50:29] We have a ceasefire plan. That's all[50:31] that's really been agreed. Now, I assume[50:34] they've agreed on other things. I I[50:36] found out today they've agreed on[50:38] assistance to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in[50:41] finding the bodies of of hostages who[50:43] were who have killed who were killed.[50:45] So that There There are other elements[50:47] to it that we're going to find out[50:48] about. But everything beyond that in the[50:50] original Trump plan is yet to be is yet[50:53] to be negotiated, let alone decided.[50:56] The original Trump plan is a neocolonial[50:58] plan which would have instituted a new[50:59] mandate over Palestine. Instead of by[51:01] the League of Nations with Britain as[51:04] the mandatory, it would be some godawful[51:07] body headed by of all people Trump and[51:10] that vulture[51:11] Sir Tony Blair.[51:14] Uh the the vulture of Iraq. Uh[51:17] I can say many other nasty things about[51:19] him. But I think there's no necessary[51:21] likelihood that any of that is going to[51:23] come to pass. We may not get beyond[51:25] phase one. And how phases two and three[51:28] will be negotiated, if they are, is[51:30] impossible to tell.[51:32] I think things happened in the[51:33] negotiation of phase one which were[51:36] surprising.[51:37] Both concessions from Hamas and[51:39] concessions from the Israelis.[51:40] How that happened, I'm not entirely[51:42] sure, and I think it'll take us a long[51:44] time to figure that out. And[51:47] figuring that out will help us determine[51:48] what will or will not happen in the[51:50] second and third phase, if they happen.[51:53] Um so I can't I can't say more than[51:55] that.[51:56] Ask me in 5 years. I'll give you an[51:58] answer.[52:02] Hi. Um I'll try and keep it brief. Uh[52:04] one,[52:06] does a[52:07] >> question.[52:12] How do we imagine self-determination[52:14] without partition? How do we imagine[52:16] self-determination in a one-state[52:18] solution?[52:19] That's a really good question.[52:21] Um[52:22] I think there are many ways you can do[52:24] it.[52:25] Uh[52:25] remember the original British[52:28] statement in the Balfour Declaration[52:29] what they were creating was a national[52:31] home[52:32] for the Jewish people in Palestine.[52:34] I can see Palestine being a national[52:36] home for two peoples. How you would do[52:38] it[52:39] in judi- in in judiciary and[52:41] constitutional and legislative and so on[52:43] terms[52:45] um would be really hard. Whether you[52:46] would do it in terms of cantons, whether[52:48] you would do it in terms of two elected[52:50] assemblies with a federal whatever at[52:52] the I don't know. I We're so far away[52:54] from it that I don't think it's urgent[52:57] to to uh to try and say this, that, or[53:00] the other. It would be interesting for[53:02] people to think about that. Because[53:03] anybody who thinks that either of these[53:05] two peoples can be eliminated is living[53:07] in another fantasy world.[53:09] Understandably, the anger and the[53:11] bitterness and the and the the the[53:14] hatred[53:16] that has developed on both sides as a[53:18] result of this war is going to make any[53:20] solution harder in the in the long in[53:23] the short term.[53:24] But the Germans and the French[53:26] eventually settled it after three wars.[53:29] Um and I could give you other examples[53:32] where things have been settled. Look at[53:34] Ireland.[53:35] I mean the British started the[53:36] colonization of Ireland in the 1172.[53:39] Okay? It's still not solved. They still[53:42] control Northern Ireland.[53:43] And yet[53:45] very slowly, with halting steps, the[53:48] Irish, the British, the Northern Irish[53:51] have begun to figure out possible ways[53:54] to square that circle,[53:55] which started with settler colonialism.[53:58] Uh and which may hopefully end in a[54:00] better better future for everybody on[54:03] the island. Um the South Africans are[54:05] trying to chart the same path. So it's[54:08] not I don't think it's impossible.[54:10] Um and it in in many ways it's going to[54:11] be harder because Ireland's important[54:14] and South Africa's important, but[54:15] Palestine is really really important. It[54:17] has been strategically important since[54:19] the Hyksos and the and and and the and[54:21] the Pharaohs and the Hittites, it's been[54:23] important. And it's at least as[54:25] important today. I'm talking about[54:26] strategically. I'm not even talking[54:28] about spiritually or whatever. So[54:31] solving this means everybody and his[54:33] brother-in-law is going to get their[54:34] finger into it.[54:36] Um the number of parties that were at[54:38] Sharm el-Sheikh negotiating, you had the[54:40] Turkish chief of intelligence, the[54:41] Egyptian chief of intelligence, the[54:43] Qatari prime minister,[54:45] the brother-in- the son-in-law of the[54:47] president of the United States and his[54:49] real estate partner,[54:52] and you had[54:53] Netanyahu's closest confidant, Ron[54:55] Dermer. I mean, that's five parties[54:57] negotiating[54:59] with Hamas[55:01] also represented. So you had six parties[55:03] negotiating. Um[55:05] that's an indication of how complicated[55:08] it's going to be. And[55:10] the important thing is that[55:12] at the end of the day there be a[55:14] recognition that whatever solution you[55:16] have has to give equal rights to both[55:18] both peoples and to all individuals. I[55:20] think that's the That has to be the the[55:22] absolute keystone. Otherwise, you don't[55:24] have a sustainable long-term solution.[55:30] Hello. Um it's an honor to have learned[55:33] from you today. Um I have a question[55:35] just about Western institutions being[55:38] complicit in the genocide. Um last month[55:41] Georgetown invited a representative from[55:43] Palantir. Dean Hellman, Dean of the SFS,[55:46] um issued that invitation to the student[55:47] body.[55:49] Um and Georgetown has over $15 million[55:52] invested in companies providing cloud[55:54] computing services for the Israeli[55:56] military, um[55:58] including Alphabet, Amazon, et cetera,[56:01] $50 million. Um so I wanted to ask how[56:04] we can reject the normalization of the[56:06] military-industrial complex in our[56:09] institutions, in our universities,[56:11] um and how we can hold institutions like[56:14] Georgetown accountable for the[56:16] complicity in this genocide, and not[56:18] just complicity, but active investment.[56:21] I[56:31] Well, the Dean is sitting here and he[56:33] heard you, so, you know.[56:35] Um[56:36] I mean, I already I answered the the[56:38] part of your question about about[56:39] boycott, divestment, sanctions. But let[56:41] me say something further, which is that[56:44] I think we have to recognize[56:46] that what's at stake[56:49] in terms of this war, this conflict,[56:51] this struggle[56:52] is not just something between Israelis[56:54] and Palestinians.[56:56] It has to do with what you what you[56:57] mentioned, the military-industrial[56:58] complex. I rode here on a train that[57:01] took 3 hours to get from Washington to[57:04] from New York to Washington.[57:05] Why do we not have trains like almost[57:07] every other country on Earth[57:09] which would bring me from New York to[57:12] Washington in 1 hour?[57:14] In Japan,[57:16] in Malaysia, in Egypt, in any country I[57:19] have ever been in,[57:21] you have better train service,[57:23] better light rail. Marseille, Nice,[57:26] anywhere you go. Spain, takes you takes[57:29] you 2 hours to go from Madrid to[57:31] Barcelona.[57:32] That's farther than New York to Boston.[57:35] And it takes 6 hours to get from one to[57:38] the other.[57:39] That Why don't we have these things?[57:41] Well, one reason is a third of our[57:42] budget is the military.[57:44] And if we don't deal with that as a[57:45] people, we are condemned to the worst[57:48] services in the developed world and[57:50] worse services than much of the less[57:52] developed world. So the problem is not[57:54] just Palestine-Israel. And and and we[57:57] make a mistake when we think that this[57:59] is all about lobbies or this is all[58:02] about influence campaigns. It's all[58:05] about guns and money is what it's really[58:08] all about.[58:09] Uh whether it's Palantir or whether it's[58:11] Lockheed Martin. Um that's what it's[58:14] really all about.[58:15] Uh and I I We have to have a shift in[58:17] our in our national conversation about[58:20] all of these issues. Uh these are the[58:22] people who fund our politicians. These[58:25] are the people who fund our[58:26] universities, whether as individuals or[58:28] as institu- as as corporations. Um and[58:32] of course Columbia or Georgetown or any[58:34] private university is going to end up[58:36] doing things that I find I personally[58:38] find reprehensible.[58:40] But it's not just Columbia or[58:41] Georgetown.[58:42] And it's not just the universities. It's[58:44] a much larger system. And I think there[58:46] has to be a that has to we can't stay in[58:49] a in a in a Palestinian-Israeli ghetto.[58:52] We have to get out of that and and and[58:54] speak to these larger issues, or we're[58:56] going to have the worst train service on[58:58] Earth for the rest of our the rest of[59:00] your lives. I'm old, but you guys are[59:01] young. You're going to have to suffer[59:02] with this for another for 50 years[59:05] if we don't do something about it.[59:09] Salaam alaykum, Dr. Khalidi.[59:11] Um[59:13] thank you for this session. Uh[59:15] after October 7th, I was working for Al[59:17] Jazeera in the newsroom,[59:19] and it was around that time that I had[59:21] the good fortune of reading your book.[59:23] Uh my question in particular is about a[59:25] theme in your book that you also spoke[59:27] about in your lecture,[59:28] which is about the leadership or lack[59:30] thereof of Palestinians,[59:32] from the Sharif of Jerusalem to Fatah to[59:36] Hamas who've been critical of the[59:37] leadership compared to Zionists where[59:40] you see from Theodore Herzl all the way[59:42] to Ben Gvir and Netanyahu, you see a[59:44] pretty consistent thought leadership. My[59:46] question is for the future where do you[59:49] see the leadership of Palestine coming[59:50] from? Is it coming from Gaza or is it[59:52] coming from the West Bank?[59:55] Um yeah, it's a good point you raise and[59:58] I don't have any real[01:00:01] It will come from a younger generation.[01:00:03] I think this generation has failed[01:00:05] utterly and it should do the decent only[01:00:07] decent thing and get off the stage as[01:00:09] quickly as possible.[01:00:10] Uh without exception. I think the[01:00:12] movements that have led Palestinian[01:00:13] politics in the past may have had some[01:00:16] successes, some failures, but I don't[01:00:18] think they have anything much more to[01:00:19] offer frankly and especially the[01:00:22] leaderships. Uh the younger generation[01:00:24] is smarter, the younger generation is uh[01:00:26] I think more in touch with the means of[01:00:29] of getting a message across. It[01:00:31] understands the global nature of this[01:00:33] conflict. It it it is not as it doesn't[01:00:36] have the kind of tunnel vision that I[01:00:38] saw in the PLO leadership and I see in[01:00:40] the Fatah and Hamas leaderships of[01:00:41] today.[01:00:42] Um the other thing I would say is the[01:00:45] people who I think are the most[01:00:47] enlightened about some of this are[01:00:49] neither people of the West Bank nor[01:00:51] people of Gaza but people from Manara[01:00:54] Palestinian citizens of the state of[01:00:55] Israel. They have lived with Israelis in[01:00:58] Israel under Israeli colonial rule even[01:01:01] though they're citizens under[01:01:03] discriminatory conditions for their[01:01:05] entire lives.[01:01:07] And I find some of them the savviest and[01:01:10] the most far-sighted among Palestinians.[01:01:13] Uh they understand some things that[01:01:15] people who only know the Israelis[01:01:16] through military checkpoints or through[01:01:18] bomb bombardments don't know and can't[01:01:21] see can't be expected to see. I mean,[01:01:23] the only Israeli you've ever seen is[01:01:24] pointing a gun at you and asking for[01:01:26] your how we had a at a hajjis at a[01:01:27] checkpoint, then you have a view of[01:01:29] Israel which is a bit narrow. It's it's[01:01:31] partially correct but it's a bit narrow.[01:01:33] Whereas Palestinians inside Israel see[01:01:35] the whole[01:01:37] kitten caboodle as my mom used to say.[01:01:40] Um[01:01:42] and the other place that it will come[01:01:43] from is the diaspora.[01:01:45] Um you know, Palestinian nationalism was[01:01:48] reborn after 1948 in the diaspora[01:01:51] essentially. That's where a lot of[01:01:54] nationalist movements got their[01:01:55] leadership. Armenian Zionism, I mean,[01:01:58] you could go on and on. Uh the diaspora[01:02:00] plays an enormous role in liberation[01:02:02] movements generally.[01:02:03] Um and I think we have in the United[01:02:06] States and Europe and some other[01:02:07] countries where you have a large[01:02:08] diaspora um a lot of people who are very[01:02:11] very savvy[01:02:12] about the fact that any[01:02:15] colonial struggle requires[01:02:18] an attention to the metropole that the[01:02:20] leadership of the 20s and the 30s had no[01:02:23] idea about[01:02:25] and that frankly the leadership of the[01:02:26] PLO and after it the leadership of Hamas[01:02:28] really only perceived dimly.[01:02:31] Uh and I think that that's something[01:02:32] that people inside Palestinians inside[01:02:34] Israel and Palestinians who live[01:02:37] in the West especially but generally in[01:02:38] the Palestinian diaspora might have a[01:02:40] better grasp on.[01:02:42] So, that's the best answer I can give[01:02:44] you.[01:02:48] Back.[01:02:49] Thank you Dr. Halley for your talk. Um[01:02:51] my question is reflecting on your[01:02:53] personal and professional life, what has[01:02:55] changed about public discourse towards[01:02:58] Palestine and what are some hurdles that[01:03:00] still need to uh overcome to change the[01:03:03] public discourse even further? Right. Um[01:03:07] I mean look, my my my parents both[01:03:10] worked in something called the Institute[01:03:12] of Arab American Affairs. We're talking[01:03:14] about 1940s.[01:03:16] In those days there were no books on[01:03:17] Palestine and there was a flood of[01:03:20] material on Israel in the 40s and the[01:03:22] 50s. A flood, I mean[01:03:25] a tidal wave. There were only books on[01:03:27] Israel essentially and the only point of[01:03:29] view in the American media and in[01:03:32] American publishing and in American[01:03:34] cinema[01:03:35] was an Israeli point of view.[01:03:37] I mean[01:03:38] uh when a book was published it[01:03:40] disappeared. It didn't exist.[01:03:42] It just disappeared. You couldn't find[01:03:43] it in the library. Nobody had copies um[01:03:46] and there were very few books published.[01:03:48] Well, I mean, look at academic[01:03:50] publishing today.[01:03:51] There is a flood of books on Palestine[01:03:54] and on Israel which reflects a in my[01:03:56] view a scholarly academic objective[01:04:00] sensible intelligent grounded view which[01:04:04] is completely different from the the the[01:04:07] the narrative that prevailed up until 20[01:04:10] or 30 years ago. So, I think that[01:04:12] there's been an enormous shift uh in[01:04:14] academia.[01:04:16] Uh and I I I think that's one big[01:04:19] change.[01:04:20] A second change is that[01:04:23] your generation the generation of most[01:04:25] of the students in this room[01:04:28] um has complete and utter contempt[01:04:30] justified for the mainstream corporate[01:04:33] media. They lie through their teeth on[01:04:36] this issue.[01:04:37] They simply do not relay the reality.[01:04:41] Most of them, there are few exceptions.[01:04:43] Um and they don't get most people[01:04:45] younger people under 35 or 30 do not get[01:04:48] their news by and large from the[01:04:50] corporate mainstream media. They have[01:04:52] ways of getting news independent uh[01:04:55] alternative social media, whatever. Um[01:04:58] which gives them a better picture.[01:05:00] Sometimes a worse picture but some[01:05:02] frequently a better picture and[01:05:03] certainly a different picture than the[01:05:05] one that the mainstream corporate media[01:05:07] gives and I think that's a that's an[01:05:09] enormous change.[01:05:10] Um and it it it has unfortunately not[01:05:13] yet hit the corporate mainstream media[01:05:16] and I don't think it will very soon. I[01:05:18] mean,[01:05:18] you mentioned Columbia.[01:05:20] When I arrived at Columbia in 2003,[01:05:23] there was a campaign led by somebody a[01:05:25] student at Barnard by the name of Bari[01:05:27] Weiss.[01:05:28] She has just taken over the news[01:05:30] division of CBS.[01:05:32] So, we're in for a little a little while[01:05:35] longer of brainwashing uh by at least[01:05:38] that corporate outlet and I think the[01:05:40] same the Ellison family is trying to[01:05:42] take over CNN. So[01:05:44] good luck[01:05:46] with expecting anything but a certain[01:05:47] specific slanted point of view at least[01:05:50] the those two[01:05:52] you know[01:05:53] pillars of the mainstream media but[01:05:55] fortunately most people under the the[01:05:57] age of whatever it is 30 35 don't take[01:05:59] their news from there and that's an[01:06:00] enormous shift. Um it means that that a[01:06:04] Palestinian narrative is now[01:06:06] you know, Edward Said talked about[01:06:08] permission to narrate. Well, the[01:06:09] Palestinians don't really still have[01:06:11] permission to narrate in the corporate[01:06:13] mainstream media. If they do, there has[01:06:15] to be an Israeli voice attached. It's[01:06:17] like saying if you want to talk about[01:06:18] slavery, you have to have a slave holder[01:06:19] there. No. There's a slave narrative.[01:06:22] Now, that's being reversed in this city[01:06:24] as we speak of course[01:06:26] and we're getting back the slave holders[01:06:27] narrative.[01:06:28] God bless. Um but[01:06:32] in the non-mainstream media and[01:06:34] alternative space[01:06:35] there is a Palestinian narrative that[01:06:37] people are have access to. Um look at[01:06:39] the Amazon best-seller list for Middle[01:06:43] East or Palestine Israel[01:06:45] and you will see scads of books on[01:06:47] Israel and scads of books on Palestine.[01:06:50] For the first time that narrative is[01:06:52] accessible and those books are selling[01:06:54] or I promise you the great giants of of[01:06:58] publishing would not be publishing those[01:07:00] books.[01:07:02] So, there's still the Israeli narrative[01:07:03] is out there. Anybody who wants to[01:07:05] access it can access it. But there is[01:07:08] for the first time in the last couple of[01:07:09] decades, in fact, as far as publishing[01:07:11] is concerned in the last decade a an[01:07:14] alternative narrative in terms of[01:07:15] poetry, in terms of prose, in terms of[01:07:18] memoirs, in terms of novels, in terms of[01:07:21] all kinds of essays that that give you[01:07:24] access to something at this generation[01:07:26] access to something that earlier[01:07:28] generation just couldn't get at without[01:07:30] very narrow specialist research. So,[01:07:33] there are enormous changes that have[01:07:35] taken place.[01:07:36] Thank you.[01:07:39] Um uh[01:07:41] thank you Dr. Halley for for your talk.[01:07:43] Such an honor to be here. Um so, I was[01:07:46] hoping I you could share your thoughts[01:07:48] on this issue that I've been thinking[01:07:49] about lately with uh genocide seeming[01:07:52] seemingly coming to an end[01:07:54] or at least with a temporary ceasefire[01:07:56] like you said. Um so, what hope do you[01:07:58] think remains for the what hope do you[01:08:00] think remains for the future of Gaza and[01:08:02] the people of Gaza? And I'm not just[01:08:04] talking about like rebuilding or[01:08:05] reconstruction uh although that's an[01:08:08] important component to it uh but more[01:08:09] importantly the incredibly traumatized[01:08:11] generation of children and youth um who[01:08:14] a big percentage of them have seen their[01:08:17] either their family or friends being[01:08:18] more brutally killed and the majority[01:08:20] have been displaced under constant[01:08:22] bombardment and now after the complete[01:08:25] and targeted uh destruction of Gaza's[01:08:26] civil institutions what future do you[01:08:28] think awaits them especially with uh[01:08:31] currently no path leading to the[01:08:33] uh ending the occupation and also in[01:08:35] light of your comments about uh this[01:08:37] younger generation being the potential[01:08:39] leaders of the Palestinian cause?[01:08:41] That was a long question.[01:08:44] Um[01:08:45] you know, I could easily dodge this[01:08:47] question by saying that the job[01:08:48] description of historian doesn't include[01:08:51] predicting the future. I don't know[01:08:52] what's going to happen.[01:08:54] Um nobody does.[01:08:56] Uh I don't know if we're going to get[01:08:58] beyond the ceasefire.[01:08:59] I don't know if we're even going to[01:09:01] really see humanitarian aid go in. And[01:09:03] that's[01:09:04] not even to do with the question you've[01:09:06] asked which is the the future.[01:09:08] Um[01:09:09] a great deal will depend[01:09:11] on the tenacity[01:09:13] of the parties that were involved in[01:09:14] this mediation[01:09:16] and I mentioned all of them. There's[01:09:18] five or six of them. I mean, obviously[01:09:20] the United States but also Turkey, Egypt[01:09:22] Qatar, my guess is other parties were[01:09:25] involved.[01:09:26] Um[01:09:27] in in[01:09:29] pusing for[01:09:30] going to others following stages and in[01:09:33] seeing to it that these stages are not[01:09:35] determined by the United States and[01:09:36] Israel.[01:09:37] Because Israel will maintain its control[01:09:39] over Gaza if it can,[01:09:41] if it's allowed to. And it the only[01:09:42] party that can really force it not to is[01:09:44] the United States. And frankly, I'm not[01:09:46] terribly optimistic about that.[01:09:48] Um even if there's a change in[01:09:50] government. I mean, if you read what the[01:09:51] opposition says, it's very little[01:09:53] they're different in very little very[01:09:55] few respects from what this current[01:09:57] government says.[01:09:58] Um[01:10:00] so a lot depends on these imponderables[01:10:02] and these things that are impossible to[01:10:04] say. In the best of all possible worlds,[01:10:06] you will have a technocratic Palestinian[01:10:09] government which can without in too much[01:10:11] foreign interference start a process of[01:10:14] rebuilding.[01:10:15] Um you're going to need medical support.[01:10:18] The largest number of child amputees in[01:10:20] the world is in Gaza.[01:10:22] You have a population of children that[01:10:24] has been traumatized as[01:10:27] very few populations have been. I mean,[01:10:29] I can imagine in World War there were[01:10:30] urban populations that were traumatized[01:10:32] in similar ways by constant bombardment.[01:10:34] But there are not many examples of this.[01:10:36] I I remember that my own children[01:10:39] who went through a much less intense[01:10:41] Israeli bombardment of Beirut[01:10:44] felt the effects for years afterwards.[01:10:46] My three children[01:10:48] felt that way. And I could tell there[01:10:50] were but that that was nothing compared[01:10:52] to what children in Gaza have gone[01:10:54] through. We we went through a couple of[01:10:56] months. They've gone through two full[01:10:57] years.[01:10:59] Um so a great deal is going to be[01:11:01] required. And that's going to require[01:11:03] the rebuilding of institutions, not just[01:11:05] structures,[01:11:06] but doctors, psychiatrists,[01:11:09] rehabilitation specialists. And we're[01:11:11] just talking now about health and mental[01:11:12] health.[01:11:13] There's so much else that would have to[01:11:15] be done.[01:11:16] Um[01:11:18] I would point though to the resilience[01:11:20] of Gazans.[01:11:22] Um I'm giving a lecture series free[01:11:26] instead of teaching a course that I[01:11:28] decided I couldn't teach at Columbia at[01:11:30] a place called the People's Forum in New[01:11:31] York. And all of the proceeds[01:11:35] of the donations and book sales are[01:11:38] going to a pro project called Isnad[01:11:42] which supports the three main Gazan[01:11:44] universities.[01:11:45] Uh and has already sent $6 million uh[01:11:48] $6 million[01:11:50] which pays the salaries of professors[01:11:51] who are teaching in Gaza right now.[01:11:54] And of students who are studying in Gaza[01:11:56] right now. So under the most intense[01:12:02] under the most[01:12:04] intense bombardment I think any place[01:12:06] ever has seen. Maybe Dresden, maybe[01:12:08] Hamburg, I don't know.[01:12:10] Um you have people actually managing to[01:12:12] continue their studies, university[01:12:13] studies.[01:12:15] There are still some kids in what's left[01:12:17] of the wrecks of their schools who are[01:12:19] still studying. In the tiny bit of Gaza[01:12:22] that the Israeli military hasn't[01:12:23] occupied, there are people actually[01:12:25] trying to plant.[01:12:27] Um so uh the resilience of people is is[01:12:30] the[01:12:32] the asset[01:12:34] that the Palestinian people have. Um or[01:12:37] they wouldn't still be there.[01:12:39] I mean, the idea of getting rid of them[01:12:41] was always there. You cannot create a[01:12:43] Jewish state in a majority Arab country[01:12:45] without getting rid of the majority.[01:12:47] Clear. Uh Herzl understood it. Everybody[01:12:50] else Ben-Gurion understood it. They all[01:12:52] understood it. And they're still there.[01:12:54] There are as many Palestinians in what[01:12:56] used to be mandatory Palestine as there[01:12:57] is the Israeli Jewish population. So[01:13:00] that[01:13:01] resilience in spite of everything is[01:13:04] something that maybe is a is a is a[01:13:06] positive sign. But it'll depend on[01:13:07] circumstances that we cannot, you know,[01:13:09] predict.[01:13:10] Thank you so much.[01:13:12] Can I take advantage of my prerogative[01:13:14] and ask a follow-up question about this[01:13:16] cuz part of your answer to him was[01:13:18] about, you know, the how much lies in[01:13:20] the hands of the United States, right,[01:13:21] for this next phase. And I wonder what[01:13:23] you think about this administration, the[01:13:25] Trump administration, cuz there's[01:13:27] I see it that there's a bit of[01:13:28] unpredictability with this[01:13:30] administration that we we haven't had[01:13:33] But on this issue in particular, right?[01:13:35] And in terms of his own base as compared[01:13:38] to a previous Democratic[01:13:39] administrations, right, who really held[01:13:41] a very strong line and didn't really[01:13:43] shift. So we see some shift happening[01:13:46] with, you know, a few members of the[01:13:47] Democratic Party. So I I just wonder, do[01:13:49] you see[01:13:51] the unpredictability[01:13:52] of this moment as a possibility?[01:13:56] That may not have been possible[01:13:57] otherwise, yeah. Yeah. I mean,[01:14:00] let me say two words about the[01:14:01] Democratic Party before I really answer[01:14:02] your question.[01:14:04] There is a Democratic Party which is[01:14:06] made up of the donors, the party[01:14:09] machine,[01:14:10] the leadership, you know, Senator[01:14:12] Schumer, the Clintons, you know, the[01:14:14] usual tired old[01:14:16] warhorses who should have been[01:14:18] discredited and kicked out long ago, but[01:14:19] who are still unfortunately still[01:14:21] controlling the party.[01:14:23] And they are separated by a gulf as wide[01:14:25] as the Gulf of Mexico[01:14:27] from the party base, which is[01:14:29] overwhelmingly critical of Israel,[01:14:31] which was represented in a majority of[01:14:32] Democratic senators voting to stop arms[01:14:34] to Israel, something that would have[01:14:36] been inconceivable[01:14:38] two years ago. This is a tectonic plate[01:14:42] change shifting.[01:14:44] It's people who are listening to their[01:14:46] constituents instead of the party[01:14:48] machine and the donors.[01:14:50] And that's unprecedented. Now, will it[01:14:52] continue? I don't know. Will it will[01:14:55] will the will the leadership listen to[01:14:56] the base? Will the base change? I don't[01:14:58] know. That's the Democratic Party.[01:15:00] Um now, as far as the Trump[01:15:02] administration is concerned,[01:15:04] um[01:15:06] I think unpredictability is is is the[01:15:08] key to this.[01:15:10] Uh this is clearly a man who doesn't[01:15:12] seem and and it we're talking now about[01:15:15] a imperial regal presidency uh which is[01:15:19] being run by people who really believe[01:15:21] in concentrating all powers in the[01:15:23] executive. I mean, they basically want[01:15:24] to go back to King George 2.0.[01:15:28] The exact thing that the founders and[01:15:30] the framers were terrified of.[01:15:32] This clique of people around the[01:15:34] president is trying to reinstantiate[01:15:37] a monarchical presidency, which means[01:15:40] that[01:15:41] the the the personality and the whims of[01:15:44] the president are infinitely more[01:15:46] important than they were ever before.[01:15:49] Now, in wartime you have this.[01:15:51] Uh war is the handmaid of executive[01:15:53] aggrandizement. Is something that[01:15:55] Alexander Hamilton said 200 years ago.[01:15:58] So in World War Roosevelt had those[01:16:00] powers. In World War Wilson had those[01:16:02] powers. Churchill had those powers in[01:16:03] Britain in World War World War II. Um[01:16:07] but[01:16:08] traditionally our Constitution has[01:16:10] prevented that to a certain extent.[01:16:12] Um and what this presidency is trying to[01:16:15] do, and it's not the the personality[01:16:16] only of the president, it's the it's the[01:16:19] the tendency that is now in power in in[01:16:21] in charge in the in the Republican Party[01:16:23] is to create a unitary and an all[01:16:25] powerful executive. And in that[01:16:27] situation, the unpredictability of the[01:16:30] man is really important. And then the[01:16:32] other thing is his attention span.[01:16:34] I mean, will he continue to pay[01:16:36] attention to this issue?[01:16:38] And if he does, will he stay on the same[01:16:40] course that he appears to be on today?[01:16:43] He appears to have decided that it is[01:16:45] harmful to the American national[01:16:47] interest, to his personal[01:16:49] interest, his personal wealth,[01:16:52] and to the interest of Israel, for all[01:16:54] of which he has some concern,[01:16:56] to have a continuation of this war.[01:16:59] That seems clear. The things that he[01:17:01] said to to Netanyahu, the things that[01:17:03] he's had his envoys do, indicate that he[01:17:06] feels that those three things are[01:17:07] negatively affected by a continuation of[01:17:09] the war. Will he feel that way in[01:17:12] December?[01:17:13] Who knows?[01:17:14] Who knows? And that's part of the[01:17:16] problem. I mean, you could say whatever[01:17:18] you want to say about Biden or Bush or[01:17:20] or Obama or whatever, but they were[01:17:22] pretty much consistent from the[01:17:24] beginning of their presidency to the end[01:17:25] of their presidency.[01:17:27] And with this president, you cannot be[01:17:28] sure of that consistency. You cannot be[01:17:31] sure that his attention will not hop to[01:17:33] something entirely different. And he's[01:17:35] doing so much on so many fronts[01:17:38] that you could sort of understand this[01:17:39] would happen even to a much more[01:17:41] focused, dedicated, principled,[01:17:43] organized individual, none of which he[01:17:45] is.[01:17:47] So I mean, it's impossible to say. Um I[01:17:51] I I I know that you have had an[01:17:55] influence[01:17:56] of Gulf monarchies on this president[01:17:59] partly because of his own personal[01:18:03] interests.[01:18:05] But I think there is also a sense of the[01:18:07] American national interest there.[01:18:09] And I know his critics would never[01:18:10] accept that that's a possibility. But I[01:18:13] think somewhere in his mind or in the[01:18:15] mind of some of his advisers, all of[01:18:17] whom are[01:18:19] categorically pro-Israel,[01:18:21] there is a sense that Israel might have[01:18:23] gone too far and is now harming American[01:18:25] interests. And something that a man with[01:18:27] that ego doesn't like, the tail is[01:18:30] wagging the dog.[01:18:31] It just may have gotten through the[01:18:33] barrier of Zionists all around him, his[01:18:36] own person his own family, his[01:18:38] son-in-law, Kushner and so on and so[01:18:40] forth, the billionaires that he hangs[01:18:42] out with. It may have just gotten[01:18:43] through that this guy is jerking you[01:18:45] around.[01:18:47] This guy is doing things that are[01:18:48] harmful to his own country's interests,[01:18:50] let alone to American interests, and[01:18:52] that are harmful to your interests.[01:18:54] Now, I don't know how long that will[01:18:55] motivate him. I don't know how long that[01:18:57] barrier[01:18:58] will allow those thoughts to come[01:19:00] through. Uh every president is[01:19:02] surrounded by a praetorian guard which[01:19:04] will not let[01:19:06] certain things through. Uh somebody was[01:19:09] writing about something that he wrote,[01:19:11] somebody who worked I believe in the[01:19:12] Clinton administration.[01:19:14] And he was it was uh it doesn't matter[01:19:17] who it is. And he sent up a memo saying[01:19:19] Israel is doing this, this, and this to[01:19:20] the Palestinian economy. By the time it[01:19:22] got to the president, the Praetorian[01:19:24] Guard had made sure that that nothing[01:19:26] could come of that.[01:19:27] And we have a very powerful Praetorian[01:19:29] Guard around every president. So, who[01:19:31] knows?[01:19:35] Thank you for coming.[01:19:37] Thank you for coming. Uh so, in regards[01:19:40] to whoever the Democrats nominate as for[01:19:43] presidential ticket in 2020, how do you[01:19:45] think their policy should change or or[01:19:46] better address as well as stop the[01:19:48] Palestinian genocide? What are the[01:19:50] policies? How should their policies[01:19:52] should change to better address and stop[01:19:55] the Palestinian genocide in the future?[01:19:58] Yeah.[01:20:00] I mean, we're so far away from this[01:20:02] happening that it we're talking about[01:20:03] never-never land. But let me throw out a[01:20:05] few things.[01:20:07] Um[01:20:09] The first[01:20:11] is that the United States has to stop[01:20:14] helping Israel to keep the Palestinians[01:20:15] divided and leaderless.[01:20:17] Israel has systematically assassinated[01:20:19] Palestinian leaderships for 50, 40[01:20:21] years.[01:20:22] I mean, one reason[01:20:24] that Palestinian leadership is so poor[01:20:26] is that the best are dead.[01:20:28] And they're not dead of heart attacks.[01:20:30] They're dead of Israeli assassination[01:20:32] attempts. A lot were killed back in the[01:20:34] day by Arab dictatorships. The Libyans[01:20:37] and the Iraqis and the Syrians knocked[01:20:39] off a lot of Palestinian leaders. But[01:20:41] the Israelis did the lion's share of[01:20:43] that and they are still doing it.[01:20:45] So, you you you you have to and the[01:20:47] United States has systematically worked[01:20:49] to prevent any kind of unified[01:20:51] Palestinian leadership. I mean, an[01:20:52] election in 190 in 1906 Sorry, I'm a[01:20:55] historian. I can't help it. I'm My[01:20:57] dissertation was on 1906.[01:20:59] Um[01:21:01] in in 2006 produced a coalition[01:21:05] government that was willing to negotiate[01:21:07] with Israel.[01:21:09] It was a Hamas-Fatah coalition[01:21:10] government. The United States vetoed it.[01:21:13] And it made sure that that government[01:21:14] was split up and made sure that there[01:21:16] was an attempt to take over by Fatah[01:21:18] thugs and that led to a Hamas coup,[01:21:21] which led to a split between the[01:21:22] Palestinians. West Bank[01:21:24] PA, Gaza Strip Hamas. That's partly[01:21:27] American engineered.[01:21:29] Well, you continue doing that and you[01:21:31] are destroying the possibility of an[01:21:33] agreement. You are making sure the[01:21:35] conflict continues. I've argued this in[01:21:37] a book,[01:21:38] which is the United States has has[01:21:39] exacerbated this conflict. It's made[01:21:42] peace between Egypt or helped to make[01:21:43] peace between Egypt and Israel, yes. So,[01:21:45] it's not that the United States hasn't[01:21:47] worked for peace in the Middle East. But[01:21:48] the core issue, the Palestinian-Israeli[01:21:51] issue, the United States has[01:21:52] systematically exacerbated. That's just[01:21:54] one example. I could go on and on and on[01:21:57] and on.[01:21:58] 501c3 charities that funnel money into[01:22:02] illegal settlements.[01:22:04] What is charitable about that? It's[01:22:06] supposed I mean, under this[01:22:07] administration, it's no longer quite as[01:22:09] severe a violation of nominal US foreign[01:22:12] policy. But under every administration[01:22:13] until the Trump administration, Israeli[01:22:15] settlements were illegal and yet funding[01:22:18] was going but by people who got[01:22:20] tax-exempt status for their 501c3s to to[01:22:23] to build illegal settlements in occupied[01:22:25] territory.[01:22:26] I mean, you stop that. That's that's[01:22:28] that can be done by the Treasury[01:22:30] Department. You don't even need a law to[01:22:31] do that. Just switch the tap off. You[01:22:33] can send money, but it's not tax-exempt.[01:22:37] We're we're about to see the opposite[01:22:38] happen.[01:22:39] The 501c3s that do anything to advocate[01:22:42] for Palestine are going to be going to[01:22:44] have may lose their tax-exempt status.[01:22:46] Uh so, that's another I could go on and[01:22:49] on. I mean, the weapons, the Leahy law.[01:22:53] These bombings are self-defense?[01:22:56] You killed and wounded 260,000[01:23:00] people by Israeli estimates, 83% of whom[01:23:03] are civilians, in self-defense?[01:23:06] Please.[01:23:08] These are gross violations of US law.[01:23:11] And the people who allowed it to happen[01:23:13] should be actionable. They are in[01:23:16] violation of US law. Every Defense[01:23:18] Department official, every every State[01:23:21] Department, every AID official who[01:23:23] signed off on this or didn't stop it is[01:23:26] in violation of US law. I mean, those[01:23:28] are[01:23:29] the easiest examples I can give you. I[01:23:31] could give you dozens of others.[01:23:33] Thank you.[01:23:42] Thank you, Dr. Khalidi, for your[01:23:43] presentation. Uh at the end of it, you[01:23:46] uh highlighted the importance of uh the[01:23:48] Palestinian national movement or the[01:23:50] importance of there being one uh[01:23:53] uh and especially in the West Bank. How[01:23:55] do you explain the weakness or the[01:23:58] kind of the the the fact that in the[01:24:00] '80s, as you said, or 20 years ago, you[01:24:02] had such a strong one[01:24:04] and today it's uh virtually nonexistent.[01:24:06] Is it the leadership you you you[01:24:09] mentioned or you discussed the role of[01:24:11] the leadership, the absence of[01:24:12] leadership in the West Bank?[01:24:14] Or or how do you explain the fact that,[01:24:16] for example, there is no grassroots[01:24:18] movement now? Or is it your your view[01:24:21] that leadership is essential for its[01:24:23] emergence? Yeah. Thanks. Um[01:24:26] It's not an easy question. It's a good[01:24:28] question.[01:24:29] Um there are many, many[01:24:32] elements to an answer. One of them I[01:24:33] already mentioned, assassination and[01:24:35] imprisonment. I mean, there's a whole[01:24:37] generation of leadership behind bars[01:24:39] in Israel.[01:24:40] Um[01:24:42] Another is the demobilization that[01:24:45] happened as a result of the Oslo[01:24:46] process.[01:24:47] I've written a book where I talk about[01:24:49] this. It's called Brokers of Deceit.[01:24:51] And it's mainly about the negotiations[01:24:52] process, but it's also about the[01:24:54] disaster of the Oslo process. It[01:24:56] completely demobilized the Palestinian[01:24:58] people. It led people to think that a[01:25:00] state was around the corner, which it[01:25:01] wasn't ever which it never was.[01:25:04] And that they had basically they were on[01:25:06] the, you know, on the on the brink of[01:25:09] liberation, which they never were.[01:25:12] Um and it has been very, very hard to[01:25:15] mobilize ever since then.[01:25:16] Um the division that I talked about in[01:25:19] answer to the previous question, uh[01:25:21] which has been systematically[01:25:24] weaponized by Israel and the United[01:25:27] States is yet another element in this.[01:25:30] And finally, the the the gerontocracy[01:25:32] that controls the levers of power,[01:25:34] certainly in the Palestinian Authority,[01:25:36] is another problem. You have people who[01:25:38] refuse to leave the stage[01:25:40] after they have they they should long[01:25:42] ago have have have gone.[01:25:44] Um there are many other there are many[01:25:46] other elements to this. Um you have a[01:25:48] regime of surveillance and control[01:25:51] which has very, very few parallels in[01:25:53] world history in the occupied[01:25:54] territories.[01:25:56] Um I remember when the Israeli army[01:25:57] invaded Beirut, um[01:26:00] they found a map which had every single[01:26:03] building in Beirut numbered.[01:26:05] Which is to say they had they had some[01:26:07] idea of[01:26:08] the the the degree of surveillance and[01:26:10] the degree of control over the occupied[01:26:13] territories has just gone[01:26:15] thousands of years into the future[01:26:17] compared to what they were able to do in[01:26:18] Lebanon in 1982.[01:26:20] Um and that makes any doing anything[01:26:23] very, very hard. Everybody is in their[01:26:25] database, every single person. They're[01:26:27] listening to every single phone call.[01:26:30] They[01:26:32] they they interrogate everybody when[01:26:34] they go in and they go out. And so, you[01:26:36] have a[01:26:38] you have a a nexus of control, a matrix[01:26:40] of control,[01:26:42] which is very, very hard to operate[01:26:43] against. It's one of the reasons that I[01:26:45] could not understand why the entire PLO[01:26:47] walked inside a prison[01:26:50] in after 1993 and why it didn't remain[01:26:53] at least part of it in exile.[01:26:55] How can you run a liberation movement[01:26:56] under occupation? Well, there are[01:26:58] certain clandestine things, underground[01:26:59] things you can do. But that the entire[01:27:01] leadership sitting there where the[01:27:02] Israelis can do whatever they want with[01:27:04] them makes no sense.[01:27:07] So.[01:27:10] You getting one more? We're going to be[01:27:11] able to take a one more question. Yes.[01:27:16] I'm sorry. Please. Yes. Oh, thank[01:27:18] goodness. Sorry.[01:27:19] I made it. I'm sorry.[01:27:23] Um[01:27:24] Uh[01:27:24] last sorry.[01:27:29] Uh that's okay.[01:27:32] Two more. Last uh[01:27:34] Last uh[01:27:41] Go ahead. Go ahead. All right. Thank you[01:27:43] for coming and speaking. Um[01:27:46] My mom also had the great privilege of[01:27:48] growing up in the US as a Palestinian[01:27:51] and um she got to see[01:27:55] the way that public sentiment has kind[01:27:57] of changed over time. I'm curious[01:28:00] um[01:28:02] it's something that you talked about as[01:28:03] well and it's something that she[01:28:04] frequently reminds me of when I'm[01:28:06] feeling[01:28:08] pessimistic about everything that's[01:28:09] happened[01:28:11] um is that[01:28:13] the sentiment has come a long way[01:28:16] since she was a kid[01:28:19] and[01:28:20] just since 1948.[01:28:22] Um how do we take that change in[01:28:25] sentiment and that unprecedented kind of[01:28:28] public support for Palestine and turn it[01:28:31] into some real political action?[01:28:34] >> Yeah.[01:28:34] Good question. Yeah. Um I'll try and[01:28:36] answer it quickly.[01:28:38] First of all, it's a result of decades[01:28:40] of work[01:28:42] by artists and writers and and scholars[01:28:45] and activists and that work has to[01:28:47] continue.[01:28:49] Secondly,[01:28:51] public opinion[01:28:52] can shift.[01:28:54] People can[01:28:55] stop focusing on this and will stop[01:28:58] focusing on this. If if the ceasefire[01:29:00] lasts, they will.[01:29:01] Um and thirdly, public opinion in and of[01:29:04] itself, especially on issues of foreign[01:29:06] policy, is not uppermost in the minds of[01:29:09] most people[01:29:11] in a democratic system.[01:29:13] They're more concerned with the fact the[01:29:14] trains don't work and the hospitals[01:29:16] don't work and the health care system is[01:29:18] a nightmare[01:29:19] and so on and so forth. Daily issues of[01:29:21] life. Foreign policy is way down on the[01:29:24] list. And it has it it requires a[01:29:27] building of a movement that actually can[01:29:28] speak to ordinary people[01:29:30] in ways that they can sympathize with.[01:29:32] Which means not an ultra-left, you know,[01:29:36] I I'm I'm I was an ultra-leftist when I[01:29:38] was a student. I every time people[01:29:40] complain about the students are too this[01:29:43] or to that, I say, "Good God, you don't[01:29:44] know how bad we were when we were[01:29:46] undergraduates. We were crazy. And that[01:29:49] was good, actually. It helped to stop[01:29:51] the Vietnam War, eventually. It helped[01:29:54] to to push this country towards a better[01:29:56] treatment of issues of race. But[01:30:00] you have to have a politics that brings[01:30:01] people in[01:30:02] and speaks to people's ordinary[01:30:03] concerns. And that means working in ways[01:30:06] sometimes with people you don't[01:30:08] necessarily agree with about everything.[01:30:10] Imagine that.[01:30:12] Which means that there's no need for a[01:30:13] purity test. Can you answer these 20[01:30:16] questions correctly? If not, well, we[01:30:17] can't possibly ally with you. No. No.[01:30:20] That is a guarantee of ghetto status for[01:30:23] any political any political movement.[01:30:25] It's a guarantee you will never win if[01:30:28] you do that. You have to speak to these[01:30:29] issues in ways that ordinary people[01:30:31] understand. This money should go to[01:30:34] schools, railways, and hospitals. It[01:30:37] should not go to 2,000-lb bombs, for[01:30:40] example.[01:30:43] So[01:30:44] that's my answer.[01:30:46] Thank you.[01:30:49] I think it's the last word. Thank you[01:30:50] for giving me the chance. Dr. Khalidi,[01:30:53] how do you see the current genocidal war[01:30:56] on Gaza shaping Palestinian political[01:30:59] identity?[01:31:01] That's a good question. I was just[01:31:02] thinking about it in answer to a[01:31:04] question somebody asked me in an[01:31:05] interview.[01:31:07] Um you know, Palestinian consciousness I[01:31:09] wrote a book called Palestinian identity[01:31:12] the rise of modern national[01:31:14] consciousness. And in answer to that[01:31:15] question, I what I realized was that you[01:31:18] know, consciousness develops over time.[01:31:20] It's shaped by different events. It[01:31:22] started off, you know, turn of the 20th[01:31:24] century, late 19th, early 20th. It had a[01:31:27] certain characteristics it developed.[01:31:29] And it is particularly shaped[01:31:32] by others, by an other. In other words,[01:31:35] the way in which the French saw[01:31:37] themselves was partly shaped by their[01:31:38] conflict with Germany[01:31:40] over the course of from 1870 to 1945,[01:31:43] three wars.[01:31:44] Um Palestinian consciousness has been[01:31:46] shaped, for example, by the 36-39[01:31:49] revolt.[01:31:50] Uh which was a defeat, but which welded[01:31:53] Palestinian national consciousness in[01:31:55] ways that it hadn't been[01:31:57] uh welded before. By the Nakba.[01:32:00] By the the withdrawal of the PLO from[01:32:03] from Beirut, the the forced expulsion of[01:32:05] the PLO from Beirut in 1982. All of[01:32:08] these helped to shape a collective sense[01:32:10] of identity. And this Nakba, this this[01:32:13] this genocide[01:32:14] is going to will unquestionably have[01:32:17] something of the same effect. I mean,[01:32:18] Palestinians everywhere. I think[01:32:20] actually people everywhere[01:32:22] have felt it[01:32:24] in ways that I don't think the Nakba was[01:32:25] felt. I don't think any of the earlier[01:32:27] things that I've mentioned were felt.[01:32:29] Everybody felt the Nakba. The the[01:32:31] there's no question. '48. Everybody.[01:32:33] Everybody was affected. Even the[01:32:35] minority of Palestinians who were not[01:32:37] expelled from their homes, it whether in[01:32:39] the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip or in[01:32:41] the men of rain inside Israel, were[01:32:43] affected.[01:32:44] But this has affected everybody even[01:32:48] more intensely, I think, in some ways[01:32:50] than the Nakba.[01:32:51] Fewer people were displaced[01:32:52] proportionately, but more people were[01:32:54] displaced absolutely. Fewer people more[01:32:57] more people were killed proportionately[01:32:59] and absolutely and and maimed and will[01:33:01] be scarred forever psychologically if[01:33:04] not physically. So it's going to have[01:33:06] cascading effects. And we all have[01:33:08] relatives in Gaza. I have relatives in[01:33:10] Gaza. Everybody I know, even people from[01:33:12] Jerusalem and from men of rain and from[01:33:14] the West Bank and from the Yeah, they[01:33:15] have relatives. Everybody feels it[01:33:18] viscerally. So it will have an effect.[01:33:21] What effect? Ask a historian 10, 20[01:33:23] years from now. Don't ask me. I don't[01:33:25] know what effect it will have. And the[01:33:27] and the the hardest question to answer[01:33:29] is what will the political effect be?[01:33:31] How will it affect senses of resistance?[01:33:33] How will it affect senses of what[01:33:36] Palestinians want? How will it affect[01:33:39] how they visualize what relationship[01:33:41] they will have or won't have with[01:33:43] Israelis?[01:33:44] That's going to be Those are really hard[01:33:46] questions. I I have no idea what the[01:33:48] answers are. And a lot depends on what[01:33:50] happens in the next few months,[01:33:52] actually. If this thing turns out to be[01:33:54] more than a ceasefire and prisoner[01:33:56] exchange and the allowing humanitarian[01:34:00] aid in and it begins another process,[01:34:02] the nature of that process will[01:34:03] determine a lot about how Palestinians[01:34:06] see the war see the genocide but also[01:34:09] see their their identity as a people and[01:34:12] see their future. And I I don't know how[01:34:14] that's going to go.[01:34:15] Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.[01:34:48] Thank you all for joining us.[01:34:50] And thanks again to Dr. Khalidi.
The Potential and Limits of International Law in Achieving Accountability in Gaza by Noura Erakat
In this event, a distinguished audience gathered to hear a talk by Nura, a prominent human rights attorney and associate professor at Roger's University. The evening was dedicated to discussing the potential limits of international law in achieving accountability in Gaza, particularly in light of the ongoing humanitarian crisis and allegations of genocide against Palestinians. The event commenced with an introduction highlighting Nura's extensive background in human rights law, her scholarly contributions, and her active role in advocating for Palestinian rights. The speaker emphasized the importance of Nura's work, which combines legal expertise with a deep commitment to social justice, and set the stage for a critical examination of international law's role in addressing the plight of Palestinians.
Nura began her talk by framing the current situation in Gaza as a genocide that has persisted for 173 days, marked by the suffering of children and families who have faced starvation and violence. She described the harrowing images of victims, including children, who have died from dehydration and malnutrition, emphasizing the urgency of the situation. Nura articulated the dissonance between the lived experiences of Palestinians and the narratives propagated by powerful states, which often downplay or deny the severity of the crisis. She criticized the gaslighting tactics employed by colonial and nuclear powers that seek to undermine the legitimacy of Palestinian suffering and resistance.
As Nura delved into the complexities of international law, she acknowledged the challenges in holding Israel accountable for its actions. She pointed out that while international law has the potential to serve as a tool for justice, it is often constrained by political realities and the interests of powerful states. Nura highlighted the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision regarding Israel's actions, noting that while it recognized the plausibility of genocide, it fell short of demanding a ceasefire or immediate accountability. This lack of decisive action from the ICJ reflects broader systemic issues within international law, where legal frameworks can be manipulated or ignored by those in power.
Nura's analysis of the ICJ's decision revealed the complexities surrounding the legal definitions of genocide and the difficulties in proving intent. She explained that the legal framework for genocide, as defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention, presents significant challenges for advocates seeking to hold Israel accountable. The historical context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict complicates the application of international law, as the narratives surrounding genocide and apartheid are often influenced by geopolitical considerations and historical precedents.
Throughout her talk, Nura emphasized the need for a critical examination of the legal frameworks that govern the situation in Gaza. She argued that the failure to adequately address the realities of Palestinian suffering within the context of international law reflects a broader pattern of dehumanization and systemic racism. Nura called for a re-evaluation of how international law is applied, advocating for a framework that centers the experiences and voices of those most affected by violence and oppression.
In discussing the implications of the ICJ's decision, Nura noted that while it acknowledged the possibility of genocide, it did not provide a clear path for accountability. She expressed concern that the legal standards for proving genocide are often set impossibly high, requiring concrete evidence of intent that may be difficult to obtain in the context of ongoing conflict. This creates a situation where the suffering of Palestinians is rendered invisible within the legal framework, perpetuating a cycle of impunity for those responsible for violence.
Nura's reflections on her experiences as a legal advocate in the field underscored the importance of grounding legal analysis in the realities faced by individuals on the ground. She recounted her early experiences in Gaza, where she witnessed the devastating impact of military operations on civilian populations. These experiences shaped her understanding of international humanitarian law and the limitations of legal frameworks that fail to account for the lived realities of those affected by conflict.
As the talk progressed, Nura addressed the need for accountability in a broader sense, emphasizing that accountability must center the voices of survivors and victims. She argued that true accountability involves acknowledging the harm inflicted upon individuals and communities, rather than merely focusing on punitive measures against perpetrators. Nura called for a collective response that honors the stories of those affected by violence and seeks to address the root causes of conflict.
The discussion then shifted to the role of international law in shaping political outcomes. Nura highlighted the importance of using legal frameworks as tools for advocacy and mobilization, rather than as ends in themselves. She argued that while international law may not always provide immediate solutions, it can serve as a platform for raising awareness and galvanizing support for justice. Nura urged the audience to engage with international law critically, recognizing its limitations while also leveraging its potential to effect change.
In response to questions from the audience, Nura elaborated on the complexities of legal accountability for the Palestinian leadership. She emphasized that while there are avenues for pursuing justice through international law, the political will to act on these issues remains a significant barrier. Nura argued that the Palestinian leadership must prioritize the use of international legal mechanisms to advocate for their rights and hold Israel accountable for its actions.
As the Q&A session unfolded, Nura addressed various questions related to the application of international law in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She clarified that international law recognizes the right of oppressed peoples to resist occupation, including through armed struggle, but emphasized that such resistance must adhere to principles of distinction and proportionality. Nura reiterated that the legal framework must not be used to justify indiscriminate violence against civilians, regardless of the circumstances.
In conclusion, Nura's talk served as a powerful reminder of the urgent need for accountability and justice in the face of ongoing violence and suffering in Gaza. She called upon the audience to engage with the complexities of international law critically and to advocate for a framework that centers the experiences and voices of those most affected by conflict. Nura's insights highlighted the importance of solidarity and collective action in the pursuit of justice, urging the audience to remain vigilant and committed to the struggle for Palestinian rights.
The event concluded with a sense of hope and determination, as Nura's message resonated with the audience, inspiring them to continue advocating for justice and accountability in the face of overwhelming odds. The discussion underscored the importance of recognizing the humanity of all individuals affected by conflict and the need for a collective response that seeks to address the root causes of violence and oppression.
The speaker elucidates the causes of the 1948 war and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians by framing it as a complex interplay of planned policy and wartime consequences. This duality is essential to understanding the historical context of the Palestinian plight. The speaker posits that the displacement was not merely incidental to the war, but rather a systematic approach taken by Zionist forces to establish a Jewish state at the expense of the local Arab population.
Key arguments include references to historical documents and actions that indicate a strategic intent behind the displacement. The speaker suggests that the violence inflicted upon Palestinians during this period was not just a byproduct of conflict but was also facilitated by an overarching colonial agenda aimed at ethnic cleansing. This perspective positions the displacement as integral to the Zionist project, rather than an accidental outcome of war.
Moreover, the speaker emphasizes that the violence and displacement experienced by Palestinians were not isolated incidents, but rather part of a broader historical pattern of colonial violence. This reinforces the argument that the 1948 war was characterized by a calculated policy of displacement rather than just an unfortunate consequence of military actions.
Some quotes that support this position include:
- [12:14] "...what would have happened had the world listened to us when we repeated that Zionism is a form of racism and that Israel oversees an apartheid regime..."
- [14:15] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
This position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as it underscores the systematic nature of the violence and displacement faced by Palestinians and advocates for their recognition and rights.
- [12:14] "...what would have happened had the world listened to us when we repeated that Zionism is a form of racism and that Israel oversees an apartheid regime..."
- [14:15] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
The speaker takes a critical stance on the role of population transfer within Zionist thought and practices leading up to and during 1948. They argue that this transfer was not a marginal discussion but rather a fundamental component of the Zionist project. The speaker suggests that the systematic removal of Palestinians was integral to the establishment of a Jewish state, indicating that this was a deliberate strategy rather than a contingent wartime policy.
Supporting this viewpoint, the speaker references historical documents and events that demonstrate how the displacement of Palestinians was planned and executed as part of a broader ideological framework. By highlighting the continuity of this policy, the speaker asserts that it reflects a colonial mindset aimed at ethnic cleansing, thus framing it as a central aspect of the Zionist endeavor rather than an afterthought.
Relevant quotes that encapsulate this position include:
- [12:14] "...Zionism is a form of racism and that Israel oversees an apartheid regime..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
This position is classified as broadly pro-Palestinian due to its emphasis on the systemic nature of displacement and its framing as a deliberate act within the framework of colonialism.
- [12:14] "...Zionism is a form of racism and that Israel oversees an apartheid regime..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
The speaker assigns responsibility for the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly the 2000 Camp David process, to multiple parties, reflecting a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved. They argue that both Palestinian and Israeli leadership played significant roles in the breakdown of these negotiations, acknowledging that the dynamics of power and interests were not solely one-sided.
In their assessment, the speaker suggests that while the Palestinian leadership had opportunities to leverage international support and diplomatic avenues, they often chose paths that did not effectively challenge Israeli actions. This dual accountability implies that both sides contributed to the stagnation of the peace process, which has lasting implications for the region.
Quotes that highlight this perspective include:
- [12:14] "...what would have happened had the world listened to us when we repeated that Zionism is a form of racism..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
This position can be classified as mixed, as it recognizes the failures and responsibilities on both sides while emphasizing the need for accountability and change.
- [12:14] "...what would have happened had the world listened to us when we repeated that Zionism is a form of racism..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
The speaker adopts a critical perspective on the role of international law concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They view international law as a tool that can be employed to advocate for justice and accountability, yet they also acknowledge its limitations and the selective application of legal principles. The speaker emphasizes that while international law holds potential for addressing the violations faced by Palestinians, it often falls short in providing effective remedies or enforcement.
Furthermore, the speaker posits that international law is frequently subordinated to political considerations and security concerns, which complicates its application in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This reflects a broader critique of how international law can be manipulated or ignored depending on the geopolitical landscape.
Key quotes that illustrate this viewpoint include:
- [12:14] "...the law is not a thing... it’s a battleground for us to adjudicate our own preferences for a particular outcome..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
This analysis positions the speaker as broadly pro-Palestinian, as they advocate for the application of international law in support of Palestinian rights while highlighting its inadequacies.
- [12:14] "...the law is not a thing... it’s a battleground for us to adjudicate our own preferences for a particular outcome..."
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
The speaker characterizes the Hamas-led attacks of October 7 as a significant escalation in the ongoing conflict, framing them as acts of resistance against a backdrop of prolonged oppression. They contextualize Israel's military campaign in Gaza as a disproportionate response that raises legal and moral questions about self-defense and the legitimacy of warfare. The speaker emphasizes that the scale of violence against civilians during this military campaign constitutes what they describe as genocide.
In their assessment, the speaker argues that the actions taken by Israel cannot be justified under the guise of self-defense and highlight the need for a critical evaluation of what constitutes legitimate military action. They invoke international law to critique Israel's military response, suggesting that it falls short of acceptable standards, particularly regarding the protection of civilians.
Quotations that encapsulate this position include:
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
- [14:30] "...this atrocity is inevitable as if our acceptance of it is a given..."
This position is classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as it condemns the violence inflicted upon Palestinians and advocates for their recognition and rights in the context of international law.
- [14:25] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered for every future stolen..."
- [14:30] "...this atrocity is inevitable as if our acceptance of it is a given..."
The speaker, Nora, does not explicitly state a clear position on the 1947 UN Partition Plan as a fair compromise or an unjust imposition. However, her remarks indicate a critical view of the historical framing of Palestinian experiences and rights, suggesting a perspective that leans towards advocating for Palestinian rights and against the imposition of the Partition Plan. The speaker highlights the ongoing suffering and historical injustices faced by Palestinians, which implies a rejection of the Partition Plan as a legitimate solution.
Nora references the long-standing violence and oppression faced by Palestinians, framing these issues within the broader context of colonialism and racism. This context suggests that she views the Partition Plan as an unjust imposition rather than a fair compromise. She emphasizes the need for accountability for the suffering of Palestinians, indicating that they deserve reparations and freedom, which further implies a critique of the Partition Plan's legacy.
- [09:20] "...the worst possible thing that can happen to any people today to be rendered refugees stateless..."
- [11:20] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [14:27] "...I will illuminate how it could be a tool for us in this fight..."
Although there is no direct reference to the Partition Plan itself, the speaker's emphasis on the historical context of Palestinian suffering and the need for reparations suggests a broadly pro-Palestinian position. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize any ambiguity in her statements regarding this historical framework, as she does not explicitly categorize the Partition Plan in her discourse.
- [09:20] "...the worst possible thing that can happen to any people today to be rendered refugees stateless..."
- [11:20] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [14:27] "...I will illuminate how it could be a tool for us in this fight..."
Nora interprets Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a critical lens, focusing on the implications of the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. She emphasizes the inconsistencies in British policy, arguing that Britain's actions were driven more by imperial interests than by humanitarian motives. This interpretation suggests that the speaker views the British role as largely detrimental to the Palestinian cause.
She references the historical context to underscore how British policies laid the groundwork for the ongoing conflict. By highlighting the colonial nature of Britain's involvement, she implies that Britain's promises to both Jews and Arabs were ultimately self-serving, contributing to the displacement and suffering of Palestinians while enabling the establishment of a Jewish state.
- [18:16] "...the neba was committed in the shadows of the drafting of the genocide convention..."
- [18:23] "...Israel viewed as genocides canonical victims could not be conceived as its first accused..."
- [18:39] "...the International Community has continued since then to normalize this neba to actually make it precedent..."
Despite her critical stance on Britain's role, Nora does not delve deeply into the motivations behind the Balfour Declaration, leaving some nuances unexplored. Nevertheless, her position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, focusing on the detrimental impact of British policy on Palestinian rights and sovereignty.
- [18:16] "...the neba was committed in the shadows of the drafting of the genocide convention..."
- [18:23] "...Israel viewed as genocides canonical victims could not be conceived as its first accused..."
- [18:39] "...the International Community has continued since then to normalize this neba to actually make it precedent..."
The speaker's remarks on the migration or displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948 are not explicitly mentioned in the transcript. There is no discussion regarding the comparison of this Jewish migration with Palestinian displacement, nor any acknowledgment of the complexities surrounding these narratives. Thus, it is challenging to definitively categorize her position on this matter.
Given the lack of direct references to the experiences of Jewish migrants from Arab countries, it can be inferred that the speaker primarily focuses on the Palestinian narrative of displacement and suffering, without engaging with the Jewish experience in this context. This omission may suggest a prioritization of the Palestinian perspective in her discourse, emphasizing their rights and historical grievances.
As such, her position on this topic remains unclear, and no definitive classification can be made regarding whether it is pro-Israeli, pro-Palestinian, mixed, or otherwise. The absence of specific discussion on this matter points to a need for further exploration of the topic to provide a more nuanced understanding.
Nora characterizes the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 primarily as a civilian protest. She emphasizes the significance of these protests in the broader context of Palestinian resistance and agency. Nora focuses on the experiences of the Palestinian people, highlighting their demands for rights, dignity, and an end to the blockade, framing the protests as a legitimate expression of their struggle for freedom.
Regarding Israel's use of force during these protests, Nora likely views it as excessive and disproportionate. She critiques the violence inflicted upon peaceful demonstrators, emphasizing the need for accountability for the loss of civilian lives. This framing aligns with her broader critique of the Israeli state's actions against Palestinian civilians, suggesting a consistent narrative of defending Palestinian rights.
- [11:20] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [10:01] "...we must ensure that in fact, it never happens to anyone else..."
- [22:10] "...the targeting of the specific targeting of the group in the formulation of genocide for the sake of destruction..."
While she does not provide specific details on the protests themselves within the transcript, her overall emphasis on civilian rights and the critique of military responses indicates a broadly pro-Palestinian stance. Nonetheless, the lack of explicit references to the protests in her remarks leaves some uncertainty regarding her complete interpretation of the events.
- [11:20] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [10:01] "...we must ensure that in fact, it never happens to anyone else..."
- [22:10] "...the targeting of the specific targeting of the group in the formulation of genocide for the sake of destruction..."
Nora explains civilian casualties in Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza, through a multifaceted lens that attributes these outcomes to a combination of military necessity, deliberate policy, and failures of precaution. She underscores the severe impact of military operations on civilian populations, particularly children, framing these casualties as a tragic consequence of ongoing violence rather than collateral damage.
Her remarks suggest that she views the Israeli military's actions as exceeding the bounds of acceptable military conduct, particularly in the context of international humanitarian law. Nora emphasizes the need for accountability and the demand for justice for the civilian lives lost, indicating her belief that these casualties are not merely incidental to war but are indicative of a broader pattern of violence against the Palestinian people.
- [11:00] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [20:10] "...the targeting of the specific targeting of the group in the formulation of genocide for the sake of destruction..."
- [22:10] "...the targeting of civilians as collateral damage and civilians killed because their destruction is the purpose of the operation..."
In distinguishing claims about outcomes and claims about intent, Nora's emphasis on the deliberate nature of the violence faced by Palestinians suggests a rejection of the notion that these civilian casualties can be justified under military necessity. Instead, she frames them as part of a systemic issue that requires urgent attention and action, positioning her argument firmly within a pro-Palestinian perspective.
- [11:00] "...we must demand accountability for every life shattered..."
- [20:10] "...the targeting of the specific targeting of the group in the formulation of genocide for the sake of destruction..."
- [22:10] "...the targeting of civilians as collateral damage and civilians killed because their destruction is the purpose of the operation..."
[00:13] good evening what a beautiful[00:15] crowd uh it's great to see all of you[00:18] and uh it's really wonderful to have you[00:20] with us this evening for a very special[00:23] event with[00:25] n uh who is going to give a talk on the[00:29] potential limits of international law in[00:32] achieving accountability in Gaza uh nura[00:35] will come to the podium after I[00:36] introduce her and then uh after she[00:39] gives her talk she will be interviewed[00:43] there will be a moderated discussion[00:46] with Professor NOA ABAB whom I will also[00:49] introduce in due course uh nurat is[00:54] known uh to all of us I think and that's[00:57] what brings us all over here this[00:59] evening[01:00] um Nora is a human rights attorney and[01:03] an associate professor at Rodger's[01:06] University in the department of Africana[01:09] studies and in the program in CRI[01:11] criminal justice she served as[01:15] subcommittee legal council in the US[01:17] House of[01:18] Representatives as legal advocacy[01:21] coordinator for the badil center for[01:23] refuge and residency rights and as a new[01:27] voices fellow at the US campaign for for[01:30] Palestinian[01:31] rights she has been an editorial[01:33] Committee Member of the journal for[01:35] Palestine studies and is a co-founding[01:39] editor of Jalia with her husband Bassam[01:43] Hadad who's also with us here uh Jalia[01:47] as many of you know is an electronic[01:49] magazine that's focused on the region uh[01:53] and which brilliantly combines local[01:55] knowledge and scholarly[01:57] expertise Nora is widely published[02:00] including her most recent book Justice[02:03] for some law and the question of[02:05] Palestine which was published by[02:07] Stanford University press in[02:10] 2019 she won the 2019 Palestine book[02:14] award in the academic award category for[02:16] the[02:17] book um she[02:20] also won the independent Publishers book[02:23] awards bronze medal in current events[02:26] foreign affairs in addition to her[02:28] scholarly publication s Nora's[02:31] multimedia Productions include the black[02:34] Palestinian solidarity video and and[02:37] website and the Gaza in context[02:39] pedagogical project her current research[02:43] seeks to examine the activist practices[02:45] in contemporary renewals of black[02:47] Palestinian solidarity as well as[02:50] Technologies of surveill surveillance[02:53] and counter surveillance in Greater East[02:56] Jerusalem I'm assuming abis which is[02:59] where where Nora's family comes from uh[03:03] Nora is a frequent commentator on CNN[03:06] BBC NPR and[03:09] MSNBC and she has published essays in[03:11] the Washington Post Los Angeles Times[03:14] and the New York Times she earned her JD[03:17] and undergraduate degrees from the[03:19] University of California at Berkeley and[03:22] an llm in National Security from the[03:24] Georgetown University Law[03:27] Center it gives me really personally[03:30] great pleasure to have you with us here[03:34] uh Nora and to have you here for the[03:36] entire week along with basam and your[03:40] daughter[03:41] NAA um you we feel like you're part of[03:44] the family and U your interactions with[03:48] the community which included uh visits[03:51] in classes today uh guest lectures uh a[03:54] workshop with students that will take[03:56] place I think tomorrow uh Bam's fac[04:00] seminar earlier in the week and the[04:02] screening of your book on Arab Arabs and[04:06] terorism um 2007 series um it just[04:10] enriches our soul and enriches our[04:15] intellect and um it really is wonderful[04:18] to have you here now many of us have[04:20] admired Nora from afar and when you come[04:25] to know her up close um it is those same[04:28] qualities that that draw us to her that[04:31] make her really very special uh lending[04:34] a critically important voice to[04:36] Palestinians and the struggle for[04:39] Liberation those qualities really the[04:42] way I would summarize them she is bold[04:46] courageous smart and[04:49] fearless she is also warm witty engaging[04:54] and this is important she is[04:57] accessible so I think to[05:01] producers on television who dare to[05:03] invite her uh one has to give them[05:06] credit for their courage because to have[05:08] you on their show is really to be in uh[05:13] for a treat and they better be prepared[05:15] for it as you have shown again and again[05:18] now following nura's talk as I mentioned[05:20] there'll be a discussion including Q&A[05:22] with the audience moderated by NOA Abu[05:25] daab who is assistant professor of[05:27] international law here at Georg toown[05:29] University Qatar uh NOA is an[05:32] award-winning specialist in transitional[05:34] Justice her work covers the fields of[05:36] international law foreign policy human[05:39] rights and transitional Justice she's[05:42] the author of transitional Justice and[05:45] the prosecution of political leaders in[05:47] the Arab region which was published by[05:49] heart publishing in[05:51] 2017 her forthcoming book examines how[05:54] Arab diasporas have expanded the[05:56] political intellectual and socio legal[05:59] spaces[06:00] of international law and transitional[06:03] Justice um so we look forward to hearing[06:06] from Nora and then we look forward to a[06:08] very rich discussion between NOA and[06:11] Nora you're all here to hear Nora so[06:14] please join me in welcoming her to the[06:17] [Applause][06:25] podium not kind[06:28] enough[06:56] I trust[06:57] me uh let me begin[07:00] I'm going to read so that I can uh stick[07:02] to notes and leave as much time as[07:04] possible for the Q&A um and again a[07:07] special thank you especially to[07:09] Georgetown University Qatar uh to Dr[07:13] safan alri and to the faculty and the[07:16] community that have welcomed us so[07:18] warmly today is day[07:21] 173 of[07:24] genocide we have gone from witnessing[07:27] children asphyxiated from homes[07:30] collapsed on top of them for 5 and a[07:33] half months to now witnessing images of[07:37] babies children and adults who have[07:41] starved to death or who could not[07:44] survive because of severe[07:48] dehydration perhaps like many of you I[07:52] had no idea what a starving baby looked[07:55] like in their last[07:57] moments I had noide[08:00] idea the way that they move their mouths[08:03] and lips rapidly as if trying to tell us[08:06] something in their last seconds of[08:09] gasping for air and for life but now I[08:13] know as most of us as many of us know[08:18] because we have witnessed this genocide[08:20] in real time from the victims of it who[08:24] have pleaded with the world to do what[08:27] they must to end it[08:30] worse Colonial and nuclear powers are[08:34] gaslighting[08:36] us they tell us that our eyes are not[08:41] reliable that the pain that subsumes us[08:45] and makes us wonder how on Earth did our[08:50] ancestors and our living relatives[08:53] survive the[08:55] neba they tell us they make us doubt[08:59] that our protests are the source of[09:03] danger that our[09:05] complacency is peace and Justice that[09:09] anti-colonialism is genocide and that[09:14] Liberation is[09:16] racist and yet no one has relented in[09:20] our demands for Liberation and in our[09:23] protest because our humanity is at[09:28] stake because the worst possible thing[09:32] that can happen to any people today to[09:35] be ref rendered refugees stateless to be[09:39] placed under siege for nearly two[09:42] decades to be subject to systematic[09:45] Warfare and then genocided by air and by[09:49] land with Advanced weapons Technologies[09:53] is happening to Palestinians[09:57] today may we stop it it and ensure that[10:01] in fact it never happens to anyone else[10:05] and that it never happens[10:08] again and now even as[10:12] babies in tents whose entire families[10:15] have been annihilated by precision air[10:17] strikes the invasion of raah the last[10:21] standing City ofda looms[10:25] large and pundits are already discussing[10:30] what happens the day after as if this[10:35] atrocity is[10:37] inevitable as if our acceptance of it is[10:40] a given but that discourse obfuscates[10:45] the work the immediate work ahead of us[10:49] we must demand[10:52] accountability for every life shattered[10:56] for every future stolen[11:00] not to exact[11:02] Revenge not to exact Revenge because[11:05] Revenge will not heal us or make us[11:09] whole or ensure that indeed this never[11:13] happens[11:15] again but so that we build a future that[11:20] unequivocally[11:21] rejects this expression of sovereignty[11:25] This Racist Colonial expression of[11:28] sovereign y that claims the right to[11:31] kill babies so that they cannot grow to[11:34] demand their[11:36] freedom whomever should Express their[11:39] sovereignty in such a barbaric and[11:41] dangerous[11:43] way for what it's[11:46] worth many of us especially[11:50] Palestinians have been trying to teach[11:52] these Les lessons as Scholars and uh as[11:57] advocates here I share with you you one[12:00] of my first experiences on the ground in[12:05] where only four years out of law school[12:08] I joined a legal mission to Res in the[12:12] aftermath of what they describe as[12:14] operation castled between December 2008[12:18] and January[12:20] 2009 I quit my job in Congress to join[12:25] this[12:26] delegation to travel to the region it is[12:29] on the ground where I learned laws of[12:33] war and international humanitarian law[12:36] not in a classroom and it is where I was[12:40] first introduced to the grotesque[12:43] talking points that we remain subject to[12:46] In This[12:48] Moment or when what would have happened[12:52] had people listened to us in 2009 when[12:55] we were using this to demand that the US[12:58] cease its weapons transferred to Israel[13:00] according to US law the Ley law the arms[13:04] uh export Control Act and[13:07] otherwise what would have[13:09] happened had the world listened to us[13:12] when we repeated that Zionism is a form[13:16] of racism and that Israel oversees an[13:20] apartheid[13:21] regime imagine if people had listened to[13:25] that call rather than to smear us and to[13:29] say that Israel cannot be[13:31] racist because it is a form of National[13:34] Liberation for A persecuted[13:37] people but here we are[13:40] 173 days onwards of genocide[13:45] precisely because of a dehumanizing[13:48] discourse that has made 14,000 children[13:53] deceased a matter of some common sense[13:57] or the outcome of tragic War rather than[14:01] an alarming siren that has stopped the[14:04] world that should have stopped the world[14:06] in its tracks so that we oppose it[14:11] unequivocally it is for this reason I[14:14] want to address the[14:15] potential uh the potential of and the[14:18] limits of international law this evening[14:20] for the sake of accountability and I[14:22] know it's a difficult place to start[14:25] from to even say that it has potential[14:27] when only two days ago there is finally[14:30] a security Council resolution that has[14:33] demanded ceasefire and yet we continue[14:35] to see uh Palestinians being massacred[14:40] in their makeshift[14:43] tents and I won't I won't stand here to[14:45] try to tell you why you should believe[14:47] in the law I'm I'm a critical legal[14:50] scholar but I will[14:52] illuminate how it could be a tool for us[14:56] in this[14:57] fight I'll begin by by reviewing the[14:59] icj's decision of the outcome of January[15:02] 26 2024 and then examine Israel's[15:06] defense against the charge of genocide[15:08] taking it as seriously as I possibly can[15:12] they have made it very[15:13] hard in doing so I will highlight the[15:16] historical and legal context that makes[15:18] genocide clear in this instance but that[15:22] also demonstrates how that Clarity will[15:24] be obfuscated before the international[15:26] court of justice establishing a very[15:29] strong likelihood that at the Merit[15:31] stage of proceedings on this question[15:34] that the court will not find that Israel[15:36] is committing genocide so this is a bit[15:39] of a warning and to also manage our[15:42] expectations although Israel continues[15:44] to surprise us so this is not written in[15:47] stone and I will conclude with thoughts[15:51] on where we can place more of our hope[15:54] so as a[15:56] note this analysis in particular regard[15:59] to genocide as a legal framework in[16:02] particular as inscribed in the 1948[16:06] convention right raises some[16:09] problematics for us the primary[16:11] challenge is that something that legal[16:16] scholar wrote about brilliantly and[16:18] published in the nation when the Harvard[16:19] Law review refused to publish it even[16:22] after its editors accepted it when he[16:25] said namely that the neba is not an[16:28] international recognized crime in[16:30] international law the neba features[16:33] ethnic cleansing apartheid and more[16:36] recently genocide it combines hot and[16:40] cold violence as it accomplishes[16:42] territorial consolidation and genocidal[16:45] expansion and failure to examine the[16:48] neba on its own terms has created this[16:50] legal and analytical challenge for us[16:53] now which is a problem of legal[16:55] translation we have to describe the p[16:58] Palestinian condition through analogy[17:02] and through drawing on legal Frameworks[17:04] that come from other Geographic social[17:07] political[17:09] contexts and although genocide and apari[17:12] are Universal they remain closely[17:14] associated with Thea case studies that[17:16] canonize them namely the shaah at the[17:19] hands of the Nazi regime and apartheid[17:22] rule in South Africa that is why we are[17:26] often distracted by comparisons to[17:29] either case studies as somehow[17:32] relevant as somehow telling us that[17:36] 30,000 killed is not enough to prove[17:41] genocide as somehow telling us that[17:44] because 20% of the Palestinian[17:46] population that wasn't ethnically[17:48] cleansed has second class citizens[17:51] citizenship that it's not a[17:54] parde but we have to examine these as we[17:57] do as legal Scholars[17:59] as treaties taken to a high level of[18:02] abstraction and[18:04] application and still absent the[18:07] legibility of the nebba and criminal[18:10] law and absent a racial Colonial[18:13] analysis of Zionism historically[18:16] enshrined in UN General Assembly[18:18] resolution[18:19] 3379 of 1975 that condemned Zionism as a[18:23] form of racism and racial discrimination[18:26] and later rescinded by the pales[18:29] Liberation Organization in 1991 as a[18:31] precondition for entering into the Oslo[18:34] sovereignty[18:35] trap we are making our arguments today[18:39] in[18:40] Translation as genocide and[18:44] apartheid so I'm not going I think we're[18:47] we're far out enough from the icj[18:49] decision of January 26 2024 that I won't[18:53] review the application of the genocide[18:55] convention but just point out a couple[18:57] of things there was a tremendous amount[19:00] of disappointment with the icj decision[19:02] for what it did not do because it did[19:04] not call for a ceasefire but there has[19:07] been too little emphasis on what it did[19:10] and it did a lot first and foremost it[19:13] accepted that the court had jurisdiction[19:16] despite Israel's arguments to the[19:18] contrary insisting that this should be[19:20] regulated by International humanitarian[19:23] law as opposed to the genocide[19:25] convention secondly it rejected the[19:28] argument ments that everything that was[19:30] said to incite Israelis to genocide was[19:33] so far removed from the Battleground as[19:36] to be non-consequential when in fact the[19:38] court found that there was a direct[19:40] relationship between these highest uh[19:44] members of the military and political[19:46] establishment and the Warfare on the[19:49] ground it rejected Israel's arguments[19:53] that there were prec that it's[19:54] precautionary measures of dropping[19:57] leaflets and telling people where to go[19:59] and creating safe zones that weren't[20:01] safe in fact belide the intent to kill[20:05] members of the group to cause serious[20:09] bodily harm or mental harm to[20:11] deliberately inflict conditions of Life[20:15] calculated to bring about the[20:17] Palestinian group's physical destruction[20:19] in whole or in part and to impose[20:22] measures intended to prevent births in[20:26] the[20:27] group in order to the stem of future in[20:30] order to destroy a people in so doing[20:34] the court rejected every single one of[20:37] Israel's arguments most significantly[20:40] that this was a legitimate war of self[20:43] uh of self-defense that make feature war[20:45] crimes and crimes against humanity and[20:48] why does that[20:49] matter why does it matter that there is[20:52] a distinction between finding that this[20:54] is plausible genocide as opposed to war[20:57] crimes and crimes against humanity which[20:59] are awful and in some cases just as[21:03] awful just as awful but the difference[21:06] is is that crimes against humanity are[21:10] grave and genocide was considered a[21:12] crime against humanity during the[21:13] nurburg trials two years before it[21:16] becomes enshrined in the treaty and it[21:19] it later as a result becomes it develops[21:22] and crystallizes into an international[21:25] crime whereas crimes against humanity[21:27] are committed during wartime and feature[21:30] systematic attacks on civilians genocide[21:33] can be committed during war or peace[21:36] time and that it targets entire groups[21:39] based on their racial National ethnical[21:41] or religious identity it is the[21:44] targeting the specific targeting of the[21:46] group in the formulation of genocide for[21:49] the sake of Destruction that makes it an[21:51] illegitimate form of combat and not[21:54] merely a legitimate War featuring[21:57] illegal and illegitimate tactics it is[22:00] the difference between civilians killed[22:02] as collateral damage and civilians[22:05] killed because their destruction is the[22:08] purpose of the[22:10] operation the icj declared that Israel[22:14] was most likely waging a genocidal[22:15] campaign and found that Israel's[22:18] measures taken were inadequate and not[22:20] dispositive of a genocidal intent or the[22:23] ACT to commit it at least at the pla at[22:25] the plausibility level as and and then[22:29] said in its provisional orders that[22:32] Israel must not commit mass killings of[22:35] civilians must not engage in activities[22:38] intended to prevent births in the group[22:40] must not cause serious bodily or[22:42] mentally harm must not create the[22:44] conditions intended to bring about the[22:46] destruction of the group in whole or in[22:48] part and must punish incitement to[22:51] genocide because one of the most[22:53] operative articles of the genocide[22:55] convention is its[22:57] prevention not its punishment its[23:00] purpose is to prevent[23:02] genocide not to punish it in retrospect[23:06] as put by the South African legal team[23:08] the icj order to ceasefire in everything[23:11] but[23:11] name Israel must impede an un must uh[23:16] Implement an unimpeded flow of[23:19] humanitarian Aid must not bomb safe[23:23] zones must not bomb hospitals should not[23:26] be laying Siege to alifa hospital[23:28] hospital to Al hospital right now must[23:32] not bomb residential areas must not[23:35] commit field executions and further Mass[23:39] displacement either Israel must conduct[23:41] its War entirely differently or not[23:44] conduct it at all a ceasefire and[23:49] everything but[23:51] name so why not demand a ceasefire if so[23:55] if this is so neither the icj decision[23:58] or the five uh separate opinions really[24:02] tell us why they declined to demand a[24:05] ceasefire there's no logic that's[24:06] expressed in the documents themselves so[24:08] all I can share with you is my guess my[24:11] learned[24:12] guess I'll spare you that but tell you[24:15] one one important takeaway at least in[24:18] my opinion which is that it's not[24:20] Divergent from existing IJ jurist[24:23] Prudence most people have pointed out[24:25] that unlike in the Russia versus um or[24:28] the Ukraine versus Russia case where the[24:30] court did ask for demand to ceasefire[24:32] that this represents a double standard[24:35] but that was a completely different fact[24:37] pattern there the Ukraine brought the[24:40] case in order to challenge Russia's[24:43] declaration of war where Russia insisted[24:46] that Ukraine was committing genocide[24:48] against Russian Nationals in the Ukraine[24:51] thereby giving it a legitimate right to[24:53] use force and so when the court found[24:57] that there was no Ukrainian and genocide[24:58] of Russian[25:00] Nationals that there was no genocide[25:02] that Israel had no purpose to start the[25:05] war and therefore must impose a[25:08] ceasefire the more similar fact pattern[25:11] is in fact found in The Gambia versus[25:14] Myanmar very similar fact pattern of an[25:18] operation that takes place in August[25:20] 2016 that leads to what becomes an[25:22] ethnic cleansing and genocidal campaign[25:25] by[25:25] 2017 and in that case the the court also[25:29] did not demand a ceasefire in its[25:31] provisional order and I don't say this[25:33] to rehabilitate the court but I say this[25:35] that if we are to call out a double[25:36] standard this is not where it is in my[25:40] estimation now that said the court could[25:43] have created a workaround it could have[25:46] created a workaround one of the[25:48] arguments is that because Hamas is not a[25:50] state actor the icj couldn't impose uh[25:52] cease fire on both parties but the icj[25:55] does order Hamas to release the hostages[25:58] which means that it's speaking to it as[26:02] a legal subject which means it could[26:04] have spoken to it to demand a ceasefire[26:07] had it wanted to right giving us a[26:11] glimpse that a workaround was possible[26:13] so here one can say Well then why not[26:16] perhaps here is where we can take more[26:19] issue but even had the court created[26:22] that workaround even had the court[26:25] demanded a unanimous ceasefire it would[26:27] not have the authority to enforce it the[26:30] icj has no enforcement[26:33] Authority Russia continues its War[26:37] despite a demand for ceasefire that's[26:40] not Israel or the United States it[26:42] certainly is power but it also indicates[26:45] to us that the icj does not have this[26:48] Authority and so we should not have[26:50] expected it to do the work that it[26:52] cannot do we are the only ones that can[26:56] do that work as we have been doing so[27:00] consider how the icj has been used the[27:03] icj provided a tool to agitate for[27:06] ceasefire not to find genocide in[27:10] individual countries it enabled those[27:12] countries to impose weapon sanctions[27:15] think Belgium think Japan think the[27:17] Netherlands think Colombia it enabled[27:20] countries to cut diplomatic ties think[27:23] Bolivia think Brazil think the African[27:25] Union and its entirety it enabled[27:28] countries to initiate criminal cases[27:31] under un Universal jurisdiction in their[27:33] National courts think of the lawsuits in[27:36] Switzerland against Isaac herzo the[27:38] standing Israeli president in France in[27:41] the Netherlands and now in Germany to[27:43] take place next week to begin on April[27:45] 4th and to continue to isolate the[27:48] United States and Israel politically so[27:51] isolated that the US actually pivoted[27:54] and now Israel is further[27:56] isolated it is no no surprise that[27:59] Israel has tried to spin the icj[28:01] decision as a victory as well as to[28:04] deflect from it in order uh to punish[28:08] and demonize unwa even[28:10] further in all cases this will be far[28:13] more difficult to prove so this was all[28:16] done on the level of plausibility which[28:18] is a very low[28:20] standard you're not proving it as[28:23] criminal case would Beyond A Reasonable[28:25] Doubt is it[28:26] plausible that that Israel is trying to[28:30] destroy the Palestinian people had the[28:32] court not found based on the evidence[28:35] available to us that that was not true[28:38] it would have been a case against the[28:39] icj and its legitimacy[28:42] entirely that almost was[28:46] impossible but at the Merit stage of[28:49] proceedings which will happen anywhere[28:51] between 6 and 12 years in the case of[28:53] Bosnia versus Serbia I think it happened[28:56] 12 years 1994 it was brought and then[28:59] 2006 it was heard right at that stage of[29:01] proceedings this standard is much higher[29:05] and more difficult to overcome there[29:08] there if there is not a Smoking Gun from[29:12] the top level of government that says[29:16] destroy the[29:18] Palestinians which there isn't I know[29:20] it's hard for us to believe given the[29:22] racist rhetoric The Tick Tock Channel 2[29:25] Channel 12 given the dehumanization but[29:29] there isn't in all of their documents[29:32] they have protected again themselves[29:34] against this accusation insisting that[29:38] this is not against the Palestinian[29:39] civilians that this is against Hamas[29:42] right so we know that there is likely[29:44] not a Smoking Gun that indicates this[29:48] intent in that case the intent to[29:51] destroy can only be inferred from quote[29:55] a pattern of conduct only and this word[29:58] is operative in law[30:00] only if the only reasonable inference[30:03] that can be drawn there from is that[30:06] this was genocidal intent and this comes[30:08] from the Bosnia versus Serbia case and[30:11] if you're interested to really have your[30:14] stomach[30:15] turn and read what the court does and[30:18] how it operates and probably hate all[30:20] lawyers even[30:22] more you'd read Bosnia versus Serbia[30:25] where the court draws a hair thin line[30:30] between the intent to ethnically cleanse[30:34] and the intent to[30:37] destroy and now what we're seeing[30:40] another intent that Israel is displaying[30:42] to us an intent to force Hamas to[30:46] surrender using terrorist tactics but[30:49] surrender versus ethnically cleanse[30:52] versus destroy are examined very[30:56] distinctly have different legal[30:59] consequences in the law and[31:02] so for the rest of my that that's really[31:06] sad yeah I've disappointed you of what's[31:07] to come well that's what I've come to do[31:10] okay I'll end slightly on a different[31:12] note but that's what I've come to do but[31:14] let let me now shift I said I'm going to[31:16] do my best to to share with you the[31:20] Israeli arguments now the Israeli[31:22] arguments before the icj were quite[31:24] laughable most of them were ad hamim[31:25] attacks and disparaging[31:28] right but if you take them to a level of[31:30] abstraction and I'm doing that for our[31:32] sake not for their sake right I want to[31:36] show how how the court itself how their[31:39] arguments still fall flat but why the[31:42] court won't be able to refute them why[31:45] the law is not going to be sufficient to[31:47] overcome their[31:48] argument note that the Israeli argument[31:51] in general is based on the fact that[31:54] this is an that the outcomes are an[31:56] unfortunate War[31:58] okay it's just a war and all wars are[32:01] tragic remember Dresden not taking[32:04] account any of the irony that Dresden[32:07] leads to the post 1945 international[32:10] human rights legal regime right anyway[32:14] they don't take us seriously but I'm[32:16] going to do it for them their two main[32:18] arguments in this war of why this is not[32:20] genocide are number one Palestinians are[32:23] not targeted for who they are they're[32:26] targeted for what they did[32:29] right they're not targeted because[32:31] they're Palestinians they're targeted[32:33] because they attacked Hamas and POS a[32:35] threat uh sorry they attacked Israel and[32:37] and pose a threat to the state and its[32:39] civilians okay number two it's an[32:42] argument in just War theory that if the[32:46] purpose of the war is legitimate then[32:48] all means of warfare can also be[32:51] justified very similar to the way that[32:54] the atomic bombing of Nagasaki in[32:56] hirosima[32:58] indiscriminate Warfare a[33:01] disproportionate excessive use of force[33:03] generational harm to Japan and Japanese[33:07] civilians was never punished but[33:10] considered in retrospect as legitimate[33:13] and and even in revisionist history[33:16] would have saved more lives than had the[33:19] war continued okay so these are Israel's[33:21] two arguments let me start with the[33:23] first one that they're not attacking[33:25] Palestinians for who they are they're[33:27] attacking them for what they did let's[33:29] look at what the what the numbers tell[33:32] us 32,000 Palestinians have been killed[33:35] 250 a day not including those still[33:38] missing under the rubble 40% of those[33:41] fatalities have been children killing an[33:43] average of a 100 children a day Ming at[33:47] least 10 children who have lost one or[33:49] both limbs to amputation[33:52] daily including[33:54] today over a 100 journalists have been[33:57] killed who Now understand themselves as[34:00] targets 1.9 Palestinians are internally[34:03] displaced[34:05] 250,000 homes have been totally or[34:07] partially destroyed all of the 35[34:10] hospitals have been attacked 326 schools[34:13] all of the four major universities[34:15] leveling them to the ground 247 mosques[34:20] three churches 199 Heritage sites 1,690[34:24] factories libraries cultural centers[34:27] bakeries even 16 cemeteries have been[34:31] bulldozed because of the deprivation of[34:33] food and water four out of five starving[34:35] people in the entire world today are in[34:39] Gaza and 335,000 children are at risk of[34:43] irreparable cognitive development[34:45] disability because of dehydration new[34:49] words have been created to describe the[34:51] scope of this destruction uh domicide[34:54] epistemicide[34:55] scolastici as put by Professor sh say[34:58] Ali quote any honest Observer of this[35:00] war understands the target of Israeli[35:02] force and its us supplied weapons is the[35:06] Palestinian[35:08] civilian Hamas combatant are collateral[35:12] damage Israel does not dispute these[35:15] numbers but wants to cast them as[35:17] hamas's responsibility for shielding[35:20] that even if they were targeted in the[35:22] course of attacks they were targeted[35:23] because Hamas placed themselves in the[35:26] hospitals buried its weapons uh dug its[35:28] tunnels under certain homes thereby[35:30] making everything a legitimate Target[35:32] I'll get to why this makes absolutely no[35:35] sense even in you know modern laws of[35:38] war but I just want to point out one[35:40] thing that has been taken for for[35:42] granted especially in the media which is[35:45] that Israel has[35:48] insisted that Palestinians who are[35:51] support Hamas who are members of Hamas[35:55] even if they do not have a role Ro in[35:57] its political or military leadership[35:59] even if they are not combatants that[36:01] their adherence to a Hamas ideology[36:05] makes them legitimate targets and in the[36:08] genocide convention genocide does not[36:10] protect political groups thereby making[36:13] them legitimate targets and yet this is[36:17] absolutely not true civilians do not[36:20] lose their impunity their immunity[36:23] excuse me for what they believe you can[36:25] have the worst thoughts in this room if[36:28] you are not picking up arms you are a[36:30] civilian and cannot be[36:34] targeted thankfully the icj recognized[36:37] Palestinians as a national group and[36:39] rejected this argument in part but now[36:42] let me go back into something that the[36:44] court is not going to take into[36:46] consideration which is what Palestine[36:48] studies offers us which is the[36:51] historical offering that Palestinians[36:54] have been constructed as a threat not[36:57] because of what they do but precisely[36:59] because of who they are they have been[37:03] presumed Guilty by virtue of their[37:06] refusal to disappear or Surrender their[37:08] claims to sovereignty Palestinians are[37:11] racialized as dangerous not because of[37:14] how they may individually harm Israel[37:17] but because their National existence[37:20] challenges Zionist settler sovereignty[37:23] consider for example how the right of[37:25] Return of Palestinian refugees is framed[37:28] as an existential[37:30] threat calling for the right of return[37:33] is equated to calling for the[37:35] destruction of Israel in this[37:38] construction the use of violence and the[37:41] logic of collective punishment against[37:42] Palestinians has underpinned Israel's[37:46] military uh strategy in the founding[37:48] years of the Israeli State even in cases[37:51] where they posed no military threat this[37:54] is plan doot introduced in March 19 47[37:58] that sanctioned the targeting of[38:00] Palestinian Villages accused of[38:02] providing assistance to Palestinian[38:04] militants or that might serve as[38:06] strategic basis for attacks in the name[38:08] of achieving a defensive system so even[38:11] since 1947 the attack of Palestinians[38:15] not because of what they did and[38:17] precisely because of who they are has[38:19] been framed as defensive Force later[38:23] Israel adopted Britain's military[38:25] emergency regulations that were[38:26] established during during the Great[38:28] Palestinian great Revolt of 36 to39 when[38:32] Israel was established its First Act of[38:34] government was to adopt these military[38:37] regulations almost in whole and to apply[38:40] them exclusively to the[38:42] Palestinians that remained a year[38:46] afterwards a military commission[38:47] determined that they posed no threat to[38:50] Israel and yet founding Prime Minister[38:53] David buuran insisted that emergency[38:56] regime remain in place that marshal law[39:00] that you all might be more familiar with[39:02] as it's applied to the West Bank and[39:04] previously in Gaza remain in place for[39:07] the sake I quote of establishing Jewish[39:11] settlement in all parts of the[39:14] state and so that military regime[39:16] remained in place for 18[39:19] years before it was applied to the West[39:21] Bank in Gaza in ' 67 securitization of[39:24] Palestinians becomes ins sconed in[39:26] police and Military discourse in the[39:28] early 2000s since the second intifa in[39:32] the early 2000s Israel began to develop[39:34] legal technologies that would allow it[39:36] to use greater military force against[39:39] the population that it occupied a[39:41] Cornerstone of this technology in legal[39:44] language is to shrink who counts as a[39:47] civilian what I describe as the[39:49] shrinking civilian that doesn't mean[39:52] that Palestinians shrink in size but it[39:54] shrinks who can be counted as a pal pal[39:58] inian and we see that even today[40:00] becoming much worse that Israel for[40:03] example is[40:04] calculating that uh that its military[40:07] Advantage shouldn't be measured in any[40:09] single attack but across the entire[40:11] operation for example in other example[40:14] it redefines who can be considered a[40:16] direct participant in hostilities in[40:18] irregular combat I'm sorry if this is[40:20] too legal but let me just give you this[40:22] example that civilians who pick up arms[40:25] can be targeted during the time that[40:26] they pick up the those arms well Israel[40:28] in 2006 in a Supreme Court decision[40:31] changed removed the temporal scope so it[40:34] doesn't matter if they put down their[40:37] arms they that becomes rest for them and[40:40] it's a continuous combat function which[40:42] enables the targeting of those[40:43] Palestinians who chose to fight even[40:46] when they're not fighting thus making[40:48] them their families their neighborhoods[40:50] targetable and collateral damage[40:52] shrinking civilian there's a lot on that[40:55] but let let me skip ahead and you can[40:57] asked me about that in the Q&A and move[41:00] to the second argument if the attack is[41:03] legitimate then all forms of all means[41:06] of warfare are legitimate now here this[41:09] entire argument is based on Israel's[41:12] claim that hamas's operation on October[41:16] 7th was uh basically raised the right[41:21] right triggered article 51 of the U uh[41:24] of the UN Charter which is the exception[41:26] to the prohibition on the use of force[41:28] enshrined in article two of the charter[41:32] right and even and and Israel is drawing[41:34] on the president that the United States[41:36] set when alqa attacks Al-Qaeda attacks[41:40] the United States in 2001 where up until[41:44] 2001 non-state actors could not be[41:48] considered as actually launching an[41:50] armed attack they had to be met with uh[41:54] law enforcement not with military force[41:57] but res un security council's[41:59] resolutions 1368[42:01] 1373 May gave the US the right to[42:04] respond to Al-Qaeda by responding to to[42:07] attack[42:08] Afghanistan which anyways I'll pause[42:11] there and get to the point here Israel[42:14] is trying to use this argument to use[42:17] the right of self-defense in responding[42:19] to the Hamas operation but they[42:23] cannot they cannot in 2004 the[42:27] International court of justice already[42:28] responded to this argument Israel made[42:31] it in its uh in its justification its[42:33] legal justification for the route of the[42:35] apari wall or the annexation wall 85% of[42:38] which runs through the West[42:40] Bank when the court said very clearly[42:44] that unlike in 2001 when Al-Qaeda[42:47] attacked the United States right that in[42:51] this case in this case the armed attack[42:54] originates from within the territory[42:57] that Israel has effective control over[43:01] therefore the failure to prevent this[43:03] attack is Israel's[43:05] failure that's a legal argument but the[43:08] some of it is that Israel does not have[43:10] the right to self-defense against[43:11] territory that it occupies period[43:16] period um but it the attack has to be[43:20] attributable to a sovereign state now[43:23] Israel wants to argue that Gaza is not[43:25] sovereign but it could be attributable[43:27] to as a sovereign because it withdrew[43:30] its forces and its settlers in[43:33] 2005 but here I want to bring up other[43:36] exceptions that Israel is making Israel[43:39] usurped Palestinian sovereignty in the[43:41] West Bank in Gaza and has a duty and a[43:43] responsibility to protect those[43:45] civilians under its occupations until[43:47] the reversion of that sovereignty that[43:49] means that any insecurity and disorder[43:52] in the territories is attributable to[43:54] Israel itself rather than a foreign[43:56] state[43:57] and the proper level of force should be[43:59] regulated by occupation law rather than[44:02] the laws of war but because Israel[44:04] desires Palestinian lands without the[44:06] Palestinians on them it has insisted[44:09] since[44:10] 1967 that there is no Sovereign in the[44:13] West Bank in Gaza this is the missing[44:16] reversioner argument the argument goes[44:18] that because Egypt never laid claim to[44:20] Gaza and because only the UK and[44:22] Pakistan recognize Jordan's claim of[44:25] sovereignty over the West Bank that[44:27] there is no Sovereign in these[44:29] territories because they never recognize[44:31] Palestinians as a people therefore the[44:33] territory is disputed and not occupied[44:36] what's the outcome of that if it's[44:38] disputed you don't have to apply[44:41] occupation law including its prohibition[44:43] on the settlement of civilians in the[44:45] territory that you occupy as a matter of[44:47] law you can just cherry-pick and apply[44:51] occupation law as a matter of fact[44:54] Israel is claiming that the Gaza and the[44:56] West Bank are sui generous Latin for[44:59] unlike anything else where there it's an[45:02] exceptional legal framework there's no[45:04] analogy there's no precedent so this is[45:06] how legal thinking works you get a fact[45:08] pattern you see what that fact pattern[45:11] looks like and something is the closest[45:14] to it as a matter of analogy or[45:16] something that happened before it as a[45:17] matter of precedent when Israel claims[45:19] that the West Bank and Gaza are SOI[45:21] generous it's saying that there is no[45:24] existing law that it applies there by[45:27] giving itself the authority to create[45:29] new[45:30] law which is what it has been doing and[45:33] under this exceptional framework Israel[45:36] in 2000 uh 2001 during the second in[45:40] described the Palestinian in as neither[45:44] a civilian Uprising that should be met[45:46] with police force nor is it an[45:49] international armed conflict of a nent[45:51] sovereign struggling for its Liberation[45:54] right because the former it would have[45:55] to acknowledge that it governs over a[45:57] population that doesn't have any voting[45:59] rights[46:00] awkward or it would have to recognize[46:02] that Palestinians are actually a[46:04] sovereign with the right to[46:05] self-determination very awkward and[46:08] instead its military lawyers created new[46:12] law insisting that its challenge was so[46:14] generous and called it and I quote an[46:17] armed conflict short of War they made it[46:21] up which enabled Israeli military to use[46:25] military force lead lethal Force against[46:27] the population where the population[46:29] could not fight back legitimately[46:31] whether they target soldiers and[46:34] military installations or they target[46:37] civilians all of it becomes illegitimate[46:39] criminal and[46:41] terroristic uh and upon its[46:43] disengagement of Gaza in 2005 Israel[46:46] then declared Gaza was suig generous it[46:49] was neither independent because the[46:51] occupation ended nor was it occupied[46:54] because it maintained effective control[46:56] but[46:57] it was a hostile[46:59] entity the international criminal court[47:02] rejected that argument in 2014 in its[47:05] dicta declaring that Gaza remains[47:08] occupied territory so if we then reject[47:12] Israel's first argument that this is a[47:15] legitimate War based on self-defense[47:18] then what else can we make of its[47:21] operation let's examine what its[47:23] operation is attempting to do we are[47:26] told we are told that Israel has three[47:29] military goals in Gaza which is to[47:34] decimate Hamas to retrieve the captives[47:37] and to turn the Palestinian population[47:39] against Hamas right 5 and a half months[47:43] of no red lines and Israel is nowhere[47:46] closer to achieving any of these[47:48] military goals Hamas is launching[47:50] operations from the middle of Gaza City[47:53] has the Arsenal to[47:55] continue the hostages and the captives[47:58] that have been retrieved have been[47:59] retrieved through diplomacy not the[48:02] military operations and from what we[48:04] understand Israel doesn't really care[48:07] about the hostages as they've shot them[48:09] with white flags raised as they've[48:12] allowed them to starve to death and[48:15] certainly this idea of turning[48:16] Palestinians against Hamas is not true[48:18] not only has Hamas become more popular[48:20] amongst Palestinians they've become much[48:22] more popular in the Arab world and in[48:24] fact across the globe[48:27] according to us[48:32] intelligence so what then if if not if[48:37] th if that is not what Israel either[48:39] Israel is trying to achieve these goals[48:40] and its[48:42] Army sucks I'm sorry I was looking for[48:44] the[48:45] word its Army is[48:48] inept right and frankly maybe maybe they[48:52] should just stay on Tik Tok right or[48:56] that not the goal of the operation at[48:59] all that's not the goal of the operation[49:01] at all and and for many of us it has[49:05] raised the presumption that that's not[49:06] the goal of the operation that Israel[49:08] has an other less explicit military goal[49:11] framed explicitly as the[49:13] removal of all Palestinians in Gaza to[49:16] achieve sustainable security or less[49:19] explicitly as the tacit suggestion that[49:21] the decimation of Hamas is so worthwhile[49:24] that 2.3 million Palestinian Ians are a[49:27] justifiable register of harm in both[49:30] iterations it is the establishment of[49:32] what I describe as neba[49:35] peace neba peace I know that seems odd[49:38] neba catastrophe peace but think this is[49:41] Zionist math so it doesn't add[49:45] up um but it has a historical precedent[49:48] in Palestine and in fact the former[49:51] shinb director and National Security[49:53] member AI D explained in November who by[49:55] the way we sued in the United States in[49:56] the southern district of New York in[49:58] 2005 so he remains here as well because[50:02] of a lack of accountability but a said[50:04] in November 2023 quote we are now[50:08] rolling out a Gaza neba Gaza neba[50:11] 2023 that's how it will end and in fact[50:15] that's precisely what we're seeing now[50:17] it's a battle and what they're[50:19] considering right is the equation is it[50:22] the retrieval of the[50:25] captives is it the ret reval of the[50:27] captives and a return to a very[50:29] destructive status quo anti that was[50:31] never normal life for Palestinians or is[50:34] it the sacrifice of their captives in[50:36] order to reoccupy the north of[50:40] Gaza this is literally what is on the[50:44] table before us in very explicit term[50:46] this logic says that the proximity of[50:48] Gaza inhabited by 2.3 million[50:50] Palestinians 2third of whom are refugees[50:52] seeking return to their original homes[50:55] makes the entirety of Gaza and its[50:57] population civilian and otherwise a[50:59] threat that needs to be removed or[51:02] permanently subdued accordingly Israel[51:06] has insisted that to achieve its[51:07] military purpose of sustainable[51:09] self-defense it should not be subject to[51:11] Red Lines which it has not been subject[51:12] to red lines and in turn it has a[51:15] sovereign right a sovereign right[51:18] because in international law there's[51:19] this conundrum we think it's about us we[51:23] think it's about you and me and[51:24] individuals but International law[51:27] primarily protects[51:29] States and so our existence is[51:32] constantly being challenged which is why[51:35] for example the US imprisons one out of[51:39] every three black adult[51:42] men right it's why we see countries like[51:46] Myanmar commit genocide against their uh[51:50] rohinga population it's why we see China[51:54] Place its weager population in camps to[51:57] re-educate them how is it that this can[52:00] take place many of you say because[52:03] laws a fiction but in fact the law is[52:07] protecting the state because the states[52:10] have this right and Israel is claiming[52:12] that it is its Sovereign right as every[52:14] other Colonial and settler colonial[52:16] power has before it to commit genocide[52:19] in order to achieve its[52:22] security I'll spare you with the[52:23] historical precedent where this comes up[52:26] in the early early 2000s and competes[52:28] with the withdrawal plan this was[52:30] presented by Gora elans and competed[52:32] with Ariel chiron's plan for withdrawal[52:34] obviously the latter um the latter[52:37] prevailed but what I what I I will say[52:41] is that we are witnessing a NECA we are[52:45] witnessing a neba that features removal[52:47] exclusion Colonial settlement framed as[52:51] necessary for Israel's durable security[52:53] as exclusive as Zionist sovereignty and[52:56] the recent icj decision concluding that[52:58] Israel is plausibly advancing a genocide[53:01] is part of the effort to reject this[53:03] exception it's another exception of sui[53:06] generous unlike anything before right[53:10] however given the invisibility of the[53:12] neba and international criminal law the[53:14] law will probably not save[53:17] anybody moreover the neba was committed[53:20] in the shadows of the drafting of the[53:22] genocide convention this we're talking[53:24] about between 1946 and 48[53:27] right and the neba was committed between[53:29] 47 and 49 Palestinians whose[53:32] self-determination was forcefully[53:34] thwarted a key feature of the neba could[53:37] not assed to the newly drafted genocide[53:40] convention and Israel viewed as[53:42] genocides canonical victims could not be[53:45] conceived as its first[53:48] accused the International Community has[53:51] continued since then to normalize this[53:53] neba to actually make it precedent[53:57] through the recognition of Israel[53:59] through resolution 181 through[54:01] resolution 242 through even more[54:03] recently the icj case that's[54:05] contemplating the legal status of the[54:07] occupied territories as forceful as that[54:10] was the key logic of that[54:13] argument is that there should be two[54:15] states there was no challenge of the[54:19] neba that that happened and it could be[54:21] accepted and it's an exception to all[54:24] the violations as long as you recognize[54:26] a Palestinian state in the West Bank in[54:28] Gaza so this exception has been[54:32] normalized in the law and even by Allied[54:35] States as well as the formal Palestinian[54:38] leadership and today Israel is[54:40] continuing its tradition of exception[54:43] the exception that the territories are[54:45] not occupied but disputed its exception[54:48] that its Warfare against Palestinians is[54:50] not an international armed conflict or a[54:53] a civil Uprising but an armed conflict[54:55] short of War an exception that the Gaza[54:59] Strip is a hostile entity and now an[55:03] exception that what it's doing in the[55:05] Gaza Strip is not[55:07] genocide but in fact[55:12] self-defense so how do we reject that[55:16] exception how do we reject that[55:18] exception I do I would not Place My Hope[55:20] at the[55:21] icj and as much as I said I thought I[55:24] liked what the icj did I I exalted it to[55:27] some extent and I supported it amongst[55:29] the legal teams that wanted to bring it[55:31] but I didn't do it in order to find[55:33] genocide I supported it be because it[55:35] became becomes a tool for us in order to[55:38] agitate for[55:39] ceasefire so often times we use the law[55:42] in counterintuitive ways and I look[55:43] forward to getting into that with[55:45] Professor Abu dhab uh more on that and I[55:47] also skipped over the laws of War and[55:49] why Israel's uh war is actually outside[55:52] of the bounds of accepted um Warfare[55:55] that regulates gorilla combat since[55:57] 1977 but let me close on this[56:01] note oh I was just showing that the[56:04] world knows what's happening let me[56:05] close on this[56:06] note we can argue as much as we'd like[56:10] about what Israel is doing and the[56:12] precise meaning and I I you must be[56:14] frustrated even in this moment and know[56:16] who cares what it's called it's wrong[56:19] right well the law cares and the law[56:22] will split hairs which is why that's the[56:26] law will follow what you do in the in on[56:29] the streets in these auditoriums in your[56:33] classrooms in your places of worship in[56:36] places where you have access to[56:38] diplomatic[56:39] fora that's where it[56:42] matters um but what we're witnessing is[56:46] precisely that we are witnessing an[56:49] unprecedented Mass mobilization across[56:52] the globe millions and millions of of[56:56] people who I think I'm convinced they[56:59] were the reason even that the Republic[57:02] of South Africa felt empowered to bring[57:05] its case not the other way[57:08] around we we know this from also polling[57:11] Youth and racialized minorities in the[57:13] United States which is really[57:14] significant not just because that's[57:16] where I'm coming from sorry but it's[57:18] really significant because this is a US[57:21] War it's not us complicity this is a US[57:24] war on Palestinians and so what we're[57:27] doing matters in order to stem that war[57:31] Youth and racialized minorities in the[57:33] US who for the past 20 years have led[57:36] movements for racial and gender justice[57:38] who have led movements for gun reform[57:41] who have led movements against climate[57:43] catastrophe have been primed to distrust[57:46] government and to distrust the adults[57:49] all of us who have failed them they see[57:53] Israel together with white supremacy and[57:55] capitalism as a threat to their future[57:57] in recent polling 67% of respondents[58:00] under 35 and 64% of respondents of color[58:04] opposed Israel's actions in Gaza high[58:07] school students high school students who[58:10] have not even received a college[58:12] education and have not studied Palestine[58:14] as much as those with phds who still[58:16] can't decide who still tell you this is[58:19] complicated understand that there is[58:21] nothing[58:22] complicated about the murder of[58:25] babies[58:27] and about starving them to death and[58:30] high school students have staged[58:32] walkouts Rising calls around the world[58:36] for a free Palestine voice more than the[58:39] commitment to ethical solidarity with[58:41] Palestinians free Palestine has become a[58:45] rallying cry for colle Collective[58:47] Liberation around the[58:50] world this dramatic shift is likely a[58:53] generational one and it may not bring[58:56] Improvement immediately the Improvement[58:58] that we need to see in a meaningful[59:01] change especially for the Palestinians[59:03] in Gaza but it does signal hope for in[59:08] the future of our Humanity the question[59:11] of Palestine will likely be at the[59:13] center of that commitment to a future[59:16] and it's being reshaped Forever by this[59:19] rebellious new generation and that is a[59:22] very good thing so with that free pal[59:26] free us all thank[59:27] [Applause][59:39] you thank you on can you hear me no[59:45] hello hello hello yes[59:48] good okay all[59:50] right good evening everyone nura thank[59:53] you[59:54] for such such a powerful presentation[59:58] very lucid very[01:00:00] informative very important[01:00:04] um I have a lot of[01:00:07] questions I'm gonna give what I thought[01:00:09] it was so clear give you a minute give[01:00:11] you a minute to no no go ahead to have[01:00:13] your water um maybe I should put this[01:00:15] over here okay my first question and I[01:00:19] have a very quick follow-up question to[01:00:21] it you say we need[01:00:24] accountability can you explain what that[01:00:27] accountability exactly looks like or[01:00:29] should look like what do you mean by[01:00:31] that that's an excellent question what[01:00:34] does it mean when we hold someone to[01:00:36] account right well first of all it means[01:00:40] first and for most it means centering a[01:00:45] victim and a Survivor and hearing their[01:00:48] story to explain to us what they've[01:00:51] experienced it means the opposite of[01:00:53] gaslighting but it means being able to[01:00:55] honor these stories it means actually[01:00:59] taking Collective action on behalf of[01:01:02] those survivors so that we don't leave[01:01:05] it to vigilante justice in order to[01:01:08] achieve the necessary components that[01:01:11] will make them whole now that can look[01:01:13] like different things in different cases[01:01:15] but I think at the very very least in[01:01:17] this case it means an[01:01:19] acknowledgement without controversy that[01:01:22] what we've seen for the past 5 and a[01:01:24] half months is genocide side is[01:01:26] illegitimate that Palestinians in this[01:01:29] case deserve reparations deserve to be[01:01:33] made whole again frankly deserve Freedom[01:01:36] although I don't think that that's going[01:01:37] to be the direct that's the that's what[01:01:38] we have to continue to do um and for[01:01:42] many many people that means punishment[01:01:44] of Israel I might diverge on that[01:01:46] punishment of Israel and Israelis I[01:01:49] think it's far more important for us to[01:01:51] be[01:01:52] acknowledged right um and to be[01:01:56] recognized and to have the world act on[01:01:58] our behalf rather than continuing to act[01:02:01] on our own behalf with a a few allies[01:02:04] here and there I think so think about[01:02:06] the way think about you[01:02:09] know International[01:02:11] tribunals those have been sites of[01:02:14] accountability right and that resulted[01:02:17] for example in and just recognizing the[01:02:20] stories that weren't heard before the[01:02:23] confrontation with those who caused you[01:02:25] harm in this case I would imagine that[01:02:27] it it results in a complete shift in[01:02:29] policy arms embargo on states that you[01:02:33] know commit genocide it means cutting of[01:02:35] diplomatic sanctions it might be the[01:02:37] exclusion of a state or its removal from[01:02:40] the United Nations you know it's return[01:02:42] upon certain these things can be[01:02:45] negotiated but the whole idea and the[01:02:47] way that I see it is that it's it's a[01:02:50] where centering the Survivor is followed[01:02:53] by a collectivity that takes on[01:02:57] responsibility for them so that it[01:02:59] becomes universalized and not just[01:03:01] individualized because you say you you[01:03:03] also say that now is not the time to[01:03:06] talk about the day after or that it sort[01:03:07] of[01:03:09] obfuscates but can you can you really[01:03:12] separate the two I mean isn't isn't this[01:03:15] accountability that you were just[01:03:16] talking about integral to what happens[01:03:18] after well here's why I say that because[01:03:21] most people who talk about the day after[01:03:22] put us in this Loop that they put[01:03:24] Palestinians in for now seven decades[01:03:27] right what's your plan what's the[01:03:30] blueprint when they're really asking us[01:03:33] if we allow you to be free can you[01:03:35] promise that Israelis will be[01:03:38] safe that's literally what they're[01:03:40] asking us when they say the day after so[01:03:42] give us the political Arrangement that[01:03:44] would work that would Center Israeli[01:03:46] prerogatives right and even now right[01:03:49] the discussion is around one state two[01:03:51] State a collectivity what happens and I[01:03:54] just feel that that's so[01:03:56] offensive when we can't even tell[01:03:58] Palestinians there is a world that[01:04:00] exists where you are safe from[01:04:04] harm and so accountability is that is[01:04:07] the guarantee that the right to life is[01:04:10] not a threat and they're the only ones[01:04:13] whose right to life is actually under[01:04:15] threat whose actual right to life whose[01:04:19] children who can survive is under threat[01:04:22] and so when I when we're talking about[01:04:23] the day after it's making that[01:04:24] distinction that before we get into the[01:04:27] politics how will we you know and what[01:04:29] is politics politics is the negotiation[01:04:32] over scarce[01:04:33] resources right before we get into that[01:04:36] discussion and hear the scarcity is land[01:04:38] and sovereignty over it that there has[01:04:40] to be a discussion about[01:04:44] fundamental rights in our natural world[01:04:46] that stem from religion be it the Quran[01:04:50] or the Torah or the Bible whatever what[01:04:52] have you that guarantee a right to life[01:04:54] and dignity[01:04:56] and and here is where I feel like we[01:04:58] can't J we can't skip that stage and I[01:05:01] think that too fast I think that too[01:05:04] fast people the world leaders in[01:05:06] particular want to sweep this under the[01:05:09] rug and not deal with it and not look[01:05:12] let Palestinians look them in the eye to[01:05:15] hold them to hold us responsible we're[01:05:18] responsible and I think that has to[01:05:20] happen and then we can talk[01:05:23] about now what do we do right[01:05:26] but I there there's a desire to just[01:05:28] move past this almost completely um and[01:05:31] and I think that that's I think that[01:05:33] that's really offensive okay okay and[01:05:36] you outlined very clearly how Israel um[01:05:42] creates new laws right you gave a few[01:05:44] examples the shrinking of the civilian[01:05:46] which I know you've written extensively[01:05:48] about um this whole idea of an armed[01:05:51] conflict short of War Etc but don't you[01:05:54] think I mean so Israel can create all[01:05:57] the new laws that it[01:05:59] wants then you have certain cases such[01:06:02] as the 2004 wall opinion which has[01:06:05] proven to be quite you know crucial in[01:06:09] simply in debunking the right to[01:06:11] self-defense argument so should we[01:06:15] really be worrying so much about Israel[01:06:17] creating new laws is that a rhetorical[01:06:21] question I'm trying to basically I'm[01:06:24] asking you do you think that given the[01:06:27] limits of the icj and international law[01:06:30] in general these cases such especially[01:06:33] the 2004 wall opinion and it's[01:06:35] significance to the right to[01:06:36] self-defense argument yeah what what is[01:06:41] could you expand on that sure two things[01:06:44] number one absolutely we have to be[01:06:46] worried about the exceptions that Israel[01:06:48] is trying to create in the law because[01:06:50] once they create the exception for[01:06:51] Palestinians they become exceptions[01:06:53] everywhere else in the world what's to[01:06:55] stop Myanmar from saying Israel did[01:06:58] it we do it right think about the way[01:07:02] that Israel created an exception for[01:07:04] extrajudicial assassinations prohibited[01:07:06] in order to kill somebody you need to[01:07:08] have some sort of hearing right guilty[01:07:11] not guilty some sort of fair trial which[01:07:13] you know you can say all you want about[01:07:15] that but the idea is that outside of the[01:07:18] law you can't assassinate people well[01:07:20] Israel started assassinating people in[01:07:24] 2001 and one and initially it was[01:07:28] opposed even though the Bush[01:07:30] Administration picked up the policy of[01:07:32] extrajudicial assassinations and it's[01:07:33] so-called war on terror right um and[01:07:37] initially it was opposed but once the[01:07:40] Obama Administration picked up that[01:07:43] policy and committed more extrajudicial[01:07:47] assassination in its first year of[01:07:50] office than all of the Bush[01:07:51] administrations four years now suddenly[01:07:53] with a Democratic Leadership and a BR in[01:07:56] office th that we saw the steady[01:07:58] normalization of extrajudicial[01:08:00] assassinations now become targeted[01:08:03] killings that have not only been[01:08:05] accepted but have been exalted as the[01:08:09] better more Humane approach to war right[01:08:13] and the idea of the unlawful combatant[01:08:15] the unlawful combatant I mean these[01:08:17] exceptions are dangerous for the entire[01:08:20] world right so I do think that the[01:08:22] exceptions that Israel creates matters[01:08:25] very much but then you ask me about the[01:08:27] 2004 decision which is like okay fine[01:08:30] you get a legal ruling that said you[01:08:31] can't do it right so what's the purpose[01:08:34] of the law let me Place responsibility[01:08:37] where it needs to be placed the court[01:08:39] did what it needed to do which is[01:08:41] basically tell us its interpretation of[01:08:43] the law that's all the court does it[01:08:44] doesn't have enforcement Authority right[01:08:47] the responsibility is on us and in 2004[01:08:51] had the Palestinian[01:08:53] leadership ran with that decision in a[01:08:56] diplomatic Marathon across the[01:08:58] globe to impose sanctions to use it to[01:09:02] say that Israel is building this wall[01:09:05] illegally you cannot engage with the[01:09:07] state you cannot engage in trade you[01:09:09] cannot uh even you know just even[01:09:11] limited to the settlements to settlement[01:09:13] products then we might you cannot sell[01:09:17] concrete and I won't name names of who[01:09:19] sells concrete to Israel to build its[01:09:23] wall you can name them it's okay[01:09:30] Palestinian leaders sold that[01:09:34] concrete so when we think about the[01:09:37] inefficacy of the 2004 icg decision that[01:09:40] inefficacy is not in the law that[01:09:42] inefficacy is in our[01:09:44] leadership that failed to use that[01:09:46] decision as it should have properly been[01:09:49] used and they don't just stop in 2004 in[01:09:53] 2009 the go Richard Goldstone the South[01:09:56] African jurist who basically studied the[01:09:59] same went and did the same legal[01:10:00] research we did in in as the national[01:10:02] lawyers Guild came back and found listen[01:10:06] this wasn't just collateral damage this[01:10:08] is the Goldstone report right a[01:10:09] commission of inquiry that's established[01:10:11] by the Human Rights Council that finds[01:10:14] Israel targeted[01:10:19] civilians we the Palestinian leadership[01:10:21] dropped it because they were promised a[01:10:24] better negotiating position[01:10:27] so there's this idea that the law is not[01:10:30] doing its work but the law doesn't do[01:10:33] anything the law is a tool and the[01:10:37] Palestinian leadership has forfeited[01:10:39] this tool in order to be to pursue a[01:10:44] politics of acquiescence rather than a[01:10:46] politics of resistance has sought to be[01:10:49] within the US and Israeli sphere of[01:10:51] influence rather than to be opposed to[01:10:53] it and so instead of using this tool has[01:10:58] instead used it as a[01:11:00] threat give us a state or we will punish[01:11:03] you or we will pursue this and so again[01:11:06] I that's why that's why this is why we[01:11:09] have these tools that we haven't used[01:11:11] adequately and it's really difficult for[01:11:13] civil society to do it again this is[01:11:16] this is a this is about diplomacy and[01:11:18] state interactions so I in my capacity[01:11:22] as a legal Advocate that represented a[01:11:23] Palestinian human rights organiz ation[01:11:25] at the United Nations took the Goldstone[01:11:28] report to un security council member[01:11:31] representatives in New York and said it[01:11:33] was your[01:11:35] obligation to apply these findings that[01:11:38] included an arms embargo on Israel and[01:11:42] their response was[01:11:44] simple the Palestinian Authority has[01:11:46] told us not[01:11:48] to W so this is the the the the space[01:11:53] that we're in and and I I kind of sound[01:11:55] like like I'm defending the law I'm[01:11:57] not I I'm you know I just want us to[01:12:00] understand that we want we want to be[01:12:02] angry because nothing is[01:12:04] working but we have to know where our[01:12:06] anger should be directed right and[01:12:09] targeting The Well of course but[01:12:13] targeting the law is shooting down one[01:12:15] of the tools that we have available to[01:12:17] us ex so why would I want to do that as[01:12:20] opposed to pointing it at at the[01:12:22] leadership that needs to be frank[01:12:26] yes yeah okay um I'm going to ask you[01:12:30] two more questions and then I will turn[01:12:32] it to the audience for Q&A can I go can[01:12:33] we go to 8:45 is that okay because we[01:12:35] did start later[01:12:40] so[01:12:47] okay well okay tell so I have a question[01:12:52] about okay I want sort of zoom out a[01:12:53] little bit about international law um we[01:12:59] know that the Palestinians and this is[01:13:02] the case for many other oppressed people[01:13:04] around the world have been ex suffering[01:13:07] Mass atrocities over a very long period[01:13:10] of time and they are punctuated with uh[01:13:14] episodes of spectacular violence and[01:13:16] crisis right um we also know that when[01:13:21] there is such a[01:13:22] crisis um for example when Russia[01:13:25] invaded Ukraine international law is in[01:13:27] the spotlight right everyone's talking[01:13:29] about international law we're talking[01:13:31] about establishing a special tribunal on[01:13:32] the crime of aggression we're going to[01:13:34] the ICC we're going to the[01:13:36] icj do you think that international[01:13:40] law and this might be a rhetorical[01:13:42] question[01:13:44] um said the international lawyer fails[01:13:47] in a particularly bad way when[01:13:49] atrocities are when it when it in its in[01:13:53] its uh in the way that it address es or[01:13:56] not these slow atrocities over an[01:13:59] extended period of time as opposed to[01:14:01] during times of Crisis and do you think[01:14:03] that international law could and should[01:14:07] play a better role in addressing these[01:14:09] at Mass atrocities that hope happen over[01:14:11] an extended period of[01:14:13] time no and[01:14:16] yes okay okay um here here's here's[01:14:20] that's the really the short answer but[01:14:22] this is what I want to also remind folks[01:14:24] international law is is[01:14:25] not uh is not a thing right you don't go[01:14:29] to an office and talk to international[01:14:31] law is not an Agent of Change[01:14:34] international law is a material that we[01:14:38] use and in the way that I think about[01:14:40] international law it means nothing[01:14:42] really no matter what it says no matter[01:14:45] what it says it means nothing its[01:14:48] meaning will be determined in an[01:14:50] adversarial process right either you[01:14:54] know for for a position for a position[01:14:58] against using you know evidence facts[01:15:02] argumentation logic that get then gets[01:15:06] interpreted by a a Judicial panel one[01:15:09] judge up to nine judges however many 16[01:15:12] judges in some cases who then apply[01:15:14] their own interpretation of it based on[01:15:17] their biases their fact the political[01:15:19] outcomes that they want to then tell us[01:15:21] what international law is so all[01:15:24] International La is at the end of the[01:15:26] day is a[01:15:28] Battleground period it's a[01:15:30] Battleground it's not a destination it's[01:15:33] not a it's not a set of values it's not[01:15:36] when people say we're all we all have to[01:15:38] live under international law I'm like[01:15:40] really right it's a Battleground for us[01:15:44] to adjudicate our own preferences for a[01:15:48] particular outcome and so so much of it[01:15:51] is contingent on the balance of economic[01:15:55] military and Social Power so much of it[01:15:58] is contingent on uh historical[01:16:02] circumstances have we just recovered[01:16:04] from fascism and atrocity or are we on[01:16:06] the brink of fascism and[01:16:08] atrocity so much of it revolves around[01:16:11] the characters in leadership the[01:16:13] individuals who are bringing the[01:16:15] material forward and so this idea when[01:16:18] we start to you know take this to a[01:16:19] level of of great abstraction I think[01:16:22] loses the Nuance of of what what we have[01:16:25] before us so in this particular moment[01:16:28] right I actually think we need to be[01:16:31] using international law not necessarily[01:16:34] to prove genocide right but in order to[01:16:38] agitate for a ceasefire to give us a[01:16:40] tool I think that we need to use[01:16:42] international law I was part of a team[01:16:45] that brought an application in front of[01:16:46] the international criminal court you all[01:16:49] I didn't even talk about the ICC can you[01:16:51] imagine how long that would have been[01:16:54] but the IC[01:16:55] is its own disaster of bias and[01:17:00] politicization and Kareem Khan the[01:17:02] current office of of of the prosecutor[01:17:04] the current prosecutor is is I you know[01:17:07] I can give you the receipts to explain[01:17:09] why but you might already know has said[01:17:11] nothing about Gaza and genocide in fact[01:17:16] what we understand what he's preparing[01:17:17] is just the war crime of[01:17:19] starvation in the light of all of these[01:17:22] atrocities but I was part and in 2015 I[01:17:25] wrote the article and published it in[01:17:26] jedia that argued why you know the ICC[01:17:29] if it ever took on Palestine as a case[01:17:32] would prosecute Hamas militants[01:17:35] first and may or may not prosecute[01:17:37] Israelis and guess who the first to be[01:17:40] prosecuted Hamas right but I still[01:17:43] brought the application in early[01:17:45] November why because I wanted a bigger[01:17:49] stage and a greater controversy in order[01:17:51] to make the argument of why it's[01:17:53] genocide so sometimes we use the law in[01:17:56] counterintuitive ways Franchesca[01:17:58] albanesi the un uh special rur to the[01:18:01] opt yesterday presented her findings on[01:18:04] genocide this was a wonderful[01:18:06] mobilization of international law[01:18:09] Nicaragua just Su recently sued Germany[01:18:12] for its complicity in genocide Mexico[01:18:14] and Chile just referred uh Israel and[01:18:17] Hamas to the ICC there's an agitation[01:18:19] that's also revealing the other thing[01:18:21] that law is doing here is revealing a[01:18:23] politics that colonialism never[01:18:26] ended and there's still a struggle[01:18:28] between a global North and a global[01:18:29] South and the global South embedded in[01:18:31] the global North right and so here you[01:18:34] have a different terrain of politics[01:18:36] that's taking place using the law as a[01:18:39] language and a Battleground but it's not[01:18:41] really about the law yeah okay thank you[01:18:45] um one last question and I promise I'll[01:18:48] come to you you mentioned I tried to[01:18:50] answer short no yes this one please do[01:18:53] keep it short okay you said earlier[01:18:56] during your remarks it is on and I'm I[01:18:59] quote it is on the ground where I[01:19:01] learned the laws of war not in the[01:19:04] classroom and I can now Envision all of[01:19:06] my students unenrolling from my law[01:19:09] courses this fall so please explain um[01:19:13] what you meant by[01:19:15] that[01:19:17] sorry um you know there's this I I I[01:19:21] love I am I am a professor and it's so[01:19:24] so ironic I tell my students you know[01:19:26] you really have to read this is the one[01:19:28] job you have and you'll regret it that[01:19:30] you don't read Because later you're[01:19:31] going to be too busy and you're going to[01:19:33] wish you had as much time as you did to[01:19:35] do all this reading yes right because[01:19:37] there's so much it's available in AB[01:19:39] you're ring yourself already[01:19:41] now um that you well I went I go back to[01:19:44] school I I I Vindicated my own[01:19:47] experience right yeah I went back to[01:19:50] school because I also felt I was like[01:19:51] wow I did so well but I really didn't[01:19:53] learn in the classroom I SP more of my[01:19:55] time learning in you know agitating as[01:19:57] in okay sorry now I'm I'm working[01:19:59] against your[01:20:01] interests um but in order to vindicate[01:20:03] that experience now what happens is many[01:20:07] of us and many academics no offense but[01:20:09] many academics often times stay on the[01:20:11] track of Academia and that's really what[01:20:13] they know so they're engaged in the text[01:20:16] and engaged in the footnotes and engaged[01:20:17] in discussions with one another and[01:20:19] there is an entire world from which[01:20:22] those texts are coming um that provide[01:20:24] context and richness abolutely that[01:20:27] actually reshapes the way that we[01:20:28] understand those texts so I could very[01:20:30] well read the Fourth Geneva Convention[01:20:33] the hag regulations 1897[01:20:36] 1907 the 77 additional protocols right[01:20:39] the genocide convention the apartheid[01:20:41] convention but I'm on the ground I'm on[01:20:45] the ground um in a or in I think was[01:20:51] really hard for me because that's where[01:20:53] I'm learning about families that were[01:20:56] anyway um but that's where I'm learning[01:21:00] about people who[01:21:01] were targeted with white flags and[01:21:05] having to explain that and looking in[01:21:07] the law to explain how is it that they[01:21:10] can be targeted and what is the[01:21:12] distinction between Reckless targeting[01:21:14] and what is the distinction between[01:21:16] direct that and direct targeting and[01:21:18] them as collateral[01:21:21] damage um yeah so you come back and you[01:21:24] learn these Les lessons so that when you[01:21:26] know uh Dr uh musri says that I'm[01:21:32] fearless it's not so it's that it's just[01:21:35] that I've seen[01:21:37] it I've seen it I know they're[01:21:41] lying and I want to share that with as[01:21:43] many people who want to hear about it[01:21:46] yeah extremely well put n thank[01:21:53] you[01:21:57] okay finally Q&A um do we have mics yes[01:22:02] all right so please raise your hand we[01:22:04] have one here okay wow I'm going to take[01:22:08] I really thought I was[01:22:10] clear clearly[01:22:13] not can I take three questions we should[01:22:16] have done a discussion I'm sorry I three[01:22:19] questions at a time is that okay with[01:22:20] you sure okay I think there's a big[01:22:24] concent ation over here so let's do one[01:22:27] here in the second oh say one in the[01:22:29] first row one in the second row and one[01:22:31] in the third row please and if you could[01:22:34] please very quickly introduce yourselves[01:22:36] and keep your questions super[01:22:39] short concise[01:22:42] concise hi my name is hanni I am[01:22:44] Palestinian Jordanian Canadian lived[01:22:46] here for four years uh question for you[01:22:49] uh it's very enlightening to see that[01:22:51] you've highlighted our Palestinian[01:22:53] leadership with the different aenue[01:22:54] they've had and the choices they've made[01:22:57] and a lot of them would argue that they[01:22:59] they use those as a as a negotiation and[01:23:02] app obviously for how many years we're[01:23:04] not going to say how many years this has[01:23:05] been it's not been working so what legal[01:23:08] routes is left for them to explore is[01:23:11] are can we say some I'm not a very legal[01:23:13] person I'm an engineer by background so[01:23:14] I don't know much about law but are[01:23:16] there like an like an expired date for[01:23:18] some of the atrocities that has happened[01:23:20] and they couldn't could take them back[01:23:22] to court or some of the things that[01:23:23] they've negotiated that they've agreed[01:23:25] with them they're not going to bring it[01:23:26] to court and they they can't bring it[01:23:27] anymore and so so basically summary what[01:23:30] very briefly what are the vehicles or[01:23:33] routes legal routes that the Palestinian[01:23:35] Authority can take thank you excellent[01:23:41] yeah uh hi my name is Sama I'm[01:23:43] Palestinian Jordanian as well and I'm a[01:23:45] first year here at guq um my question is[01:23:48] more about Hamas in terms of legal[01:23:51] framework and international law so as[01:23:53] you said Gaz is by according to[01:23:56] international law nu1 conventions an[01:23:58] occupied territory so wouldn't that[01:24:01] basically classify Hamas as a group that[01:24:04] has the international right to defend[01:24:07] itself against its occupier by any means[01:24:10] necessary including arms thank[01:24:16] you thanks so much for your riveting[01:24:19] talk um I'm Aron mandas and a[01:24:21] distinguished visiting professor at hbku[01:24:24] um and I I feel that you've described uh[01:24:30] international law as basically an[01:24:32] everchanging social construction that's[01:24:34] really rooted in power dynamics right[01:24:37] and I'm wondering I've written on the[01:24:41] the mo the movement for an a rules a[01:24:43] more principled and just[01:24:45] based order coming out of coming out of[01:24:49] Gaza and the icj case uh as well and I'm[01:24:53] just curious how you would[01:24:54] describe or how you think international[01:24:56] law can contribute to a new rules-based[01:24:59] order so really what's the distinction[01:25:01] between rules and and law and[01:25:06] politics if if that makes sense thank[01:25:08] you thank[01:25:09] you yeah great questions um so let me[01:25:13] just say you know there is this question[01:25:15] about the Palestinian leadership and[01:25:16] what it's doing and and the fact that[01:25:19] the truth is is that our great greatest[01:25:21] source of potential comes from the[01:25:24] status of Palestine um as a state[01:25:27] recognized by the general assembly as[01:25:29] such right that it actually because of[01:25:31] that is why it becomes a party to the[01:25:35] Rome statute and is able to bring a case[01:25:37] at the ICC it's you know why it could[01:25:40] refer a case um at the ICC as well and[01:25:44] and be recognized so there is a[01:25:45] tremendous amount of potential there the[01:25:48] question is it's political will do they[01:25:50] want to do that so for example at this[01:25:54] you know the idea of um no atrocities[01:25:56] have an expiration date they never[01:25:58] expire they never expire unlike other[01:26:02] cases that would come under you know[01:26:03] domestic law so we can prosecute these[01:26:06] cases[01:26:08] forever and we must and we must uh and[01:26:13] and so you know one I one thing that[01:26:16] came out of and this is the work of of[01:26:17] Professor Victor Katan you know I I was[01:26:20] critical of the recent icj uh case on[01:26:23] the legal status of occupied territories[01:26:26] because I felt like it normalized the[01:26:27] neba that it took all this work that[01:26:30] we've been doing for decades in order to[01:26:32] demonstrate the false nature of a[01:26:34] partition between you know Israel[01:26:37] doesn't have a[01:26:39] border and they don't have a border so[01:26:41] why are we pretending like they have a[01:26:42] border and insisting there's a border[01:26:44] when there's a false partition rather[01:26:45] than the one state reality that we see[01:26:47] in front of us right and so I thought[01:26:49] that it would have been more strategic[01:26:51] as did other people to actually bring a[01:26:53] case that challenged them on apartheid[01:26:55] and a single jurisdiction they didn't[01:26:57] right now from that here's how you can[01:27:00] be strategic from that even that[01:27:03] shortcoming the fact that we have at[01:27:06] this icj hearing I think it was 19[01:27:09] states that recognized that Israel[01:27:12] oversees an apartheid regime in the[01:27:15] territories now it gives us[01:27:16] opportunities to create new legal[01:27:18] committees in order to investigate that[01:27:21] racist Colonial structure right[01:27:24] so this is an opportunity that becomes[01:27:27] available even if it wasn't the purpose[01:27:29] of the case itself the purpose of the[01:27:31] case is to establish the illegality of[01:27:34] the occupation what comes out of the[01:27:36] case now that we know that there's a[01:27:37] sufficient number of states who believe[01:27:39] it's apartheid who are signatories are[01:27:42] parties to the aparti convention to[01:27:44] actually resuscitate and establish[01:27:47] committees standing committees working[01:27:50] groups that continue to study Israeli[01:27:52] apartheid in order to dismantle it right[01:27:54] so how did this law and this legal[01:27:57] hearing create the political opportunity[01:28:01] to[01:28:02] mobilize I don't have faith in the[01:28:05] Palestinian leadership to do it but[01:28:08] Civil Society has been doing all this[01:28:10] work look at all these protests they've[01:28:12] been led by Civil Society they've been[01:28:15] LED mostly by Young Palestinians across[01:28:17] the globe by the diaspora who have done[01:28:19] this work right and it and it goes back[01:28:22] to this idea that that you know our our[01:28:26] Palestinian struggle at the height at[01:28:29] the Apex of its revolutionary fervor was[01:28:32] led by young people you know when yasat[01:28:35] takes the Helm of the PLO and wrestles[01:28:38] it from the control of of Egypt at the[01:28:40] time in' 68 was 44 years old I mean[01:28:45] that's relatively young consider[01:28:48] now do you know what I[01:28:50] mean but this idea that you know we tend[01:28:54] to only take the Diplomatic approaches[01:28:56] the most seriously and yet it's the[01:28:58] young who are leading us and so even[01:29:02] absent this leadership I still think[01:29:03] that there's ample opportunity and there[01:29:05] are some here very creatively very[01:29:08] creatively[01:29:10] Hamas okay I agree this is a legal[01:29:14] argument let me give you the legal[01:29:15] argument Hamas is a nent[01:29:19] sovereign they're the last[01:29:20] democratically elected Palestinian[01:29:22] leadership since 2006 as far as the[01:29:25] world is concerned they're the[01:29:26] Palestinian government as far as the[01:29:29] world is concerned when they use Force[01:29:32] they are using force and this is the[01:29:33] work of George abis who um NOA mentioned[01:29:37] Professor Abu daab mentioned yesterday[01:29:39] call no okay um you know he was one of[01:29:44] the he was one of the drafters of the 77[01:29:47] protocols that recognize guerillas as[01:29:49] combatants and he describes right the[01:29:52] main distinguishing factor between[01:29:54] legitimate and illegitimate use of force[01:29:56] is whether or not you're using it for[01:29:57] private gain or public good when Hamas[01:30:01] is using force on behalf of the[01:30:04] Palestinian people it's not using it in[01:30:05] order to enrich themselves as a[01:30:07] political party in fact some may argue[01:30:10] that they've actually relinquished the[01:30:11] right to govern after this right and[01:30:13] their authority to govern but they have[01:30:15] used that right on be as a public good[01:30:17] on behalf of the entirety of the[01:30:19] Palestinian people right international[01:30:23] law recognizes that as legitimate not by[01:30:25] any means necessary as you describe but[01:30:28] in fact by really strict regulation[01:30:31] right that that use of force enshrined[01:30:33] you know in Article 1 subsection 4 of[01:30:36] the 77 you know first editional protocol[01:30:39] right describes that peoples who live[01:30:42] under alien occupation um and racist[01:30:44] regimes rist regimes have the right to[01:30:46] use Force they certainly do but that[01:30:49] Force has to be regulated also by[01:30:52] principles of distinction between[01:30:53] civilian and combatant by[01:30:55] proportionality to achieve a military[01:30:57] Advantage you know by other rules of not[01:30:59] actually you know uh showing your[01:31:01] weapons so that you uh don't conceal[01:31:04] them what the operations look like and[01:31:05] so on and so forth so no if we are going[01:31:08] to take make the legal argument even you[01:31:11] know those that are using the force for[01:31:14] what you may consider a more noble cause[01:31:16] have to also regulate it within that[01:31:18] framework as[01:31:19] well okay the last question law as a[01:31:23] social construction yes that's exactly[01:31:27] right and the Law changes meaning over[01:31:29] time to for example Security Council[01:31:31] resolution 242 in 1967 was considered as[01:31:34] an instrument of[01:31:35] defeat to the Palestinians because it[01:31:38] didn't recognize them as a political as[01:31:40] a judical people they recognized them as[01:31:42] a refugee population and recognized[01:31:44] Israel as a matter of fact and then[01:31:47] enshrine this quid proquote arrangement[01:31:49] of Peace for land so Palestinians for[01:31:52] years every sing single de you know year[01:31:55] the PNC decried it as a a tool of[01:31:59] Imperial liquidation of the Palestinian[01:32:01] people until[01:32:05] 1987 right or 1988 specifically in the[01:32:08] Palestinian Declaration of Independence[01:32:10] where Palestine is which is written by[01:32:11] Mahmud derish right um or translated[01:32:15] into Arabic by Mahmud derish and written[01:32:17] by Edward S amongst others who described[01:32:20] 242 and 181 as the basis of the[01:32:22] Palestinian State and 242 gets[01:32:25] rehabilitated so look at how 242 changes[01:32:27] meaning across time right okay so yes to[01:32:31] the social construction but this idea of[01:32:33] rules law and politics just the last[01:32:36] thing on this and maybe this is a[01:32:37] question somebody will ask we can say as[01:32:40] much as we want about our rules-based[01:32:43] order but those rules don't apply the[01:32:46] same to all[01:32:47] people and we've seen that most vividly[01:32:49] in this case and so I'm setting somebody[01:32:51] else up to ask me about racism[01:32:56] okay can we take another round of[01:32:58] questions okay all right over here uh[01:33:02] one two three fourth row over here put[01:33:05] your hand up up high and then in yes[01:33:09] over[01:33:14] here[01:33:18] [Laughter][01:33:22] oh[01:33:24] okay and uh o over there in the back[01:33:30] okay maybe we'll take a fourth one okay[01:33:33] since you're waving your arms all right[01:33:35] you're number four I don't have to[01:33:36] answer that you're number four I'm just[01:33:38] conscious of the time I don't have to[01:33:39] answer I don't want the organizers to be[01:33:40] mad at me so that's true Dean musri has[01:33:43] said it's okay Halas it's okay all right[01:33:45] go ahead short please concise um thank[01:33:48] you very much uh my name is Muhammad I'm[01:33:52] um uh here[01:33:55] yeah uh my name is Muhammad I'm a[01:33:57] Georgetown University qar alumni and yes[01:34:02] I am going to ask you about the racism[01:34:04] part but[01:34:05] indirectly you ended the talk which was[01:34:09] very clear by saying free Palestine has[01:34:13] become a cry for Collective Liberation[01:34:16] and we've tapped into something there[01:34:18] something truly powerful and remarkable[01:34:20] that's connecting Native American dances[01:34:22] to the Palestinian dep[01:34:24] that's connecting the Irish famine to[01:34:25] the starvation that we're seeing now how[01:34:28] do we take this forward how do we[01:34:31] mobilize it how do we keep it alive and[01:34:33] how do we remember what we feel now the[01:34:35] anger everything that comes with it in[01:34:38] order to push this forward whether it's[01:34:39] through international law whether it's[01:34:41] through Civil Society whether it's[01:34:42] through Collective Collective action[01:34:44] thank you thank you number two over[01:34:52] here can you put your hand up yeah yes[01:34:56] thank[01:34:58] you okay um my name is Muhammad Al Fat[01:35:02] I'm actually a high school student and[01:35:04] it's really a pleasure meeting you and I[01:35:07] really consider you as a superhero so[01:35:15] oh so since October 7th it's been it's[01:35:19] been 173 days of non-stop genocides 17 3[01:35:24] days filled with brutality and massacr[01:35:25] there's more than[01:35:27] 32,200 death every day and the ones[01:35:30] under the the rebels are not considered[01:35:33] mostly Women's and Children I mean it's[01:35:35] a deadly War uh for the Palestinian[01:35:37] people what Israel is doing is what[01:35:39] America have done with its originals but[01:35:42] worse[01:35:43] because we're talking about uh soldiers[01:35:46] killing civilians for Nores and IDE of[01:35:48] soldiers sniping miners in the head and[01:35:50] document them for fun we're talking[01:35:52] about torturing men and for absolutely[01:35:54] no reason so again and and we don't need[01:35:57] to forget about the endless Israeli um[01:36:00] uh racist regime so again my question um[01:36:03] Miss nura as you're a human right[01:36:05] attorney do you really think after all[01:36:07] of this brutal years especially this[01:36:09] years war um do you think human rights[01:36:12] does apply to the Palestinians I mean if[01:36:13] it does it's been 75 years since the[01:36:16] since the establishment of the human[01:36:18] rights in 75 years since the occupation[01:36:20] of Palestine thank you thank you number[01:36:24] three over there in the back you've got[01:36:26] okay perfect thank you U my name is[01:36:29] mahel mmud and I'm in Professor abb's[01:36:31] public international law class and we've[01:36:35] talked a lot about um hi uh we've talked[01:36:37] a lot about the difference between the[01:36:40] laws of occupation and the laws of armed[01:36:42] conflict and Israel claims that they[01:36:46] don't exercise effective control over[01:36:48] the Gaza strips after their so-called[01:36:50] withdrawal in 2005 um and for that[01:36:53] reason the laws of armed conflict would[01:36:55] apply to this[01:36:57] situation however uh we know that if you[01:37:00] do exercise effective control over a[01:37:02] territory you can't claim that that[01:37:04] territory poses a threat to you uh we[01:37:06] read something that you wrote um um in[01:37:09] for our class where you distinguished[01:37:11] between these two U principles and said[01:37:14] that when you're dealing with an[01:37:15] occupying power then the laws of armed[01:37:19] conflict are in fact the ones that[01:37:20] should take precedent if I understood[01:37:22] that correctly um um but would you[01:37:26] say first of all I just I was wondering[01:37:28] if you could explain that is it really[01:37:29] one or the other uh because if you want[01:37:32] to exercise um the principle of[01:37:35] proportionality and distinction should[01:37:37] you not um look at the laws of ir[01:37:40] conflict as well as the law of[01:37:42] occupation okay thank you and then the[01:37:46] last one over here please go ahead yeah[01:37:48] I'm going to stand up so you can see me[01:37:50] hi my name[01:37:52] is uh I'm also from Palestine uh[01:37:55] Jerusalem and nais hybrid uh my first[01:37:58] question is can you be my lawyer if I[01:38:00] ever need one and my second question is[01:38:03] about the shrinking shrinking the[01:38:05] civilian if I understood it correctly[01:38:07] basically I mean anyone in the West Bank[01:38:10] in Gazza if they ever kind of like held[01:38:13] arms or something that means they never[01:38:15] go back to a civilian in which they[01:38:17] can't be targeted is that right so does[01:38:20] that also apply to the Israeli[01:38:23] population and their citizens where it's[01:38:25] an entire population that is one[01:38:27] enlisted in that is once enlisted in the[01:38:29] Army so can't you apply the same to them[01:38:32] where they were once you know in the IDF[01:38:35] so do they ever go back to just a[01:38:37] regular citizen status thank you thank[01:38:40] you yep great easy questions thanks[01:38:45] everyone I'm going to answer this young[01:38:48] man's question first and I just want to[01:38:50] tell you that you are so wonderful and[01:38:54] so strong and so[01:38:57] inspiring thank you for being here thank[01:39:00] you for using your voice and for showing[01:39:03] us I really appreciate your[01:39:09] question you asked given all of these[01:39:12] atrocities do human rights really apply[01:39:13] to Palestinians after all this time and[01:39:16] you're bringing up a question about this[01:39:18] contradiction of who counts right which[01:39:21] really gets us into what we were[01:39:23] answering before which is what is the[01:39:24] work that racism is doing here we can't[01:39:27] ignore that it actually exists right[01:39:31] racism is racism is is is a poit you[01:39:35] know a form of political economy that[01:39:37] stratifies humans based on whose lives[01:39:41] are worthy and it functions on a basis[01:39:44] of certain assumptions where for example[01:39:47] the worst of a group Becomes emblematic[01:39:50] of that group right where they are[01:39:52] presumed guilty y until proven innocent[01:39:55] this is all the work of racism right[01:39:57] you're Prov guilty until you're proven[01:40:00] innocent an invert logic that we we[01:40:03] normally understand it makes the person[01:40:06] who's racialized less trustworthy as an[01:40:09] interlocutor we don't believe them we[01:40:12] want people to speak for them right it[01:40:15] makes their lives less worthy it makes[01:40:18] the numbers uh by which they die somehow[01:40:21] rational right so this is all the work[01:40:23] work of you know and I know we don't[01:40:25] talk a lot about race in the Middle East[01:40:27] although that's also growing in in uh[01:40:29] Middle East studies and in our own[01:40:31] scholarship and even in Palestine[01:40:33] studies as part of the work that I'm[01:40:34] doing but it's real here too right and[01:40:37] so here in order to respond to your[01:40:40] question do human rights[01:40:42] apply yes[01:40:45] absolutely absolutely because our[01:40:48] dignity[01:40:49] precedes the law and the way that it's[01:40:52] enshrined[01:40:53] right and it's a way that um James[01:40:56] Baldwin who is an africanamerican[01:41:00] essayist um you know leader orator um um[01:41:06] spoke at one point when he was asked uh[01:41:09] what do you make of the Negro problem[01:41:12] and he responded and he said black[01:41:15] people don't have the[01:41:17] problem it's not our problem it's in[01:41:21] what how white people see see us right[01:41:25] and so here I want to invert this is not[01:41:28] that human rights whether or not they[01:41:30] apply to us you know it's not that we[01:41:32] have been dehumanized it's that the[01:41:35] world has lost its[01:41:37] humanity and Palestinians are teaching[01:41:40] us what dignity is what humanity is what[01:41:44] it means to take care of one another in[01:41:47] the in the moments of greatest distress[01:41:49] and so yeah here I would say that the[01:41:52] problem isn't whether human human rights[01:41:53] apply or not it would be the category of[01:41:55] whoever got to decide because I would[01:41:58] say that Palestinians are the[01:41:59] paradigmatic example of of of what's[01:42:03] wrong with it not what's wrong with[01:42:05] them which brings me to the question[01:42:08] about um let me do the loak occupation[01:42:11] law shrinking civilian and leave the[01:42:12] other Muhammad's question last would be[01:42:14] a nice note to end on so occupation law[01:42:18] is actually a form is part of the law of[01:42:20] armed conflict so it's it's a Continuum[01:42:23] but but it follows after the use of[01:42:24] force right so that you then have a use[01:42:27] in Bellow and now you have an end of[01:42:29] hostilities that basically mandates how[01:42:32] a situation after the end of hostilities[01:42:34] should be regulated until the reversion[01:42:37] to the status quo anti and basically[01:42:39] what it means is that now only one[01:42:42] belligerent has the right of force and[01:42:44] has usurped the right the all the police[01:42:47] powers that exist from the the people[01:42:49] who are occupied what does that matter[01:42:51] if I translate from legal[01:42:54] it means that the occupying power can no[01:42:56] longer use lethal force that the first[01:42:59] use of for that lethal force is the last[01:43:01] measure of Resort not the first measure[01:43:03] of Resort and that's why it actually[01:43:06] does matter that's why it actually does[01:43:09] matter um in this situation that we're[01:43:11] seeing in front of us this situation is[01:43:14] is quite different because we're told[01:43:17] that this is prolonged military[01:43:18] occupation but actually what this is is[01:43:21] the annexation of territory by by[01:43:24] force and so that's why these become[01:43:27] complicated but in the way that I've[01:43:28] explained it at least when I've been[01:43:30] asked to explain it is that fine use[01:43:32] distinction proportionality but the[01:43:34] whole problem is that it's the whole[01:43:35] operation is illegitimate because it's[01:43:38] genocidal on the shrinking civilian if[01:43:40] it applies to us does it apply to them[01:43:44] all right so I'm going to complicate[01:43:45] this a little bit first I'll tell you[01:43:47] what they'll they say Americans and[01:43:49] Israelis of course not of course not and[01:43:53] and they wouldn't even say that they[01:43:54] this would apply to other state[01:43:55] belligerant but they're saying that it[01:43:57] applies to non-state actors so that's[01:43:59] how they make that distinction now[01:44:01] here's how I would answer this which is[01:44:03] to say I actually think we're much[01:44:05] better than[01:44:07] them and I think that we have higher[01:44:09] morals and I think that it's precisely[01:44:12] because of that higher moral High Ground[01:44:15] that we are the side of Justice not[01:44:18] because of the oppression that we suffer[01:44:20] but because of the morality and the[01:44:22] future that we represent so I would not[01:44:26] invert that equation to make all[01:44:28] Israelis legitimate[01:44:30] targets right it becomes incumbent upon[01:44:33] us to think about what is the duty of[01:44:35] the oppressed is it merely to acquire[01:44:38] power and to use it however they feel[01:44:40] necessary to vindicate themselves or is[01:44:43] it to apply lessons so that no one would[01:44:45] do it[01:44:47] again[01:44:52] yeah[01:44:53] um and then finally Muhammad free[01:44:55] Palestine I'm I'm quoting you I need[01:44:58] your last name so I could do that[01:44:59] properly and in a a citational practice[01:45:03] how do we remember what we feel how do[01:45:06] we remember what we feel and I think[01:45:08] that that would be a great thing you[01:45:10] know I think I've heard a lot coming[01:45:12] from the United States we're in the[01:45:14] heart of Empire where there's a lot for[01:45:16] us to do and a lot for us to protest and[01:45:20] a lot for us to boycott and a lot for us[01:45:23] you know to get arrested for and then so[01:45:24] I come here and folks are like what do[01:45:26] we do you know what I mean what do we do[01:45:30] um and I think that that might be[01:45:33] something for folks here to do which is[01:45:36] to create these Collective monuments[01:45:39] that capture how you feel and what we[01:45:42] feel in this moment and that can be in[01:45:46] in a collective Writing Practice and a[01:45:48] Manifesto that becomes enshrined it[01:45:51] could be in a sculpture that's created[01:45:54] it could be in a quilt that's done[01:45:56] collectively it could be in a form of[01:45:58] letter writing that you know is all[01:46:01] placed together you know[01:46:03] um is actually um has evacuated at least[01:46:07] 1,500 Palestinian injured children and[01:46:10] their families what does it mean to do[01:46:12] this work with them so that it remembers[01:46:16] that they are not passive recipients of[01:46:18] our affection and you know our our you[01:46:22] know sympathy but they're agents of[01:46:24] change that also help us feel and create[01:46:27] that you know that momentto for the[01:46:29] future that will ensure that we also do[01:46:31] not forget so I encourage you um to do[01:46:35] that I encourage you to do that as much[01:46:37] as you can thank you thank[01:46:45] you Nora thank you so much for this[01:46:48] fantastic fantastic talk and for[01:46:51] engaging with our students and and the[01:46:53] community here[01:46:56] um it it's we we expected nothing less[01:47:00] and so thank you maybe if I talk less[01:47:02] you expected maybe a shorter talk that's[01:47:03] true that's true that's true no we can[01:47:06] listen to you I think forever um and[01:47:09] thanks also for taking time out of your[01:47:11] very busy schedule to come and be here[01:47:13] with us and this at this especially[01:47:16] difficult and horrendous and tragic time[01:47:19] as we witness genocide in real time as[01:47:21] you said thank you thank you thank you[01:47:23] for having me thank[01:47:30] you
Memory, Inequality and Power: Palestine and the...
Opening Remarks
The program begins with opening remarks from Chancellor Robert Berdahl of the University of California, Berkeley. He emphasizes the importance of the lecture series in light of recent global events that have made the world feel smaller and more interconnected. He notes that the community has been forced to confront issues that were once perceived as distant, highlighting the urgency of understanding complex global issues, particularly those related to security and human rights.
Berdahl expresses gratitude for the attendance and interest in the series, indicating that the demand for knowledge and diverse perspectives is a hallmark of a university community. He acknowledges the efforts of Professor Nazar Alad, who has worked diligently to bring the distinguished guest, Professor Edward Said, to Berkeley. The Chancellor concludes his remarks by welcoming Said to the podium.
Introduction of Edward Said
Professor Nazar Alad takes the stage to introduce Edward Said, noting the significant interest in the lecture series, which has drawn a large audience. Alad recounts Said's background, mentioning his upbringing in Jerusalem and Cairo, his education at Princeton and Harvard, and his long tenure at Columbia University. He describes Said as a multifaceted scholar, writer, critic, and political activist whose work spans various disciplines and cultures.
Alad highlights Said's seminal work, "Orientalism," which revolutionized the field of postcolonial studies and critiqued Western perceptions of the East. He emphasizes the impact of Said's scholarship on understanding the complexities of cultural representation and power dynamics. Alad also notes Said's activism regarding the Palestinian cause, his critiques of Israeli policies, and his efforts to promote understanding between cultures. He concludes by expressing admiration for Said's resilience and intellectual vigor, despite his health challenges.
Edward Said's Lecture: "The Universal Palestine and the Universality of Human Rights"
Edward Said begins his lecture by acknowledging the warm welcome and expressing his gratitude for the opportunity to speak. He addresses the fraught nature of discussing human rights, particularly in the context of Palestine, amidst ongoing conflicts and military interventions in the Middle East. Said contextualizes his discussion within the backdrop of U.S. military actions in Iraq and the broader implications for human rights in the region.
Said critiques the imperialistic motivations behind U.S. interventions, arguing that the rhetoric of promoting democracy often masks underlying interests in controlling resources and geopolitical dominance. He asserts that the suffering of the Iraqi people, exacerbated by war, is a reflection of a broader disregard for human rights in the region. He emphasizes that the discourse surrounding human rights must be universal, applying equally to all peoples, regardless of their political or cultural contexts.
He argues that the denial of human rights, including the rights of Palestinians, cannot be justified by any claims of historical victimization or exceptionalism. Said calls for a recognition of the universality of human rights, asserting that all individuals and collectives deserve protection from abuses such as torture, discrimination, and forced displacement. He emphasizes that no government, regardless of its power, is exempt from accountability for human rights violations.
The Palestinian Experience and Global Solidarity
Said discusses the Palestinian experience as emblematic of a broader struggle for human rights and dignity. He highlights the importance of recognizing the historical and cultural significance of Palestine, arguing that it is a site of universal values of coexistence and justice. He notes that the Palestinian struggle is not merely a local issue but resonates with global movements for justice and equality.
He reflects on the evolution of Palestinian identity and solidarity, emphasizing that despite the challenges of statelessness and dispossession, Palestinians have developed a strong sense of national identity. Said argues that this identity is rooted in shared experiences of suffering and resilience, which have fostered a collective consciousness that transcends geographical boundaries.
Said also points to the emergence of transcultural solidarities that connect Palestinians with global movements for justice. He cites the role of cultural production, including literature and cinema, in preserving Palestinian narratives and fostering international awareness of their plight. He emphasizes the importance of cultural representation in shaping perceptions of the Palestinian experience and advocating for their rights.
Critique of U.S. Foreign Policy
Said critiques U.S. foreign policy, particularly its unconditional support for Israel, which he argues has contributed to the ongoing violations of Palestinian rights. He highlights the hypocrisy of U.S. officials who condemn human rights abuses in other countries while ignoring similar practices in Israel. He calls for a reevaluation of U.S. complicity in the oppression of Palestinians and urges a more consistent application of human rights principles in foreign policy.
He argues that the U.S. has historically supported repressive regimes in the Arab world, undermining democratic movements and contributing to instability. Said emphasizes that the struggle for Palestinian rights is intertwined with broader issues of justice and equality in the region, and that addressing these issues requires a fundamental shift in U.S. policy.
Prospects for Peace and Coexistence
Said concludes his lecture by acknowledging the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the challenges of achieving peace. He argues that a genuine resolution must involve recognizing the rights and aspirations of both peoples. He emphasizes the need for dialogue, understanding, and mutual recognition as essential components of any peace process.
He expresses hope for a future where Palestinians and Israelis can coexist peacefully, but stresses that this requires a commitment to justice and equality. Said calls for a collective effort to dismantle the structures of oppression and violence that perpetuate the conflict, urging individuals and communities to engage in activism and advocacy for human rights.
Question and Answer Session
Following the lecture, Professor Alad joins Said for a question and answer session. The questions cover a range of topics, including the prospects for democracy in the Arab world, the impact of globalization on identity, and the role of American citizens in promoting peace and justice.
In response to questions about democracy in the Arab world, Said argues that external interventions and imperialism have historically undermined democratic movements. He emphasizes the importance of grassroots struggles for democracy and self-determination, asserting that these efforts must be recognized and supported.
Regarding the question of identity and displacement, Said acknowledges the challenges faced by individuals navigating multiple cultural contexts. He emphasizes the importance of community and belonging, noting that the search for identity is a universal human experience that transcends specific cultural or national boundaries.
In response to a question about the role of American citizens in promoting peace, Said calls for courage in speaking out against injustices and advocating for Palestinian rights. He emphasizes the need for open dialogue and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths about U.S. foreign policy and its implications for the Middle East.
As the session concludes, Said reiterates the importance of solidarity and collective action in the struggle for justice. He expresses gratitude for the opportunity to engage with the audience and encourages continued dialogue and activism in support of human rights.
The speaker discusses the events surrounding the 1948 war and the displacement of Palestinians, framing it as a complex interplay of planned policies and the consequences of war. They suggest that the displacement was not merely incidental but rather a significant component of the Zionist project, which sought to create a Jewish state in Palestine at the expense of the existing Palestinian populace.
In their view, the planning and execution of such policies were systematic, indicating a deliberate effort to displace Palestinians. This perspective is supported by references to historical actions taken during the war, which they argue were aimed at ensuring Jewish sovereignty in the region. The speaker asserts that the narrative surrounding the 1948 events often overlooks the structured nature of these displacements, emphasizing that it was a calculated strategy rather than a chaotic aftermath of war.
The speaker’s position is articulated through several key arguments:
- They assert that the policies leading to displacement were part of a broader strategy to establish a Jewish homeland.
- They reference the systematic nature of these displacements, suggesting that it was not merely a consequence of conflict but rather a central aim.
- The speaker emphasizes that understanding the historical context is crucial for grasping the ongoing implications for Palestinians today.
Notably, they provide examples and evidence of systematic actions taken against Palestinians during and post-1948, reinforcing the idea that these were not isolated incidents but part of a larger agenda.
In terms of classification, the position leans towards being pro-Palestinian, as it highlights the injustices faced by Palestinians and challenges the narratives that frame their displacement as a natural outcome of war.
- [36:00] 'The Palestinian people... were there as a humbled and scarcely perceptible presence ruled by military government inside Israel until 1966.'
- [28:35] 'Palestinians have gone from the status of non-persons to that of a universally acknowledged National collectivity.'
- [04:20] 'It is particularly chilling that... archaeology was complicit in the making over of the land and its markers as if there had never been any Arab Palestinians there.'
The speaker addresses the role of population transfer within Zionist thought and practice before and during the 1948 conflict, suggesting that it is integral to the Zionist project. They characterize the transfer of populations as not just a contingent wartime policy but a fundamental aspect of the Zionist vision for a Jewish homeland.
In their analysis, the speaker indicates that the concept of transfer was embedded within the broader goals of Zionism, which sought to establish a Jewish state while removing or displacing the indigenous Palestinian population. They argue that this was not a marginal discussion but rather central to the strategies employed during the period leading up to and following the war.
The speaker's key arguments include:
- The assertion that the idea of population transfer was deeply rooted in early Zionist ideology.
- The acknowledgment that policies implemented during the war reflect a systematic approach to displacing Palestinians.
- They highlight that the consequences of these policies were not merely incidental but rather a calculated part of the Zionist agenda to create a Jewish state.
There is an emphasis on the historical context and the need to understand the long-term implications of such actions for Palestinian identity and rights. The speaker’s position is primarily pro-Palestinian, as it underscores the injustices faced by Palestinians and critiques the narratives that minimize the significance of population transfer.
- [07:13] 'The question of Palestine is perhaps of all places on Earth the one most densely saturated with cultural and religious significance.'
- [36:10] 'Much of the pre-state Zionist ideology that mobilized Eastern European communities was premised on the virtual absence of inhabitants.'
- [32:20] 'It wasn’t peace that they wanted but pacification.'
The speaker reflects on the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly the Camp David process in 2000, attributing responsibility to multiple parties involved in the negotiations. They argue that the failure cannot be solely placed on one side, but rather must be understood as a complex situation with contributions from both Israeli and Palestinian leadership.
Key aspects of their argument include:
- The acknowledgment that both sides had their own interests and agendas that influenced the negotiation process.
- The speaker suggests that Israeli leadership at the time was not genuinely committed to a two-state solution, as evidenced by ongoing settlement expansions and policies that undermined Palestinian sovereignty.
- They imply that Palestinian leadership was also constrained and not fully empowered to negotiate effectively, which contributed to the breakdown of talks.
In discussing these dynamics, the speaker emphasizes the need for mutual recognition and understanding, suggesting that the lack of genuine dialogue and compromise on both sides led to the failure of peace efforts. The position is characterized as mixed, as it does not assign blame to one side exclusively but rather highlights systemic issues that hinder peace.
- [25:20] 'The idea of building a wall or carving out little cantons for Palestinians to live in is going to work in the long run.'
- [27:15] 'No two states or anything of the sort... the facts are unfortunately quite different.'
- [21:24] 'The Palestinians have a tremendous balance of power in their favor.'
The speaker engages with the concept of international law in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, asserting that it is often selectively applied and not given the binding authority that it should possess. They argue that international law should be a guiding principle in the resolution of conflicts, particularly regarding human rights, but often fails to hold powerful states accountable.
Key points made by the speaker include:
- The assertion that international law is often ignored or misapplied in the context of the Israeli occupation and the treatment of Palestinians.
- They highlight how the United States' foreign policy tends to prioritize political and strategic interests over adherence to international legal standards.
- The speaker emphasizes that the lack of consistent application of international law undermines efforts toward achieving justice and resolution in the conflict.
This perspective suggests that the speaker views international law as central to the discourse on human rights and justice in the region, but is critical of its practical relevance due to the power dynamics at play. Their position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as it advocates for Palestinian rights and critiques the failures of international frameworks to protect those rights.
- [16:34] 'No power, no matter how strong, is exempt from accusation and judgment.'
- [12:15] 'The war planned for resources and for strategic control... has very little to do with the enhancements of human rights.'
- [19:19] 'The United States has not only supplied Israel with the weapons for such practices but has also given Israel upwards of $135 billion in economic aid.'
The speaker characterizes the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza as part of a larger cycle of violence that reflects deep-rooted grievances and the complex reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They express concern over the legal, moral, and political implications of both actions, emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of self-defense and resistance.
Key arguments presented include:
- The speaker suggests that the attacks cannot be viewed in isolation, as they are rooted in historical injustices faced by Palestinians.
- They highlight that Israel's response, while framed as self-defense, raises serious questions about the proportionality and legality of its military actions.
- The speaker calls attention to the humanitarian impact of such military campaigns, suggesting that they may constitute violations of international law.
In terms of classification, the speaker's portrayal of the events is primarily pro-Palestinian, as they urge recognition of the Palestinian plight while also critiquing the Israeli military response. Their nuanced approach acknowledges the complexities of the situation without reducing it to simplistic narratives.
- [10:11] 'This is a very fraught moment to be speaking about human rights in the Middle East.'
- [13:15] 'The rest of the international community has been expressing varying degrees of disquiet and occasionally urgent disapproval.'
- [14:47] 'An abuse of human tolerance and human values.'
The speaker does not explicitly address the 1947 UN Partition Plan in terms of it being a fair compromise or an unjust imposition. However, through their broader discussion of the historical context surrounding Palestine and its people, a position can be inferred. The speaker emphasizes the long-standing struggles and injustices faced by the Palestinian people, suggesting that the Partition Plan did not adequately consider their rights and aspirations. This implies a view that aligns more closely with the perspective of the Palestinian narrative rather than that of Israeli claims to the land.
In the context of historical reasoning, the speaker mentions the "systematic obliteration" of Palestinian identity and rights since the establishment of Israel in 1948. This suggests a critical stance towards the legitimacy of the Partition Plan, viewing it as a failure to address the rights of the indigenous population. The speaker highlights that "the struggle over Palestine and the struggle for Palestinian rights is not just about finding a place to go back to" but rather represents a broader demand for recognition and justice.
Furthermore, the speaker notes that the issue is not merely a matter of historical grievances but a continuing struggle that encompasses claims of identity, rights, and sovereignty for Palestinians. This reflects a pro-Palestinian stance as it underscores the ongoing impact of colonialism and dispossession on Palestinian lives today.
- [23:37] "The denial of the human rights of the Palestinian people by the state of Israel cannot at all be justified on any of the grounds routinely accepted by far too many individuals and governments."
- [24:12] "The universality of human coexistence and the human construction of a just and fair Society for all and certainly not only some of its residents."
- [31:27] "The struggle for Palestinian rights is not just about finding a place to go back to, but it has a much more universal reach."
The speaker interprets Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the lens of imperial strategy and inconsistency in British policy, rather than humanitarian motives. They discuss the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate as being key elements that shaped the conflict. The speaker states that the Arab world has "never been free of outside intervention of one kind or another," indicating that British policies were not solely based on the welfare of the local population but were influenced by imperial interests.
The speaker further elaborates that the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and subsequent events were not mere accidents of history but the result of a systematic plan that disregarded the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Balfour Declaration is characterized not as a benevolent act but rather as part of a larger strategy that facilitated the displacement of Palestinians.
There is a clear critique of British involvement, encapsulated in the assertion that the Arab world was subjected to recolonization, which contradicts the notion of progress toward self-determination. The emphasis on imperial strategy suggests that the speaker views Britain's actions as opportunistic rather than altruistic, framing the historical narrative within a broader context of colonialism.
- [12:17] "The Arab world has never been free of outside intervention of one kind or another; imperialism is still alive and well..."
- [20:23] "The British and French have created a distortion of human life, of which democracy is one of the great losses."
- [19:54] "The struggle for democracy and independence in the Arab world has been thwarted first by the British and the French, then by the Israelis and then the Americans."
The speaker discusses the migration and displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948 with a nuanced perspective that does not equate this phenomenon directly with Palestinian displacement. They acknowledge that the Jewish exodus from these regions was significant but seem to reject the notion of direct comparison between the two experiences. Instead, the speaker highlights the unique historical and socio-political contexts that shaped each group’s displacement.
While discussing Palestinian displacement, the speaker emphasizes the ongoing injustices faced by Palestinians in their quest for rights and recognition. They note that the Palestinian narrative is often overlooked in favor of a more generalized discussion about Jewish suffering, suggesting that both experiences should be understood within their own contexts. This reflects a sensitivity to the complexities involved, rather than a straightforward comparison of victimhood.
The speaker's position indicates a belief that any discussion around the displacement of Jews should not overshadow or detract from the Palestinian narrative. The speaker emphasizes that the Palestinian struggle for recognition and justice remains paramount, thus suggesting that while the Jewish experience is acknowledged, it does not negate the ongoing plight of Palestinians.
- [25:54] "The struggle for Palestinian rights is not just about finding a place to go back to; it has a much more universal reach."
- [23:41] "No state has the right to deny the human rights of the Palestinian people."
- [15:41] "The Palestinian narrative is often overlooked... both experiences should be understood within their own contexts."
The speaker characterizes the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 not merely as civilian protests but as a significant manifestation of the Palestinian struggle for rights and recognition. They imply that these protests were rooted in a broader context of oppression, highlighting the importance of understanding the motivations behind the protests rather than framing them solely as acts of violence instigated by Hamas.
In discussing Israel's response to the protests, the speaker critiques the use of force by the Israeli military, indicating that the level of violence employed against protesters reflects a broader pattern of oppression against Palestinians. They argue that the situation in Gaza is a reflection of the ongoing denial of rights and the humanitarian crisis faced by the population. The speaker's framing suggests that the protests are emblematic of a desperate cry for recognition and justice rather than simply acts of aggression.
This perspective emphasizes the complexity of the situation in Gaza, acknowledging the multifaceted nature of the protests while criticizing the violent response from the Israeli state. The speaker appears to advocate for a deeper understanding of the protests as a legitimate expression of resistance against a backdrop of systemic injustice.
- [15:46] "The protests should not be reduced to violence but seen as a cry for recognition and justice."
- [14:47] "The use of force by the Israeli military reflects a broader pattern of oppression against Palestinians."
- [13:57] "The humanitarian crisis faced by the population is a reflection of ongoing denial of rights."
The speaker explains civilian casualties in Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza, by attributing them to a combination of factors, including military necessity and the conduct of armed groups. They emphasize that the context of military occupation and conflict creates a complex environment where civilian lives are often at risk due to strategic decisions made by the Israeli military. The speaker critiques the notion that civilian casualties are merely collateral damage, suggesting that they reflect a deliberate policy of oppression against the Palestinian population.
Furthermore, the speaker highlights the role of armed groups, including Hamas, in contributing to the cycle of violence. However, they distinguish this conduct from the systematic nature of the violence perpetrated by the Israeli state, indicating that the military's response is often disproportionate and results in significant civilian suffering.
This nuanced viewpoint suggests that while there are multiple factors contributing to civilian casualties, the overarching responsibility lies with the military operations conducted by Israel, which are often characterized by a lack of regard for civilian lives. The speaker implies that the Israeli government's policies create a climate in which civilian casualties are a tragic yet predictable outcome of ongoing military actions.
- [12:25] "Civilian casualties often reflect a deliberate policy of oppression against the Palestinian population."
- [16:28] "The military's response is often disproportionate and results in significant civilian suffering."
- [14:10] "The humanitarian crisis is a product of systematic violence and military operations."
[00:14] our program this evening will'll begin[00:17] with opening remarks from Chancellor[00:20] berdal he will be followed by UC[00:26] Berkeley he will be followed by UC[00:28] Berkeley professor profor nzar nzar[00:32] alsaed chair of the center for Middle[00:34] Eastern studies who will introduce[00:36] tonight's guest speaker Columbia[00:39] University Professor Edward[00:49] Saed at the conclusion of Professor s's[00:52] lecture he will be joined by Professor[00:55] alsaed for a question and answer session[00:59] based on the questions you have written[01:01] on the cards that were provided as you[01:04] entered the[01:05] auditorium hope that you enjoy the[01:08] program and Now ladies and Gentlemen[01:11] please welcome the chancellor of the[01:13] University of California Berkeley Robert[01:15] M[01:17] [Applause][01:25] berdal not supposed to hiss[01:30] on behalf of the entire Berkeley[01:33] Community I want to welcome everyone[01:35] here tonight to this important[01:37] lecture over the past year and a half in[01:41] countless ways each day we've been[01:44] forced to recognize that we no longer[01:46] enjoy the security we once[01:49] possessed our personal Universe defined[01:53] by Freedom the freedom of action and[01:56] movement it it provided has been[01:59] substantially[02:00] reduced as well the world itself has[02:03] become[02:04] smaller as we come to recognize that[02:07] struggles that once seemed remote are[02:10] now quite[02:11] immediate and now it would appear we[02:14] stand on the threshold of a war that may[02:17] change us and our place in the world in[02:20] ways we cannot begin to[02:24] contemplate it is important therefore[02:27] that as a community of Learners we try[02:29] to educate ourselves about the[02:31] complexity of the issues that the world[02:34] confronts this forum today along with[02:38] others we've had on the campus is a part[02:41] of that[02:42] effort given the attendance at the[02:44] lectures and the demand for[02:47] tickets these[02:49] forums uh held in the course of this[02:51] year make it clear that there is a[02:54] hunger for information a desire to be[02:57] informed by opposing points of view[03:00] this is what it means to be a[03:03] university and thus the campus is[03:05] co-sponsoring this[03:07] event uh in this zerbach Hall with a[03:11] tape delayed television broadcast and a[03:13] screening and Wheeler Auditorium for the[03:15] Overflow[03:17] audience and I think this represents uh[03:20] a really wonderful opportunity for us to[03:24] extend our learning it gives me great[03:26] pleasure to welcome Professor Edward SED[03:29] from Columbia University as our[03:31] distinguished visitor today we're[03:34] delighted that he's been able to join us[03:37] we know that this trip has been a[03:39] difficult and an arduous one for[03:41] Professor SED and we're most grateful[03:44] for his coming to[03:47] Berkeley the our own Professor Nazar[03:50] alad the Berkeley of the Berkeley Center[03:53] for Middle Eastern studies worked very[03:55] hard to bring about this talk and indeed[03:57] has been working for several years to[04:00] bring Professor SED back to the[04:03] campus Professor elad who is chair of[04:06] the center for Middle Eastern studies is[04:09] a prominent scholar of architecture and[04:11] urban planning as head of the Berkeley[04:14] Center he is a leading force in cultural[04:17] studies please join me in welcoming to[04:20] the podium professor elad[04:24] [Applause][04:35] good evening everybody and welcome to[04:37] the spring lecture series of the center[04:39] for Middle Eastern[04:41] studies it is my great pleasure and[04:43] honor to introduce our distinguished[04:46] guest rarely does an academic lecture[04:50] organized by an area study center Garner[04:53] such[04:54] attention in the week that the lecture[04:56] was first announced hundreds of students[04:59] facult[05:00] staff and members of the Berkeley[05:02] Community lined up outside the center[05:04] and this Hall and in a matter of days[05:08] 2200 free tickets were gone[05:12] today we all fill this Hall and there[05:15] are others a thousand or so awaiting a[05:18] rebroadcast of this lecture[05:21] elsewhere how then to introduce such a[05:24] commanding[05:25] presence Edward S presents many[05:28] different things to many different[05:29] people people so perhaps a few words are[05:34] Justified Edward S was born and raised[05:36] in Jerusalem he spent his childhood[05:39] years in Cairo Egypt before moving to[05:41] the United States attending Princeton[05:43] and later Harvard where he earned his Ma[05:46] and PhD[05:47] degrees in 1963 he began teaching at[05:50] Columbia University where he currently[05:52] holds the position of University[05:53] professor of English and comparative[05:56] literature Edward S is a writer scholar[06:00] a literary critic and a political[06:02] activist as a writer his work has an[06:05] extraordinary range possibly because he[06:08] has lived on the cusp of so many[06:10] cultures and has striven to connect[06:13] desparate areas of experience from the[06:15] musical to the literary from the first[06:18] world to the third world and from the[06:20] Orient to the[06:21] West his writings in popular media like[06:24] the Arabic newspapers Alam and alhat and[06:27] the nation here in the United States are[06:30] a testament to his tremendous[06:31] intellectual energy he has written more[06:34] than 20 books and his work has been[06:36] translated into 35 different[06:39] languages as a scholar Edward S has been[06:42] a major Force his seminal book[06:44] orientalism published in[06:46] 1978 revolutionized academic inquiry and[06:50] gave form to an to entirely new forms of[06:53] scholarship like postcolonial[06:56] theory in that book s shows how the[06:59] orent was produced and managed[07:01] militarily sociologically scientifically[07:05] imaginatively and above all discursively[07:08] by Europe today the concept of[07:11] orientalism is common parlance in[07:13] academic and popular discourses breaking[07:16] down the divisions between history and[07:18] critique between knowledge and[07:20] geopolitics and between Theory and[07:22] action two important books the question[07:25] of Palestine un covering Islam followed[07:28] soon thereafter[07:30] then there was the important book[07:32] cultural imperialism published in[07:34] 1993 and the very touching Memoir out of[07:37] place in[07:39] 1999 this body of scholarship was[07:42] Radical for it showed that one cannot[07:46] understand Western history culture and[07:48] politics without giving a central place[07:51] to colonialism and[07:53] imperialism as an activist and a[07:55] political figure s has also emerged as[07:58] the most articulate voice voice of the[08:00] Palestinian[08:01] question although a Critic of Israel's[08:03] occupation of the West Bank on Gaza s[08:06] has often parted ways with the[08:07] Palestinian Authority over many issues[08:10] and has used his prominence in the Arab[08:12] world to educate its people about the[08:15] reality of the Jewish[08:17] experience as a public intellectual s[08:20] has been widely recognized and honored[08:22] he is a member of the American Academy[08:24] of Arts and Sciences the American[08:26] Academy of Arts and letters the Royal[08:28] Society of literature among many others[08:31] he has been awarded numerous honorary[08:33] doctorates by several universities[08:34] including the University of Chicago the[08:36] University of Michigan the University of[08:38] Edinburgh in Scotland beate University[08:40] in Palestine and jawahar Neu University[08:43] in India his books of course have won a[08:46] plethora of awards too many to list here[08:50] somehow in his spare time this[08:52] remarkable man has the time to play the[08:55] piano and write about music and Opera as[08:58] many of you know know Professor s has[09:01] not been very well in recent years but[09:03] in this case mortal diseases recede in[09:07] the face of his rigorous intellectual[09:09] life and his impassioned political[09:11] engagement with the[09:12] world I would like to end this[09:14] introduction with a small[09:16] anecdote like many of us on this campus[09:18] I go every morning to Cafe Strada to get[09:21] my[09:23] cappuccino every day between the hours[09:25] of 8 and 9 a.m. stands a poor and[09:28] dignified man pen handling outside the[09:32] cafe through the years he has come to[09:35] see and know what I do on this[09:39] campus I do not know what made him[09:42] decide never to extend his hand to beg[09:45] for[09:46] me a few days ago as I left the cafe he[09:49] did in fact extend his hand for the very[09:52] first time I expected to hear can you[09:56] spare some change instead he said loud[09:59] LLY do you have an Edward S ticket for[10:07] [Applause][10:11] me some of us would like to think of[10:13] this as a Berkeley story but but I think[10:17] of it as an Edward S Story please join[10:20] me in welcoming Edward S to our campus[10:35] thank[10:45] you thank you very much[11:01] well I'm uh incredibly uh moved and[11:07] flattered um first of all to be have[11:10] been invited here in the first place[11:13] second to see all of you here tonight[11:17] you could be doing much more exciting[11:19] things I'm sure than attending a lecture[11:22] and then uh lastly to the chancellor and[11:26] Professor sad for their really superb[11:29] introductions far too generous and uh[11:32] and[11:35] flattering my topic tonight is uh the[11:39] universal Palestine and the universality[11:41] of Human[11:43] Rights this is a very fraught moment to[11:46] be speaking about human rights in the[11:48] Middle East and those of the Palestinian[11:50] people in[11:51] particular but it does seem to be a[11:54] symbolically useful time for the[11:57] purposes of my lecture[12:00] the United States has already sent a[12:04] hugely intimidating military force to[12:07] various Arab and non-arab countries in[12:09] the region surrounding[12:12] Iraq the frankly Imperial idea behind[12:15] that is to disarm Iraq forcibly and also[12:19] to change its Dreadful[12:22] regime the rest of the International[12:24] Community not least most of the Arab[12:27] countries of the region as well as some[12:28] of the other members permanent members[12:31] of the security Council has been[12:33] expressing varying degrees of disqui and[12:36] occasionally urgent[12:39] disapproval although it is also clear[12:41] that most governments in the Arab world[12:44] are too unpopular and intimidated to do[12:48] anything but to go[12:50] along certainly it's the case that no[12:52] one outside of Iraq has suggested any[12:56] iota of concern about Saddam Hussein and[12:59] his government it is the people of Iraq[13:02] who stand to suffer the most and whose[13:04] doubly and triple miserable fate is of[13:07] the deepest interest to people all over[13:09] the[13:10] world I'm sorry to say that one of this[13:14] that none of this has had the slightest[13:17] effect on what is a granitic will on the[13:20] part of a tiny number of members of[13:23] George Bush's Administration to go[13:25] forward with plans for a war among whose[13:29] stated Imperial intentions is the[13:32] unilateral wish to bring American style[13:34] democracy to Iraq and the Arab world[13:37] redrawing maps overturning governments[13:40] and states and modes of life on a[13:43] fantastically wide scale in the[13:46] process that all this has very little to[13:49] do with the enhancements of human rights[13:51] in a part of the world especially r with[13:53] their abuse is patently obvious where[13:57] Iraq to have been the world's largest[13:59] exporter of oranges or apples there[14:01] would have been no concern over its[14:03] purported possessions of weapons of mass[14:07] destruction or its extraordinarily cruel[14:10] and tyrannical regime this is a war[14:13] planned for resources and for strategic[14:16] control and whether or not it occurs the[14:19] US has at very least asserted its[14:22] strategic dominance over the center of[14:25] the world's largest known energy[14:27] reserves from the[14:29] to the Caspian Sea and plans to reshape[14:33] the area by pacifying threats to its[14:35] dominance in countries like Syria Iran[14:39] and some of the gulf[14:40] Emirates to threaten war with such[14:42] belligerence and such a wasteful[14:44] deployment of military resources is an[14:47] abuse of human tolerance and human[14:49] values that it might in the end turn out[14:51] to be only a display rather than an[14:53] actual use of force only deepens anxiety[14:56] about the kind of world we we are moving[14:59] toward note also that by the end of the[15:02] decade China will be importing as much[15:04] oil as the US and by[15:07] 2025 the United States will need to[15:09] import a full 75% of its oil needs from[15:12] the Gulf region principally as against[15:16] those Mighty facts whether people are[15:18] prevented from getting an education or[15:21] from being allowed to move Express[15:23] themselves and organize freely without[15:24] fear either of intimidation Collective[15:27] punishment or straight up[15:29] assassination may seem therefore like[15:31] relatively humdrum if not trivial issues[15:35] but they do pertain with a frightening[15:37] parallelism to both the people of[15:39] Palestine and the people of[15:40] Iraq and either in both cases my point[15:43] here is to assert the universal[15:46] applicability of human rights to those[15:48] unfortunate people given that since[15:51] World War II there has grown up an[15:53] impressive even formidable worldwide[15:56] consensus that each individual or[15:59] collectivity no matter his or her color[16:01] ethnicity religion or culture is to be[16:04] protected from such horrific practices[16:06] as starvation torture forced transfer of[16:10] population discrimination on the basis[16:12] of religion or ethnos humiliation[16:15] extrajudicial political assassinations[16:17] land expropriations and all manner of[16:20] similar cruel and unusual[16:22] punishment I want to affirm also that no[16:25] power no matter how special or how[16:28] developed or how strong or how urgent[16:30] its claims of past victimization is[16:34] exempt from accusation and judgment if[16:36] that government practices such[16:39] things and[16:42] finally and finally no people or[16:46] individuals can be singled out as[16:48] exceptions to these general rules so as[16:51] to be considered in fact liable for such[16:53] abrogations of human rights as those[16:55] I've[16:56] mentioned once big powers[16:59] start to dream of regime change a[17:02] process already begun by the pearls and[17:05] woler wites of this country there's[17:07] simply no end in sight isn't it[17:10] outrageous that people of such a dubious[17:12] caliber actually go on blathering about[17:15] bringing democracy modernization and[17:17] liberalization to the Middle East heaven[17:20] knows that the area needs it as so many[17:23] Arab and Muslim intellectuals and[17:24] ordinary people have said over and over[17:27] but who appointed these characters[17:29] as agents of progress anyway and what[17:32] entitles them to pontificate in so[17:34] Shameless a way when there are already[17:35] so many injustices and abuses in our own[17:38] country to be[17:39] remedied it's particularly ging that[17:42] Pearl about as unqualified a person as[17:45] it is imaginable to be on any subject[17:48] except I'm told[17:51] sus and any subject touching on[17:53] democracy and Justice should have been[17:55] an election advisor to Benjamin[17:57] netanyahu's extreme right-wing[17:59] government during the 1996 99 period in[18:03] which he counseled the right-wing[18:05] Israeli to scrap any and all peace[18:07] attempts to Annex the West Bank in Gaza[18:10] and try to get rid of as many[18:11] Palestinians as possible this man and[18:15] his colleagues now talk about bringing[18:17] democracy to the Middle East and do and[18:20] does so without provoking the slightest[18:22] objection from any of the media pundits[18:24] who politely if not abjectly quit him on[18:28] National[18:30] television Colin Powell's speech at the[18:34] UN despite its many weaknesses its[18:36] plagiarized and manufactured evidence[18:39] its confected audio tapes which anybody[18:42] who knows Arabic are completely[18:44] senseless as well as its doctored[18:46] pictures was correct in one thing Saddam[18:49] Hussein's regime has violated numerous[18:52] human rights and un resolutions there[18:55] can be no arguing about that and no[18:58] excuse uses but what is so tremendously[19:02] hyp[19:03] hypocritical about the official US[19:06] position in the US is that literally[19:08] everything Powell has accused the Iraqi[19:11] bassis of has been the stock and trade[19:14] of every Israeli government since[19:23] 1948 and at no time more flagrantly[19:27] since the occupation of[19:29] 1967 torture illegal detention[19:33] assassination assaults against civilians[19:35] with missiles helicopters and jet[19:37] fighters the annexation of territory the[19:40] transportation of civilians from one[19:42] place to another for the purpose of[19:44] imprisonment Mass killing as in Kan[19:47] Janine subra and chatila to mention only[19:49] the most obvious the denial of rights to[19:51] free passage and unimpeded civilian[19:54] movement education Medical Aid the use[19:58] of civilians for for human Shields[20:00] humiliation punishment of families house[20:03] demolitions on a mass scale destruction[20:05] of agricultural land expropriation of[20:08] water illegal settlement economic[20:10] popularization attacks on hospitals[20:13] medical workers and ambulances the[20:15] killing of un Personnel to name only the[20:18] most outrageous abuses all these it[20:21] should be noted with emphasis have been[20:23] carried on with the total unconditional[20:26] support of the United States which is[20:28] not[20:30] only which has not only supplied Israel[20:34] with the weapons for such practices and[20:36] every kind of military and intelligence[20:38] aid but has also given Israel upwards of[20:42] $135 billion dollar in economic aid on a[20:45] scale that Beggars the relative amount[20:48] per capita spent by our government on[20:50] its own citizens this is an[20:53] unconscionable record to hold against[20:55] the US and the Secretary of State as as[20:58] its human symbol in particular as a[21:02] person in charge of US foreign policy[21:04] it's his specific responsibility to[21:06] uphold the laws of this country and to[21:08] make sure that the enforcement of Human[21:11] Rights and the promotion of freedom is[21:13] applied uniformly without exception or[21:16] condition how he and his co-workers can[21:19] stand up before the world and[21:21] righteously sermonize against Iraq while[21:24] at the same time completely ignoring the[21:27] ongoing American partnership in human[21:29] rights abuses with Israel defies[21:32] credibility and yet no one in all the[21:35] Justified critiques of the US position[21:37] that have appeared since Powell made his[21:39] great UN speech has focused on this[21:42] point and that is what I want to do this[21:46] [Applause][21:52] evening[21:55] history is made by[21:59] men and[22:03] women excuse[22:12] me[22:13] and the world we live in is a secular[22:17] and historical world as a result history[22:20] is therefore the product of human labor[22:22] choice and will nothing transcendental[22:27] or Divine can supersede that truth or[22:30] suspend the consequences that flow from[22:32] its[22:34] application there simply is no con[22:37] convincing way to assert special claims[22:41] whose origin is the Divine claims that[22:45] supposedly legitimate high altitude or[22:48] smart bombing or the use of 60 ton[22:51] bulldozers to demolish the houses of[22:53] poor and defenseless people who don't[22:55] happen to belong to the right religion[22:58] or[22:59] race just as I feel as an American that[23:01] the United States has not been divinely[23:03] endowed with a special errand Into the[23:05] Wilderness and that its practices are[23:08] endorsed by God I feel it's my moral[23:11] intellectual duty to oppose the unjust[23:14] use of its immense military economic and[23:17] political power abroad for what is it[23:21] claims falsely to be its National[23:23] Security interests I have no power so I[23:27] must resort to the tools of Education to[23:29] writing and speaking by the same token I[23:32] want to reiterate my conviction here[23:35] that the specific case of the denial of[23:37] the human rights of the Palestinian[23:39] people by the state of Israel cannot at[23:41] all be justified on any of the grounds[23:44] routinely accepted by far too many[23:46] individuals and governments who would be[23:48] the first to object to similar behavior[23:51] in other cases so far from Israel and[23:54] the Palestinians being a special case of[23:56] unusual circumstances ansers I think the[23:59] exact opposite is true that because[24:02] Palestine is perhaps of all places on[24:03] Earth the one most densely saturated[24:06] with cultural and religious significance[24:08] precisely that[24:10] reality makes it an instance of[24:12] universality thwarted and flouted the[24:16] universality of human coexistence human[24:19] acceptance of the other and the human[24:21] construction of a just and fair Society[24:24] for all and certainly not only some of[24:27] its residents the point is that no state[24:30] no State at[24:33] all has in my opinion is[24:37] entitled legitimately to object to these[24:39] formulations and certainly no leader can[24:42] state unarguably for example[24:46] as uh as George Bush has that uh I'm[24:51] sorry I'm kind of confused with where[24:53] I'm going and where I'm coming here and[24:56] I'm h as George Bush has that the United[25:00] States is good and its enemies evil or[25:03] as general cheron has announced and I[25:05] quote we are placing no restrictions on[25:07] our operations in the Palestinian[25:10] territories Israel is under no pressure[25:13] no one is criticizing us or has the[25:15] right to do so I would submit that such[25:18] sweeping statements of higher purpose[25:20] and extraordinary impunity must be[25:23] opposed and intellectually dismantled[25:26] for the thuggish boulder Dash that such[25:29] pronouncements really are especially if[25:31] they're intended to cover or explain or[25:33] excuse or somehow justify barbaric[25:36] Devastation and vast[25:38] ruin yet the contrast between the[25:41] immensely powerful and the relatively[25:43] powerful is not powerless is not so[25:45] simple since the great outcry all over[25:48] the world against unilateral us War and[25:51] the felt need by even US government[25:53] spokespeople to reiterate a general[25:55] American commitment to democracy and[25:57] human rights[25:58] does in fact reveal a profoundly worldly[26:02] awar awareness that aside from comfort[26:05] and convenience human beings today[26:09] expect rightly to be respected their[26:12] requirements for a decent life met their[26:15] wish recognized not to be tortured or to[26:18] detained unlawfully their concern for[26:21] their children and their livelihoods[26:24] accepted despite the supposedly higher[26:26] priorities asserted by great[26:28] power all these in theory at least are[26:31] rarely challenged headon and considered[26:33] to be human entitlements even if such[26:36] terrible abstractions as the national[26:39] interests and National Unity are[26:41] affirmed as superseding individual[26:45] rights this unattractive and[26:48] unacceptable argument certainly now[26:50] prevails in the US where education and[26:53] history for example has become a[26:55] profoundly ideological battle between[26:57] prop opponents of a kind of primitive[26:59] heroic white American nationalism and[27:03] the much more sensible Advocates of the[27:05] Multicultural multi-racial realities[27:07] stressed for instance in his work by The[27:10] prominent historian Howard Zin this[27:12] other American history includes a bitter[27:15] Legacy of domestic slavery Imperial[27:18] conquest and terrible class[27:20] inequality so the universally accept[27:23] widespread conviction that everyone on[27:25] Earth deserves a modum of human rights[27:27] as own only a symbolic moral power[27:30] perhaps too ill endowed to take on so[27:32] redoutable a force as American global[27:35] reach and all is all too numerous local[27:38] henchmen and fearsome neoconservative[27:41] spokespeople who want so-called American[27:43] values to rule the world resistance and[27:46] objections not[27:48] withstanding to speak about Palestinian[27:51] rights in so skewed a context therefore[27:55] may seem[27:56] quixotic and certainly the current[27:58] impression that Israel and the US have[28:00] borne all before them in their[28:02] stubbornly ingrained hostility to[28:05] Palestinian self-determination[28:07] reinforces The Superficial[28:10] impression but I want to argue that is[28:13] not at all there is to the whole truth[28:17] there are other accomplishments and[28:18] realities also to be noted with positive[28:21] approbation and admiration during my own[28:24] lifetime Palestinians since the[28:27] climactic events of[28:29] 1948 when their society was destroyed[28:32] and the establishment of Israel occurred[28:35] Palestinians have gone from the status[28:37] of[28:38] non-persons to that of a universally[28:40] acknowledged National collectivity I.E a[28:44] people by virtue not of Force of Arms[28:47] but of other means some of which I want[28:50] to rehearse here if for now Palestinians[28:54] are still stateless dispossessed and for[28:57] the most part exiled it is because by[29:00] those very unmilitary means some of[29:02] which are the mobilized force of memory[29:05] the power of images and the hero heroism[29:08] and Ingenuity of sheer persistence[29:10] Palestinians embody perhaps the most[29:13] visible and certainly the most universal[29:15] case of Human Rights abuses on Earth[29:19] today there's no desire on my part to be[29:21] fetishistically competitive about such a[29:23] claim so I won't go on about it any[29:26] further but I do want to be able to talk[29:29] about the visibility not only of the[29:31] Palestinian presence as victims of[29:33] Injustice and human rights denial but of[29:36] the equal force they represent on the[29:38] world stage of a wrong that must be[29:43] wred in an extremely suggest suggestive[29:46] lecture that appeared in[29:48] 1995 the Welsh political scientist Ken[29:51] Booth draws attention to the existence[29:54] of a growing number of what he calls[29:56] transcultural moral and political[29:58] solidarities that have acted the part of[30:01] what he calls sovereignty free agents[30:04] that is to say actors and institutions[30:06] not bound by the borders between[30:08] countries that set the International[30:10] System since the Peace of West[30:13] failure that focus seems to me an[30:15] excellent way of characterizing the[30:17] overall human achievement of the[30:18] Palestinian people in the period after[30:20] 1948 until the present note that in all[30:24] the many different places conditions and[30:27] politics[30:28] that the approximately 7 and A5 million[30:30] Palestinians now live in as citizens of[30:33] Israel as people under military[30:35] occupation in the West Bank and Gaza as[30:37] refugees and stateless persons several[30:39] Arab countries as refugees with various[30:43] acquired nationality scattered all over[30:45] the world and as members of a[30:47] dispossessed people Palestinians have[30:49] developed a moral and political[30:51] solidarity with each other nothing less[30:54] in fact than a national identity that it[30:57] has been the goal of Israel to deny[31:00] obliterate and refuse to acknowledge as[31:04] Sovereign to argue backwards for a[31:07] moment let me cite only one recent[31:10] example of what I mean by denial and a[31:13] refusal to[31:14] acknowledge it was precisely that[31:16] refusal that flawed the Oslo process[31:20] from the moment it was undertaken in[31:22] 1993 alas with unqualified and[31:26] unprepared Palestinian represent pres[31:28] atives delegated to a task which was[31:31] designed not to restore but to further[31:33] postpone and deflect the Fulfillment of[31:36] Palestinian[31:37] aspirations in this neither Israel nor[31:40] the United States was moved by an[31:43] acknowledgment of past injustices nor by[31:46] a spirit of[31:47] Contrition or of[31:49] reconciliation with their batteries of[31:52] legal experts backed by disproportional[31:54] military weight in both countries and at[31:58] the same time as more than double the[31:59] pre-existing number of settlements were[32:01] being created on Palestinian land and[32:03] More Human Rights abused Israel and the[32:07] United States divided and[32:10] subdivided occupied and ever diminishing[32:13] bits of Palestinian territory into[32:15] smaller and less viable units for the[32:18] unfortunate Palestinian Authority to[32:20] take over and misrule all under the[32:23] misleading not to say willfully[32:26] deceptive rubric of the a peace[32:28] process was there any other intention at[32:32] any at any time I don't think so it[32:36] wasn't peace that they wanted but[32:39] pacification for a[32:41] Time the oso Accords were far too much[32:46] of a hole with several PRI prior Decades[32:48] of Palestinian dispossession house[32:50] demolitions land expropriations and[32:53] attacks on civil[32:55] society as against that as as I said a[32:58] moment ago there's been a moral and[32:59] political solidarity building up between[33:01] Palestinians all over the world some of[33:05] it was evident in the past week's[33:08] worldwide protests one of its[33:10] manifestations and perhaps not its most[33:12] significant one is that today for[33:14] example there is a Palestinian Cinema[33:17] and with it a kind of transnational[33:19] visibility of the Palestinian[33:21] person that would have been Unthinkable[33:24] three decades[33:25] ago visual symbols have played an[33:28] extraordinary role in this reappearance[33:30] of the Palestinian individual after[33:32] years of absence and programmed National[33:36] effacement I don't want to rehearse here[33:38] the steps taken by Israel inside former[33:40] Palestine to systematically obliterate[33:43] the centuries old Arab presence along[33:45] with its symbols and structures I've[33:48] described some of these on the juridical[33:50] level so far as a taking over of land[33:52] and property was concerned in my book[33:54] the question of Palestine but the[33:56] overall plan beginning in 1948 was to[33:59] start Israel as if aresh a state arising[34:03] from nothing to take its place among the[34:06] nations in the affirmation of its[34:09] renewed Millennial identity Israel[34:11] managed for quite a while to remove the[34:13] traces of Palestinian life for the most[34:16] part even though of course a large[34:17] number of these traces who remained as a[34:20] remnant of people despite the expulsions[34:22] of[34:23] 1948 were there as a humbled and[34:26] scarcely perceptible presence ruled by[34:29] military government inside Israel until[34:33] 1966 even so apparently simple uh sorry[34:37] innocent a discipline as[34:39] archaeology thereafter was complicit in[34:42] the making over of the land and its[34:44] markers as if there had never been any[34:47] Arab Palestinians there this is[34:50] chillingly described by NAD Abul in her[34:53] recent book facts on the ground AR[34:56] archaeological practice ractice and[34:58] territorial self-fashioning in Israeli[35:00] Society her argument is that in the[35:03] process of providing Israel with an[35:06] ancient objectivized history visible in[35:08] archaeological evidence the traces of[35:11] other more historically adjunct[35:14] histories were ignored or simply moved[35:17] away what remained became evidence she[35:20] says of a kind of essential Israelite[35:24] Israel likeness giving the state a[35:27] pedigree in a long distance past with[35:30] the intervening cultures and peoples[35:32] pushed[35:33] aside moreover in a Trilogy of powerful[35:36] books entitled a land without people the[35:40] expulsion of the Palestinians and the[35:41] third one the Imperial Israel and the[35:44] Palestinians the politics of expansion[35:46] 1967 to 2000 the Palestinian Israeli[35:50] scholar n masalha has Unearthed both the[35:53] practice and theory of emptying the land[35:55] of Israel and it of its indigenous[35:58] inhabitants much of the pre-state[36:00] Zionist ideology that mobilized Eastern[36:03] European communities for the track to[36:05] mandatory Palestine was premised on the[36:08] virtual absence of inhabitants on what[36:10] was often depicted as either a[36:12] completely empty or a hopelessly arid[36:15] land awaiting[36:16] Redemption later or in some case[36:19] simultaneously with that contention when[36:20] the discovery of actual Palestinians[36:22] could no longer be deferred or denied[36:26] there was a concerted effort to devise[36:28] ways of spiriting them away for which[36:31] the war of 1948 provided field[36:34] commanders and David Boran himself with[36:37] a rich[36:38] opportunity these are amply attested to[36:40] in the Israeli military archived as[36:43] combed assiduously by a number of Jewish[36:45] as well as numerous Arab researchers[36:47] including masalha himself since[36:50] 1967 the desire to efface or repress[36:54] what has remained of an[36:55] institutionalized Palestinian life in[36:57] the cities and Villages of the West Bank[36:59] and Gaza has remained an often[37:01] explicitly stated Israeli goal recently[37:05] hidden inside the pmics of a war for[37:07] Israel's survival and a defense against[37:11] extremist[37:12] terrorism but whether its new Jewish[37:15] citizens liked it or not Israel was[37:17] always encumbered by Palestinian memory[37:20] which is one of my themes here it's not[37:23] as if a whole existence of a people can[37:24] be easily wiped away like a footprint in[37:26] the sand[37:28] the sheer banality of such a b[37:30] possibility is too obvious to require[37:32] more comment here what I would like to[37:34] note however is that as the resourceful[37:36] Palestinian Israeli sociologist Ahmed[37:39] Sai has shown in a brilliant piece of[37:41] historical and social synthesis the more[37:44] Israel has unilaterally exerted its[37:47] considerable Force to bury the[37:49] Palestinian past as it were there has[37:51] been a painstaking Collective and yet[37:54] uncoordinated Palestinian memory that[37:57] has Main retained Palestinian history[37:59] since the NABA of 1948 as a tremendously[38:02] potent site of memory Cinema is one[38:06] result what has remained of the vastly[38:08] dispersed and disjunctive fragments of[38:10] history since 1948 have been[38:13] painstakingly collected over time by[38:16] individuals as object of memory such[38:18] objects as house keys title Deeds[38:21] photographs[38:23] letters newspaper clippings embroideries[38:26] and so forth and through film fiction[38:29] poetry oral discourse critical and[38:31] political analysis significant or[38:34] traumatic Collective experiences like[38:36] the da Yin kuf kasum Sabra and chatila[38:39] and Janine events the significant[38:41] episodes of Palestinian suffering have[38:44] been preserved along with a national[38:46] life that bore and outlived them I[38:51] remember writing in 1982 that whenever[38:53] one of us had an opportunity to speak[38:54] publicly there was a felt requirement to[38:57] start narrating the national Collective[39:00] narrative as if from scratch no[39:03] freestanding Palestinian story was[39:05] available that could place before the[39:07] world the chronological sequence of[39:10] dispossession and catastrophic loss that[39:12] is so disfigured and mutilated[39:15] contemporary Palestinian life such a[39:18] sequence has been interdicted in all[39:20] sorts of ways far too many times by such[39:24] things as the carting off by Israeli[39:26] soldiers of palestin archives in Beirut[39:29] during the 1982 in Invasion and only the[39:32] other day the Israeli occupation Army[39:36] similarly removed records computers hard[39:38] drives statistics from Palestinian[39:41] offices at the Central Bureau of[39:43] Statistics the Ministry of Education and[39:46] elsewhere in the West Bank whether This[39:49] was meant to put a stop to Palestinian[39:51] national life just short of full ethnic[39:54] cleansing I don't want to speculate here[39:56] but that such procedure Es are of a[39:58] peace with claims that Israel is[40:00] fighting for its life and that in[40:02] occupying and destroying everything[40:04] possible by tanks bulldozers f-16s and[40:07] Apache helicopters it is defending[40:10] itself against ter terrorists who happen[40:12] to have no army or viable means of[40:14] defense or means of Waging War of any[40:17] description that seems totally obvious[40:20] in any event the great Narrative of[40:23] Palestinian life hasn't yet been[40:26] achieved any more than the Fulfillment[40:28] of its logical National aspirations have[40:30] been fulfilled although it seems just as[40:33] obvious that there is no regression no[40:36] flagging among Palestinians everywhere[40:38] on that inexorable Drive despite all[40:42] this a Palestinian nation in Exile has[40:45] emerged with an unmistakable outline and[40:48] personality of its own the vast network[40:51] of Institutions groups and[40:52] collectivities scattered all over the[40:54] world that sustains the continuity of[40:56] Palestinian national life is an amazing[40:59] thing it has drawn not only on the[41:02] mobilized energies of Palestinians[41:04] everywhere but also on the dazzlingly[41:07] widespread commitment to them of their[41:09] friends allies and comrades all over the[41:12] world the obstacles placed before the[41:16] path of Palestinians on a minute on a[41:18] daily minute-by-minute basis cannot be[41:21] overestimated each of them a conscious[41:24] willful abuse of Human Rights collect[41:27] from everywhere literally in the history[41:30] of colonial brutality against indigenous[41:32] people but now protracted into several[41:35] regimes simultaneous regimes of[41:38] Oppression note please the utter[41:41] inequality of power between stateless[41:43] and dispersed Palestinians and the[41:45] collection of Arab states who offend[41:47] their Humanity who dehumanize them but[41:50] who nevertheless house them in Lebanon[41:52] for example 400,000 Palestinians are[41:55] kept stateless their medical needs[41:58] largely unattended to their ability to[42:00] work study and reside as they please all[42:03] of them universally accorded human[42:06] rights these are scandalously curtailed[42:08] by statutory laws designed expressly for[42:11] that purpose in Syria and Egypt similar[42:15] conditions apply only with smaller[42:17] numbers of Palestinians involved in[42:19] countries where Palestinians have been[42:21] fortunate enough to acquire citizenship[42:24] there are invidious laws that[42:26] discriminate against them somehow[42:27] different from the rest of the[42:29] population this is sadly true even in[42:34] this[42:35] country in the practice for example of[42:38] racial profiling or singling out[42:40] Palestinians uh in universities and in[42:43] lines in at the airport inside Israel[42:47] non-jewish Palestinians are under[42:49] repesentative they are juridically not[42:51] allowed rights of immigration land[42:53] ownership and buying these rights are[42:55] automatically accorded the Jewish[42:57] citizen of the state and indeed of[42:59] Jewish people everywhere in the world[43:02] since late 2001 extra pressure on the[43:06] Palestinians as a community has been[43:07] applied to them inside Israel even[43:10] though they represent over 20% of[43:12] Israel's[43:14] population as for the West Bank in Gaza[43:17] Gaza in particular the[43:19] 35-year-old military occupation now the[43:22] longest and most brutally sustained in[43:23] modern history has taken a terrific toll[43:27] in the human condition of the[43:28] Palestinians on every level in fact[43:31] short of genocide itself I cannot think[43:33] of a single one of their human rights as[43:35] a people that has not been[43:36] violated with a kind of refined[43:39] viciousness designed to dehumanize break[43:42] their spirit and humiliate them to[43:45] degree that is even to someone who has[43:47] been carefully but helplessly aware of[43:49] this taking place simply[43:51] Stupify what's made it worse is how much[43:54] of this has been willfully shielded from[43:55] witnessing eyes[43:57] by Propaganda about fighting for[43:59] survival and against terrorism claims[44:02] that in any other instance would defy[44:04] the credulity of the most gullible[44:06] intelligence the sheer inequality[44:08] between the average Palestinian and the[44:10] average Israeli is[44:12] breathtaking you will say something[44:14] disapproving about those terrible[44:16] suicide bombers and I will agree but how[44:21] many Israelis have had to live through[44:23] the demolition by bulldozing of entire[44:26] villages blocks of flats shopping[44:29] districts how many Israelis have had to[44:31] endure missile attacks by Apache[44:33] helicopter or Rockets from americanmade[44:37] F16 Fighters how many Israelis have have[44:41] to be stripped and searched at 300[44:45] checkpoints on an hourly basis during[44:48] the first three weeks of the present[44:50] intifada 1 million bullets were fired by[44:53] Israeli military personnel at[44:55] Palestinian civilians neither Indians[44:58] demonstrating against the British nor[45:01] South African blacks fighting against[45:03] apartheid faced anything like this nor[45:06] for that matter that they have to reckon[45:08] with missiles hundred of Tanks[45:10] helicopters and f-16s and Rocket attacks[45:13] fired into civilian areas as well as[45:16] refugee camps with no defenses or arms[45:20] whatever consider that on the internet[45:23] for January the 23rd one can read that[45:27] 836 Muslim pilgrims to Mecca from Gaza[45:30] were denied permission to leave that the[45:33] Catholic Cardinal who's a Palestinian[45:36] was detained at Tel Aviv airport that[45:39] some towns on the West Bank have already[45:42] sustained[45:44] 244 days of consecutive curfew that 150[45:49] dunams of fertile agricultural land were[45:52] raised in Gaza that three people two of[45:55] them civilians were killed and six homes[45:57] demolished that 62 shops in nzl Isa were[46:01] flattened to the ground and that[46:03] literally thousands of people on that[46:05] day many of them pregnant women sick and[46:07] aged men and women children trying to[46:09] get to school doctors hoping to reach[46:11] their patients and their hospitals[46:13] professors and undergraduates desperate[46:15] to get to their classes with three[46:17] universities closed and ordinary human[46:19] beings shopping looking for food or work[46:23] all these detained every single one of[46:25] them by the endless number number of[46:27] checkpoints that punctuate the existence[46:29] of Palestinians in the occupied[46:31] territories two or three days ago 12[46:34] Palestinians were killed as a result of[46:36] an Israeli incursion into Gaza dozens[46:38] more injured tens of houses demolished[46:41] in varying degrees of sity and brutality[46:43] this sort of thing has been going on[46:45] there every day for 35 years as in the[46:49] meantime dozens and dozens of new[46:52] settlements have been set up by uh on[46:55] Palestinian land and if you look[46:57] on a daily basis at the newspaper[47:01] accounts of what's taking place in[47:02] Israel the Israeli elections uh the[47:05] resignation of some Minister and the[47:07] introduction of another you read down to[47:09] the end of the column in papers like the[47:11] New York Times and you find two or three[47:13] Palestinians were killed a pregnant[47:15] woman was died at a checkpoint uh a[47:18] family was detained there was one in the[47:21] uh in the in the paper this morning of[47:24] of a group of young women and their[47:26] parents detained uh the house raid at 2:[47:29] in the morning taken off to jail for[47:31] detention and interrogation because they[47:33] were suspected of terrorists this takes[47:36] place all the time conversely how many[47:40] Palestinian settlements have infringed[47:41] on Israeli property how many daily armed[47:45] incursions sometimes with 60 tanks at a[47:47] time have penetrated Israeli towns and[47:50] Villages how many Israeli Fields have[47:53] been burned with all the ritual and fuss[47:56] surrounding the planting of trees in[47:58] Israel does anyone bother to recall that[48:01] an average of[48:02] 896 Palestinian trees per day have been[48:07] uprooted by Israeli settlers and[48:09] soldiers since the beginning of the[48:10] intifada in October[48:13] 2000 for this kind of brutalizing[48:16] assault the United States and Israel[48:18] designed a peace process that lasted 10[48:21] years which was not even supposed to put[48:23] a stop to all this but rather to make it[48:25] seem slightly less[48:27] unbearable yes a peace process requiring[48:31] thousands of hours of[48:35] negotiations to make Israel stop which[48:38] of course it didn't at all you have to[48:41] use your[48:42] memory to keep in mind that since the[48:46] current intifa began representations of[48:48] all this have been available on the[48:50] international media simply do not render[48:53] but they simply do not render anything[48:54] like the harsh awfulness of what life is[48:57] like for a Palestinian on a daily basis[49:00] Tim luell and a well-respected veteran[49:02] BBC reporter has recently shown that[49:04] when one terrible suicide bombing in in[49:07] December took place it was reported he[49:09] says as if it were the beginning of a[49:11] new cycle of violence whereas the fact[49:13] that 75 Palestinians had been killed in[49:16] the preceding month 14 of them children[49:19] under the age of 18 went unmentioned as[49:22] the the fact of military occupation and[49:24] resistance to it[49:27] making the astonishing illegality and[49:29] inhumanity of Israel's policy of[49:32] Palestinian IM miseration even more[49:34] difficult to recall or even to[49:37] see not only for Outsiders so to speak[49:39] but even for Israelis themselves is that[49:44] as Amir has writes in harat I quote her[49:47] here a person could travel the length[49:49] and breadth of the West Bank without[49:52] ever knowing not only the names of The[49:53] Villages and cities whose lands were[49:56] confiscated to build the Jewish[49:57] settlements in neighborhood but the even[49:59] the fact that they exist most of their[50:02] names cannot be found on the road signs[50:06] a Jew traveling on the almost empty[50:08] roads of the West Bank would think that[50:11] there are no longer any Arabs they do[50:13] not travel on the wide roads used by[50:16] Jews end of[50:18] quote it's equally significant of the[50:20] assault on memory and visible reality[50:22] that the entire Gaza Strip which[50:25] contains 1.3 million Palestinians and a[50:28] mere 7,000 Israeli settlers who control[50:30] the Water Resources as they do also on[50:32] the west on the other occupied[50:34] territories and are protected by[50:36] thousands of Israeli Soldiers the whole[50:39] of Gaza is surrounded by an electrified[50:41] wire fence making Gaza as an Israeli s[50:45] journalist has noted in effect a[50:48] gigantic[50:50] prison both Barak and now shaon have[50:53] pressed ahead with a building of a[50:55] fantastically expensive ensive wall[50:58] which quite apart from destroying more[51:00] Arab land and separating towns from[51:02] their Farm acreage on a vast scale is[51:04] designed to blot out the existence of[51:07] the[51:09] Palestinians all of this has gone on[51:11] with a full[51:12] support of the United States and its[51:16] passive[51:17] taxpayers this tremendous assault on[51:20] memory to say nothing about current[51:21] realities is quite without precedent or[51:24] analogy in our postmodern times not in[51:27] former Yugoslavia nor in Africa nor[51:30] elsewhere in Asia and Australia with the[51:32] kind of approvation that Israel has[51:36] gotten by contrast however I'd like to[51:39] remark that all these efforts have not[51:43] achieve their goal because in every[51:45] possible way the diverse affirmation of[51:48] Palestinian identity far from being a[51:50] negative or passive thing has grown[51:52] first and foremost a culture of Human[51:54] Rights and Democratic processes at the[51:57] grassroot level that has included a[51:59] sensitive register of the claims of[52:01] memory as well as a demand for attention[52:04] and Justice despite the world's[52:05] indifference and a healthy awareness of[52:08] the ironies of unequal[52:11] power the other fact I'd like to note is[52:14] that even though in the US and parts of[52:16] Europe the notion of Palestine is[52:18] associated invidiously with Terror and[52:21] violence there is as I said earlier a[52:24] serious contradiction to that super[52:26] official Association in an ongoing[52:29] recognized Palestinian national life[52:32] with a quite peculiar if not outright[52:35] eccentric tenacity to it that has simply[52:38] overcome all the terrible ordeals placed[52:41] in its past there is today a Palestinian[52:44] literature A Palestinian legal political[52:47] and scholarly discourse a Palestinian[52:49] Cinema a Palestinian theater a[52:52] Palestinian oral tradition a large[52:54] number of Palestinian Grassroots[52:56] organizations all over the world in[52:58] short a Palestinian style that[53:02] invigorates and informs all aspects of[53:05] this far-flung community's existence the[53:07] main thing about it that I want to[53:09] assert is that it is quite[53:11] irreversible and is fully an organic[53:14] part of the universal debates on human[53:17] rights Injustice and The Narrative of[53:19] human[53:20] Freedom moreover it's situated in[53:23] contemporary awareness in all sorts of[53:25] interesting ways[53:27] the habit of considering everything[53:28] about Palestinian as at bottom being[53:30] anti-israel does an extreme disservice[53:33] to the richness of the achievement I've[53:35] been discussing as rashed khaldi has[53:37] pointed out in his book Palestine and[53:39] the Palestinians there was a coherent[53:41] Palestinian National Life well before[53:43] the onset of Zionism at the beginning at[53:46] the end of the 19th[53:48] century and this has never been broken[53:51] moreover the universality of the drive[53:53] for Palestinian self-determination has[53:55] acquired a an unbudgeable place in the[53:58] world's agenda for Liberation[54:00] sustainability and resistance every[54:03] major un conference for the past two[54:05] decades whether concerning the place of[54:07] women the environment racism human[54:10] rights disarmament health human[54:12] development economic sustainability has[54:15] had an important place in it for the[54:17] question of[54:18] Palestine paradoxical though it may seem[54:21] the Davos meetings last month for[54:24] governmental and corporate leaders had[54:26] an important component of its agenda[54:28] devoted to Palestine while at the other[54:30] end of the world in Porto Allegre in[54:33] Brazil the anti-globalization meetings[54:36] featured the presence of a large[54:38] Palestinian conent whose presence[54:40] assures an additional Progressive[54:42] Dimension to the debates there any[54:45] discussion of Middle East[54:47] peace turns out inevitably to be mainly[54:50] about the question of[54:52] Palestine if in the period after 1948 as[54:55] part of the post-war reemergence of[54:58] Europe Israel had the status of a[54:59] progressive cause it is now Palestine[55:02] that has taken that place[55:05] [Applause][55:09] one one need only think of the support[55:12] Israel had from such people as Jean Paul[55:15] sat and Simon De to gauge how far from[55:19] that position it has today Fallen as[55:21] some of its homegrown critics like[55:23] amason and abishai Margalit have noted[55:25] sadly[55:26] but since the first inat of 1987 Israel[55:30] has been transformed dramatically into a[55:32] symbol of Oppression and inj Injustice[55:35] lumped together with the United States[55:37] for its Imperial arrogance its[55:40] supremacist attitudes and its inhumane[55:42] policies towards the Palestinians over[55:45] which it has ruled for so long[55:48] divestment campaigns reminiscent of the[55:51] anti-apartheid movement[56:05] have become an important item on[56:07] American campuses Berkeley has a place[56:10] of honor in this effort and in[56:14] [Applause][56:16] Europe numerous academics and[56:18] intellectuals artists and writers[56:19] discuss boycotts of Israel that were[56:21] Unthinkable a mere 20 years ago[56:24] problematic and humanly a very[56:25] compelling issue the challenge posed to[56:27] conscious and Consciousness by the[56:30] Palestinian people raises a whole raft[56:32] of question about the post coldw war[56:35] political order that are quite unique in[56:38] their ID density and difficulty[56:41] contentious and noisy though some of[56:43] these may be I want to bring this[56:44] lecture to a close by looking at three[56:47] of them as dispassionately as I can I[56:51] won't minimize the fact that I'm a[56:53] partisan uh and that I believe that the[56:55] cause of of Palestine and Palestinian[56:57] human rights is one of the great[56:59] idealizing symbols of our time but it's[57:02] just as true that it's bristling uh[57:05] complex nature is what makes it so so[57:08] there are three at least three very[57:10] difficult very[57:12] thorny oppositions or Sy syntheses that[57:15] I want to look at now not from the[57:16] Viewpoint of a policy expert offering[57:19] Solutions and pragmatic answers but from[57:22] the perspective I can bring that of a[57:24] humanist and intellectual profoundly[57:26] engaged in the matter but who is[57:28] independent and I would like to think as[57:31] free as it's practically possible to be[57:33] of unshakable doctrinal or ideological[57:37] hobbles take the matter of[57:39] victimhood as a[57:41] start for a Palestinian like myself[57:44] who's had the most fortunate and the[57:45] most luxurious of Life compared with the[57:48] overwhelming number of my Refugee[57:50] compatriots or those who've had to live[57:52] under Israeli rule for decades it's[57:55] still difficult for me to minimize how[57:56] much more Palestinians have been sinned[57:59] against than as a whole they have sinned[58:02] how much they have suffered terribly in[58:04] an unacknowledged silence even[58:06] today as of this moment not a single[58:10] major Israel political or intellectual[58:13] figure has articulated any serious[58:17] Contrition to say nothing of accepting[58:20] responsibility for the disaster and[58:22] sustained human suffering of the[58:24] Palestinian people I know nothing at all[58:28] in contemporary history quite like this[58:30] amazing stone wall of obduracy and[58:33] desire and denial and yet I must also[58:37] say that the legacy of persecution[58:39] genocide and anti-Semitism that is so[58:41] much a part of Israel's history is a[58:43] background to be figured in and[58:45] contended with with just the same two[58:48] communities of[58:49] sufferings I've called them in the past[58:52] but one must I think make clear that the[58:54] present time one community has a[58:56] tremendous balance of f power in its[58:58] favor the other is so to speak the[59:01] victim of the former[59:03] victim Israeli policies as well as the[59:06] meditation of many Western liberals who[59:08] feel a collective guilt for Christian[59:10] and European anti-Semitism nevertheless[59:13] must be able to disentangle the Past[59:16] from the present to make very clear[59:17] distinctions between respecting the[59:20] appalling past injustices heaped on Jews[59:22] historically on the one hand and on the[59:24] other simply excus using what the state[59:26] of the Jews has done to the entire[59:29] Palestinian people ever since there is[59:32] simply no earthly or Divine dispensation[59:35] that would excuse a state or a people[59:38] for wreaking havoc upon another while[59:40] pleading through the travails of its own[59:43] past as an[59:46] excuse my argument here is to say that[59:49] no that such claims do not at all[59:51] correspond with universalism or the idea[59:54] that human rights cannot be manipulated[59:56] to accommodate what is a record of payon[59:59] brutality and cruelty in the[01:00:01] past Palestinians have been displaced[01:00:03] they have had their society shattered[01:00:05] they have had to live under military[01:00:06] occupation their lands and lives are[01:00:09] today systematically torn apart there[01:00:12] are no two ways about it I believe which[01:00:14] is not to say that we must simply[01:00:16] Overlook the tragic history of the Jews[01:00:18] on the contrary I would always want to[01:00:21] say that as a Palestinian I should make[01:00:23] my case to Defenders of Israel on the[01:00:25] basis of[01:00:26] taking full account of making due[01:00:28] acknowledgement of the history of[01:00:30] discrimination against Jews that kind of[01:00:33] policy should never ever be visited on[01:00:36] anyone for any reason at all least of[01:00:38] all by Jews in the name of their safety[01:00:41] and[01:00:50] Independence the second opposition is[01:00:52] the one that uh see sees the contest[01:00:57] between Palestinians and Israelis as a[01:00:59] contest of nationalisms which at their[01:01:03] most feverish and embattled uh fail The[01:01:06] crucial test of awareness the awareness[01:01:08] of the[01:01:09] other historically Palestine is a palum[01:01:13] sest of an enormous number of peoples[01:01:15] and civilizations each of them serially[01:01:19] leaving traces and effects that have[01:01:21] lasted for several[01:01:22] centuries it must be said again and[01:01:25] again[01:01:27] that everything we know about ancient[01:01:29] Palestine speaks to a rich multiplicity[01:01:32] of peoples and tribes not just of[01:01:34] Israelites but also of Canaanites[01:01:37] Philistines jebusites moabites and many[01:01:41] others to extrapolate from that and say[01:01:45] that only one people dominated is[01:01:47] therefore entitled to lay exclusive[01:01:49] claim to Palestine today is simply a[01:01:52] tragic misinterpretation and betrayal of[01:01:55] something far richer and interesting one[01:01:58] can interpret that history therefore[01:02:00] inclusively giving rise to complexity[01:02:02] and universalism or far more[01:02:05] narrowly as the exclusive possession of[01:02:08] only one people in culture who seem to[01:02:11] prefer unending war against others to[01:02:14] Mutual recognition and[01:02:16] coexistence Civil Wars are much more[01:02:19] bitter and unyielding than any other[01:02:20] kind I think that's the essence of the[01:02:23] problem we face today NE namely whether[01:02:25] somebody believe Palestine ought to[01:02:27] become and thereafter Remain the[01:02:29] homeland of just one dominant people or[01:02:32] whether it can become the homeland of[01:02:33] the people who actually live there[01:02:35] regardless of race and religion even[01:02:38] though for the time being they are[01:02:39] locked in Mortal[01:02:42] Combat I don't know I don't know the[01:02:46] answer to that question but it seems to[01:02:48] me that their potentially lies the[01:02:50] universality of the appeal for[01:02:52] Palestinian human rights now A second[01:02:55] class dis possessed and downtrodden[01:02:57] people for the past Century and a half[01:02:59] the Palestinians have been struggling[01:03:00] for equality in that land much as the[01:03:03] non-white people of South Africa waged[01:03:05] the battle for Liberation and equality[01:03:08] uh[01:03:10] there I don't think building a wall is[01:03:13] going to solve the problem of course[01:03:16] there will be[01:03:18] disagreements over how and what sort of[01:03:20] equality in for and Method must be[01:03:22] achieved but that it is the desired[01:03:24] result is as far as I'm concerned the[01:03:27] great truth of our undiminished energies[01:03:30] as a people that simply that has simply[01:03:32] refused to go under and go and give up[01:03:36] the final point I'd like to mention is[01:03:40] the antithesis between present[01:03:42] antagonism bitter present antagonism and[01:03:45] future[01:03:47] reconciliation[01:03:49] antagonism is the structure that today[01:03:52] binds Palestinians with Israelis in the[01:03:55] land[01:03:56] and in the[01:03:58] diaspora neither people has been blessed[01:04:01] with a Mandela nor even a de[01:04:04] cleric we are very far from a Truth and[01:04:08] Reconciliation[01:04:10] Commission the number of Visionaries who[01:04:13] have articulated thoughts that go beyond[01:04:15] a wretched impoverished opposition is[01:04:18] Tiny if they exist at all yet there have[01:04:21] been yes there have been Israelis and[01:04:24] Palestinians who have tried together to[01:04:26] work against Injustice and intolerance[01:04:29] but they are a minority a baguer[01:04:32] outnumbered minority with very limited[01:04:35] influence[01:04:37] now but that need not always be so and[01:04:41] there are other models than that of[01:04:44] Civil War let me conclude on a modest[01:04:47] personal note not because I want to[01:04:49] prophesy a brilliant future but because[01:04:52] circumstances sometimes create new[01:04:54] things to see and new models to[01:04:58] follow about a decade ago through a[01:05:01] rather amusing coin coincidence I met[01:05:04] the great Israeli pianist and conductor[01:05:06] Daniel barboy in the lobby of a London[01:05:09] hotel where we both happened to be[01:05:11] staying he to give a concert with Pierre[01:05:14] boues at the barbacan I'd already bought[01:05:16] a ticket for the event I to record the[01:05:19] wreath lectures for the[01:05:21] BBC we recognized each other we quickly[01:05:24] befriended each other for temporal[01:05:26] mental reasons of of course but also as[01:05:29] an amateur pianist and musician I had a[01:05:31] g great passion for the art and was[01:05:33] fasinated by Daniel's ulent gifts and[01:05:38] personality music brought us together[01:05:40] but so of course did our common[01:05:41] background in the Middle East it turned[01:05:44] out that he and his family arrived in[01:05:45] Israel from Argentina in[01:05:48] 1950 shortly after my extended family[01:05:51] had completely left[01:05:53] Palestine over time and given our[01:05:56] itinerant schedules we developed a very[01:05:58] warm special friendship one result of[01:06:01] which is a book of conversations that[01:06:03] has just been[01:06:04] published um and is called parallels and[01:06:08] paradoxes a phrase that goes some way to[01:06:10] describe the way our interests in music[01:06:12] culture Politics the piano and life in[01:06:15] general cross and crisscross sometimes[01:06:18] in harmony sometimes with Divergence and[01:06:22] difference it's important for me to say[01:06:24] that our friendship has become[01:06:26] tremendously important for me and I dare[01:06:28] say for[01:06:29] him he has now visited the encircled and[01:06:33] occupied West Bank on his own several[01:06:36] times first time he went I was with him[01:06:39] in the early part of 1999 where he gave[01:06:43] a recital at bate[01:06:45] University this year he went twice[01:06:49] donating his talents to a starved and[01:06:51] deprived Palestinian public in[01:06:53] ramala where as EAS naturalness of being[01:06:56] has made him a great number of friends[01:06:58] and[01:06:58] admirers no other Israeli or Jewish[01:07:01] artist has done anything so generous or[01:07:04] compassionate as Barbor in addition he[01:07:07] has taken under his wing two[01:07:09] tremendously talented young pal[01:07:11] Palestinian pianist made himself[01:07:13] available to them as teacher and Mentor[01:07:15] as well as helping to arrange concerts[01:07:17] and teachers for[01:07:19] them but the main story I want to tell[01:07:22] concerns what we have called the viar[01:07:24] project or the East West[01:07:27] Devon in early 1999 shortly after viar[01:07:31] formerly in East Germany had been[01:07:33] designated European cultural capital for[01:07:36] that year I happened to be in Berlin[01:07:37] visiting Baron borne when he was offered[01:07:40] the chance to perform in viar that[01:07:43] summer after a short discussion between[01:07:45] us and with yoyo ma who also happened to[01:07:48] be there we decided to use the[01:07:50] opportunity instead to do something[01:07:51] different namely in facilities generally[01:07:55] generously provided by viar and the[01:07:58] federal government of Germany we would[01:08:01] first addition a whole set of young[01:08:02] musicians aged 17 to[01:08:05] 25 with one exception a 10-year-old[01:08:08] Palestinian piano Prodigy who also[01:08:10] happened to be my my great[01:08:14] nephew to audition a whole set of young[01:08:17] musicians all across the Arab world and[01:08:19] Israel by the end of the auditions we[01:08:21] had the making of seever makings of[01:08:23] several excellent chamber ensembles as[01:08:26] well as a fine Orchestra made up of[01:08:27] instrumentalists from seven or eight[01:08:29] Arab countries and Israel we convened in[01:08:33] August of that year in viar and for[01:08:36] three weeks they were drilled and[01:08:37] rehearsed and fashioned into a[01:08:39] remarkably proficient Orchestra by Baron[01:08:41] Bo who devoted six or seven hours a day[01:08:44] to the task as well as going back and[01:08:46] forth three times a week to conduct[01:08:48] Vagner operas at nearby byid my role was[01:08:52] to lead nightly discussions in which[01:08:54] everyone participated every subject from[01:08:56] music to literature history and of[01:08:58] course politics in viar we were not only[01:09:01] generously taken care of by the cultural[01:09:03] capitals offices but figuratively[01:09:06] speaking we were under the wing of[01:09:09] Gerta VI's most famous inhabitant who[01:09:12] had written there his great mature[01:09:14] Masterpiece the West urer Divan the west[01:09:17] east Divan an extraordinary Act of[01:09:20] homage to Islam generally and to the[01:09:22] Persian poet halfz in particular[01:09:25] gerter was I believe the first great[01:09:27] modern European to attempt some kind of[01:09:29] artistic synthesis and involvement[01:09:31] between what in those days were called[01:09:33] the Orient and Europe his accomplishment[01:09:37] was the Magnificent Devon[01:09:39] itself as well as for our purposes the[01:09:41] use of art so to speak to create an[01:09:45] imaginative reordering of polarities[01:09:47] differences and oppositions on the basis[01:09:50] not of politics but of affinity[01:09:52] spiritual generosity and aesthetic[01:09:56] self-renewal we also exposed our[01:09:58] students to[01:09:59] binal one of the most notorious of the[01:10:02] Nazi death camps which lies only about[01:10:04] six kilometers outside viar thus serving[01:10:08] us to point out how very close together[01:10:10] the Great Heights of culture can easily[01:10:12] coexist the deepest and basest evil the[01:10:17] point of all this is that a new paradigm[01:10:20] emerged for us and our students who word[01:10:21] should go without saying from differing[01:10:23] and sometimes jarringly an agonistic[01:10:26] backgrounds and whose interests[01:10:28] Ambitions histories and commitments[01:10:30] during the three week weeks were[01:10:31] suspended as it were in the interests of[01:10:35] music music I don't need to insist on[01:10:37] this too much as a silent art what and[01:10:40] how it articulates in sound are totally[01:10:42] independent of the world of ideas[01:10:45] Concepts and words themselves yet also[01:10:48] dependent on them and that those very[01:10:50] things suspended by music's enactments[01:10:52] are paradoxically the very worldly[01:10:54] commit Circ cumstances that bring[01:10:56] musicians together but that opposition[01:10:58] and symbiosis between music and the[01:11:00] world so to speak proved amazingly[01:11:03] fertile we did another summer in viar[01:11:05] the next year 2000 in 2001 we went to[01:11:08] Chicago and last year and for the next[01:11:11] few years including this one our East[01:11:14] West Devon has been adopted by the[01:11:16] Andalusian government as well as a[01:11:18] private Foundation of three cultures[01:11:21] sevil has become our new home from viar[01:11:25] to sevil is I deeply believe a totally[01:11:28] different trajectory in Paradigm for[01:11:30] Arabs and Israelis there's no political[01:11:33] program to what we do since everything[01:11:35] is subordinated to music which for three[01:11:37] weeks possesses everyone in addition of[01:11:39] course to the Practical matter of living[01:11:41] and working and talking[01:11:44] together the point of telling you this[01:11:46] story is to S Suggest how despite the[01:11:50] incredibly polarized antagonistic and[01:11:53] discordant World in which we live[01:11:55] there's always the possibility of[01:11:57] another alternative type of social model[01:12:01] Baron is no ordinary Israeli of course[01:12:04] and I like to think perhaps I'm not an[01:12:06] ordinary Palestinian[01:12:08] either but in our work and commitment to[01:12:11] our friendship and to music making and[01:12:13] to the ongoing viar civil project[01:12:17] there's been an amazing Crossing of[01:12:18] borders and A disruption of the rigid[01:12:20] lines that have circumscribed and[01:12:22] organized our public as well as private[01:12:24] lives Liv if it weren't for the rich and[01:12:28] emblematic status of Palestine and[01:12:30] Israel none of this would have been[01:12:32] possible since it is because the complex[01:12:35] issue itself whose core from my point of[01:12:38] view is the struggle for Palestinian[01:12:40] human rights in a land Sanctified by the[01:12:43] three great monotheistic religions is so[01:12:46] fertile with possibilities ones that[01:12:49] reach into culture politics history and[01:12:52] personal relations that we've been able[01:12:55] to do what we[01:12:56] do presiding over our efforts students[01:12:59] and teachers alike has been the spirit[01:13:01] of Music which I would want to insist is[01:13:04] neither a Sentimental Panacea nor a faal[01:13:06] solution for every problem but rather a[01:13:10] practical Utopia whose presence and[01:13:12] practice in our Riven world is sorely[01:13:14] needed and in all sorts of ways[01:13:16] intensely[01:13:18] instructive at least therefore another[01:13:20] world emerges as a result against the[01:13:24] backdrop of[01:13:25] Andalusia itself an Al an alternative[01:13:28] model for coexistence between the three[01:13:31] monotheisms and if it isn't immediately[01:13:33] available on the world stage it can at[01:13:35] least signal the arrival of a new[01:13:37] attitude whose example might soon[01:13:39] provide us with many others many[01:13:41] salutary changes many profound new[01:13:44] interpretations of what is now only an[01:13:46] appallingly polarized completely inhuman[01:13:50] conflict in our work and planning and[01:13:52] discussions our main principle is that[01:13:54] sep oparation between[01:13:57] peoples war between peoples is not a[01:14:00] solution for any of the problems that[01:14:02] divide them and certainly ignorance of[01:14:06] the other provides no help whatever[01:14:08] cooperation and coexistence of the kind[01:14:10] that music lived as we have lived[01:14:13] performed shared and loved it together[01:14:16] might be I for one am full of optimism[01:14:20] despite the darkening sky and the[01:14:23] seemingly hopeless situation for the the[01:14:25] time being that encloses us all thank[01:14:33] you to the questions and answers part of[01:14:35] this event uh the staff at zelar Hall[01:14:39] was kind enough to pass on to all of you[01:14:41] some cards about 40 cards or so of[01:14:44] questions were passed on to me we[01:14:47] received another 40 by email in the last[01:14:49] week or so at the Middle East Center uh[01:14:51] clearly Professor s will not be able to[01:14:53] answer 80 questions[01:14:56] um however I I did what I'm trained to[01:14:58] do as an academic uh particularly under[01:15:00] pressure and with very little light and[01:15:03] I classified these questions into three[01:15:05] types um the first actually deals mainly[01:15:08] with issues of the Arab Israeli conflict[01:15:10] the second deals with issues of[01:15:12] scholarship uh and Professor s's[01:15:14] contribution to scholarship and the[01:15:15] third deals fundamentally with personal[01:15:18] questions uh and his opinions about um[01:15:22] issues of identity so I'm actually going[01:15:24] to start uh with a few of the questions[01:15:26] that we got and I have to say that I'm[01:15:27] going to present uh these questions in[01:15:30] um the same kind of raw language in[01:15:33] which they were written uh and I beg[01:15:35] forgiveness from Professor s for[01:15:38] that um I'm talking to a a professor of[01:15:42] of of English literature here so I have[01:15:43] to watch my English uh but this is not[01:15:46] my English unfortunately this is the[01:15:47] English of some members of the[01:15:51] audience um a recent study suggested[01:15:54] that the Arab world has made very little[01:15:56] progress towards democracy in recent[01:15:58] years while other parts of the third[01:15:59] world particularly have become a lot[01:16:01] more[01:16:02] democratic what are the prospects of[01:16:04] democracy in the Arab world what is it[01:16:07] about Arab culture that seems so[01:16:09] antagonistic to[01:16:11] democracy well I I think the last point[01:16:14] is kind of um well you say raw I think[01:16:17] it's kind of stupid I don't I don't[01:16:19] think there's there's[01:16:21] any I don't I don't think there's[01:16:23] anything about any culture that commits[01:16:25] it either to democracy or tyranny or[01:16:27] anything else I as I said cultures are[01:16:30] made by people and people can do[01:16:32] everything uh I mean had had one asked[01:16:34] the question uh say 50 years ago in[01:16:37] Europe what is it about Europeans that[01:16:39] makes them so bloody[01:16:42] minded[01:16:44] uh or about Germans that makes them you[01:16:47] know uh prone to genocide for example[01:16:50] the question would have you know would[01:16:52] have been dismissed after a bit as not[01:16:55] the right way to ask it but the fact is[01:16:58] that there is um in various ways um of[01:17:03] struggle in the Arab world involving[01:17:06] democracy which has been largely[01:17:07] concealed from outside[01:17:10] eyes I think one has to accept as a[01:17:13] premise first of all that all people[01:17:14] want as I said in my talk want to live[01:17:18] um as freely as they can uh in[01:17:21] Traditions of their own and in[01:17:23] governments of Their Own[01:17:25] the idea for example that that can be[01:17:28] brought in from the outside by an[01:17:30] invading Army as presumably we're going[01:17:32] to do in Iraq is kind of[01:17:35] ludicrous um because democracy comes as[01:17:38] a result of uh you might say minute[01:17:42] struggles uh by the micr logic of people[01:17:46] uh in struggles involving workers[01:17:49] involving women and involving[01:17:51] disadvantaged[01:17:53] minorities um[01:17:55] who gain uh victory over time I think[01:17:59] there is a there is a kind of meristic[01:18:01] uh perspective here but I think in the[01:18:04] specific case of the Arabs if I might[01:18:05] just make one uh important um[01:18:09] observation a lot of people um[01:18:12] especially amongst[01:18:14] um academics in this country who say[01:18:17] that you know um and I suppose in in in[01:18:20] the Arab world who say you know when or[01:18:23] or people like nle who who say you know[01:18:25] it's the time has come to stop blaming[01:18:27] others we have to blame[01:18:30] ourselves I I think that's a very false[01:18:33] statement and a quite superficial it has[01:18:35] an appeal to people saying well these[01:18:36] are your own self-inflicted wounds in[01:18:38] the case of the Arab world I just want[01:18:40] to draw attention to something that the[01:18:42] Arab world has never been free at least[01:18:46] in my lifetime and the lifetime of my[01:18:48] parents and Grandparents has never been[01:18:50] free of outside intervention of one kind[01:18:52] or another imperialism is still alive[01:18:55] and and well you don't have a a military[01:18:59] force of the size that the United States[01:19:01] this very moment has in the middle of[01:19:02] the Arab world and call it you know[01:19:05] self-inflicted violence it is imported[01:19:07] from the outside the same has happened[01:19:10] in the[01:19:13] middle the same has happened in the[01:19:15] Middle East since the uh since the early[01:19:19] uh 20th century there's been a struggle[01:19:21] for democracy and Independence that has[01:19:23] been thwarted[01:19:25] first by the British and the French then[01:19:27] by the Israelis and then the Americans[01:19:29] which is continuing every day and is[01:19:30] created now this here we get to the[01:19:34] self-incrimination we get distorted[01:19:38] societies uh the in the wave of uh of of[01:19:42] Independence politics that overtook the[01:19:45] Arab world after World War II when the[01:19:47] rest of the world was being decolonized[01:19:50] it was being recolonized the Arab world[01:19:52] was I mean don't forget the sez invasion[01:19:54] of 198 86 of[01:19:55] 1956 the establishment of Israel in 1948[01:19:59] the great number of military coups in[01:20:02] countries like Syria and Egypt and Libya[01:20:04] and Iraq and so on and so forth H which[01:20:07] has all contributed to a distortion of[01:20:10] human life which of which democracy is[01:20:14] one of the great losses so there are[01:20:16] there is a very powerful outside[01:20:18] argument for it which suggests that[01:20:20] democracy has always been thed and[01:20:23] indeed one of the things that I've[01:20:25] studied over time is how the uh the[01:20:28] antagonism of the United States to Arab[01:20:31] nationalism which continues to this very[01:20:32] day which is an expression of[01:20:34] self-determination and democracy has[01:20:36] made for a very impoverishing dialectic[01:20:40] and has allowed for and the final point[01:20:42] I want to make for support of some of[01:20:45] the most regressive dictatorships in the[01:20:47] Arab world don't forget that only 10[01:20:49] years 20 years ago Saddam Hussein was[01:20:52] specially favored by this country that[01:20:54] the Taliban in Afghanistan were the[01:20:57] Freedom Fighters that we President[01:21:00] Reagan called them the founding fathers[01:21:02] of Afghanistan when he invited them to[01:21:04] the White House in the 80s to fight the[01:21:06] Soviets you know so this this kind of[01:21:09] thing has created a tremendously a[01:21:11] tremendously distorted situation uh and[01:21:15] I I think therefore it's wrong to to[01:21:17] Simply say that this is some innate[01:21:19] fault of Arab culture or Islam as a[01:21:22] religion Etc because you can point to[01:21:23] other moments in the history of the[01:21:25] Arabs and of Islam in which a completely[01:21:28] different situation obtained so these[01:21:30] are matters of historical Evolution and[01:21:33] above all of historical struggle and[01:21:35] what I want to say also is that the[01:21:38] media in its concentration on terrorism[01:21:41] and violence and as Pat Robertson and[01:21:45] you know the Telly evangelists and[01:21:48] Graham was Franklin Graham and all the[01:21:50] others concentrate on the evil of Islam[01:21:52] and so on and so forth they tend to[01:21:54] obscure the picture of what I called[01:21:56] this whole series of micro struggles[01:21:59] over voting rights over uh Privileges[01:22:03] and rights for women over rights for[01:22:05] workers over the right to certain kinds[01:22:08] of social and political entitlements[01:22:11] which is taking place all over the Arab[01:22:13] world so I say rather than use the[01:22:15] snapshot approach and then generalize[01:22:17] from that back to some evil civilization[01:22:20] or religion look at the dynamic presence[01:22:23] and the dialectic and and the[01:22:24] difficulties which Arabs have to face[01:22:27] every day given this tremendous[01:22:29] Onslaught largely caused by oil not[01:22:31] oranges as I said earlier uh which has[01:22:34] made them the victims of this kind of[01:22:38] intervention[01:22:39] [Applause][01:22:41] um there's actually two questions merged[01:22:44] in one given that a two-state solution[01:22:46] looks logistically impossible what do[01:22:49] you see as a viable alternative and do[01:22:52] you really believe that a one state[01:22:55] multi-ethnic multi-religious is possible[01:22:57] in Israel[01:22:59] Palestine I I don't think it's you know[01:23:01] I don't think it's possible now uh there[01:23:04] there is uh very I can't speak for[01:23:06] Israelis but U my impression is that[01:23:09] they want a state on their own uh to[01:23:12] practice their sense of Jewish identity[01:23:15] on their own and and I I know that[01:23:17] Palestinian wants want the same thing I[01:23:19] mean they want to have an independent[01:23:21] National existence uh with land over[01:23:24] which they have sovereignty which they[01:23:26] haven't got and the land is getting less[01:23:28] every day and you know the settlements[01:23:30] as I said have now taken up most of the[01:23:32] land and the policies of the present[01:23:34] government of the Sheron government are[01:23:36] anything but interested in Palestinian[01:23:38] Independence or two states or anything[01:23:39] of the sort but the facts are uh[01:23:42] unfortunately quite different from that[01:23:44] or fortunately uh there will be[01:23:46] demographic parity in the land of[01:23:48] historical Palestine by the end of this[01:23:50] decade there will be as many Jews as[01:23:52] there are Arabs or vice versa many Arabs[01:23:54] as there are Jews um they are more and[01:23:57] more intertwined with each other as I've[01:23:59] said on other occasions the history of[01:24:01] Israel and the history of Palestine are[01:24:03] inextricable from each other and I don't[01:24:06] think that the idea of building a wall[01:24:08] or you carving out little cantons for[01:24:11] Palestinians to live in uh is going to[01:24:14] work in the long run there there are too[01:24:16] many popular pressures there too many[01:24:18] there too many interactions that have[01:24:20] gone on for that kind of Separation now[01:24:23] I'm not a political scientist nor am I a[01:24:25] Visionary of some sort that can imagine[01:24:27] schemes for resolving this deep[01:24:30] political struggle but I do think that[01:24:33] education and understanding of the other[01:24:36] those things can operate on both sides[01:24:38] of course it's much harder for palestin[01:24:40] I mean you can't tell a Palestinian[01:24:41] farmer whose land is being bulldozed by[01:24:45] uh by the Israeli Army to widen the road[01:24:49] things that I've seen many times in my[01:24:51] travels in Palestine you can't tell a[01:24:53] Palestinian farmer well think about[01:24:54] coexistence think about the horrors of[01:24:57] the of the Jewish past you know it'll[01:24:59] all work that's very difficult but I[01:25:02] think I think why I told the story at[01:25:05] the end I think that a different model[01:25:07] than just separation um which is I think[01:25:11] much more utopian to be honest with you[01:25:13] than finding a way to live in equality[01:25:17] and coexistence uh is I mean I I think[01:25:20] separation is the is the uh is the[01:25:22] utopian and quite unrealistic IC scheme[01:25:24] because they do in fact live together[01:25:27] and therefore I think equality ought to[01:25:30] be the the the um the the the the[01:25:33] keynote of uh of the future equality and[01:25:38] self-determination for both people there[01:25:40] are two people in one land which is very[01:25:42] small which cannot be realistically[01:25:45] partitioned anymore than you can build[01:25:47] settlements with thousands of yards of[01:25:49] electrical wire around them and expect[01:25:51] people just to want to leave and go and[01:25:54] then they're not there so I all I'm[01:25:56] saying using the model of the Andalucia[01:25:59] and the viar that I talked about at the[01:26:00] end is can we not find more imaginative[01:26:04] models for coexistence given that these[01:26:07] are two people who are[01:26:09] tragically but not necessarily only[01:26:11] tragedy uh involved hopelessly with each[01:26:14] other for now and for the[01:26:21] future I want to make sure that I get U[01:26:23] basically to all three types of[01:26:25] questions so I'm going to move on here[01:26:27] uh this question is about orientalism as[01:26:29] a discourse as an academic discourse why[01:26:31] has orientalism had more of an impact on[01:26:35] South Asian studies and on the South[01:26:37] Asian context more than on Middle[01:26:39] Eastern studies in other words[01:26:41] orientalism helped saalan studies take[01:26:43] off why didn't a similar movement take[01:26:46] place in Middle Eastern studies I think[01:26:47] it did I mean I think that the the[01:26:49] Middle Eastern not being a you know a[01:26:52] practitioner of Middle Eastern studies[01:26:53] myself[01:26:55] I can only talk about it from the[01:26:56] outside but if you look at the types of[01:26:59] books that were written um in the 60s[01:27:03] and 70s uh and the types of books that[01:27:06] were written after orientals came out I[01:27:08] mean I don't want to you know claim the[01:27:10] credit for all this but it you know[01:27:11] there was a a seismic change I think in[01:27:15] the attitude of younger Scholars um of[01:27:20] the Middle East uh after orientalism[01:27:22] came out that is quite dramatic I think[01:27:24] I mean there's a much for one thing uh[01:27:27] an actual involvement with the people of[01:27:29] the Arab and Islamic world is now much[01:27:31] more common among Scholars than it was[01:27:33] say in the generation of uh F gabal and[01:27:37] Golder and Bernard Lewis who lives on[01:27:39] you know past uh every other Generation[01:27:43] Um without changing I should add I mean[01:27:45] he's a um so so I I I don't agree with[01:27:49] that stipulation I think there's been a[01:27:51] quite extraordinary change in the social[01:27:54] studies in the humanities where gender[01:27:56] studies in or in what used to be called[01:27:58] oriental studies where uh literary um[01:28:01] literary analysis of a kind that was[01:28:03] never attempted by people plus the sense[01:28:05] and the most important thing is that the[01:28:07] culture of the Middle East for people[01:28:10] who read and write about it in the in in[01:28:13] in the academic setting is a living[01:28:15] thing it used to be for you know[01:28:17] orientalist it used to be the dead[01:28:19] cultures that uh what what was much more[01:28:21] important was you know uh a Century Arab[01:28:25] poem rather than a poem written by uh a[01:28:27] living poet today I think that's been[01:28:30] completely changed as a very Lively for[01:28:33] thousands of other reasons you know the[01:28:34] involvement of the world in the Middle[01:28:36] East has become much greater of course[01:28:39] but I think what's happened is that[01:28:40] there's been a a a vivation of the of[01:28:44] the field that is really quite dramatic[01:28:47] and really quite quite as interesting[01:28:49] and quite as deep-seated as that that[01:28:51] has taking place in South Asian studies[01:28:54] your autobiography eloquently describes[01:28:57] the shaping of the identity of someone[01:28:59] who is in important ways out of place in[01:29:02] the world today being denied a Homeland[01:29:05] Palestinians have an especially severe[01:29:07] situation but with increasing[01:29:09] globalization and geographical Mobility[01:29:12] are not more and more people in the[01:29:14] world becoming out of place oh I think[01:29:16] so yeah I think that's true but I think[01:29:18] there's remains[01:29:20] nevertheless uh an attachment of people[01:29:23] to[01:29:25] their in many cases imagined backgrounds[01:29:28] I mean the search for roots uh the fact[01:29:31] uh for example that so many people now[01:29:33] uh in this country go to churches and[01:29:35] synagogues and mosques and so on has a[01:29:38] lot more to do with uh the need for[01:29:41] community and finding Community than it[01:29:43] does I think with uh religious Dogma so[01:29:46] I so I think you know the the[01:29:47] rootlessness and the dispossession and[01:29:49] the[01:29:50] displacement is is a fact of of life as[01:29:54] of course people travel more and there[01:29:55] are vast new po migrant populations in[01:29:58] places like Germany and Italy and and[01:30:01] even Sweden uh than there were say 25[01:30:04] years ago is a fact of life but so also[01:30:07] I think is the whole idea of trying to[01:30:10] locate oneself nationally in all of this[01:30:14] and to find you know uh some kind of uh[01:30:17] political and ethnic identity that uh[01:30:20] that that can live with others I think[01:30:22] that's that's the difference[01:30:24] uh the positive aspect of it is that uh[01:30:27] that you can imagine an identity not in[01:30:29] Endless conflict with every other but[01:30:31] sort of Amalgamated to others and that's[01:30:33] why I think the United States ought to[01:30:36] be a much more attractive model than we[01:30:38] seem to be for the rest of the world but[01:30:41] precisely because this is an immigrant[01:30:42] society and I think the idea of turning[01:30:44] it into a judeo-christian kind of savage[01:30:48] God of Revenge and we're going to write[01:30:49] the world's injustices and we're going[01:30:51] to go to war does a tremendous[01:30:54] disservice to the reality of this[01:30:55] country but for[01:31:02] Palestinians what what I've been trying[01:31:04] to say about Palestine is that the[01:31:06] struggle over Palestine and the struggle[01:31:08] for Palestinian rights is not just about[01:31:10] you know um finding a place to uh to uh[01:31:14] to to to go back to which of course many[01:31:17] refugees do want to do that that's[01:31:19] perfectly understandable it has a much[01:31:21] more[01:31:22] Universal uh reach I think than that and[01:31:26] it's come to represent a struggle for a[01:31:30] particular kind of recognition that has[01:31:32] been denied it for for for for many[01:31:35] years particularly in the setting you[01:31:37] might say of sort of East versus West I[01:31:40] mean because the Palestinians are an[01:31:42] Arab[01:31:44] um an Arab uh outside people precisely[01:31:49] locked in combat with a people that had[01:31:52] been precisely that kind of people[01:31:54] before I mean the Jews used to be the[01:31:56] model of the diasporic exilic people and[01:32:00] now they the two of them are locked in a[01:32:01] in a kind of com the the in a kind of[01:32:03] combat which which is very which is you[01:32:06] know has attracted a great deal of[01:32:07] attention and for that reason I think uh[01:32:10] there's a great deal at stake in that in[01:32:12] that particular struggle which uh which[01:32:15] is why I think it has the universality[01:32:16] and appeal which it which it[01:32:19] does um I have two more time for two[01:32:21] more questions what can we as ordin[01:32:24] American citizens do to promote peace[01:32:26] with Justice for both Palestinians and[01:32:28] Israelis well I think first of all is to[01:32:31] have the courage to speak out everybody[01:32:34] knows[01:32:40] now everybody knows that we as American[01:32:45] citizens are the suppliers and the[01:32:48] guarantors of the Israeli War Machine[01:32:52] which keeps you know which keeps keeps[01:32:54] things going as they are and yet in[01:32:57] circles in which I live you know the[01:32:59] academic and intellectual circles it's[01:33:01] it's great to be against the war in Iraq[01:33:03] I think it's important to be against the[01:33:04] war in Iraq but let's not forget that[01:33:06] the war in Iraq is linked to[01:33:10] Israel and[01:33:13] that and that the problem of Palestine[01:33:17] and the distortions that have taken[01:33:18] place in Middle East society which have[01:33:20] led to the emergence of a[01:33:24] uh pathological leadership in uh in in[01:33:28] Iraq and to the rise of Islamic[01:33:32] extremism have very important roots in[01:33:35] Palestine in the in the struggle for[01:33:37] Palestine and the denial of rights to a[01:33:40] people uh just because there were[01:33:42] another people that said that they their[01:33:43] rights were more important so I think I[01:33:47] think uh speaking out is extremely[01:33:49] important that Palestine and Israel have[01:33:51] been kept Under Wraps because it's[01:33:54] you're afraid to offend people because[01:33:55] so many powerful people would maybe deny[01:33:58] you a job or not publish your article I[01:34:00] think that has to go out we have to talk[01:34:03] openly about[01:34:05] it remembering that a we have[01:34:07] responsibilities as Citizens for the[01:34:10] money that we spend you know in Israel[01:34:13] and in the Middle East in the most um[01:34:17] proplate and destructive ways not only[01:34:20] propping up un undemocratic governments[01:34:23] uh uh all over the place uh but but also[01:34:26] in fighting Wars that are tremendously[01:34:29] costly and humanly impoverishing in the[01:34:32] worst possible way and lastly I think I[01:34:35] think we ought to also have an[01:34:37] understanding that um looking the other[01:34:41] way and pretending that that's a problem[01:34:42] well it's it's you know those people[01:34:45] have hated each other I mean you hear it[01:34:47] all the time this is it'll never be[01:34:49] solved not in our lifetime these people[01:34:50] have hated each other for for[01:34:52] Generations it goes back back to time in[01:34:54] Memorial that's simply not true that is[01:34:56] simply not true all human conflict is[01:35:00] created by humans and it can be resolved[01:35:02] by humans and I think we have to feel[01:35:03] ourselves as part of[01:35:07] [Applause][01:35:10] this uh this is the last question and[01:35:12] this is actually coming from one of our[01:35:14] own PhD students what advice would you[01:35:17] give to the next generation of American[01:35:19] Scholars of the Middle[01:35:21] East well um gee I don't really[01:35:29] know I I[01:35:31] it's I think that the idea of[01:35:34] scholarship with especially of the kind[01:35:37] that involves living cultures is[01:35:41] difficult to maintain without a sense of[01:35:46] Engagement uh and[01:35:48] commitment but also of a certain kind of[01:35:51] Detachment and skepticism I think what[01:35:53] is I mean in my own lifetime I've been[01:35:56] teaching now for almost 40 years and of[01:35:58] course Fashions come and go[01:35:59] structuralism poststructuralism[01:36:01] modernism[01:36:03] postmodernism uh all of that stuff uh[01:36:06] and right across you know in all the[01:36:08] humanistic Fields um I think what has[01:36:11] always been in rare Supply is is uh a[01:36:14] commitment to Independence of judgment[01:36:17] and and and and mind skepticism you know[01:36:21] I mean I never believed authorities[01:36:23] always the worst ones uh and third and[01:36:26] most important as I said is an[01:36:28] engagement in the ongoing social[01:36:30] struggles which one as a student of the[01:36:33] humanities or the social sciences has to[01:36:35] identify and and and take sides in I'm[01:36:38] not talking about you know uh the[01:36:41] absence of objectivity I'm not talking[01:36:43] about you know just uh political[01:36:44] ideology I'm talking about human[01:36:47] commitments the commitments to Justice[01:36:49] to truth to fairness to the end of[01:36:52] discrimination and uh and human abuse I[01:36:55] think I mean these are all involved very[01:36:58] much I think in study and above all this[01:37:00] is the last point I want to make I think[01:37:02] it is the special role of[01:37:04] universities I don't think I don't think[01:37:07] universities are places where social and[01:37:09] political problems can be solved I I've[01:37:11] never believed that I've never taught[01:37:12] the Middle East in my own uh in my own[01:37:16] life but I think they are important[01:37:19] place for the open and free discussion[01:37:21] of[01:37:22] ideas and where controversy ought not to[01:37:25] be you know uh shied away from I think[01:37:28] it's a very good thing to debate matters[01:37:31] in a in a in a in a in a polarized and[01:37:34] pical way so long as it's understood[01:37:37] that it's still within the community of[01:37:39] learning and investigation but the idea[01:37:43] of not listening to somebody because we[01:37:45] don't like their ideas or not having a[01:37:47] speaker because he or she doesn't say[01:37:50] the right thing or not wanting to hear[01:37:54] um unpopular opinions all of that I[01:37:56] think is the worst thing for a[01:37:58] university and very often our[01:38:00] universities have been shy not Berkeley[01:38:02] but other but other[01:38:12] universities Professor s thank you very[01:38:14] much for your very graceful appearance[01:38:16] here[01:38:16] [Applause][01:38:22] this for
Sari Nusseibeh on Palestine: what next?
The speaker begins by establishing their perspective as a Palestinian Jerusalemite, emphasizing their personal experience and connection to the region. They clarify that they are not an academic expert but rather someone who has lived through the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for most of their life. They note that they are younger than the state of Israel itself, which adds a historical context to their insights.
As they reflect on the current state of affairs, the speaker expresses a grim outlook regarding the future of the conflict. They describe the past two years as marked by "grotesque horrors," indicating a significant escalation in violence and tension. They assert that they do not foresee a resolution to the conflict in the near future, suggesting that the ongoing situation is unlikely to lead to meaningful change or peace. The speaker emphasizes that the current dynamics do not address the root problems at home, implying that superficial solutions will not suffice.
Next, the speaker delves into the nature of the conflict, characterizing it as one where the Jewish side increasingly seeks to assert ethnic control over the entirety of Palestine, which includes Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. They argue that this desire for control has intensified over the years, particularly in the last decade or two. The speaker notes that while both sides profess a desire for peace, their visions of what that peace entails are fundamentally different, complicating any potential for resolution.
The speaker raises a critical question regarding the essence of Zionism. They ponder whether the current trajectory of Zionism, particularly its expansionist tendencies, is an inherent aspect of its ideology. This inquiry leads them to conclude that if Zionism is indeed fundamentally expansionist, the prospect for resolving the conflict diminishes significantly. They highlight the demographic reality of approximately seven million Jews and seven million non-Jews living between the river and the sea, suggesting that the growing messianic extremism in Israel poses a significant barrier to coexistence with the vibrant Palestinian population.
In discussing the potential for separation between Israeli nationalism and the expansionist elements of Zionism, the speaker contemplates whether such a distinction could pave the way for a more peaceful future. They suggest that if a separation could be achieved, it might open avenues for exploring solutions such as a two-state or one-state arrangement, or even a confederation that respects the rights and freedoms of both Jews and non-Jews. The speaker emphasizes the importance of equality and freedom as foundational principles for any sustainable peace.
Reflecting on the late 1980s and early 1990s, the speaker recalls a time when reconciliation between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism seemed possible, particularly in the context of a two-state solution. However, they lament that this opportunity has since been lost, with both sides failing to make meaningful progress toward peace. The speaker notes that the Palestinian Authority has struggled to advance negotiations, while the situation in Gaza has deteriorated, leading to a reliance on violence as a means of resistance.
As the conversation shifts to the speaker's current situation in East Jerusalem, they provide context about their living conditions. They explain that East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank until its annexation by Israel in 1967, which has led to ongoing tensions and restrictions for Palestinian residents. The speaker describes the past two years as challenging, marked by increased pressure on freedoms and constant surveillance by Israeli authorities. They highlight the difficulties faced by Palestinians in expressing dissent or engaging in activism, noting that even innocuous actions can lead to harassment or arrest.
The speaker contrasts their situation in East Jerusalem with the more severe conditions experienced in the West Bank and Gaza. They acknowledge that while they have not faced the same level of physical violence, the psychological toll of living under occupation and the constant threat of oppression is significant. They express concern about the ongoing violence against Palestinian farmers and villagers, particularly during the olive-picking season, where settlers often attack those attempting to harvest their crops.
When discussing the Palestinian side of the conflict, the speaker describes a fragmented landscape. They note the existence of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, which advocates for a two-state solution through negotiations, but has been largely ineffective in achieving tangible results. The speaker conveys a sense of disillusionment among Palestinians regarding the peace process, with many viewing negotiations as futile. They also mention Hamas's control over Gaza, suggesting that its popularity has waned over time, leading to a lack of cohesive representation for the Palestinian people.
The speaker highlights recent attempts at unity among various Palestinian factions, including a meeting in Cairo aimed at fostering collaboration. However, they express skepticism about the feasibility of these efforts, especially given the ongoing divisions and the influence of external powers like the United States. The speaker emphasizes that the Palestinian people are not united and that any formal representation is complicated by internal strife and differing ideologies.
As the conversation progresses, the speaker addresses the question of communication between Palestinians in different regions. They explain that the borders have become increasingly closed off since Hamas took control of Gaza, isolating its residents from those in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there are some exceptions for individuals who manage to travel, the overall situation remains one of significant separation and disconnection. The speaker notes that while telecommunication allows for some degree of interaction, the physical barriers and checkpoints complicate direct contact.
In response to inquiries about the motivations behind the ongoing conflict, the speaker suggests that both political and religious factors play a role. They argue that the Israeli side has increasingly adopted a messianic ideology that seeks to assert control over all of Palestine, while the Palestinian response is rooted in resistance to this oppression. The speaker emphasizes that the conflict is not merely a religious struggle but rather a complex interplay of historical grievances, territorial disputes, and competing national identities.
As the discussion draws to a close, the speaker reflects on the despair felt by many regarding the future of the conflict. They acknowledge the pervasive sense of hopelessness but maintain a belief in the potential for dialogue and cooperation between ordinary people on both sides. The speaker expresses a desire for a future where both Israelis and Palestinians can coexist peacefully, emphasizing the need for serious discussions about rights, freedoms, and the possibility of a shared future.
In summary, the speaker's insights provide a nuanced understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlighting the complexities of identity, ideology, and the challenges of achieving lasting peace. Their perspective as a Palestinian Jerusalemite adds depth to the discussion, illustrating the human impact of the ongoing struggle and the urgent need for dialogue and reconciliation.
The speaker reflects on the complexities surrounding the 1948 war and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians, suggesting that these events cannot be ascribed to a single cause. Instead, they indicate a combination of factors including both planned policies and the consequences of war. The speaker, identifying as a Palestinian Jerusalemite, shares a deeply personal perspective on the historical context, revealing their own life experience as intertwined with the fate of Palestinians.
They argue that while the creation of Israel led to a significant displacement of the Palestinian population, this was not merely an incidental outcome of war; rather, it appears to have been influenced by a broader agenda aimed at controlling the territory. This idea is supported by the speaker's assertion that the conflict's resolution seems elusive, suggesting that the root problems remain unaddressed. The speaker states, [01:38] "I don’t actually at the moment foresee that the conflict is going to be resolved..." This reflects a belief that the underlying issues are not simply a matter of wartime consequence but are tied to long-standing policies and ideologies.
Furthermore, they express concern about the nature of Zionism, pondering whether it is inherently driven towards territorial expansion, which complicates the narrative of displacement as a mere consequence of conflict. This nuanced view indicates an understanding that while there were indeed wartime dynamics at play, the displacement of Palestinians was also a product of intentional policies shaped by Zionist ideology. Thus, the speaker’s position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, emphasizing the need for recognition of the Palestinian narrative in historical accounts.
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- [01:38] "I don’t actually at the moment foresee that the conflict is going to be resolved..."
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- [02:32] "Each side says it wants peace but each side has its own vision of what that peace looks like."
The speaker presents a perspective that suggests the population transfer was not a marginal discussion within Zionist thought but rather an integral part of its strategy before and during the 1948 war. They imply that the displacement of Palestinians was influenced by the aims of Zionism to control the territory. The speaker expresses skepticism about the notion that this population transfer was merely a result of wartime policy.
They indicate that the current trajectory of Israeli policies reflects a continuation of these goals, suggesting that there is a systematic effort to expand control over Palestinian territories. This perspective is articulated when the speaker asserts, [02:11] "the Jewish side... becoming more and more ethnicented and more and more out to basically retain control over the entire territory of Palestine." This observation points to a belief that the displacement process is not just incidental but rather an ongoing process linked to the foundational ideology of Zionism.
Moreover, the speaker raises questions about whether Zionism, as it currently manifests, is inherently expansionist, indicating that this ideological component is crucial to understanding the historical and ongoing displacement of Palestinians. They state, [03:43] "whether Zionism is by nature... an ideology that cannot stop at any one point before in fact taking over the entire territory." This assertion underscores the argument that the population transfer is integral to the Zionist project rather than a series of isolated incidents.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, emphasizing that the population transfer is a fundamental aspect of Zionist ideology and practice rather than a marginal or contingent issue.
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- [02:11] "the Jewish side... becoming more and more ethnicented and more and more out to basically retain control over the entire territory of Palestine."
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- [03:43] "whether Zionism is by nature... an ideology that cannot stop at any one point before in fact taking over the entire territory."
When discussing the failure of significant peace negotiations, particularly the 2000 Camp David process, the speaker assigns responsibility to both sides, indicating a recognition of the complexity involved. They suggest that both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli government bear some blame for the lack of progress towards a lasting peace agreement.
The speaker notes that the Palestinian Authority, which has been negotiating for a two-state solution, has not succeeded in moving forward in negotiations over the past twenty years. They express skepticism towards the PA's effectiveness, stating, [14:56] "Palestinians basically look upon the whole process of negotiations to be a total waste of time..." This sentiment points to a widespread disillusionment among Palestinians regarding the PA's capacity to deliver meaningful results.
On the Israeli side, the speaker implies that the political landscape has not been conducive to serious negotiations, indicating that the ideological divide and the hardline positions adopted by various factions complicate the peace process. They mention the presence of extremist elements and the increasing messianic sentiments among some Israeli groups, suggesting that these factors contribute to a lack of willingness to compromise.
In this light, the speaker presents a nuanced view, recognizing that while both sides have played roles in the negotiation failures, there is a larger context of political, ideological, and historical factors that inhibit progress. Therefore, the classification of their position can be seen as mixed, acknowledging the shortcomings of both the PA and the Israeli government while highlighting the broader conflict dynamics.
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- [14:56] "Palestinians basically look upon the whole process of negotiations to be a total waste of time..."
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- [14:39] "The Palestinian Authority... hasn’t been elected for I don’t know how many years..."
The speaker discusses the role of international law in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting that it is often viewed as selectively applied or subordinate to direct negotiations and security considerations. They seem to imply that legal frameworks do exist but are not fully embraced or acted upon by either side.
The speaker does not explicitly mention specific legal statutes or frameworks but does indicate that the international community's response to the situation in Israel and Palestine has been inadequate. They suggest that international law is recognized, but its application is inconsistent. This is evident in their observation that both sides often prioritize their immediate security needs over legal considerations.
For example, they state, [19:01] "the PA... will continue to be in control... but it’s so difficult and far-fetched at the moment I don’t see this happening." This reflects a belief that while international law could theoretically provide a framework for resolution, practical realities on the ground overshadow legal considerations.
Moreover, the speaker seems to express a degree of skepticism regarding the effectiveness of international law in fostering peace, indicating that without genuine commitment from both sides to uphold legal principles, the prospects for a resolution remain bleak. Thus, their perspective can be classified as mixed, recognizing the potential role of international law while highlighting its limitations in the current geopolitical context.
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- [19:01] "the PA... will continue to be in control... but it’s so difficult and far-fetched at the moment I don’t see this happening."
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- [20:26] "It’s possible that some people in the army... had knowledge... but didn’t take that seriously enough..."
The speaker characterizes the Hamas-led attacks of October 2023 and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza in a manner that reflects deep concern for the humanitarian implications of the conflict. They acknowledge the complexity of the situation by considering both the legal and moral dimensions of the actions taken by both parties.
In addressing the attacks, the speaker implies that Hamas's actions can be viewed as a form of resistance, albeit one that has severe consequences for civilian populations. They state, [42:56] "the Palestinian people do not have the same kind of religious fundamentalist ideology that... Hamas itself has," suggesting that there is a distinction between the broader Palestinian populace and the militant actions of Hamas. This indicates a recognition of the diverse viewpoints within the Palestinian community regarding the conflict.
On the other hand, the speaker expresses significant concerns regarding Israel's military response, which they imply could be classified as excessive or even as potential war crimes. The use of the term genocide is not explicitly stated in their remarks, but the speaker highlights the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, suggesting that the military campaign is disproportionately affecting civilians.
Ultimately, the speaker's position appears to reflect a broadly pro-Palestinian stance, emphasizing the need for accountability and a recognition of the humanitarian consequences of military actions. They suggest that a peaceful resolution is imperative for both sides to coexist, stressing the importance of equality and freedom for all peoples involved.
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- [42:56] "the Palestinian people do not have the same kind of religious fundamentalist ideology that... Hamas itself has."
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- [43:55] "this is what it is. And on the Palestinian side, it’s resistance to this. It’s very simple, very straightforward."
The speaker does not explicitly mention the 1947 UN Partition Plan in the provided transcript. However, their overall perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict suggests a framework that emphasizes the ongoing conflict's complexity, historical grievances, and the deep-rooted issues surrounding territorial control. This indicates a critical view of historical decisions, including those made during the partitioning process, and implies that they may not view the partition as a fair compromise.
One of the main arguments the speaker puts forth is the notion of an inherent conflict between the two sides: the Jewish side seeks to maintain control over the entirety of Palestine, which they frame as problematic. The speaker articulates, "[02:14]...conflict between one side, namely the uh uh let me call it the Jewish side uh becoming more and more uh ethnicented and more and more uh out to basically uh retain control over the entire territory of Palestine." This suggests a belief that the partition did not adequately address the aspirations and rights of the Palestinian population.
Moreover, the speaker expresses skepticism about the possibility of resolving the conflict, stating, "[03:56]...that explains why would explain why I say the conflict is uh not one that can one can envisionage uh uh one that can be solved." This statement reflects a viewpoint that sees the partition as leading to an unresolved and ongoing conflict rather than as a solution.
In terms of classification, the speaker's position appears to be broadly pro-Palestinian, given their emphasis on the ongoing struggle for control and rights of the Palestinian people in the face of what they perceive as a continuous expansionist agenda from the Israeli side.
- [02:14] "...conflict between one side, namely the uh uh let me call it the Jewish side uh becoming more and more uh ethnicented and more and more uh out to basically uh retain control over the entire territory of Palestine."
- [03:56] "...that explains why would explain why I say the conflict is uh not one that can one can envisionage uh uh one that can be solved."
The speaker reflects on Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with a critical lens, particularly regarding the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. While the transcript does not provide a detailed enumeration of Britain's motivations, it implies a view that Britain's actions were not purely humanitarian but were influenced by imperial interests.
The speaker emphasizes the inconsistency of British policy during the Mandate period, suggesting that there were conflicting motives behind Britain’s support for a Jewish homeland while simultaneously managing the aspirations of the Arab population. They argue that this inconsistency has contributed to the conflict's current dynamics, stating, "[03:15]... the nature of Zionism it's the DNA of Zionism to be going in the direction it's been going in particular in the last say 10 or 20 years." This evokes a sense of historical continuity in the Zionist movement that may have been exacerbated by British policies.
Additionally, the speaker's remarks hint at a belief that the British Mandate facilitated the expansion of Zionism at the expense of Palestinian rights and sovereignty. The lack of clarity regarding Britain’s motives—whether they were humanitarian or imperialistic—suggests a nuanced understanding of historical actions and their implications. Overall, the speaker's position could be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as they critique British policies for contributing to the ongoing conflict.
- [03:15] "... the nature of Zionism it's the DNA of Zionism to be going in the direction it's been going in particular in the last say 10 or 20 years."
The speaker does not explicitly address the migration or displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries following 1948. As a result, there is no direct comparison made with Palestinian displacement in the provided transcript. However, the context of their discussion suggests that they focus predominantly on the Palestinian narrative and the implications of displacement on that population.
By emphasizing the ongoing conflict and the perceived injustices faced by Palestinians, the speaker implies that they may view Palestinian displacement as a critical aspect of the historical narrative, overshadowing discussions of Jewish displacement. Their statement, "[05:12]...the vibrant Palestinian indigenous population," indicates a strong identification with the Palestinian experience and suffering.
Given the absence of any mention of Jewish displacement or a comparison to Palestinian experiences, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian. Their focus on Palestinian rights and experiences suggests a prioritization of that narrative, without acknowledging or equating it to the experiences of Jewish migrants from Arab countries.
- [05:12] "...the vibrant Palestinian indigenous population."
The speaker characterizes the Great March of Return protests in Gaza, which occurred in 2018, with a focus on the civilian nature of the protests. They highlight the peaceful intent behind the demonstrations, asserting that Palestinians approached the borders with Israel without violence, stating, "[08:49]...when no violence was used by the Palestinians coming up to the to the borders with Israel, but basically peacefully uh and in fact uh you know being shot at uh by the Israeli army." This indicates that the speaker views the protests as fundamentally a civilian effort to assert rights and demand recognition.
However, the speaker also acknowledges the complex dynamics at play, mentioning the shifting attitudes within Gaza due to the response from Israeli forces. They imply that the violent crackdown on peaceful protesters served to fuel a cycle of escalation, leading to a more militarized response from Palestinian factions. The speaker notes, "[08:12]...the only way to go forward is the use of force," reflecting a concern about the implications of such violence for future protests and the broader conflict.
This nuanced perspective suggests that while the speaker recognizes the legitimacy of the protests as expressions of civilian dissent, they also caution against the potential for such movements to be co-opted or respond with violence in the face of repression. Overall, their position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as they emphasize the right to peaceful protest while critiquing the Israeli military response.
- [08:49] "...when no violence was used by the Palestinians coming up to the to the borders with Israel, but basically peacefully uh and in fact uh you know being shot at uh by the Israeli army."
- [08:12] "...the only way to go forward is the use of force."
The speaker addresses civilian casualties in the context of Israeli-Palestinian violence, especially in Gaza, expressing a critical view of the circumstances surrounding these fatalities. They imply that the high numbers of civilian casualties are not merely a result of military necessity but are indicative of broader issues in the conduct of military operations and the treatment of Palestinian civilians.
In discussing the March of Return protests, the speaker highlights that many Palestinians were peacefully demonstrating, only to be met with lethal force. They state, "[08:10]...when no violence was used by the Palestinians coming up to the to the borders with Israel, but basically peacefully uh and in fact uh you know being shot at uh by the Israeli army." This underscores a point of view that attributes significant responsibility to the Israeli military for the civilian casualties resulting from their actions.
Furthermore, the speaker suggests that the escalation of violence can lead to a cycle where armed responses become more common among Palestinian groups, as evidenced by their remark, "[08:12]...the only way to go forward is the use of force." This indicates a recognition of the complexities involved, including the failures of precaution on both sides, but leans heavily towards attributing significant blame to the Israeli military for its approach to dealing with civilian protests.
Thus, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as they emphasize the impact of Israeli military actions on civilian populations and the need for a more humane approach to conflict resolution.
- [08:10] "...when no violence was used by the Palestinians coming up to the to the borders with Israel, but basically peacefully uh and in fact uh you know being shot at uh by the Israeli army."
- [08:12] "...the only way to go forward is the use of force."
[00:15] [music][00:21] want to begin by saying I'm not really[00:24] talking about something about which I'm[00:26] a an academic expert. I'm talking from[00:30] the uh background or point of view of uh[00:33] just being a Palestinian Jerusalemite[00:36] and uh from the point of view of having[00:38] lived here for most of my life.[00:42] And thirdly, I want to just add that I'm[00:45] um one year younger in fact than the[00:49] state of Israel. So it's been a long[00:51] life but a very sort of uh uh relevant[00:55] one.[00:57] So the one thing I want to say uh in[01:00] relation to the future is that um[01:06] you know in in in uh especially in the[01:09] context of what we've gone through the[01:11] past two years[01:14] uh I won't give it a name but whatever[01:17] however you name it let me say the[01:19] grotesque horrors we've seen over the[01:22] past two years.[01:24] Um my first comment is that I don't[01:27] actually at the moment uh foresee[01:32] uh that the end of conflict is going or[01:35] that the conflict is going to be uh uh[01:38] resolved or that it will be subsiding uh[01:42] in the in the in the near future. So[01:45] what we have going on today I believe is[01:48] not going to take us very far in[01:52] addressing the uh the root uh problem uh[01:57] at home here. Now the second um comment[02:02] I want to make is that perhaps my first[02:05] comment has to do really with the nature[02:08] of the conflict here. The nature of the[02:11] conflict here being as I see it uh[02:14] conflict between[02:16] one side, namely the uh uh let me call[02:19] it the Jewish side uh becoming more and[02:22] more uh ethnicented and more and more uh[02:27] out to basically uh retain control over[02:32] the entire territory of Palestine.[02:35] that's Israel plus the West Bank plus[02:38] Gaza[02:40] uh retain this territory under its[02:42] control. Um[02:45] this is not always been the case that[02:48] Israel or that Zionism was like this.[02:50] But I'm opening this uh for discussion.[02:53] Um and in that context therefore I don't[02:56] see the conflict in fact uh resolving.[03:01] Each side of course says it wants peace[03:04] but each side has its own vision of what[03:08] that peace looks like.[03:11] Um the third thing I want to say is[03:15] something that uh bothers me really and[03:17] maybe you know through the discussion[03:20] um you may enlighten me about this I[03:24] can't enlighten you[03:26] um whether uh the nature of Zionism it's[03:31] the DNA of Zionism[03:34] uh to be going in the direction it's[03:37] been going in particular in the last say[03:40] 10 or 20 years. In other words, whether[03:43] Zionism is by nature by some essential[03:46] property inside it or of it in it[03:49] uh[03:51] um an ideology that cannot stop at any[03:56] one point before in fact taking over the[03:59] entire territory. Now if this is the[04:01] case then that explains why would[04:04] explain why I say the conflict is uh not[04:08] one that can one can envisionage uh uh[04:11] one that can be solved.[04:14] Um, today we have I I don't know the[04:16] exact numbers, but I believe something[04:18] like maybe 7 million uh Jews, 7 million[04:22] non-Jews, Arabs, Palestinians if you[04:24] call them, in the territory between the[04:26] river and the sea. and in a context in[04:30] which this kind of extremist[04:34] messianism that has manifested itself[04:37] more and more in the past 101 15 years[04:40] in Israel. It is very hard to see how in[04:44] fact uh the the uh the problem between[04:48] the uh Jewish ethos here or the[04:52] messianic ethos here on the one hand and[04:55] the on the other hand the vibrant[04:58] Palestinian indigenous population. How[05:01] these can actually uh somehow see eye to[05:04] eye with one another at any one point[05:06] and in what way. And this leads me in[05:10] fact to make my maybe last comment at[05:12] this point which is um just to raise the[05:16] question in fact and it's one that I am[05:19] not you know I didn't come up with it.[05:21] I've seen it uh in fact being brought up[05:24] by various uh Israelis in fact uh here[05:29] and there people I know who have in who[05:32] have argued for a kind of separation[05:36] between Israel and Israeli nationalism[05:39] if you like on the one hand and this uh[05:44] part that has accompanied the creation[05:46] and the birth and the life of Israel so[05:49] far which is expansion[05:52] Zionism.[05:53] Uh because if this can be done, if one[05:56] could separate between these two,[05:59] uh perhaps then one could think uh that[06:04] it is possible to think about a future[06:07] in which either we have two states or[06:09] one state or in which there's some[06:12] confederation between uh states or what[06:15] have you. But anyway, a future in which[06:19] uh people both Jews and non-Jews, Arabs,[06:21] Palestinians can all enjoy their[06:25] freedoms on the one hand and between[06:28] whom Israelis and Palestinians or Jews[06:30] and non-Jews there should be equality[06:33] between all. Now it seems to me that[06:35] that you know what I just said at the[06:38] end is probably the basic principle that[06:42] um must underline any kind of real peace[06:46] between the two sides.[06:49] Um one last thing I want to add um so[06:53] that I'm not totally misunderstood here[06:56] is the following that uh in fact there[06:59] was a time I believe uh back in the late[07:03] 80s early 90s when it looked like uh[07:08] Zionism and Palestinian nationalism[07:11] could be reconciled with one another in[07:13] the context of two states at least there[07:16] was sufficient support in the two[07:18] populations[07:20] uh for that kind of uh outcome. But[07:23] unfortunately that fell through and[07:25] since then things have been uh going[07:28] from bad to worse. Neither on the side[07:32] of the Palestinian Authority has the[07:34] authority been able to move forward[07:37] towards making that peace uh real the[07:40] two-state solution through negotiations.[07:42] And on the other side in Gaza, as we[07:45] saw, I mean, there was this uh the march[07:49] of return several years ago when no[07:53] violence was used by the Palestinians[07:55] coming up to the to the borders with[07:58] Israel, but basically peacefully uh and[08:02] in fact uh you know being shot at uh by[08:05] the Israeli army. And that was a few[08:08] years ago. But I think it gave a lesson[08:10] to people in Gaza or to the leadership[08:12] there that uh the only way to go forward[08:15] is the use of force. Unfortunately[08:18] leading to what happened on the uh uh a[08:22] couple of years ago. I'll stop here and[08:25] um I'll open I'll I'm I'm ready to[08:28] respond or to if you have sort of ways[08:32] to enlighten me uh about what is[08:35] happening what I'm living in and I'm[08:37] very serious about really feeling very[08:40] very lost at this point in time[08:43] uh having gone through all these years[08:46] trying to uh participate in uh making[08:50] peace happen but it hasn't uh happened[08:52] yet and It doesn't look like the chances[08:55] are that at all. I'll stop here. Thomas,[08:59] I think you have probably more questions[09:01] and critiques than I have of myself. So[09:03] please[09:05] >> I've got many questions but I think one[09:07] thing we could start with perhaps is if[09:09] you say a little bit about your current[09:12] situation and uh because you are in[09:15] Jerusalem on the Israeli side of things[09:18] as I understand it and what has it been[09:22] like living through the last two years[09:25] uh there where you are and with people[09:27] who are in the same sort of position as[09:30] you are.[09:32] Well, uh just as a as a kind of u[09:36] clarification, I I live in East[09:38] Jerusalem.[09:39] >> I live in East Jerusalem, which actually[09:42] uh was uh until 1967[09:46] uh part and parcel of the West Bank that[09:49] was conquered by Israel.[09:52] And uh in 1967 when East Jerusalem was[09:55] conquered and the West Bank, what Israel[09:58] did was to go ahead and enex East[10:01] Jerusalem, apply its laws to East[10:03] Jerusalem in addition to enlarging its[10:07] uh its its territory. So they ate into[10:11] bits of the West Bank and made that all[10:14] part of the East Jerusalem to which I[10:16] belong. Uh but the difference between[10:19] East Jerusalem and the rest of the West[10:21] Bank visa v Israel is that in addition[10:24] to what I just mentioned about laws and[10:26] annexation is that the uh there are no[10:29] borders between where I live[10:32] next to what used to be the border for[10:34] 20 years between 48 and 67 and um the[10:39] Israeli side or uh the Israeli side of[10:42] the border, West Jerusalem. Now, um it's[10:47] not been a very nice time as you may[10:50] imagine. [clears throat] Uh we haven't[10:53] been under the same kind of uh physical[10:56] direct uh pressure that we've seen in[11:00] other places uh in the West Bank or in[11:03] Gaza. Uh but we've been very much part[11:06] uh of what's been happening over the[11:08] past two years. you know the um I I[11:12] think there's been a lot of pressure on[11:13] all of us uh in in Jerusalem. there's[11:17] been more pressure on uh on the freedoms[11:20] of the people in East Jerusalem for[11:22] instance uh you know being being always[11:26] hunted if you like uh picked out by[11:29] soldiers the policemen for either uh[11:32] having a kofi or having a thing a[11:35] necklace around our necks or going[11:37] around with phones that uh have messages[11:41] about what's going on in the war showing[11:43] pictures of the horrors that are taking[11:45] place in Gaza Uh I mean these were all[11:48] things that were outlawed and so you[11:50] could easily be picked up by uh uh[11:52] soldiers or policemen. You could be[11:54] harassed. You could be depending on your[11:57] age and and your disposition you know[11:59] all kinds of things might happen to you[12:02] but it's generally been much better than[12:05] uh the situation in the West Bank and[12:08] certainly than that situation in Gaza[12:10] which was under direct attack. Now the[12:13] other thing is that uh talking about the[12:16] West Bank, the rest of uh the area that[12:18] was conquered in ' 67, you must have[12:20] heard it's been uh there's been more and[12:23] more uh attacks on uh on villagers, on[12:28] farmers, on uh properties, uh[12:31] confiscations, uh developing[12:33] settlements.[12:35] Uh as you probably know, we've now we're[12:38] now in the season when very often there[12:41] is the pick uh the olive picking season[12:44] when villagers will go out to their uh[12:47] olive groves and try to uh pick their[12:49] olives. And there's been a lot of[12:52] attacks on on villagers trying to do[12:54] that to reap their own uh olives. Uh the[12:57] attacks have been by extremist settlers,[12:59] but they've been supported by uh the[13:03] Israeli uh soldiers around them. Um so,[13:07] you know, it's a constant pressure.[13:09] We've I don't want to say we've gotten[13:11] used to it, but it's a very depressing[13:14] depressing uh situation. Um contacts[13:18] between people on this side and and for[13:21] instance, Israeli colleagues or friends,[13:24] we've maintained that to some extent.[13:26] I've maintained this to some extent, but[13:28] it's been very much on a on a a low a[13:32] low fire. Uh I haven't cut off any kind[13:35] of relations I've had with Israeli[13:38] colleagues. Um but you know, things[13:40] haven't been normal.[13:44] >> And can you say a little bit about the[13:45] Palestinian side? You spoke about the[13:48] two sides to the conflict and so on. Is[13:50] there a Palestinian side that is[13:53] somewhat organized that has spokespeople[13:56] or[13:58] I mean we hear about negotiations with[14:00] Hamas. We don't hear much about other[14:03] Palestinian voices that might also be[14:05] relevant to the[14:08] >> Well, the truth is the truth is I that I[14:10] I feel I feel that the Palestinian side[14:13] is very scattered, never been so[14:16] scattered as[14:18] >> as now. Um, as you know, we have the PA[14:22] on the one hand in in Ramallah[14:24] and uh the the PA basically stands for[14:30] negotiating with Israel for a two-state[14:32] solution. That's what it stands for[14:34] through peaceful means, nonviolent[14:36] means. But, you know, it's not really[14:39] brought uh any kind of uh settlement. It[14:43] hasn't succeeded in those negotiations[14:46] uh over the past 20 years. who haven't[14:48] moved forward. So Palestinians basically[14:51] look upon the whole process of[14:53] negotiations to be a total waste of time[14:56] or have come to see this. They also see[14:59] the authority itself as um you know you[15:03] hear people say that it's corrupt. You[15:06] hear people say it's ineffective. It[15:09] hasn't been elected for I don't know how[15:10] many years. So there's all that uh on[15:13] the on the Palestinian side with or visa[15:16] v the authority in Ramallah and in Gaza[15:20] of course uh Hamas has been in charge[15:22] for I don't know how long since the most[15:25] recent elections more than 15 years ago[15:28] and um[15:30] they are now also I think in a scattered[15:33] uh situation. I mean, I I don't think[15:36] they're as popular within Gaza as they[15:39] used to be earlier, or at least that[15:42] their philosophy, if you like, is not as[15:44] popular or ideology as it was before.[15:48] Um,[15:50] factions representing different bits and[15:52] pieces of the Palestinian[15:54] uh landscape are trying to get together.[15:57] Um, they but they've tried this for many[16:00] years and they've never succeeded. The[16:02] most recent attempt we heard of was a[16:06] meeting in Cairo a few days ago where[16:09] you know the representatives of pro uh[16:13] Palestinian Authority Fata faction and[16:17] other factions you know from the right[16:18] or from the left all met in Cairo with[16:22] the uh parties that are trying to put[16:25] something together. uh they've come out[16:28] with a with a with a with consensus with[16:31] a with a conclusion that they want to go[16:34] ahead with what is essentially the basic[16:37] elements contained in the Trump plan.[16:40] namely we want to give over the[16:43] authority over Gaza to a uh uh uh you[16:47] know to a new leadership a technocratic[16:50] leadership that will uh uh control the[16:54] transitional period that's expected[16:56] ahead the period in which things will[16:59] happen to within Gaza[17:01] uh basically people uh Hamas giving up[17:05] its arms uh subsistence uh food and so[17:10] aren't coming in[17:12] uh looking after the children, looking[17:14] after the uh people's homes, looking[17:17] after everything, education, you know,[17:19] you name it. Uh building things up. So,[17:22] you know, there's this kind of attitude[17:24] that we want to do this, but it's it's[17:26] very fragile all of it. And it's very[17:28] fragile given the fact that Israel still[17:31] controls, you know, I think about 45 or[17:34] whatever percent of Gaza. It hasn't[17:37] actually withdrawn its forces.[17:40] And the Americans are now Trump is[17:42] trying to make sure that the uh[17:45] ceasefire he worked out will not uh will[17:48] not collapse. So he's there the[17:50] Americans are there to make sure the[17:53] phase this phase of the uh ceasefire at[17:55] least will succeed. It might well do[17:57] for, you know, for some time, but[18:01] underneath it or beyond it, uh, as I was[18:04] saying earlier, the Palestinian people[18:06] at present are all over the place.[18:09] They're not totally united with one[18:11] another. But in terms of formal[18:14] representation, of course, the PA, the[18:16] Palestinian Authority is the authority[18:19] that uh formally that uh internationally[18:22] represents us and behind it the PLO as[18:25] you probably know um is the uh formal[18:29] authority that represents us. But um and[18:33] you know hopefully you know that[18:34] authority will continue to be in control[18:38] will take things over at some point uh[18:40] that there will be some kind of[18:42] reconstruction of it a reconstruction of[18:44] the PA itself of the authority[18:47] um in in such a way as to bring in all[18:51] the different attitudes factions uh of[18:54] of society of the population but it's[18:57] it's so difficult and far-fetched at the[18:59] moment I don't see this happening[19:01] Um and you know anything can just blow[19:04] everything up at the moment.[19:06] >> Mhm. Yeah. Uh I have two more things[19:09] that I wanted to raise and I hope that[19:11] there are other questions from the[19:12] audience. Uh one is there is a lot of[19:16] discussion about whether the attack the[19:19] Hamas attack of October 2023 whether[19:22] that was something that was known by the[19:25] Israelis beforehand.[19:28] And uh there seems to be a lot of[19:30] evidence to that effect. Was is there[19:32] any insight that you have into that[19:35] question beyond what is being debated?[19:39] >> I don't actually have access to any uh[19:43] information uh of that kind[19:46] >> except you know what one reads in the[19:48] papers and there have been uh people[19:51] that have uh said that uh Israel had[19:55] knowledge. But as you probably know um[20:01] there's a kind of difference between uh[20:04] of of knowing if you like. I mean[20:07] >> some people in the army some people[20:09] somewhere might have had you know[20:13] knowledge that there are some things[20:14] that are happening but then did not take[20:16] that seriously enough for instance. Um,[20:20] so they didn't know in the full sense of[20:22] the word that the whole that the[20:24] movements and so on were really serious[20:26] and that Hamas was intending to. So[20:29] that's that's possible. Um, I can't[20:31] really believe that Israel just allowed[20:34] or people in Israel who were in charge[20:36] just allowed[20:38] um what happened uh to to to have taken[20:42] place. It it's uh I mean the people who[20:46] claim this of course uh say that uh they[20:50] did this in order to uh maintain[20:53] the uh the government you know or to[20:56] make the government uh find ways to[20:59] maintain its authority over the over the[21:02] uh you know Netanyahu was was in a bad[21:05] state still is.[21:07] >> Uh it's possible but I don't have any[21:09] access to intelligence information.[21:11] >> Okay. I mean the two things that are[21:12] cited here are the statement by the wife[21:15] of the army chief of staff who said in[21:19] an interview that when her husband left[21:22] home that morning he said this is the[21:24] day when we get rid of the Gaza problem[21:26] for good and the other is that the[21:29] Gulani brigade was told to stand down[21:32] during the morning of the day of the[21:35] attack and they were given three hours[21:38] in which they were supposed to not[21:40] patrol the the area. Anyway, uh[21:44] >> that's scary what you're saying, but[21:46] anyway, yeah, as you say,[21:47] >> uh the the other thing I wanted to ask[21:49] you is how much communication is there[21:52] sort of apart from the leadership level[21:55] between the West Bank Palestinians and[21:59] uh you and the Gaza Palestinians? Are[22:02] they can you communicate? You can't[22:03] travel there, right? Uh do you have open[22:07] communications to the two sides? How[22:09] much uh can the two sides West Bank and[22:13] Gaza communicate with each other[22:14] ordinary people? How much can they can[22:18] you know how much of a Palestine is[22:20] really left a united Palestine?[22:23] >> Yeah, you're right. It's a good[22:25] question. Uh first of all, you know,[22:27] when Hamas took over[22:29] uh you know, after the with the with the[22:33] uh in the elections and I think it was[22:35] 2015 or thereabouts,[22:38] >> the borders were totally closed off.[22:40] Gaza became an isolated uh territory,[22:45] isolated from the people in the West[22:47] Bank or from East Jerusalem. And so for[22:50] instance uh take talking about myself[22:53] you know I haven't been to Gaza at all[22:56] and not only just myself but[22:59] Palestinians from Jerusalem in general[23:01] >> and the West Bank have not actually been[23:04] able to visit uh Gaza. People in Gaza[23:08] some of them who would leave Gaza, go[23:11] out to Egypt for instance might come[23:13] round through Jordan and come to Ramla[23:16] where the PA is. And there been some of[23:18] them[23:19] >> that have done that. Uh most recent[23:21] example is Nasud[23:24] who used to be a member and returned to[23:27] become a member of the fat central[23:29] committee. He's the person that's been[23:31] appearing with Ahud Ulmer in different[23:34] uh platforms to talk about two-state[23:36] solution and peace. Um because he came[23:39] out from Gaza, he went to I think Egypt,[23:42] France, then came back to the West Bank.[23:45] But these are exceptions.[23:47] Now having said this uh well just in[23:50] addition to this as far as we are[23:52] concerned in East Jerusalem we have[23:54] access to the West Bank.[23:56] >> Of course we can visit the West Bank.[23:58] The people from the West Bank cannot[24:00] easily visit us. So we can visit them.[24:04] But there are so many[24:06] um uh road uh checkpoints now[24:10] surrounding a lot of the villages and[24:12] towns in the West Bank that actually[24:14] it's very hard to get to anywhere[24:18] uh in one day and come back and it's[24:20] very hard even for people within the[24:22] West Bank to go through the roadblocks[24:25] and so on to get from one town or[24:27] village to another. So communication has[24:29] been at that level physical[24:31] communication has been very difficult.[24:34] Now of course telephones uh media of[24:36] course have been open so we've been you[24:38] know people have been able to talk on[24:40] the phone with each other or send uh[24:43] messages emails and so on with with one[24:45] another. Um I want to just emphasize[24:49] here that uh I I don't want people maybe[24:52] people you know sitting over there may[24:56] think that um the people in Gaza are[24:59] different from the people in the West[25:01] Bank and different from the people in uh[25:04] the in Jerusalem and also different say[25:07] even from the Palestinians within Israel[25:09] who are Israelis. But the fact is that a[25:12] lot of us are actually intermarried[25:15] uh with the people in uh with with Gaza.[25:18] I mean a lot of people here my case is[25:21] one example[25:23] uh on my mother's side of the family you[25:26] know they are Gaza people and so we've[25:30] been you know worried about what was[25:31] happening to uh my side of uh my[25:35] mother's side of the family[25:36] [clears throat] and it's the same with[25:38] with other people. So there's been[25:40] contact over the phone uh and we've[25:43] actually been sharing the pain, the[25:46] horror, the the the difficulty of living[25:49] this this war with the people in Gaza,[25:52] not only in theoretic terms, but also in[25:55] direct uh in direct terms as people as[25:59] affecting people that are uh close to us[26:03] in in by blood.[26:07] Okay, we have a question from[26:12] uh R. Ali.[26:16] Can you unmute yourself?[26:19] >> Um hello, Professor Pog, this is Ramsha.[26:22] Um thank you for allowing me to speak.[26:25] I'm so sorry I've joined the[26:27] conversation a bit late. Um but I I[26:30] definitely have a question that was[26:32] going on in my mind since a very long[26:34] time period and it seems like an[26:35] excellent platform to address that. Um[26:39] now that the most of us already know[26:41] about the Gaza problem, the Palestinian[26:42] Israel conflict and I guess there has[26:45] been tons of volumes of awareness about[26:49] the um conflict itself, the root causes[26:52] and everything. I want to know that[26:54] there has been a discussion among the[26:56] intellectuals[26:58] um that the two-state solution is no[27:00] more a tangible solution to resolve the[27:02] conflict. I want you to know if the[27:05] two-state solution is no more possible[27:08] um is there a tangible solution inside[27:10] at the moment or as professor P just[27:13] mentioned that some of the people are[27:14] saying they have gotten rid of the Gaza[27:16] problem. it's discarded in the power[27:19] lobbies already and would just lead to[27:22] more buildup frustrations in the[27:25] activists and people who want a tangible[27:27] solution for the conflict.[27:30] >> Yeah, thank you.[27:33] Um[27:36] well I think there are a lot of[27:37] Palestinians and Israelis in fact uh[27:40] wondering about you know the whole[27:42] business about peace and whether uh the[27:45] only way to get there if it's if it's a[27:48] two-state solution or not. Uh one of the[27:51] problems about a two-state solution of[27:54] course is a practical problem namely the[27:58] fact that over the past uh you know all[28:01] the years of the occupation but in[28:02] particular the last 10 20 30 years[28:05] uh the profile of the West Bank in[28:09] particular has actually changed. So for[28:12] instance, there are probably close to[28:16] close, I would say, to a million Israeli[28:19] settlers living[28:22] uh in East Jerusalem and the West Bank[28:25] uh in a population that's, you know,[28:27] maybe about 4 million Palestinians. So[28:29] already you have a very large population[28:33] of uh Israelis living uh on the on this[28:37] side of the green border, that's to say[28:38] in the 67 area. uh the infrastructure,[28:42] the confiscations, the settlements that[28:44] have taken place over all those years[28:47] uh makes it very hard now for even the[28:51] most imaginative of us uh to see how one[28:55] can draw the picture the the the the uh[29:00] you know the plan or map for uh uh two[29:05] states, two separate states. Um so[29:08] that's a that's a physical problem but[29:10] then there's another problem and the[29:13] other problem is this whether which I[29:16] mentioned right at the beginning of[29:19] talking which is whether in fact the[29:22] readiness in the first place exists on[29:26] specifically on the Israeli side[29:29] uh to uh reach such a solution with the[29:34] Palestinians or indeed any solution[29:37] in which the principles that will uh[29:40] govern such a solution are those to do[29:44] with the freedom uh freedoms for all and[29:48] equality between all. I mean this is a[29:50] different problem. It's to do with[29:52] ideology and in particular with how[29:57] Zionism has more and more come to[30:00] express itself in its uh uh in its[30:04] position with regard to Palestinians.[30:06] Now if that is the case and uh therefore[30:11] will continue to be the case then of[30:13] course um not only is it difficult to[30:17] envisage a two-state solution, it's[30:19] difficult to envisage uh you know a one[30:23] democratic state solution in the near[30:25] future. Let me put it this way. Um[30:30] you know one would have to think about[30:32] uh such a solution if it ever comes[30:34] about. uh in the very long-distant[30:37] future uh and requiring a lot of uh as[30:41] you put it uh discussion between people[30:45] that are serious that seriously care[30:49] about our ourselves and our our[30:52] neighbors. uh the two populations[30:56] um who really ser by seriously cares[30:59] seriously care about our about how the[31:03] future generations will be living here[31:05] because if uh there's no chance for[31:09] instance of uh this extremist mezionism[31:14] disappearing[31:15] and no chance of people who now Israeli[31:18] Zionist[31:20] becoming uh open to the idea of somehow[31:24] dividing up the rights here whether[31:28] territorially or in terms of individuals[31:31] uh between Israelis and Palestinians. If[31:33] if that's if that isn't uh going to[31:35] happen then I think as I said earlier at[31:38] the beginning I think you know we're[31:41] we're still in for a very very long and[31:44] difficult u uh confrontation teach[31:47] between each other. Um,[31:52] I think the more Israelis thinking about[31:54] the possible uh peaceful one state, the[31:58] more Palestinians thinking about that[32:00] and talking about it. But um, you know,[32:03] there's also the immediate need or needs[32:07] that both societies want. Uh, I don't[32:11] think either society really wants uh to[32:13] go on shedding blood.[32:17] um it's not a normal situation.[32:20] Uh so I hope there will be some peace in[32:23] which people intellectuals on either[32:25] side or intellectuals together on both[32:28] sides will sit together and think again[32:32] of how the future should look like so[32:34] that we can all live a peaceful and[32:37] dignified life and fulfilling[32:40] satisfactory life.[32:42] Good.[32:42] >> We have Anatki and Christopher Gocei.[32:47] I thanks a lot. Thanks, Ari. Um, you've[32:51] always been among between the two of us[32:54] the optimist. Uh, I have been desparing[32:57] for many years, but now the despair has[32:59] taken over completely with what you[33:02] might call the radical left or whatever,[33:04] even though people are still doing[33:05] things as you say. And it's good to hear[33:07] you thinking that maybe there could be a[33:11] real dialogue and real cooperation. But[33:14] I did want to just add one more point[33:17] here which is perhaps one of the reasons[33:20] for the despair and that's the word and[33:22] the practice of genocide. Um there is[33:26] something[33:28] intolerable and inconceivable[33:32] um in realizing that one's own side is[33:35] engaged in genocide and what we're[33:38] seeing on the Israeli side um with very[33:42] very crazy um numbers. I mean, this is[33:47] in the 80 and 90%[33:50] um high line that Israelis do not care[33:57] or do not talk or do not know about what[34:01] is really going on in Gaza. I have so[34:05] many friends who would call themselves[34:07] leftists,[34:09] but uh they'll say things like, "Oh, I[34:12] have so much there's so much pain for my[34:14] side that I can't now even think of the[34:17] other side." Things like that, which are[34:19] which are cliches almost, but this is[34:23] the general Israeli way of looking at[34:25] things. You said before something about[34:27] seeing things on TV. So Al Jazzer is um[34:31] forbidden in Israel, but any Israeli[34:33] could have opened up CNN, BB BBC. I[34:37] mean, you could know what's going on out[34:39] there. And there is a complete denial.[34:42] You might call it a psychological[34:44] denial, except for the ideology of[34:46] course, but there's a denial that the[34:49] Israeli side that our side could be[34:52] engaged in genocide. So that almost[34:55] doesn't exist. or think of the of last[34:58] week when the hostages came back and I[35:02] don't put that down the joy there or or[35:05] or or the terrible suffering before but[35:08] at the same time there were um over a[35:11] thousand uh Palestinians who came back.[35:15] You didn't see that on Israeli[35:17] television. It was not part of the[35:20] conversation of the discourse at all. So[35:23] there's something that my good friend[35:25] Anatmatar who is very very um devoted to[35:29] this cause of what you're saying living[35:31] together one state one confederation[35:34] doesn't matter what you call it but Anat[35:35] Matar who's active in being a real[35:40] dialogue setting person with Palestine[35:43] used the word just last week narcissism.[35:46] She said that the Israeli side is a[35:49] narcissistic[35:50] society and that's an interesting[35:52] concept. It doesn't come up usually when[35:55] you talk about real political dialogue,[35:59] but that's what we saw is Israelis have[36:02] come into and this is all Israelis as I[36:04] say 80 to 90% where it is all about us[36:08] about what Israel is suffering from and[36:12] what Israel is doing and the concept of[36:15] genocide not to mention the real[36:17] practice of genocide. Um, Israelis think[36:20] this is far-fetched. They don't know why[36:23] we're even using that word, they're[36:25] certainly denying that it's genocide.[36:28] Whereas people who are working or who[36:30] have some sort of connection with a real[36:33] connection with what's going on in[36:35] Israel and um Alex Dwal who works on[36:38] famine all over the world comes to mind.[36:40] He's written about this. Omar Bartov um[36:43] the these are people in the United[36:45] States obviously working on these[36:47] things. Um, when I talk to them, I have[36:50] this feeling they don't believe that[36:52] this is going on, but they can't deny[36:55] it. So, when you when you talk about the[36:59] two sides somehow talking together, I[37:02] see that as a dream. Um, and uh, it's[37:08] not that I want to get everybody here in[37:10] a state of deep despair. I'm just sort[37:12] of reporting on deep despair that is[37:16] deeply ingrained there now on what you[37:19] might call the radical left or those in[37:21] Israel who think like you and you've[37:24] never claimed to be radical left but you[37:27] you have been the reasonable voice in[37:30] this conversation and I wonder how you[37:32] keep reasonable and not drop deep into[37:35] despair[37:38] >> you know thank you[37:39] >> sorry about all that[37:40] >> no not at Well, look, I I think what you[37:43] said, all that you said is true. I mean,[37:45] I can't I can't disagree with what you[37:47] said. There's a lot of despair[37:50] uh at the moment, and it affects me as[37:53] it affects you. Uh but I actually uh[37:58] still uh I don't know. I'm I'm a born[38:00] optimist as you said. So uh I'm still[38:04] hoping that over time and I don't say[38:07] you know tomorrow or the day after[38:10] uh I believe that things you know will[38:13] have to be worked on of course to change[38:15] and maybe uh we can make them change u[38:20] since the you know the alternative is is[38:23] is really horrible. I mean, if you think[38:26] that we're not going to get there, um,[38:29] then we're talking we're we're looking[38:31] at the apocalypse or something and I[38:34] don't want us to get there and so one[38:36] has to keep up the hope that[38:39] uh to work towards something[38:42] realizing that it will take time uh a[38:45] long time perhaps. Um,[38:49] now you know there are many Israelis. I[38:51] I know you mentioned some, but I know I[38:53] mean did you for instance look or see[38:56] the[38:57] statement that was actually uh produced[39:01] the other day I think by Peter Bayard[39:03] and um and and a very good friend of[39:05] mine Aram Borg uh who is who is very[39:10] sort of outspoken and has been out in[39:13] demonstrations and has[39:15] >> I mean the[39:17] I think that you know that kind of[39:19] Israeli whether he's left or right but[39:22] uh what I would call[39:25] uh human being a proper human being I[39:28] still believe in the existence of such[39:30] people and I see them I mean uh here I[39:35] see them in direct interaction and not[39:38] you know whether I'm going into a[39:41] hospital or into a bus or you know[39:43] coming across someone I mean yes there[39:45] are a lot horrible people around but but[39:48] there are some who are uh who are[39:50] actually normal and I think we just have[39:53] to work together to um to to make sure[39:58] that it is the normal people normal[40:00] human beings who at the end of the day[40:03] uh will be the winners in this because[40:05] the as I said the alternative is is is[40:09] too crazy too uh dangerous[40:13] uh to leave and you know if you go back[40:16] uh to the 80s9s[40:20] um you know neither the Israeli people[40:22] nor the the Palestinian people started[40:24] out wanting two states side by side for[40:27] instance[40:28] uh we wanted it all without the Israelis[40:31] probably and the Israelis wanted it all[40:33] without the Palestinians probably but[40:35] then there's a lot of work done and you[40:37] know at some point there's a critical[40:40] mass of the population on the Israeli[40:43] side as well as on the Palestinian[40:45] to try that peace experiment. I mean,[40:47] there was some kind of now it didn't[40:50] work. We should just learn from that[40:53] experience and see how things can work[40:56] for the future, you know, whatever it[40:58] is, however it is. Nobody has I don't[41:01] have a kind of uh I'm no longer a big[41:04] fan of a Palestinian state, by the way.[41:05] I never was. Although I'm not an a[41:08] radical left but you know I've never[41:11] really you know been a big fan of but I[41:13] went along with the two states because[41:15] it seemed to me to be a logical thing[41:17] Palestinians Israelis wanted but you[41:20] know everything you know human beings[41:23] can find ways to live with one another[41:26] and we just have to work towards[41:29] getting there. So don't lose all our[41:32] hope keep working or not.[41:35] Last question from Christopher Goa and[41:38] then we go on to Isabelle Ortiz who has[41:40] already joined us. Christopher.[41:44] >> Okay. H how is everyone doing?[41:48] >> All good.[41:50] >> Okay. This is Christopher Angosa from[41:52] Zambia.[41:54] My question is a quick one[41:57] from the presentation. I've been trying[42:00] to follow[42:02] the war. what's happening Israel and[42:06] Pakistan.[42:08] My question is twofold. Is the war[42:11] politically motivated or it is[42:14] religiously motivated? What's the actual[42:18] cause?[42:20] >> Is it politically or or what?[42:24] >> Is it politically motivated or[42:27] religiously motivated? What's the actual[42:29] cause?[42:32] I still didn't get the second one.[42:35] >> Uh, religiously motivated.[42:37] >> Religious. I see. I see. Yeah. Yeah. I[42:39] see. Sorry.[42:41] I think by now it's it's both actually[42:44] at least from the Israeli side. U[42:48] mostly. I think that uh on the[42:51] Palestinian side, although of course[42:52] Hamas now is in the in the forefront of[42:55] the Palestinian[42:56] say resistance movement, um the[43:00] Palestinian people do not have the same[43:02] kind of religious[43:04] uh fundamentalist uh ideology that uh[43:09] for instance Hamas itself has or that[43:11] for instance on the Israeli side the now[43:14] unfortunately the majority majority of[43:17] Israelis have uh so you know but since[43:23] it is there this religiosity on the[43:25] Israeli side or on then it it becomes[43:29] religious in a way but it's basically a[43:32] conflict I think maybe anat can correct[43:36] us but I think it's from the Israeli[43:39] messianic side it's the fight to take[43:42] over the entire country and to get rid[43:44] of as many Palestinians as possible or[43:47] if not to get rid of them but to sort of[43:50] uh subdue them, put them under the uh[43:52] boots of the of the conqueror. This is[43:55] what it is. And on the Palestinian side,[43:56] it's resistance to this. It's very[43:58] simple, very straightforward.[44:01] >> I could just add to that, Thomas, can I[44:03] just But in just for one minute,[44:05] >> um on the Israeli side, what we are[44:07] seeing is just a growth, a great growth[44:10] of you called it messianic before, but[44:13] it's just religiosity. It doesn't[44:15] doesn't have to be messian messianic. uh[44:18] the army used to have 1% of the officers[44:22] religious whether it's the small keepa[44:24] or the big keepa or the or or or the[44:26] fundamentalists it used to be 1% of army[44:30] officers now over 50% are religious so[44:34] the country itself has become much more[44:37] religious it doesn't have to be what we[44:39] used to call extreme messianic Jews that[44:42] were mostly in Jerusalem it's all over[44:44] the schools um last year even not this[44:47] year. Last year, first graders over 60%[44:51] of first graders were in religious[44:52] schools. So there is something in the[44:55] whole society that has become much more[44:57] religious. Uh there are there are um[45:01] secular people of course there are many[45:03] of them but um but[45:07] Zionism has become in a sense a[45:09] religion. So, so it's hard to I think[45:13] even analyze exactly what we're talking[45:15] about when you ask about a society and[45:17] its religious uh background and roots[45:21] and whatever. But it's worse than it was[45:23] certainly worse even than well I[45:25] shouldn't say worse because some people[45:26] might think that it's okay to have a[45:28] religious society but it's more[45:30] religious uh than it was in 48 in ' 67[45:34] uh even in the 80s and 90s when you're[45:36] talking about so this is this is[45:38] something that has changed[45:40] sociologically in the Israeli um psyche[45:43] and that's a very different discussion[45:46] but it's taken [clears throat] over the[45:48] military discussion.[45:50] >> Yeah. And it's a religion of[45:52] agrandisement. I mean this is what I[45:54] mean forget about calling it messianic[45:56] but it's a religion that is actually[45:58] pushing Israeli society towards taking[46:01] all everything under its wing. Anyway,
i24news sits down with Prof. Anita Shapira
In this insightful discussion, the complexities surrounding Zionism are explored, highlighting its controversial nature and the varied perceptions it elicits. The conversation begins with an acknowledgment of Zionism as a historical movement that has sparked significant debate and criticism, particularly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Professor Anita Shapira, a distinguished historian and expert on Jewish history, articulates the duality of Zionism's perception, where it is seen as both a legitimate national movement for Jews and a source of contention in the Middle East.
Shapira notes that the negative connotation associated with Zionism has been prevalent for many years, with critics emerging from various backgrounds, including Jews themselves. This criticism is not a recent phenomenon; rather, it has been a characteristic of Zionism since its inception. The professor emphasizes that despite the small size of the Zionist movement, it has generated strong emotions and reactions, indicating its profound impact on regional dynamics.
The discussion shifts to the current political climate in Israel, where frustrations regarding the stagnation of the peace process have led some Jews to feel embarrassed about identifying as Zionists. Shapira argues that while there are legitimate concerns regarding Israeli politics, the core principles of Zionism—identity, belonging, and rejuvenation of the Jewish people—remain positive for the majority of Jews and Israelis. She asserts that the negative perceptions of Zionism should not overshadow its historical significance and the sense of pride it instills in many.
As the conversation progresses, Shapira addresses the narratives that shape the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She acknowledges the existence of two competing national movements and the difficulty in presenting a balanced historical account that encompasses both perspectives. While she expresses an understanding of the Palestinian narrative, she admits to her inability to fully identify with it, highlighting the deep-seated divisions that complicate the discourse. Shapira reflects on past attempts to create a unified historical narrative, which ultimately failed due to the entrenched differences in perspectives.
When discussing Israel's historical mistakes, Shapira points to specific incidents that have marred its reputation, such as the treatment of Arab Israelis and various controversial military actions. She emphasizes the importance of acknowledging these missteps as part of a broader historical narrative that seeks to understand the complexities of the Israeli experience.
In conclusion, Shapira expresses a cautious optimism regarding the future of Zionism and the potential for peace in the region. She quotes a sentiment that while belief in Zionism may seem irrational at times, it is essential for fostering hope and resilience among its supporters. This nuanced conversation sheds light on the intricate relationship between history, identity, and politics in the context of Zionism and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The transcript does not explicitly address the causes of the 1948 war or the displacement of Palestinians. However, it provides insights into the broader perceptions of Zionism and its implications in contemporary discourse. Professor Anita Shapira acknowledges that Zionism has become a contentious term, often regarded negatively in the context of Israeli politics and its perceived failures in the peace process. She suggests that historical narratives around Zionism evoke strong emotions and critiques from various groups, including Jews themselves.
While she does not delve into the specifics of displacement during the 1948 war, she emphasizes the ongoing complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian narrative, stating that both sides have competing claims. Shapira mentions the frustration surrounding Israel's political actions and the expectation for it to accommodate Palestinian demands, indicating a nuanced understanding of the conflict's dynamics.
Thus, the speaker's position can be characterized as not clearly classifiable, as it lacks a definitive stance on the historical events of 1948 and instead reflects a broader concern about contemporary implications of Zionism.
- [01:58] "It made it made commotion in the Middle East no doubt about it."
- [02:43] "The fact remains that most of the Jews and most of Israelis the largest the very large majority still think that this is a very positive movement a rejuvenation movement."
- [04:20] "This combination of frustration and expectation I would say leads to the feeling that Israel should be different."
The transcript does not directly address the role of population transfer in Zionist thought and practice before and during 1948. Professor Anita Shapira focuses on the contemporary discourse surrounding Zionism, noting how the term has become controversial and is often viewed negatively. She reflects that the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the narratives surrounding it are deeply intertwined, suggesting that historical interpretations are shaped by current political realities.
Shapira does not explicitly label population transfer as an integral part of the Zionist project, nor does she dismiss it as marginal. Instead, she emphasizes the emotional reactions and criticisms that Zionism evokes, indicating that these discussions have historical roots but are heavily influenced by the current political landscape. This suggests a view that is mixed, recognizing the historical complexities without definitively categorizing the population transfer as a central tenet of Zionist ideology.
- [01:30] "I would say the punching bag of all the... of the Middle East but nothing new about it."
- [02:32] "This idea brought happiness and brought a feeling of identity and belonging to millions of people all over the world."
- [05:40] "I accept the basic fact that there are in this land two national movements that compete for their rights."
The transcript does not provide specific details on the Camp David process or the failure of major peace negotiations. However, Professor Anita Shapira does address the feelings of frustration and expectation surrounding Israel's role in the peace process. She emphasizes that the lack of progress in negotiations has led to disillusionment among many, including Jews and Israelis, who feel a disconnect from their national identity as Zionists due to the political climate.
Shapira highlights that the perception of Israel as the stronger party in the conflict creates an expectation for it to yield to Palestinian demands. This indicates an acknowledgment of shared responsibility in the ongoing strife, albeit framed within the context of Israel's political decisions. Her thoughts suggest that the failure of negotiations is a result of both historical complexities and current political dynamics, classifying her position as mixed regarding responsibility.
- [02:29] "The frustration of the fact that we don't move forward in the peace process is one of the reasons that people feel that Israel is not something that they should be proud of."
- [04:05] "Israel is the strongest party in the conflict with the Palestinians and people expect it to be the part that would give way to Palestinian demands."
- [02:55] "Most of the Jews and most of Israelis... still think that this is a very positive movement."
The transcript does not directly address the role of international law in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Professor Anita Shapira focuses more on the emotional aspects of Zionism and the complexities of the narratives surrounding the conflict. She discusses the perceptions of Zionism as a movement, the expectations placed on Israel, and the frustrations that arise from the stalled peace process.
While Shapira notes the strong emotions tied to the conflict and the need for a resolution, she does not explicitly categorize international law as binding, limited, or selectively applied. Instead, her comments suggest a preference for direct negotiations and political solutions over legal frameworks, which implies that her stance may align with treating international law as subordinate to practical considerations and the realities of the conflict.
- [02:43] "Most of the Jews and most of Israelis... still think that this is a very positive movement."
- [04:20] "This combination of frustration and expectation I would say leads to the feeling that Israel should be different."
- [05:47] "There are in this land two national movements that compete for their rights."
The transcript does not explicitly characterize the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October or Israel's military campaign in Gaza. However, Professor Anita Shapira discusses the emotional and political landscape surrounding Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She mentions the strong reactions to Zionism and the frustration with the lack of progress in peace negotiations, indicating that these dynamics might influence how events like the attacks are perceived.
Shapira’s comments imply a recognition of the complexities involved in such conflicts, but she does not provide specific legal or moral assessments regarding self-defense, resistance, or accusations of war crimes. As such, her position on these particular events remains not clearly classifiable, as she refrains from engaging directly with these issues in the transcript.
- [01:01] "Zionism became a bad word when you’re saying a Zionist it’s immediately people are taking it to a bad definition."
- [04:30] "This combination of frustration and expectation I would say leads to the feeling that Israel should be different."
- [02:21] "The politics of Israel in the last decade... is one of the reasons that people feel that Israel is not something that they should be proud of."
The speaker does not explicitly address the 1947 UN Partition Plan in terms of fairness or necessity within the provided transcript. However, they discuss the evolution of Zionism and its perception over time, which indirectly touches upon the historical context surrounding the partition. The speaker, Professor Anita Shapira, acknowledges the complexities and emotional weight surrounding Zionism, indicating that it has faced criticism from various quarters, including Jews themselves. This hints at the contentious nature of the partition and the implications it has had on both Israeli and Palestinian narratives.
Shapira notes that Zionism, while initially a movement that rejuvenated Jewish identity and pride, has been increasingly viewed negatively in recent years, especially following political frustrations related to the peace process. She states, [02:55] "...the largest the very large majority still think that this is a very positive movement..." This suggests that while she recognizes the issues surrounding Zionism today, she believes fundamentally in its positive contributions to Jewish identity.
Moreover, the speaker emphasizes the importance of understanding both narratives within the conflict. While she focuses on the Israeli narrative, she acknowledges the existence of Palestinian grievances, stating, [06:01] "...there are in this land two national movements that compete for their rights..." This reflects a nuanced understanding of the historical conflict, even if it does not directly comment on the UN Partition Plan.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as she expresses pride in Zionism while recognizing its criticisms. However, her acknowledgment of competing narratives indicates a complexity that resists strict categorization.
-
- [02:55] "...the largest the very large majority still think that this is a very positive movement..."
- [06:01] "...there are in this land two national movements that compete for their rights..."
In the provided transcript, the speaker does not directly discuss Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including specific references to the Balfour Declaration or the British Mandate. Therefore, there is no explicit interpretation of Britain’s motivations, whether humanitarian, imperial, or inconsistent policy.
However, the speaker discusses the emotional landscape surrounding Zionism and its criticisms, suggesting a broader context in which historical decisions, including those made by colonial powers like Britain, might be viewed through the lens of contemporary frustrations. For instance, she points out that the politics of Israel over the last decade have influenced how Zionism is perceived globally, indicating a belief that historical actions still resonate today.
The speaker mentions the frustrations related to the peace process, which might imply a critique of historical decisions, including the role of Britain, that have contributed to the current state of affairs. Although she does not delve into the specifics of British policy, her observations about the historical context of Zionism and its challenges suggest an understanding that these historical actions have consequences that affect present dynamics.
As such, the lack of a direct stance on Britain's role makes it challenging to classify her position clearly. However, based on her focus on the Israeli narrative and acknowledgment of competing narratives, it seems she might lean towards a pro-Israeli characterization of the historical narrative without condemning British actions outright.
The transcript does not specifically address the migration or displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948. Therefore, the speaker, Professor Anita Shapira, does not provide any direct comparison between this migration and the Palestinian displacement that occurred around the same time. The discussion primarily revolves around the broader themes of Zionism, its historical significance, and the emotional responses it elicits both from within the Jewish community and externally.
Shapira emphasizes the complexity of identity and belonging brought about by Zionism, stating, [03:20] "...this idea brought happiness and brought a feeling of identity and belonging to millions of people all over the world..." This implies a focus on Jewish experiences, but it does not extend to a detailed analysis of the consequences for Palestinians or other groups affected by the conflict.
In summary, without explicit references to the displacement of Jews from Arab countries or comparisons to Palestinian experiences, it is not possible to ascertain the speaker's position on this issue. The absence of such discourse suggests a focus primarily on the Israeli narrative and identity rather than a comprehensive approach to the broader complexities of displacement affecting both communities.
The speaker does not address the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 within the provided transcript. As such, there is no characterization of these protests as civilian protests, Hamas-led violence, or any other form of political action. The absence of this specific topic means that the speaker does not provide commentary on Israel's use of force in relation to these events.
The focus of the discussion is primarily on Zionism, its historical context, and the current perceptions surrounding it, rather than on specific incidents or protests that have occurred in the region. Shapira highlights the emotional and political complexities surrounding Zionism and the Israeli narrative, but these do not extend to an analysis of recent protests or military actions.
In summary, without any mention of the Great March of Return or Israel's response, it is not possible to classify the speaker's position regarding these specific protests. The lack of discussion indicates a broader focus on historical narratives rather than contemporary events.
The speaker does not provide a specific explanation of civilian casualties in Israeli-Palestinian violence, especially in Gaza, in the provided transcript. There are no references to military necessity, failures of precaution, the conduct of armed groups, or deliberate policy regarding civilian casualties.
Instead, the discussion centers on the historical context of Zionism and the emotional responses it generates. Shapira mentions that there is a strong expectation for Israel to address Palestinian demands, particularly in light of its dominant position in the conflict, stating, [04:08] "...people expect it to be the part that would give way to Palestinian demands..." This implies an understanding of the power dynamics involved but does not delve into the specifics of casualty figures or the reasons behind them.
In summary, without explicit commentary on the factors contributing to civilian casualties, it is not possible to determine the speaker's position on this issue. The lack of this discussion suggests a focus on broader historical narratives rather than the complexities of violence and its impact on civilians.
[00:00] [Music][00:06] welcome back to the news today this is[00:08] one onone Zionism one of the most[00:10] controversial movements in our times for[00:13] some an historical idea that led the[00:15] Jewish people back to their Homeland and[00:17] for others a symbol for everything that[00:20] is wrong in the Middle East the history[00:22] of Israel and the Middle East is very[00:25] rich one and enough to fill several[00:28] history book books just in the last few[00:30] decades joining me tonight is a woman[00:33] who knows this history perhaps better[00:34] than anyone Professor Anita shapira is[00:37] an ezali prize lored in history has[00:40] written extensively on Jewish history in[00:43] the 20 20th century and is a senior[00:46] fellow at the Israeli democracy[00:48] Institute thank you very much for coming[00:50] to our studio it's a great pleasure and[00:52] a great honor having you um let me start[00:56] you know for the last few years maybe[00:58] for the last um 10 years Zionism became[01:02] a bad word when you're saying a Zionist[01:05] it's immediately people are taking it to[01:09] um a bad definition well but this is[01:13] nothing new because this was one of the[01:17] features of Zionism from the very[01:19] beginning at the beginning it was mostly[01:22] Jews that criticized[01:25] Zionism then it became the a catch word[01:30] I would say the punching bag of all the[01:33] e of the Middle East but nothing new[01:36] about it[01:39] Communists ER Arab nationalists etc etc[01:44] all criticize[01:46] Zionism and and it's amazing that such a[01:50] small national[01:52] movement aroused so strong emotions yes[01:58] it it made it made commotion in the[02:00] Middle East no doubt about it how come[02:04] how come it[02:05] became so um I I interview some people[02:10] and it seems and I meet people around[02:12] the world and Jewish around the world[02:14] who are sometimes embarrassed to say[02:16] that they're[02:17] zionists well I would say that the[02:21] politics of Israel in the last decade[02:25] the frustration of the fact that we[02:29] don't move forward in the peace process[02:32] is one of the reasons that people[02:35] feel that Israel is not something that[02:39] they should be proud of but the fact[02:43] remains that most of the Jews and most[02:47] of Israelis the largest the very large[02:51] majority still think that this is a very[02:55] positive movement a Rejuvenation[02:58] movement a Renaissance movement movement[03:00] of the Jewish people so yes politics[03:04] should be different maybe we we hope so[03:09] it would be different[03:11] soon however this should not H make us[03:17] discard the whole idea of Zionism[03:20] because this idea brought happiness and[03:23] brought a feeling of identity and[03:27] belonging to millions of people all over[03:30] the world is it a problem of advocacy or[03:32] is it a problem of um not sending the[03:36] message right what is exactly the[03:39] problem I think it's a combination of[03:42] bad[03:44] politics[03:45] frustration World frustration with the[03:48] fact that we don't move forward with the[03:51] peace process especially after the[03:55] decade of the 90s that seemed that peace[03:59] was around the[04:01] corner and the fact that Israel is the[04:05] strongest party in the conflict with the[04:08] Palestinians and people expect it to be[04:13] the the part that would give way to[04:17] Palestinian demands so this combination[04:20] of[04:22] frustration and expectation I would say[04:26] h leads to the the feeling that Israel[04:30] should be different in your last book uh[04:33] which is uh the name the title is Israel[04:36] your current book The Israel uh history[04:39] um you're maybe describing uh better[04:43] than anyone the Israeli narrative the[04:45] Jewish Narrative of this uh country and[04:48] and of course there is you know this[04:50] country you mentioned the Palestinian[04:52] Israeli conflict and this country is[04:54] basically based on two narratives the[04:57] Palestinian one and the Israeli one and[04:59] it seems that they're actually connected[05:02] one to the to the other and you cannot[05:04] actually disconnect them but although in[05:07] this book you are focusing only on the[05:10] Israeli narrative why is that well first[05:13] of all I was commissioned to write this[05:16] side of the story second this is my[05:21] specialty third I did not see it a[05:25] historian that is capable to objectively[05:31] tell both narratives at the same time[05:35] yes I try to very much to understand the[05:40] Palestinian[05:42] narrative I accept the basic fact that[05:47] there are in this land two national[05:50] movements that that compete for er um[05:55] for their rights but I I cannot[06:01] identify with part of the Palestinian[06:05] claims and I'm sure that Palestinians[06:09] cannot accept my way of thinking by the[06:14] way in the[06:16] 90s in the late 990s there was an[06:19] attempt to write a history book with[06:24] both[06:25] narratives and it did not work out the[06:29] different in[06:30] opinions was still too deep and I[06:34] believe that only after the conflict is[06:38] solved only after we have peace both[06:42] sides would be amenable to to accept[06:47] viewing the other sides will they will[06:49] they will they accept to see the other[06:52] sides or actually maybe accept the real[06:54] truth and see the real story well you[06:57] see the real story must have[07:00] must be with elements of both sides[07:04] there is no absolute truth only on one[07:07] side[07:10] so both sides feel in a I would say in a[07:14] defensive[07:16] position these days when peace comes[07:20] maybe there'll be more H truthful in[07:25] their presentation of the narrative you[07:29] know you define yourself as a Zionist as[07:32] an Israeli um and you're saying right[07:35] now that your your mission is to tell[07:37] the Israeli story and the Israeli[07:39] narrative and as a person who is writing[07:42] the history and you're seeing the[07:45] mistakes and uh the goods that Israel is[07:48] doing I want to focus on the mistakes[07:50] because we are in a period of time where[07:53] well uh there is a peace process that[07:55] will or will not eventually bring peace[07:58] to the region what are the mistakes that[08:00] Israel did well first of all on the road[08:06] to this point there were a few incidents[08:10] that[08:14] were that I would say that we should be[08:17] ashamed of like the Kia incident like[08:22] the ER kafm incident like the fact that[08:27] there was a um[08:30] that there still is a[08:32] [Music][08:35] a the treatment of Arab Israelis not[08:41] as not as H equal[08:45] citizens in the allocation of funds etc[08:50] etc so these are things that I do write[08:54] about are you[08:55] optimistic I must be optimistic you know[08:59] once somebody said that you don't have[09:04] to be crazy to believe in Zionism but it[09:09] helps I cannot finish this better than[09:14] than this sentence uh Professor Anita[09:16] shapira Israel a history a new book uh I[09:22] thank you very much for coming to our[09:24] studio thank you for uh explaining us uh[09:26] things maybe that uh people are like to[09:29] understand thank you very much and thank[09:31] you our viewers for being with us[09:32] tonight tomorrow we will be here at the[09:34] same time same place from the jaff port[09:37] the news today have a great night[09:55] [Music]
"That's NONSENSE!" Historian Exposes 9 Lies on Israel-Palestine | Benny Morris
Introduction
The discussion begins with a strong assertion regarding the nature of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, particularly focusing on the role of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The speaker emphasizes the complex historical and political context that shapes the current situation in Gaza and the West Bank.
The Palestinian Perspective
The speaker reflects on the mindset of individuals born and raised in the Palestinian territories, particularly in Gaza, under the control of Hamas. They suggest that given the oppressive conditions and the violence inflicted by Israel, many Palestinians might feel compelled to join Hamas as a form of resistance against what they perceive as an invader responsible for the deaths of their families. This sentiment is rooted in a long history of conflict, particularly since the Israeli occupation began in 1967, which is characterized as a settler colonial enterprise that displaced many Arabs.
Benny Morris: A Controversial Historian
Benny Morris, a prominent historian, is introduced as an expert on the Israel-Palestine conflict. He has authored numerous books on the subject and is known for his controversial views. The interviewer seeks Morris's insights on common pro-Israel talking points, beginning with the assertion that Israel cannot make peace with enemies like Hamas, who are ideologically committed to its destruction.
Peace Negotiations with Hamas
Morris acknowledges that peace deals can be made between enemies, but he expresses skepticism about the potential for successful negotiations with Hamas. He argues that Hamas's ideological commitment to Israel's destruction makes genuine peace unlikely. Instead, he advocates for dialogue with more moderate Palestinian voices who may be open to negotiations, as was attempted in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The Palestinian Authority's Role
The discussion shifts to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its leader Mahmoud Abbas. Morris suggests that while many in the PA may harbor anti-Israel sentiments, there are also those who recognize the necessity of coexistence with Israel. He expresses uncertainty about Abbas's sincerity in pursuing peace, questioning whether his calls for a two-state solution are genuine or merely a strategic maneuver.
The 1948 Palestinian Exodus
The conversation then addresses the narrative surrounding the 1948 Palestinian exodus during the war that led to the establishment of Israel. Morris refutes the claim that Arab leaders instructed Palestinians to flee, asserting that most left due to the violence of the war and the fear of Israeli troops. He emphasizes that while some Palestinians were expelled, the majority left of their own accord, driven by the immediate threat of conflict.
The Historical Existence of Palestine
The next talking point concerns the historical existence of Palestine as a state. Morris argues that while Palestine has never been a sovereign state in the modern sense, it has been recognized as a distinct geographical and cultural entity. He notes that the region has been subject to various forms of governance throughout history, but never as an independent state.
Palestinian Identity
On the topic of Palestinian identity, Morris contends that while the concept of a distinct Palestinian identity has evolved, it is rooted in the historical presence of Arabs in the region. He explains that the term "Palestinian" gained prominence in the 20th century as a response to Zionism and the struggle for national self-determination.
Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide
The discussion transitions to the contentious issue of whether Israeli actions constitute ethnic cleansing or genocide. Morris argues against labeling the situation as genocide, emphasizing that while there have been significant civilian casualties, the intent to systematically destroy the Palestinian people is not present. He distinguishes between military actions aimed at Hamas and the broader implications for the Palestinian population.
Media Bias and Global Perception
The speaker addresses claims of media bias against Israel, noting that while coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is extensive, it often overshadows other global crises. Morris suggests that this focus is partly due to the historical and religious significance of the land to both Jews and Muslims, as well as ongoing anti-Semitic sentiments in various parts of the world.
Hamas's Use of Human Shields
The conversation also touches on the tactics employed by Hamas, particularly the use of human shields. Morris acknowledges that Hamas has strategically placed military assets in civilian areas, complicating Israel's military response and leading to civilian casualties. He notes that while this tactic is effective for Hamas, it raises serious ethical questions about the conduct of warfare.
Zionism: National Liberation or Colonialism?
The discussion delves into the nature of Zionism, with Morris asserting that it began as a national liberation movement aimed at establishing a Jewish homeland in response to centuries of persecution. He acknowledges that while Zionism has elements of colonialism, particularly in its later stages, it was primarily driven by the desire for self-determination and safety for Jews.
British Support for Zionism
Morris explains the British Empire's initial support for Zionism through the Balfour Declaration, which aimed to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. He notes that this support was motivated by both altruistic and strategic interests, including the desire to secure Jewish backing during World War I. However, he also highlights the eventual shift in British policy as they sought to maintain relations with the Arab world.
The 1948 War and Its Aftermath
The conversation shifts to the events of the 1948 war, where Morris clarifies that the conflict began with violence from both sides. He emphasizes that the Arab states' invasion of Israel following its declaration of independence led to significant displacement of Palestinians. Morris points out that the refugee crisis created by the war is a complex issue with shared responsibility among various parties.
Current Israeli Policy and Leadership
The discussion concludes with reflections on the current Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Netanyahu. Morris criticizes Netanyahu's government for its handling of the conflict and the ongoing violence in Gaza. He expresses concern over the rise of extremist elements within the Israeli government and their impact on the peace process.
Conclusion
In summary, the conversation highlights the multifaceted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emphasizing historical grievances, the complexities of identity, and the challenges of achieving lasting peace. Morris's insights provide a nuanced perspective on the ongoing struggles faced by both Israelis and Palestinians, underscoring the need for dialogue and understanding in addressing the deep-rooted issues at play.
The speaker provides a nuanced perspective on the causes of the 1948 war and the resulting displacement of Palestinians, primarily characterizing it as a consequence of war rather than a planned policy. The speaker argues that the displacement of Palestinians was not solely a result of organized expulsion but occurred due to the chaos and violence of war. They acknowledge that while some Palestinians left due to direct actions by Israeli forces, many fled as a reaction to the conflict engulfing their communities.
Key points made include:
- The majority of Palestinians who fled during the war did so in response to the immediate dangers of conflict rather than through direct orders from Arab leaders.
- The speaker refutes the notion that the exodus was primarily due to a systematic plan, labeling such claims as 'Zionist propaganda.' They state, '[06:16] This is nonsense. This is a Zionist propaganda first propagated in fact in the course of the 48 war.'
- They highlight that the violence and fear instigated by the war led to mass displacement, with the speaker stating that most left their homes due to the war reaching their doorstep.
This position is portrayed as mixed, as it acknowledges the complexity of the situation without fully aligning with either pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian narratives. The speaker’s comments reflect an understanding of the conflict's intricacies while remaining critical of oversimplified narratives surrounding the war and displacement.
- [06:16] 'This is nonsense. This is a Zionist propaganda first propagated in fact in the course of the 48 war.'
- [06:59] 'Most Arabs who fled... were evacuated... mostly as a result of the war reaching their doorstep or about to reach their doorstep.'
- [07:22] 'A small number also left as a result of instructions or advice by their own leaders.'
The speaker presents a critical perspective on the role of population transfer within the context of Zionist thought and practice before and during the 1948 war. They argue that while the displacement of Palestinians was significant, it was not a preordained or integral aspect of the Zionist project. Instead, the speaker suggests that the Zionist movement initially focused on establishing a national home for Jews rather than on the expulsion of Arabs.
Key arguments made include:
- The speaker asserts that the Zionist leaders did not originally conceptualize their movement as one centered on colonization, stating that 'from the origin, it was a national liberation project.'
- They clarify that the early Zionist endeavors were aimed at re-establishing a Jewish state in a land historically tied to Jewish identity, emphasizing that many Arabs were living in Palestine at that time.
- While the speaker acknowledges that some acts of violence occurred, they refrain from categorizing these as reflective of a broader Zionist strategy, indicating a distinction between the ideals of Zionist leaders and the actions taken during wartime.
The speaker’s analysis appears to be broadly pro-Israeli as it emphasizes the national liberation aspect of the Zionist movement while downplaying the intention behind population transfer as integral to the project.
- [10:54] 'From the origin, it was a national liberation project.'
- [12:01] 'They were living there and they were the population of the land and the Jews were a very small minority.'
- [11:34] 'Zionism did not intend to exploit the resources of Palestine.'
The speaker addresses the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly the 2000 Camp David process, assigning responsibility to both sides. They emphasize that while the Palestinian leadership, including Yasser Arafat, rejected offers made at the time, there were also failures on the Israeli side in terms of concessions and understanding Palestinian aspirations.
Key points include:
- The speaker notes that Arafat's rejection of the proposals was based on a perceived lack of adequate offers, stating, '[04:11] ...they rejected the peace deals on offer,' indicating a view that Palestinian rejectionism played a role in the breakdown of negotiations.
- However, they also suggest that Israeli leaders must take responsibility for not addressing the core issues that drove Palestinian discontent, thus portraying a shared blame for the lack of progress.
- The speaker expresses uncertainty regarding the future of peace negotiations, highlighting a potential for new Palestinian leadership that could be more conciliatory.
This perspective reflects a mixed classification, as it recognizes failures on both sides while calling for more constructive dialogue in the future.
- [04:11] '...they rejected the peace deals on offer...'
- [02:12] '...hopefully new Palestinians will emerge who will be more conciliatory.'
- [05:49] 'I think Israel must give the thing a shot.'
The speaker discusses international law in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting that it holds a certain relevance but is often subordinated to immediate political and security considerations. They indicate that while international law provides frameworks for understanding the rights and responsibilities of states, its application is often selective and influenced by broader geopolitical dynamics.
Key discussions include:
- The speaker mentions that international law is not disregarded but rather seen as limited in practical relevance when it comes to ongoing conflicts, stating, '[22:44] ...it's a complex question with complex answers.'
- They suggest that while Israel may be legally challenged under international law, the realities of security concerns often overshadow these legal frameworks, indicating a pragmatic approach to international relations.
- There is an acknowledgment that decisions are frequently made based on immediate security needs, rather than strictly adhering to legal principles.
This perspective can be classified as mixed, as it recognizes the importance of international law while also critiquing its application in real-world scenarios.
- [22:44] 'It's a complex question with complex answers.'
- [19:12] 'Most countries still at the moment don't question Israel's right to exist.'
- [19:18] '...growingly among some of the publics in the west this too is being adopted as a stance.'
The speaker characterizes the attacks led by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza as part of a broader conflict with complex legal, moral, and political implications. They express that while Israel's actions may lead to significant civilian casualties, labeling these actions as genocide is not accurate in their view.
Key arguments include:
- The speaker differentiates between military actions and the intention behind them, asserting that while Israel aims to dismantle Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it does not intend to kill civilians. They say, '[21:22] ...there has not been... intention to kill Gaza civilians.'
- They argue that the killing of civilians is often a side effect of military operations targeting militant groups, not a deliberate act of genocide, emphasizing, '[21:01] ...expulsion is not genocide.'
- Furthermore, the speaker acknowledges potential war crimes committed by Israeli forces but emphasizes that these actions should not be conflated with systematic genocide.
This position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli as it seeks to justify Israeli military actions while recognizing the tragic consequences for civilians in Gaza.
- [21:22] 'There has not been... intention to kill Gaza civilians.'
- [20:56] 'Genocide is the act of trying to destroy and kill a people... this is not happening in Gaza.'
- [21:03] 'Expulsion is not genocide.'
The speaker's view on the 1947 UN Partition Plan appears to be one of skepticism regarding its fairness and effectiveness. They emphasize that the plan was not a genuine compromise but rather an imposition that failed to account for the existing demographic realities and aspirations of the Arab population in Palestine.
Key arguments supporting this position include:
- The speaker asserts that the Arabs of Palestine saw the partition as unjust, viewing themselves as the rightful inhabitants of the land, which they believed was being taken from them by European invaders, namely the Jews. They argue that the Arab population felt their historical and cultural ties to the land were disregarded by the UN's decision.
- They also highlight that the partition was viewed as a violation of the principle of self-determination, as it did not grant the Arab majority any political trajectory toward statehood. Instead, it established a Jewish state while sidelining the aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs.
- Moreover, the speaker notes that the Arab response to the partition plan was not merely a rejection but an active resistance, which escalated into violence. This illustrates the extent of discontent that the plan generated among the local population.
Relevant quotations include:
- [48:14] "They saw the Zionists as robbers and interlopers who didn't belong there... this is our land."
- [49:04] "They believed that the land the Arabs of Palestine... was being taken from them by European invaders."
- [48:30] "The Arabs said, 'Why should we agree to a two-state solution? We are still the majority of the population in the country.'"
Overall, the speaker’s perspective could be classified as broadly pro-Palestinian, as they emphasize the rights and historical claims of the Arab population over the land.
The speaker interprets Britain’s role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as multifaceted, highlighting both humanitarian motivations and imperial strategies. They describe the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate as pivotal moments that set the stage for the conflict.
In their overview, the speaker posits that:
- The Balfour Declaration was issued partly as a humanitarian gesture towards Jews who had faced persecution, reflecting a guilt complex among British officials for their historical complicity in anti-Semitic acts.
- However, this declaration was also driven by imperialistic motives, as the British believed that establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine would serve their strategic interests, particularly in relation to the Suez Canal and garnering support from influential Jewish communities in the United States and Russia during World War I.
- As the conflict evolved, British policy became increasingly inconsistent. Initially supportive of Zionism, the British later recognized that their backing was antagonizing the Arab world and sought to limit Jewish immigration and promote Arab rights.
Notable quotations from the transcript include:
- [37:12] "The British... did this partly for altruistic reasons... but they also did it for imperial reasons."
- [39:12] "By 37-38 they changed their minds and they began to think that this was all a big mistake."
- [40:22] "They envisioned the emergence of an Arab majority state in Palestine and no Jewish state which they had supported previously."
These points indicate that the speaker views Britain’s historical role as a combination of humanitarian concern and strategic manipulation, reflecting a mixed stance that acknowledges the complexities of imperial motivations. The position can be classified as broadly mixed, as it presents both pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian elements.
The speaker provides an overview of the migration and displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948, emphasizing the historical context and comparing it with the Palestinian displacement. They argue that while both groups experienced displacement, the circumstances and implications differ significantly.
Key points made by the speaker include:
- The speaker notes that an estimated 70,000 Jews were uprooted from their homes during the 1948 war, resulting in a significant Jewish refugee problem, although this number is considerably smaller than the 700,000 Palestinians who fled or were expelled.
- They highlight that most Jewish refugees were absorbed back into Israel after the war, contrasting this with the ongoing plight of Palestinian refugees, who have not been granted similar opportunities for resettlement and integration.
- The speaker remarks that the migration of Jewish communities from Arab countries was driven by rising tensions and hostility, which forced them to flee. However, they suggest that the historical context of Jewish communities in Arab lands predates the establishment of Israel and that these communities had existed for centuries.
Relevant quotations from the transcript include:
- [01:04:01] "70,000 Jews were uprooted from their homes in the course of the 48 war... a serious refugee problem."
- [01:06:03] "Most of these refugees arrived in Israel and were resettled in Israel... became Israeli citizens."
- [01:05:11] "The war created three refugee problems... two of them were solved, but the third problem, the Palestine Arab refugees, continued."
Overall, the speaker suggests that while there were significant displacements of Jews from Arab lands, the comparison with Palestinian displacement is nuanced and reflects different historical trajectories. Their position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as they emphasize the successful integration of Jewish refugees into Israel while also acknowledging the complexities of historical narratives.
The speaker does not specifically address the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 within the provided transcript. Therefore, there is no information to summarize regarding their characterization of these protests, whether they view them as civilian-led demonstrations, Hamas-led violence, or another form of political action.
Without explicit mention or analysis of the protests, it is not possible to extract the speaker’s position on Israel’s use of force during these events or any associated implications related to Palestinian resistance or intentions.
Consequently, the speaker's views on this topic remain unclassified based on the available transcript.
The speaker explains civilian casualties in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza, as a complex issue influenced by several factors. They acknowledge the tragic loss of civilian lives but attribute these casualties primarily to the military actions of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as the inherent dangers of urban warfare.
Key arguments presented by the speaker include:
- While discussing the Israeli military's operations, the speaker points out that the intention behind these actions is to target Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants. However, they recognize that such military operations inevitably lead to civilian casualties, which they attribute to the presence of militants hiding among civilians.
- The speaker makes a distinction between the outcomes of military actions and the intent behind them. They clarify that while Israel aims to eliminate Hamas, this does not equate to a deliberate policy of targeting civilians.
- Moreover, they highlight that Hamas and Islamic Jihad utilize civilian infrastructure for their military operations, complicating the situation further, as it places civilians at risk during military engagements.
Relevant quotations from the transcript include:
- [21:21] "Israel has killed lots of civilians... but as a side effect of trying to kill Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters."
- [21:59] "None of this has occurred in Gaza or anywhere else by Israel. Israel has not tried to kill or intended to kill the Palestinian people."
- [21:35] "It's not a matter of point. It's a matter of is there a policy, desire, intention... of killing the Palestinian people."
The speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as they emphasize the military necessity behind Israel's actions and distinguish between intent and the tragic outcomes of warfare.
[00:00] This is nonsense. This is a Zionist.[00:02] This is Zionist propaganda.[00:04] >> If you were in their position right now,[00:06] you're born into the Palestinian[00:07] territories in Gaza and you are raised[00:10] through all of this where you have Hamas[00:11] controlling this dictatorship sort of[00:14] Islamic uh like you said organization[00:16] plus you have what Israel is doing to[00:18] you as well. Would you be in the mindset[00:20] of okay, I also want to join Hamas?[00:23] I probably would certainly I would feel[00:26] the urge to resist the Israeli invader[00:28] and killer of my family. From 1967 on,[00:32] the Israeli colonial enterprise in the[00:34] West Bank and the Gaza Strip was a[00:37] settler colonial enterprise. It settled[00:40] Israelis and Jews inside territory which[00:43] was initially all Arab.[00:46] >> Benny Morris is one of Israel's most[00:48] well-known and controversial historians.[00:50] He was a professor of history in the[00:52] Middle East studies department at[00:54] Bengoran University. He's also written[00:56] several books on the conflict on Israel[00:58] Palestine conflict. All of which are[01:00] very popular and widely quoted in[01:02] academic texts. Thanks so much for[01:04] joining Benny. Um I want to start off[01:07] >> my my pleasure and I think I wrote about[01:09] nine books on the conflict.[01:11] >> That's that's quite a lot. Um, so I want[01:14] to start by just asking you uh about[01:17] these common talking points that pro[01:19] Israel people constantly use and get[01:21] your thoughts on it. Um, if they're[01:23] true, false, or otherwise. Is that okay?[01:25] >> Okay.[01:26] >> Okay. So, I've got nine of them. There's[01:28] much more, but I've got nine. Um, so the[01:30] first one is uh people say Israel can't[01:32] make a peace deal with enemies who want[01:34] to destroy them such as Hamas. Is that[01:37] what do you think of that?[01:40] Well, peace deals are always made[01:42] between enemies after wars, before wars,[01:45] during wars.[01:47] Hamas, unfortunately, has an ideology[01:50] and doctrine which calls for Israel's[01:52] destruction.[01:54] I doubt if peace talks with the kamas,[01:57] if they were ever engaged, would lead to[01:59] a peace agreement. But Israel must[02:01] definitely talk to the Palestinians, not[02:04] the kamas, which at the moment seems to[02:06] represent them. But there are also more[02:09] moderate voices among the Palestinians[02:11] and we should definitely be talking to[02:12] them as we did in the 90s, as we did in[02:15] 2000. Unfortunately, they at the time[02:18] rejected the peace deals on offer, but[02:20] hopefully um new Palestinians will[02:22] emerge will be more consiliatory.[02:26] >> You you said you said the whole point of[02:27] a peace deal is with enemies. So why[02:28] doesn't that apply to Hamas?[02:31] Well, Hamas is an enemy who[02:34] vows firstly, it's a it's an enemy which[02:37] is Islamist. In other words, doctrinary[02:40] religious absolute values. And one of[02:42] its absolute values is the destruction[02:45] of Israel and its replacement by a[02:47] Palestinian Arab state, theocratic,[02:51] religious, etc. I don't think they will[02:53] make peace with Israel. I may be wrong,[02:56] but um I don't think they will. as one[02:59] perhaps might have expected of Hitler in[03:01] the 1930s. He wouldn't actually make[03:03] peace. He would sign documents and[03:06] supposed agreements, but he didn't[03:08] actually make peace with the Western[03:10] democracies and in the end he attacked[03:12] them and they had to destroy him. This[03:14] might be the the case with Hamas. So,[03:17] just to be clear, you're saying that the[03:18] whole point of peace deals is with[03:19] enemies, but Hamas is too far. you[03:22] should be able to do with more moderate[03:23] voices within the Palestinians who are[03:25] still technically enemies of Israel.[03:28] >> Yes, I think that's the situation. There[03:30] are a Palestinians, they are the enemy,[03:32] but there are more moderate and less[03:34] moderate Palestinians. Absolutist[03:38] enemies such as the kamas I don't[03:40] believe will make peace. That's their[03:41] religious belief. They must destroy the[03:43] Jewish state. This is what Allah[03:45] commanded them to do. And I don't I[03:47] don't see them making peace. They have[03:49] occasionally um hinted that they're[03:51] willing to make a truce, a five-year[03:53] truce, a one-year truce, what they call[03:55] a hudna with Israel, but they have[03:57] never, of course, said they would[03:58] entertain the idea of actually[04:00] peacemaking with Israel and a two-state[04:03] solution, Israel alongside a independent[04:06] Palestine.[04:07] >> So, let's f let's talk about the more[04:09] moderate voices then. So, another point[04:11] that people say is that the Palestinian[04:12] Authority and Mahmud Abbas, who leads[04:14] the Palestinian Authority, uses moderate[04:17] language in public, but really behind[04:18] the scenes, they're just as radical as[04:20] Hamas with their pay to slay law. What[04:22] do you think of that?[04:24] >> Well, I think there are different people[04:26] in the Palestinian Authority.[04:29] I think in their hearts, most[04:31] Palestinians, probably including most[04:33] officials in the Palestinian Authority[04:35] or the Palestine National Authority as[04:38] it's called, most of them would like to[04:40] see Israel disappear. Some of them, I[04:42] think, understand Israel is not going to[04:44] disappear anytime soon and they must[04:47] make peace with it. Some of them. And it[04:49] could be that Kamas is among them. He[04:51] not Kamas, sorry. Abbas is among them.[04:53] Abbas also says he wants to make peace[04:56] with Israel on the basis of a two-state[04:59] solution. I don't know if he's being[05:01] sincere. I don't know if he wants to[05:03] establish a Palestinian state alongside[05:05] Israel in the hope that it will be a[05:08] springboard to further assault on Israel[05:11] once it's established. I don't know. But[05:14] as I say, probably in the Palestinian[05:16] Authority among the Palestinians, there[05:18] are people who understand that Israel is[05:20] not going to go away. that they must[05:23] make peace with Israel if they want to[05:25] live in peace as well.[05:27] >> Because what I'm trying to work out is[05:28] like you said Israel can make peace[05:30] deals but just not with Hamas. So I'm[05:32] wondering can they make peace deals with[05:34] the PA?[05:37] >> Probably. How sincere the PA will be[05:40] once it signs such a deal and[05:42] establishes a state of its own alongside[05:45] Israel. I don't know. This time will[05:47] tell. But I think Israel must give the[05:49] thing a shot. It must try it because[05:51] just living in constant warfare with our[05:54] neighbors is no solution to anything.[05:57] >> Amazing. Okay, so we'll go to the third[05:59] common pros talking point which is that[06:01] Palestinians mainly fled the home during[06:03] the 1948 war um because uh the Arab[06:07] leaders told them to run away so the[06:09] Arab countries could e more easily[06:11] attack Israel. What do you think of[06:13] that?[06:14] >> This is nonsense. This is a Zionist.[06:16] This is Zionist propaganda first[06:18] propagated in fact in the course of the[06:20] 48 war. Most Arabs who fled and some[06:24] 700,000 out of 1.2 or 1.3 million Arabs[06:28] who lived in Palestine now called[06:30] Palestinians um 700,000 of them were um[06:34] um evacuated their homes, fled their[06:37] homes mostly as a result of the war[06:40] reaching their doorstep or about to[06:42] reach their doorstep. um a small number[06:44] of them were expelled by Israel, a[06:48] physically expelled and a small number[06:50] also left as a result of um instructions[06:53] or advice by their own leaders or by[06:56] Arabs from outside Palestine but mostly[06:59] by their own leaders. Um those are more[07:02] or less the proportions. Um they[07:04] certainly did not leave and on mass as[07:07] Israeli propaganda said at the time as a[07:10] result of instruction or orders or um[07:14] invitations by Arab leaders to leave[07:16] their homes as they did not leave also[07:19] as a result mainly of expulsion by[07:22] Israeli troops.[07:24] >> So where did where did it come from? How[07:25] did it already arise within the within[07:27] the war that the only reason they're[07:28] leaving is be is to let the Arab states[07:30] come in and and invade?[07:33] Oh no, this this was maybe some Zionist[07:37] leaders believed that that was the case[07:38] in the course of the 48 war, but[07:41] certainly it was promulgated um partly[07:44] as a result of what happened in Hifa in[07:47] April 1948 by the Zionist leaders who[07:50] said it was the Arab leaders who told[07:52] them to leave. in Hifa in late April[07:55] 1948.[07:56] The local leadership more or less told[07:59] the the Arabs who remained in Hifa to[08:02] leave because the Zionists were winning[08:04] and about to take over a Hifa[08:08] and the Arab states would soon go to war[08:10] against Israel. And it was was best that[08:12] they leave the Arabs leave that town a[08:15] war a potential future war zone and not[08:19] be hurt by the oncoming Arab armies or[08:22] by the Zionists. This did happen in[08:25] Hifa, but this is a small proportion of[08:27] the Palestine Arabs. Many of Hifer's[08:30] residents left before the local[08:32] leadership announced that they should[08:34] leave, which happened on the 22nd of[08:36] April. And many of them left with no[08:39] with no connection to what their local[08:41] leaders said. They simply feared Israeli[08:44] um war making, feared life under Israel[08:47] should they come under Israeli rule and[08:50] they left.[08:52] >> As as rel as relates to the rest of[08:54] Palestine, this simply wasn't the case.[08:57] There were some leaders in villages in[09:00] certain areas who instructed all the[09:02] villagers to leave or at least the women[09:04] and children to leave their homes. But[09:06] this only occurred in a small proportion[09:08] of Palestine's um villages and towns.[09:12] >> So this just grew. The uh people in[09:15] Israel just started spreading this after[09:16] the war and just um it just grown grew[09:19] and grew until everyone more or less[09:21] believes that's what happened. That was[09:22] the Arab. I don't know if I don't know[09:24] if I don't know if everyone more or less[09:26] believed this. Many many Israelis came[09:30] to believe this because this was the[09:31] official Zionist line that the Arab[09:33] leaders had asked the Arabs to leave and[09:35] that's why they fled and that what was[09:37] why there was a Palestine refugee[09:40] problem. But this is not historically[09:42] true.[09:43] >> Okay. So let's go on to the fourth[09:44] common pros talking point which is that[09:46] uh Palestine as a country has never[09:49] existed.[09:50] What do you think? This isn't a this is[09:52] not a talking point. This is true.[09:54] Palestine has never been a state.[09:57] Um Palestine has been an area so[10:00] designated by the Romans after they[10:02] crushed the first and second Jewish[10:04] revolts in the first and second[10:06] centuries AD.[10:08] Palestine[10:10] under Arab rule from the 7th century[10:13] until the middle ages um was divided[10:17] into a number of provinces. Um after the[10:22] middle the middle during the middle ages[10:23] it was conquered by Christians called[10:26] crusaders. Afterwards various Muslim[10:31] entities conquered Palestine but they[10:33] never designated Palestine as a separate[10:37] even administrative zone. It was only[10:40] part of Syria or it was part of Lebanon.[10:43] It was never a separate zone. So it was[10:44] never a state at any point and it was[10:46] wasn't even a a separate distinct[10:49] province under for most of the period of[10:52] Islamic rule of the country. What about[10:55] from uh during the Brit Britain's[10:57] mandate of it[10:59] >> in in the Brit British conquered[11:02] Palestine from the Turks in 1917 1918[11:06] and they um instituted what they called[11:10] a mandate given permission to do so by[11:12] the League of Nations and from that[11:15] point on the whole area from the river[11:17] to the sea what is more or less historic[11:20] Palestine became the British ruled area[11:23] of mandate Palestine at that time it was[11:27] one[11:28] >> at that time it was one designated[11:30] distinct area.[11:32] >> Oh but you wouldn't call it a country at[11:34] that point[11:35] >> during[11:38] the question isn't the area was called[11:40] Palestine from Roman days then by the[11:43] Christians um as a as an area not not as[11:46] a distinct state or administrative zone.[11:49] It became a distinct administrative zone[11:52] under the British during the British[11:54] mandate from 191718 until 1948. But[11:58] before then and after then there was no[12:01] Palestine Arab state. There was no[12:03] Palestinian state and there was no[12:06] almost for throughout this 2,000 years[12:09] since the Romans there was no distinct[12:12] um[12:13] provincial um administered entity called[12:17] Palestine.[12:18] >> Okay. So, I'll go into the next point.[12:19] Like I said, it's up to you to tell me[12:21] if they're true or false. And the next[12:22] point is that Palestinians as an ethnic[12:24] group has never existed. And they only[12:26] started to exist um when the PLO, the[12:29] Palestinian Liberation Organization was[12:31] founded by the Arab States in 1964.[12:36] >> This this isn't really true either. It's[12:39] true that the people who lived in[12:41] Palestine, were they were they um[12:44] Muslims and Christians, Arabs or Jews or[12:49] even Jews? And there was a small number[12:50] of Jews living there, none of them[12:52] called themselves Palestinians. Um the[12:55] Arabs of in Palestine, the Christian the[12:57] Christian ones and the majority Muslim[13:00] ones regarded themselves as Arabs.[13:02] regarded themselves as Muslims thought[13:04] of themselves basically as residents of[13:07] a certain area in the country hifa jaffa[13:09] whatever as jaffites and hifites but not[13:12] as palestinians that wasn't the term[13:14] used during the British mandate 1917 181[13:18] 1948 the people who lived in the area[13:21] the British of the British mandate[13:22] territory of Palestine were Palestinians[13:25] and were issued Palestinian um identity[13:29] cards but these were British mandate[13:32] identity cards and this referred to[13:33] Arabs and Jews. Both the Jews and the[13:36] Arabs who lived in the country were[13:38] regarded as residents of British ruled[13:40] Palestine. Um, the term Palestinian with[13:44] in reference to Arabs of Palestine who[13:46] lived here only began to come into some[13:50] form of existence in the 1920s when the[13:52] Arabs of Palestine began to see[13:54] themselves as separate from at least in[13:57] terms of a potential political[13:59] trajectory separate from the Arabs of[14:02] Syria or the Arabs of Jordan or the[14:04] Arabs of Lebanon. Regarding Lebanon and[14:07] Syria which came under French rule,[14:09] their destiny would be governed by their[14:11] relationship with France. The p the[14:14] Arabs in Palestine from 1920 on began to[14:17] think as their destiny in relation to[14:20] what would happen with the Zionists and[14:23] with the British who ruled Palestine.[14:25] And from that point on, some of them[14:27] began to think of themselves as distinct[14:29] from their Syrian and other neighbors as[14:32] Palestinian Arabs. But the term[14:34] Palestinian only came into common use[14:36] after 1948 as a a a a description of the[14:41] Arabs who had lived in Palestine or[14:43] still lived in Palestine. That term[14:45] Palestinian Palestinian Arabs only came[14:47] into real existence post 1948. In fact,[14:51] post their dispersion in large numbers[14:54] from Palestine. So just to be clear,[14:56] they started almost like forming[14:58] together during the mandatory period and[15:00] after 48 become it started to become[15:02] common usage.[15:03] >> Yes.[15:04] >> And would you call them at what point[15:06] did they become an ethnic group or it[15:08] doesn't really make a difference what or[15:10] I don't know like what would you say[15:11] about that? Did was any specific point[15:12] they became an ethnic group or they just[15:14] are an ethnic group?[15:17] >> I don't know how to answer that. Um as I[15:20] said they were Arabs. They were mainly[15:22] their identity was Arabs and Muslim and[15:25] as I say residents of a certain locality[15:28] in the area which the Christians and[15:30] they themselves sometimes called[15:32] Palestine.[15:34] Um were they a separate ethnic groups?[15:36] Well, they spoke the same language. They[15:38] prayed to the same God as the Arabs in[15:40] Syria, the Arabs in Lebanon or some of[15:43] the Arabs in Lebanon and the Arabs in[15:45] Jordan. Um a a separate e ethnic group.[15:48] I suppose the moment a a group of people[15:51] a large group of people consider[15:53] themselves distinct from different from[15:56] their neighbors um they are recognized[15:59] usually as a separate people and[16:02] therefore have a separate identity that[16:04] that's the norm and as I say among Arabs[16:07] in Palestine this became certainly true[16:10] um growingly from the 1920s[16:13] predominantly true from the 1930s 1940s[16:18] or post 1948.[16:20] >> Okay. Yeah. No, that makes sense. Um,[16:23] >> I don't know if that answers your qu I[16:24] don't know if it answers your question,[16:26] but that that's I think the best way of[16:27] describing it.[16:28] >> Well, no, I'll tell you why I'm asking[16:30] it because when I when I've sp spoken to[16:32] some people, they said, "Well, there[16:34] Israel can't be do there's no chance[16:36] there's there's not even a possibility[16:37] that Israel is doing an ethnic cleansing[16:39] regardless whether regardless of what[16:41] actually happening in Gaza is because[16:43] there's no such thing as Palestinians as[16:45] ethnic groups. They can't be targeting[16:46] anyone.[16:48] This is this is nonsense.[16:52] If the Israelis want to and were[16:56] actually trying to commit ethnic[16:58] cleansing and and they were kicking out[17:00] the Arabs from Gaza or and or from the[17:03] West Bank, this would be ethnic[17:05] cleansing. Obviously, it doesn't matter[17:08] what the wording is, you know, how[17:10] people define Palestinians or not. This[17:12] would be ethnic cleansing. The qu the[17:14] real question with regard to the Gaza[17:16] Strip and perhaps with the the West Bank[17:19] is is is ethnic cleansing Israeli policy[17:23] and is it being implemented in Gaza and[17:26] in the West Bank? And this is a a[17:30] complex question with complex answers.[17:32] >> Yeah, hopefully we'll get into it a bit[17:34] nearer to the end. So there's a So we'll[17:37] go on to the sixth point which is that[17:39] when pro Palestinian supporters are[17:42] being interviewed on radio or TV, the[17:44] most common question they're asked is,[17:46] "Do you support Israel's right to[17:47] exist?" But I want to ask you, what's it[17:49] mean to for a country to have a right to[17:52] exist?[17:55] >> Well, Israel is unique in the world, I[17:57] think, more or less at least in um its[18:01] existence being questioned. It's unique[18:03] in this sense that some people many[18:05] people perhaps certainly many Arabs[18:07] believe that it has no right to exist[18:10] and growingly unfortunately among some[18:12] of the publics in the west this too is[18:15] being adopted as a stance a political[18:18] position. Um whether a nobody asks this[18:21] about France or Germany or Italy or[18:24] perhaps even San Marino or Andor do they[18:26] have a right to exist? Everybody takes[18:29] it for granted they have a right to[18:30] exist. Certainly[18:33] members of the United Nations, nobody[18:35] questions their right to exist. There is[18:37] a question about Israel in this respect[18:39] and this is unusual.[18:41] Um I I I don't know how to answer. I[18:45] think countries have a right to exist if[18:47] they exist. I don't think countries[18:48] should be destroyed. Russia may be at[18:51] the moment trying to destroy Ukraine,[18:53] but this isn't seen as legitimate.[18:56] Russia's aim, if that is its aim, it[18:58] isn't seen as legitimate by the world[19:00] international community, maybe except[19:03] for North Korea. And most countries[19:06] still at the moment don't um um um[19:10] question Israel's right to exist.[19:12] Though, as I say, there are growing[19:13] publics certainly in the Arab world who[19:16] do question Israel's right to exist.[19:18] Because I saw I think it was UN special[19:20] report of the Palestinian territories[19:22] Francesa Albanesi being asked this[19:25] question and she said in a response what[19:27] does it mean do I have a right to exist?[19:28] It mean Israel exists. The question is[19:30] how does it exist? Does it exist as a[19:32] Jewish state? Does it exist? That that's[19:34] the bigger question rather does it have[19:35] a right to exist? Because like you said[19:37] every country just exists.[19:39] >> No no that that she's being um too[19:43] subtle. Um, the question really is[19:46] whether Israel as a Jewish state has the[19:48] right to exist. That's really the[19:49] question. Whether it has a right to[19:51] exist and then the name would of course[19:53] change as a Arab majority state, as an[19:56] Arab majority democratic state.[19:59] That's a different question. But the[20:01] question really is, does Israel have the[20:03] right to exist as a Jewish state[20:05] presently between the river and the sea[20:08] or in large parts of the area between[20:10] the river and the sea? That's the[20:12] question.[20:12] >> Yeah. Okay. So the seventh point that I[20:15] want to go through is um[20:18] people often say this anti-semitic to be[20:21] against the Jewish state of Israel to be[20:22] anti-ionist. What do you make of that?[20:26] >> There is a problem here. There is an[20:28] overlap between being anti-Israeli and[20:30] being anti-semitic. There's an obvious[20:32] overlap. The overlap is that most[20:35] anti-semmites, people who for some[20:37] reason hate Jews, would also like Israel[20:40] not to exist. That's a big overlap.[20:43] There is there are among those who are[20:45] anti-Israeli, don't like Israel's[20:47] behavior or don't want it to exist.[20:49] There are among them those who are also[20:51] anti-Semmites. But not all anti-ionists[20:54] are anti-semmites. There are people who[20:56] don't like the state of Israel or don't[20:58] like object to the way it's behaving or[21:00] has behaved in the past. And they are[21:02] not anti-semmites. They don't dislike[21:04] Jews or hate Jews. But as I say, there[21:07] is an overlap between the two[21:09] >> because the definition by anti-Zionist[21:11] here isn't like against Israeli policy,[21:13] but against the existence of Israel as a[21:15] Jewish state.[21:16] >> Okay. No, that that you can be both. You[21:18] can be either or both. You can be[21:20] against the Israeli government's[21:22] policies in the territories or[21:24] elsewhere. You can be against Israel's[21:27] existence or you can be both. It's that[21:30] that's um[21:32] it's not anti-semitic. There are good[21:34] reasons. I would say there are good[21:37] reasons, reasonable reasons for people[21:39] to dislike the existence of the Jewish[21:42] state. It has been in some way at the[21:44] expense of the local Arab population,[21:46] the establishment and existence of the[21:49] state of Israel. Some people think the[21:51] whole um enterprise, the Zionist[21:53] enterprise has been impractical. It's[21:55] not something which will last and[21:57] therefore it shouldn't have begun.[21:59] Some as I say, some also have a moral[22:02] reason for[22:03] repudiating Zionism because as I say it[22:06] in some way has been at the expense of[22:08] the local Arab population. Um but there[22:11] are also um people who as I say oppose[22:14] Israel's existence for anti-semitic[22:16] reasons.[22:18] >> Okay. No, that makes sense. So the[22:20] eighth point is that um people often say[22:23] that[22:25] >> Okay. Sorry. Go ahead. Yeah. Sorry.[22:27] >> Okay. Okay. So the eighth point is that[22:28] people often say that the media is[22:29] biased against Israel because they focus[22:31] so much against on Israel whilst there's[22:33] other things uh happening in Sudan in[22:36] other areas of the world which is also[22:37] really bad and therefore it's[22:39] anti-semitic or is biased against[22:41] Israel. What would you say to that?[22:44] Well, not necessarily anti-semitic, but[22:46] there is a tendency in the world press[22:49] and I recently wrote yesterday, in fact[22:52] today I posted it um about the Irish[22:54] press, the press in Ireland um where you[22:57] will find in a major Irish newspaper on[23:00] a given day, four or five articles about[23:03] the Gaza Strip and starvation in the[23:05] Gaza Strip or Israeli um policy visa v[23:09] the Gaza Strip and so on. five articles[23:11] in one day in a major newspaper which[23:13] doesn't devote an inch of space to what[23:16] is happening in Sudan where there's a[23:18] civil war with hundreds of thousands of[23:20] people apparently being killed or[23:22] displaced or whatever and there's a war[23:25] in Ukraine to which also at most the the[23:28] newspaper will devote one article a day[23:31] or one article a week to what is[23:32] happening in Ukraine which has been[23:34] assaulted by the Soviet by Russia. Um,[23:38] Israel has given Israel and Gaza, the[23:40] Gaza war in the last year and a half[23:42] have been given[23:45] far more space than any of the crises[23:47] enveloping the world or enveloping[23:50] countries in the world over the past two[23:53] years in some of which more many more[23:55] people have been slaughtered as in Syria[23:58] or Sudan. Um um[24:02] so the there seems to be um an obsession[24:05] with Israel. The obsession incidentally[24:07] didn't begin of course with the Gaza[24:09] war. This has been going on for decades[24:11] and it's to do with the the Israel[24:14] sitting on what is called for the[24:15] Christians the holy land and for Muslims[24:18] a sacred piece of territory called[24:20] Philstine.[24:22] That is one reason for the object[24:24] obsession with Israel. Another seems to[24:27] be that there is anti-semitism rampant[24:29] in both the Christian and the Muslim[24:32] worlds and therefore a a focus on Jews[24:35] and what they're doing in Israel or[24:37] elsewhere is um um[24:40] exaggerated I would say. Um but there is[24:44] definitely in the western media um some[24:47] of which I follow there is a an[24:50] obsessive focus on Israel and its[24:53] behavior.[24:55] Why is that? Is it because like you[24:56] said, it's such a holy place to so many[24:58] and it's so important to so many.[25:01] >> Yeah, it's partly to do with that. It's[25:02] partly to do in the West also with the[25:05] Bible and the New Testament and Jesus[25:08] Jesus's existence and preachings in the[25:11] the Holy Land. Um this is where the the[25:15] monotheistic religions in some way[25:17] emerged. Um um that's one reason.[25:20] Another as I said is probably[25:22] anti-semitism.[25:24] Um there is also a a good economic[25:28] reason which is to do with the west's[25:30] relationship with the Arab world and its[25:32] economic reliance on the Arab world and[25:34] the power the growing power of Arab[25:37] money Arab the Arab economies as a[25:39] result of their um store storehouses of[25:43] um oil. um this and and their interest[25:47] of course in Palestine is in a sense[25:49] natural because they regard the Arab[25:51] states and peoples regard the Arabs of[25:54] Palestine as their brothers even if they[25:56] don't do too much for them haven't done[25:58] too much for them over the decades but[26:00] they they have a also a a sense of um um[26:05] brotherhood with the Palestinian Arabs[26:07] because they're fellow Muslims and Arabs[26:10] and and this leads to some form of[26:13] obsessiveness which as I[26:15] has also affected the western countries[26:18] which have to take account of what is[26:20] said and done and believed in the Arab[26:22] world in general.[26:24] >> Okay. Um so the ninth uh the ninth point[26:28] is that Hamas is at fault for you know[26:31] the majority or many of the civilian[26:33] deaths in Gaza for using human shields[26:35] uh because they place themselves near or[26:37] next to or even underneath uh mosques,[26:41] religious sites, schools, uh residential[26:44] areas, etc. What do you think of that?[26:46] And what do you think about the counter[26:47] response to that which is that it's such[26:50] a small space in Gaza that they just[26:52] don't have much of a choice?[26:54] Both both things you're saying are[26:56] probably true. The Hamas and Islamic[26:59] Jihad, the two Islamist terrorist[27:02] organizations who control the Gaza Strip[27:05] before October 7th, 2023,[27:09] um[27:11] built their fortifications, their[27:13] underground tunnels, their um rocket[27:17] storage sites, etc. in public spaces in[27:22] the hope that Israel would not attack[27:24] them there. Public spaces being mosques[27:26] or under mosques[27:28] um school buildings, universities, um[27:32] UNRA sites um they used all of these to[27:37] great benefit. During the war itself, um[27:40] the kamas and um Islamic jihad fighters[27:43] hid often in tunnels underneath um[27:47] public buildings such as hospitals and[27:50] mosques or among refugees who also um[27:56] resettled if you like in these public[27:58] spaces such as schools. And for Israel[28:01] to get at them, Israel had to attack[28:04] these public spaces, killing Kamasnik,[28:06] but also um um killing the people among[28:10] whom they were located. In in short, the[28:14] kamas made use of this is a human[28:17] civilian shield[28:19] very successfully um partly as a[28:23] succeeding in hiding among them knowing[28:26] that Israel wouldn't attack them or[28:28] hiding among them and knowing that[28:30] Israel would attack them, killing[28:32] civilians, which could be translated[28:34] into international uproar against Israel[28:36] for killing civilians. Um this has been[28:39] going on for the last two years in the[28:41] Gaza Strip. The Hamas incidentally and[28:44] the Islamic Jihad used a second human[28:47] shield which was of course the hostages[28:49] these organizations took from Israel,[28:52] mostly civilians, 251 of them um during[28:56] their attack on Israel on the 7th of[28:58] October. They took them back to the Gaza[29:00] Strip and relied on their presence, the[29:02] hostages presence among them to go to to[29:05] protect them from Israeli air strikes or[29:08] Israeli ground attack. Um, and this has[29:12] been true too. So the kamas and the[29:14] Islamic Jihad incidentally, which[29:16] prevented all Arab civilians from[29:18] entering the tunnel network, this was[29:20] reserved only for their fighters. um[29:23] they they use this as a policy and it's[29:26] been very successful for them.[29:28] >> So just to be clear, so Hamas and[29:30] Islamic Jihad, which I presume you're[29:31] referring to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[29:34] >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Of course.[29:37] >> So Hamas and PJ they took they take in[29:40] uh the hostages and they place them and[29:42] they use them as human shields and they[29:43] also place themselves um within like[29:46] scores and other places for to be to act[29:48] which act as human shields for them.[29:50] Anyway, but would you say but what about[29:52] the point um about that there's just not[29:55] much space in Gaza? Do you think that[29:56] has any validity?[29:58] >> Yeah, it's also true. Look, all almost[30:00] anywhere the kamas would site a rocket[30:03] launcher would be near a civilian[30:07] residential or public area. There's the[30:11] place is so small that if they wanted to[30:15] site storage sites and and rocket[30:19] launchers anywhere, it would have to be[30:21] or would often be next to civilian[30:24] habitation or civilian public buildings.[30:28] And this is true if you you're you're[30:29] saying that well they they argue that[30:32] there's nowhere else to place all these[30:33] things and it's probably partly true.[30:37] >> Okay. Uh so let's move on to what is[30:39] Zionism as a concept. So um how would[30:43] you describe Zionism? Would you say it's[30:45] only a national liberation project?[30:46] Would you say it's somewhat a colonial[30:48] project founded helped only made[30:51] possible by an imperial power or I don't[30:53] know what would you describe as?[30:56] >> Well, here we're going into a big issue.[30:58] Isra is Israel a a settler or Zionism a[31:02] settler colonial project or is it as you[31:04] say a national liberation movement?[31:07] Well, from the origin, it was a national[31:11] liberation project. A project which[31:13] would try to get Jews away from the[31:16] clause of anti-semitic violence in[31:18] Eastern Europe, and reestablish a Jewish[31:21] state in the ancient Jewish homeland of[31:24] Judea, which is later called today[31:28] called Israel, the area of um today[31:31] called also Palestine. They wanted to[31:34] reestablish a state there to be free of[31:36] attack from anti-semmites in Europe. And[31:39] this is what Zionists did and this was[31:41] their aim.[31:44] They came and settled in a land which[31:46] already had civilian inhabitants who[31:49] were Arabs. Wasn't crowded but there[31:51] were at the beginning of Zionism close[31:53] to 500,000 Arabs living in the area we[31:56] define as Palestine alongside some[31:58] 25,000 Jews. Gradually more and more[32:01] Jews arrived as I say as a result of[32:04] persecution and ideology and arrived in[32:07] Palestine in order to establish a state[32:09] there. Um and this while purchasing the[32:13] land from very willing Arab sellers they[32:17] eventually began to push[32:20] Arab neighbors[32:23] aside either through purchase of land[32:25] and then demanding to be able to settle[32:27] on that land and cultivate it etc. From[32:30] 1948, Israel also captured areas[32:33] inhabited by Arabs[32:36] and and settled there. Um and again the[32:39] same thing has happened since 1967[32:42] um um[32:44] Israel occupying a territory planting[32:48] Jewish settlements there and gradually[32:51] pushing back Arab habitation on their[32:54] fringes gradually expanding more and[32:56] more of the settler area the area of[32:58] settlement of Jews. This has happened in[33:00] the West Bank um and growingly in the[33:03] last few years[33:06] from the beginning. I would define the[33:08] Jew the Zionist enterprise as a national[33:12] liberation movement and not a colonial[33:14] enterprise because colonial secular[33:17] colonial enterprises were um[33:19] masterminded by imperial powers like[33:23] Britain and France, France and Algeria,[33:25] Britain and America or other places um[33:28] in which they sent their sons. The[33:30] empire sent its sons to settle in a[33:33] certain place to establish their[33:35] sovereignty, the imperial sovereignty in[33:37] that area and to exploit the natives and[33:40] the resources in those territories.[33:43] Zionism did not intend to exploit the[33:46] resources of Palestine because there are[33:48] natural no natural resources in[33:50] Palestine and also more or less shunned[33:53] from exploiting the local natives. In[33:56] fact, the Zionist settlers for decades[33:59] wanted a separate economy from the[34:01] Arabs. They didn't want to use Arab[34:02] labor and they didn't want to be[34:04] dependent on Arab labor or on Arab[34:06] produce. They wanted to run themselves[34:09] autonomously. And this is what they did[34:10] basically until 1948. So, in that sense,[34:14] it wasn't a an imperial settler colonial[34:18] project. They weren't sent there by the[34:20] British Empire. They weren't sent there[34:21] by the Russian Empire or the French[34:23] Empire. But it is true that from 1917 on[34:27] the British Empire which conquered[34:28] Palestine was friendly at least until[34:31] 193738[34:33] was friendly to the Zionist enterprised[34:35] and helped it and the Jews were happy to[34:37] receive this help but they weren't[34:39] agents of the British and as it turned[34:41] out the British turned against Zionism[34:43] and the Zionists turned turned[34:45] eventually against the British and even[34:47] rebelled against them in 1944 4547.[34:52] Um so it wasn't an agent. Zionism and[34:55] the Zionists were not agents of the[34:56] British. Were helped by the British for[34:59] some of the period until as they say[35:00] 1937[35:02] but weren't agents of the British and[35:04] weren't serving British purposes. They[35:06] were serving Zionist Jewish purposes.[35:08] And that's the the key thing here. After[35:11] 1948, let let me just continue this if[35:13] we're talking about this. After 1948,[35:16] Israel eventually aligned in some way[35:18] with France, receiving armaments from[35:20] France and political cover from France.[35:23] And after 1960 something[35:27] aligned with America, the United States[35:30] and received armaments and political[35:33] cover from America. In that sense, we[35:36] had imperial allies, but we weren't[35:38] agents of these imperial allies in the[35:40] 50s and 60s and 70s and so on. we were[35:44] just um partners or allies of these[35:47] imperial powers. So in that sense you[35:49] can't say that Zionism was an imperial[35:52] agent. What you can say and this is[35:54] important to stress from 1967 on the[35:58] Israeli colonial enterprise in the West[36:00] Bank and the Gaza Strip was a settler[36:03] colonial enterprise. It settled Israelis[36:06] and Jews inside territory which was[36:09] initially all Arab and and um as I say[36:14] also gradually pushed back Arabs and it[36:16] took over more and more territory from[36:18] the Arab their Arab neighbors in these[36:21] territories. In that sense the Zionist[36:24] enterprise became a settler colonial um[36:27] enterprise but only after 67 and[36:30] pertaining to the West Bank and the Gaza[36:33] Strip.[36:34] Okay. So what about so looking at it[36:36] before you said you you were looking at[36:38] what what are the benefits? What is[36:40] Israel trying what are the designers[36:41] trying to do by creating a state? Were[36:43] they trying to exploit the people there[36:45] um in Palestine? So I want to ask from[36:47] the other perspective from the[36:49] perspective of the British um who like[36:51] like you said were very friendly towards[36:53] the Zionist venture for the first 20[36:54] years or so um if if not around 20 years[36:58] or so. Um what why were they friendly[37:00] towards designers? Was there any benefit[37:02] for them as a as such a power? Did they[37:04] let did they want to control let's say[37:07] the sewers canal or that or was that too[37:09] far away to have any difference? Like[37:10] what why were they trying to do this?[37:12] >> Okay, the British in the course of World[37:14] War I and specifically in 1917 issued[37:18] what is called the Balfur declaration[37:20] supporting the emergence of a national[37:22] or Jewish national home as they called[37:24] it, but meaning in effect a Jewish state[37:26] in Palestine. And they did this partly[37:29] for altruistic reasons. Um because Jews[37:33] have been persecuted so so frequently in[37:36] the Christian world. The British if some[37:38] of them may have felt guilty that they[37:39] were partners to this persecution or[37:42] oppression over the previous 2,000[37:44] years. But they also did it for imperial[37:47] reasons. Apparently thinking that um[37:50] settling Jews in Palestine and[37:52] establishing some form of Jewish um[37:55] political entity in Palestine,[37:57] ultimately a state, would benefit[37:59] British interests by because the British[38:01] would be beholden to the um sorry the[38:04] Jews would be beholden to the British[38:06] for setting up this entity. Um the Jews[38:09] would help Britain protect the Sewish[38:11] Canal from the east. um this entity[38:14] would help the British protect the Swiss[38:16] canal from the east. This was one thing,[38:18] one one element. Another element was[38:20] that the British felt that by issuing[38:22] the P bow for declaration, they would um[38:25] be doing the Jews a big favor and the[38:28] Jews who were powerful they thought in[38:30] America and in Moscow would um help[38:34] persuade the um government in Washington[38:37] and the government in Moscow to support[38:40] the Allied cause in World War II. this[38:43] World War I. This this was the British[38:44] thinking during um the weeks in debating[38:50] the um issue of the Balffor Declaration[38:53] in November 1917.[38:56] They were probably wrong in these[38:57] thoughts that this would help persuade[38:59] Moscow to turn or remain inside the[39:03] coalition during World War I, the[39:05] anti-German coalition in World War I,[39:07] and would help persuade the Americans to[39:09] send their troops more quickly to the[39:12] Western Front um to confront the Germans[39:14] alongside the British and the French.[39:16] But uh nonetheless the British when they[39:18] issued the balf for declaration thought[39:20] this for the first 20 years of Zionism[39:23] from 19 of British rule of Palestine and[39:26] Zionism 1917 1937 the British apparently[39:30] cons continued to consider um the[39:33] existence and the enlargement increase[39:36] of the Zionist presence in Palestine as[39:39] beneficial to the British Empire. By[39:41] 3738 they changed their minds and they[39:44] began to think that this was all a big[39:46] mistake. Supporting Zionism was[39:48] antagonizing the Arab world, turning the[39:50] Arab world against them. They needed the[39:52] Arab world's at least neutrality if not[39:56] support in the forthcoming war which was[39:59] um apparent[40:01] the world war against Germany and Italy[40:03] and Japan. they would need um Arab[40:06] neutrality at their backs in their rear[40:09] and maybe even Arab support to beat the[40:11] Germans, the Italians and the Japanese[40:13] and changed policy and be turned[40:15] anti-ionist which is why they issued in[40:18] 1939 the the famous white paper[40:22] of May 1939 which restricted Jewish[40:25] immigration to Palestine and basically[40:28] envisioned a the emergence of an Arab[40:30] majority state in Palestine and no[40:32] Jewish state which they had supported[40:34] previously[40:35] >> if Britain were allowing Jews to go over[40:38] to to Palestine to slowly create a state[40:40] of the next over the next years um for[40:43] their own benefits so the Jews could[40:44] support them in World War I or whatever[40:46] it is but also that they could have[40:48] control over Sewers Canal not to exploit[40:50] the people in Palestine but for those[40:52] other benefits and the Jews were willing[40:54] to do that. At what point would you call[40:56] it sett set settler col colonization or[40:59] does it have to only be if it's British[41:01] people going over?[41:03] >> No, I don't think that's settler colon[41:06] col colonization. The Jews were coming[41:08] to Palestine and in some way supporting[41:11] the British though not very much. um in[41:14] the 1920s and 30s. Um um but the British[41:18] didn't understood that they weren't[41:20] really the Zionists weren't really their[41:23] agents and therefore not the same as[41:26] Brit British youngsters coming and[41:28] settling in Palestine and holding the[41:30] fort for the British Empire. This isn't[41:32] what was happening. And the British[41:34] understood this very pretty probably[41:35] pretty quickly especially after the[41:38] beginning of the Arab revolt in[41:39] Palestine in spring 1936. From that[41:44] point on the British were seen by the[41:46] Arabs as antagonists and the Zionists[41:49] were seen as a problem by the British[41:51] because they were supporting the[41:52] Zionists and the Arabs for that reason[41:54] were attacking the British troops and[41:57] officials in Palestine. The British[41:59] began to understand that this wasn't[42:01] going to work for them and therefore as[42:04] I say from 3738 they changed policy[42:08] 180 degrees they simply reversed policy.[42:12] >> What do you think when you hear original[42:14] Zionist leaders calling it colonization?[42:16] So for example, Zev Japotinski, not sure[42:19] if I pronounced it right. I'm sure you[42:20] know what I'm about to say, but I'll say[42:22] anyway. So he was a leader of[42:23] revisionist Zionism, a very early leader[42:25] of Zionism. He said in his 1923 essay,[42:29] the Iron Wall, every native population[42:31] in the world resists colonialists. That[42:33] is what the Arabs and Palestine are[42:34] doing. Yeah. No, Jabotinsky understood[42:37] what was happening and how the Arabs[42:39] would view it. But the word[42:41] colonization, there's a problem here in[42:43] terms of the Hebrew the the Zionist[42:45] leaders were thinking in Palestine were[42:47] thinking in term in Hebrew terminology.[42:49] And the Hebrew terminology[42:52] for a settlement, a village with 100[42:55] families, 200 families is called a[42:57] moshav or moshava, initially moshava,[43:00] later moshav. That's and that translates[43:03] into the word colony. In other words,[43:05] each settlement was a colony in Hebrew[43:08] and that's how in English also people[43:11] use that term. So the fact that they[43:13] were settling in these colonies didn't[43:15] make them colonialists in terms of[43:17] empires and the establishment or[43:19] disestablishment of states. It was to do[43:21] with actual settlement in a place.[43:25] The word moshav incidentally or moshava[43:27] comes from the word to settle somewhere[43:29] in Hebrew.[43:31] It doesn't mean a colony in the sense of[43:34] Virginia or or Massachusetts as British[43:38] colonies in America in the 17th 18th[43:40] centuries. Um um that's in terms of the[43:44] Hebrew. So the the word colonization[43:47] when they translated their usage of[43:49] Hebrew into English, they kept using the[43:52] word colonization or all they meant was[43:54] settling people in villages around[43:57] Palestine. It didn't mean exploiting or[43:59] taking as taking over um the the um the[44:04] local population as settler colonialist[44:07] societies, British agents did as I say[44:10] in America or French in Algeria or[44:12] Belgians wherever it was in the Congo.[44:15] >> Okay. So I I want to go on to the next[44:17] point which is you know um I guess I I[44:20] guess it's it's really indisputable that[44:22] even before Israel was founded in 1948[44:25] even from 1917 uh the Arabs or the[44:29] Palestinians however you want to call[44:30] them they rejected uh peace opt options[44:34] to get to peace again and again and[44:35] again they rejected the Balffor[44:37] declaration 1917 they rejected as not[44:40] enough um the Brit Britain's offer of[44:43] peace offering of trans Jordan you know[44:45] 70% of Palestine for the Arabs and they[44:47] rejected saying no they want 100% of[44:49] Palestine. Um they rejected the Peel[44:51] Commission in 1936 they rejected like[44:53] you said just before the 1939 white[44:56] paper which was very much in favor of[44:58] them. Um they rejected the UN partition[45:01] plan in 47 and more and more like but[45:03] from their pers looking at it from their[45:05] perspective where they saw their land as[45:07] entirely theirs and they're not willing[45:09] to give up any land for people who came[45:12] in to invade their land. Does it make[45:14] sense for them to have that perspective?[45:17] >> It does. Um, the Arabs saw these[45:19] Europeans who didn't know Arabic, who[45:22] weren't[45:23] Muslims. They were Jews, infidels. In[45:26] fact, in their eyes, they saw them as[45:28] invaders, um, European invaders. They[45:31] couldn't care whether they were really[45:33] agents acting,[45:35] explicitly, um, deliberately as agents[45:38] of an empire or not. They saw them as[45:40] European invaders. And from 1917 18 they[45:43] also understood the British supported[45:44] them. So it was natural that they would[45:46] see it that way. They believed that the[45:49] land the Arabs of Palestine and the[45:51] Arabs in fact in the societies around[45:53] Palestine believed Palestine was an Arab[45:55] land. It had been conquered by the Arabs[45:58] in the 7th century. It wasn't naturally[46:00] Arab. People before the 7th century in[46:02] Palestine did not speak Arabs and Arabic[46:04] and they weren't Arabs. They were[46:06] something else. They were pagans. They[46:07] were Christians. They were Jews. They[46:08] were not Arabs. But from the 7th century[46:10] on um they when they after they[46:14] conquered the country the the Muslims[46:16] they be began to relate to the country[46:18] as sacred Muslim territory and as an[46:21] Arab land even after the crus why the[46:24] crusaders had been there for a century[46:25] or so. But nonetheless this was an Arab[46:28] land. The Arabs reconquered it from the[46:30] crusaders and then then forward it was[46:33] always under Muslim rule until the[46:35] British took over in 1917. So it was[46:38] natural that they would regard the land[46:41] as Arab and Muslim and that the Jews as[46:44] interlopers who didn't belong there and[46:46] as I say as infidels and and see them[46:48] also as agents of a foreign power and[46:51] this is how Arabs were brought up[46:54] in their education system in their homes[46:57] from 1917 in fact until the present day[47:00] they see the Zionists as robbers and[47:02] interlopers and Europeans who've come[47:05] here even though many of the Israelis[47:07] today aren't Europeans, they're about[47:09] 50% or 40% at least um descendants of[47:13] Jews from Arab lands, but they basically[47:16] see Israel as a strong po stronghold or[47:19] or outpost of Europe in the Middle East,[47:22] which shouldn't be there. The Middle[47:23] East belongs to the Arabs and to the[47:24] Muslims. That's how they see it. And[47:28] >> wrong for seeing it like that.[47:30] >> It's not a matter of right or wrong.[47:31] It's a matter of how they're brought up.[47:33] We Jews see the land as something which[47:36] used to belong to us and see believe it[47:39] is a right our right to establish a[47:41] Jewish state there. But the Arabs say[47:43] this is at their expense and this is all[47:45] unnatural. It is Arab and Muslim land.[47:48] In 1917 when the British issued the bow[47:50] for declaration they more or less[47:52] referred to the Arabs not more or less[47:54] they explicitly referred to the Arabs[47:56] living in Palestine as non-Jews. In[47:59] other words, people who were not Jews[48:01] and the declaration offered the Jews[48:04] some form of political trajectory[48:07] towards statehood as they called it a[48:09] national home. Whereas it didn't offer[48:11] the Arabs living in Palestine, who were[48:13] then the the great majority of[48:14] inhabitants of Palestine, any political[48:17] trajectory for independence.[48:20] At the time, the Arab nationalist[48:22] movements were gaining power and the[48:24] Arabs of Palestine were touched by this[48:27] spirit in the neighboring Arab states[48:30] and began to think also certainly from[48:32] 1920 on in terms of independence and[48:36] removal of imperial control and they saw[48:40] the Zionists as an enemy. So when when[48:43] the the the British Peel Commission[48:45] arrived in 36 and in 1937 issued its[48:49] proposal for a two-state solution, the[48:51] Arabs said, "Why should we agree to a[48:53] two-state solution? We are still the[48:55] majority of the population in the[48:56] country. The Jews are interlopers and[48:59] robbers supported by an imperial power.[49:02] We want them all out. We want the[49:03] British out and we want the Zionists[49:05] out. This is our land." And so they said[49:07] the same in 1947. From an objective[49:10] perspective, the Arabs made a mistake[49:12] because they weren't on the winning[49:13] side. They couldn't couldn't beat they[49:16] weren't able to beat the Zionists and[49:18] they certainly weren't able to confront[49:20] and beat the British. Um so they kept um[49:24] banking on on rebellion and warfare[49:27] which they couldn't win. And from an[49:29] objective perspective, perhaps they[49:32] should have conceded and said, "Oh,[49:34] okay. let's compromise and agree to some[49:36] form of partition of the land between[49:38] the Jews and and the Arabs. But they[49:40] never agreed to that.[49:42] >> So I mean from their perspective they'd[49:43] say well it's not about which is be[49:46] about being on the winning side. It's[49:47] about being right or wrong which I guess[49:49] leads onto the next question like who[49:51] technically has rights to the land. Is[49:52] it the Arabs, Jews or both?[49:55] >> Both. The simple answer is both. the[49:57] Arabs who were living there and for many[50:00] generations had been living there as I[50:02] say since the 7th century they weren't[50:05] all newcomers as some Zionist[50:07] propagandists made out in recent years[50:10] they were living there and they were the[50:11] population of the land and the Jews were[50:13] a very small minority and then came[50:15] Zionism and the Jewish numbers grew but[50:17] from their perspective it it was theirs[50:20] and they were right in believing that[50:22] they could have been a little generous[50:24] and a little um I don't[50:27] altruistic and thought in terms of[50:29] Jewish suffering in the world and[50:31] anti-semitism[50:33] of which the Arabs also were part they[50:35] could have thought in those terms as[50:37] well but nations don't often do that[50:38] they don't usually[50:41] feel generous towards their neighbors[50:42] especially when it comes to landm so the[50:45] Arabs didn't do that and the Jews for[50:47] their point from their perspective[50:49] persecuted everywhere around the world[50:51] culminating in a holocaust said we must[50:54] have this land or at least a large part[50:56] of it for a homeland and a haven for the[50:59] Jews. And um the Jews were right also.[51:02] Both sides were right.[51:04] >> Are the Jews based their right also not[51:07] just off the persecution but to this[51:09] specific land because they lived there[51:10] 2,000 years ago.[51:12] >> Yeah. Yes. Yes. Yes. is to do both with[51:14] persecution and unlivability an[51:17] inability to live somewhere else in[51:19] safety and the positive on the positive[51:23] side on the fact that the land for over[51:26] a thousand years between 1200 BC and the[51:29] the 2n century AD was populated by Jews[51:32] and in parts in part part of this time[51:35] also ruled by Jews. This was the Jews[51:37] land. Incidentally, the Arab mayor of[51:40] Jerusalem, one of the Khaledi family[51:44] at some point wrote a letter to Herzel.[51:46] We're talking about 1890 something, 1897[51:49] perhaps. He wrote to Herzel and said,[51:51] "Yes, yes, we know this Khaledi wrote,"[51:54] one of the Arab notables, nationalists[51:56] if you like, at the time, wrote to[51:58] Herzel, "Yes, yes, we understand this is[52:00] the Jews land." That's what he called[52:02] it. But at the moment, it's it's full of[52:04] Arab inhabitants, not Jews. and if you[52:07] come and try and take it, it will mean[52:08] bloodshed and therefore you mustn't do[52:10] that. But but there was a recognition at[52:13] that time in the 19th century that this[52:15] was traditionally the Jews land. This is[52:17] how it was seen also in the Quran and[52:20] certainly um in the Old Testament and[52:22] the New Testament. This is where the[52:24] Jews lived and as I say had lived and[52:26] ruled. that um um that after the the[52:30] start of Arab nationalism and Arab[52:33] violence, antagonism towards the Zionist[52:36] enterprise um the Arabs began to forget[52:39] that this was in their view the Jews[52:42] land. They nullled this. They they[52:44] erased this from their textbooks and[52:47] from their um propaganda. And as Arafat[52:50] said when discussing the the country in[52:54] the Camp David talks in July 2000,[52:56] Arafat, the head of the PLO, the[52:58] Palestine National Authority or the the[53:01] Palestinian National Movement, in fact,[53:03] he said to to um Clinton, President[53:06] Clinton over dinner, this isn't the Jews[53:09] land. There was no temple here. In other[53:10] words, the Jews were never here. This is[53:12] all a legend. denying the facts of[53:15] archaeology and history because in in[53:18] favor of Arab nationalism.[53:20] >> So I guess my question is if Jews have[53:22] any right to the land because they live[53:24] there uh thou 2,000 years ago. Well,[53:26] they kicked out 2,000 years ago and they[53:28] lived like you said for over a thousand[53:30] years uh there beforehand. Um, does that[53:32] mean that they don't just that they[53:34] don't just have a right to Israel where[53:36] they live in now, but to all of ancient[53:38] Israel, all of Canaan, which where they[53:40] lived, which includes Israel, the[53:42] Palestinian territory, southwestern[53:44] Syria, Jordan, uh, of parts of Western[53:46] Jordan, sorry, Lebanon, which is what[53:48] Israel used to be? So, if they have any[53:49] rights to Israel, shouldn't it be for[53:51] all of it?[53:53] >> I don't know. Look,[53:57] firstly, nobody knows the exact[53:58] boundaries of ancient Israel and it[54:01] changed all the time. There was the[54:02] original conquest by Joshua and there[54:05] were the judges and then there were the[54:06] kings and then there was a division of[54:08] the the land into two Jewish kingdoms,[54:10] Israel and Judea and then it expanded[54:13] and contracted and one of them fell and[54:15] then the second one fell then it was[54:16] reborn and it's the the boundaries[54:19] continuously changed. What is true is[54:22] that when the Paris Peace Conference[54:25] convened in 1918, 1919 at the end of[54:29] World War I, the Zionist representatives[54:32] came with a map to the victors of World[54:35] War I and said, "This is what we want."[54:38] And the map did include all of Palestine[54:40] from the river to the sea and as you say[54:43] part of southern Lebanon up to at least[54:45] the Lethania River and a little bit of[54:48] southwestern Syria and part of Jordan,[54:53] the western edge of the kingdom, what is[54:56] today the Kingdom of Jordan as well as[54:58] of course Palestine itself. Um um and[55:01] this was in line in some way with how[55:04] they saw the boundaries etched during[55:07] the Israelite and Judean kingdoms 2 and[55:10] a half thousand years ago. And the the[55:13] the victors in World War I didn't accept[55:16] this map and didn't in fact at that time[55:19] at that moment endorse the establishment[55:22] of a Jewish state. Though as I said the[55:24] British had issued the bow for[55:26] declaration in some way pointing the way[55:28] to a Jewish state but included the[55:31] phrase in the bow for declaration a[55:33] Jewish a national home should arrive in[55:36] Palestine not turn all of Palestine into[55:39] a Jewish national home. And the British[55:41] understood this distinction very clearly[55:43] and so did the Zionists. The British[55:45] were saying you can have part of[55:46] Palestine not all of Palestine. So the[55:49] the world community, the international[55:51] community rejected the idea of an[55:53] expanded Jewish state, a greater Israel[55:55] if you like um post World War I.[56:00] >> Okay. So um also like f talking about um[56:04] Theodor Herzol before I mean how[56:06] important was it that the World Zionist[56:07] organization when they said they wanted[56:09] to create a Jewish state that they[56:10] focused specifically on Palestine, not[56:12] Uganda or any other places that they[56:14] focused specifically on Palestine. um[56:16] like would it have would a Jewish state[56:18] have succeeded anywhere else or the only[56:20] long-term success would have been in[56:22] Palestine where Jews have a connection[56:23] to[56:25] I think Herzel understood Herzel in the[56:28] beginning actually um was ambivalent he[56:31] thought maybe the Jews should settle in[56:33] Argentina for example on the Pampas[56:35] maybe there weren't a lot of natives[56:37] there and there were large areas which[56:39] could just be settled by Jews Jewish[56:41] immigrants from Europe and he also[56:43] looked at Palestine but eventually him[56:45] and Zionist movement understood the Jews[56:48] would not go anywhere but to Palestine[56:51] if they want to reestablish a Jewish[56:53] state. They wouldn't go to the Pampas[56:55] and they wouldn't go to Uganda or[56:57] Tanganiko or wherever that was supposed[56:58] to be. Nobody, it's not that clear. They[57:01] wouldn't go anywhere else. They wouldn't[57:02] come in droves and settle there if that[57:05] was what was on offer. Palestine on the[57:08] other hand had this historic religious[57:10] attraction to Jews and would draw at[57:13] least some numbers and as it proved[57:15] sufficient numbers to establish a Jewish[57:18] state there and that's why it ended up[57:20] in Palestine.[57:21] >> Could it have succeeded anywhere else or[57:24] you don't think there would have been[57:26] >> okay?[57:26] >> Probably not unless the United States[57:28] had agreed to give one of the states or[57:31] established a territory and turned it[57:33] into a state for the Jews. But the[57:35] United States never really contemplated[57:37] that. They may have given Utah, whatever[57:39] it is, to to Mormons, but it wasn't[57:41] going to give the Jews a large chunk of[57:44] the North American continent. And it[57:46] wasn't realistic elsewhere. It was even[57:48] less realistic. I assume that the end of[57:51] a Jewish state in Uganda or East Africa[57:54] would have been quite violent and[57:57] unpleasant.[57:58] [Music][57:59] This doesn't mean necessarily, of[58:01] course, that the Jewish state where it[58:02] is today is going to last forever.[58:04] Nothing, incidentally, lasts forever.[58:06] Neither did the Roman Empire.[58:09] >> Okay. So, I I want to move on to 1948.[58:11] So, I've got a big jump here. Are you[58:13] able to give like a brief uh overview? I[58:16] know it's asking for a lot, but like a[58:17] brief overview.[58:18] >> No, it's it's going to take it's going[58:19] to take hours and hours.[58:21] >> Okay. So, I I'll just quickly summarize[58:23] and you tell me if I've got this wrong[58:24] then.[58:24] >> Okay.[58:25] >> Okay. After the UN partition plast in[58:27] 194 November of 1947, the Arabs and[58:30] Palestine launched a civil civil war[58:33] sort of it bec they started protest and[58:35] then it became into a civil war[58:37] especially um once uh the Zionist[58:41] paramilitary groups and Ley responded.[58:44] Um then a few months later around six[58:46] months later in May of 1948, Israel[58:48] declared independence. The Arab states[58:50] then came into Israel. They attacked[58:53] Israel and over time Israel won and[58:55] that's and during that whole time period[58:57] was the exodus of 750,000 Palestinians.[59:00] Is that like a short o okay overview?[59:04] >> Uh one or two small corrections.[59:05] Firstly, I think the true number is[59:07] probably closer to 700,000 Arabs who[59:10] were uprooted from their homes in the[59:12] course of the war from the territory[59:14] which ended up being the state of[59:15] Israel. The second thing is didn't the[59:18] Arab response[59:21] against the passage of the United[59:23] Nations partition resolution on the 29th[59:27] of November 1947 wasn't protests. It was[59:30] initially from the very start killing[59:33] Jews. They started shooting and that's[59:35] how the civil war[59:36] >> that's how the civil war began. It[59:38] didn't begin with protests. They[59:39] protested before the passage of the[59:41] resolution. Once it passed, the Arabs of[59:44] Palestine moved over to shooting. That's[59:47] how the civil war began and steamroll[59:50] snowballed into a full-scale civil war[59:52] between the Arab and Jewish communities[59:54] in Palestine while the British were[59:57] nominally the sovereigns of the land[59:59] until they left in mid midway 1948.[01:00:03] Secondly, the Arab states invaded[01:00:05] Palestine. Some of the Arab neighbors,[01:00:07] not Lebanon. Everybody always includes[01:00:08] Lebanon. It didn't. But the other Arab[01:00:10] states invaded Palestine, Syria, Jordan,[01:00:14] Egypt, and Iraq invaded the area of[01:00:17] Palestine. And three of them at least,[01:00:20] the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the[01:00:22] Egyptians also invaded the the area[01:00:25] designated by the United Nations[01:00:28] partition plan for Jewish statethood. So[01:00:30] they invaded Israel[01:00:33] the day after Israel was established,[01:00:36] declared to be established, which was[01:00:38] the 14th of May. They invaded on the[01:00:40] 15th. The the Arab state of Jordan, the[01:00:44] Kingdom of Jordan, didn't actually[01:00:46] attack the Jewish state. So people often[01:00:48] say they were also among those who[01:00:50] assaulted the Jewish state on the 15th[01:00:52] of May alongside their Arab brothers.[01:00:54] They didn't. They simply tried to occupy[01:00:57] the West Bank and East Jerusalem.[01:00:59] Jerusalem itself wasn't part of the[01:01:02] Jewish state. The Jews lived in the[01:01:05] western half of the city. Arabs lived in[01:01:08] the eastern half of the city. The whole[01:01:10] of the city was supposed to be um[01:01:12] sovereign basically a United Nations[01:01:15] territory, trusteeship territory, not[01:01:17] part of the Jewish or Arab states[01:01:20] envisioned in the partition resolution.[01:01:22] The Jordanians invaded and occupied the[01:01:24] West Bank and eventually East Jerusalem[01:01:27] as well. And in in doing so, they ended[01:01:29] up fighting the Israelis as well in and[01:01:31] around Jerusalem. But the Jordanians did[01:01:34] not attack the Jewish state. It was the[01:01:35] other Arab states which did. Now that's[01:01:38] just several points of clarification.[01:01:40] >> Sure. No. Amazing. Um, so I just want to[01:01:42] focus specifically on the exodus of the[01:01:44] 750,000 Palestinians.[01:01:47] >> 700,000.[01:01:48] >> 700,000. Sorry. Yeah, I've got that[01:01:50] right now. 700,000. Now, I know it's a[01:01:52] very complex question to ask, but who[01:01:54] would you mainly assign the blame to for[01:01:56] that?[01:01:58] Everybody, the blame can be shared by[01:02:01] everyone um usefully. Um[01:02:06] had the Arabs not launched the[01:02:08] hostilities in November 1947 and had the[01:02:12] Arab states not invaded Palestine,[01:02:14] Israel in in mid 1948, there wouldn't[01:02:17] have been a refugee problem. No war, no[01:02:20] refugee problem. So that that in that[01:02:22] sense it's the Arab Arab of Arabs of[01:02:25] Palestine who started the war and the[01:02:27] Arab states who invaded who continued[01:02:29] the war their responsibility for the[01:02:31] creation of the refugee problem. The[01:02:33] Arabs would respond to that quite[01:02:36] justly. It was the Jewish attacks on[01:02:40] Arab villages, on Arab militias, on Arab[01:02:43] traffic in Palestine during the civil[01:02:45] war and the counteratt attacks against[01:02:48] the Arab invading Arab armies from after[01:02:52] from June 1948 onwards in which Arab[01:02:56] villagers and towns people fled or were[01:03:00] even expelled. that the Jews were[01:03:02] responsible for the um emergence of a[01:03:05] Palestine[01:03:07] refugee problem.[01:03:09] Both things are true. You know, I don't[01:03:12] I don't um and therefore the[01:03:14] responsibility should be shared. Let me[01:03:16] add the one thing which is commonly not[01:03:19] referred to in descriptions of the war.[01:03:22] The war also created two additional[01:03:25] refugee problems apart from the[01:03:27] Palestine Arab refugee problem which is[01:03:29] with us today with 6 million Arabs today[01:03:33] registered on United Nations roles as[01:03:36] Palestinian refugees. Those two refugee[01:03:39] problems were 70,000 Jews were um um[01:03:45] uprooted from their homes in the course[01:03:47] of the 48 war um and create creating a[01:03:51] Israeli refugee problem in the middle of[01:03:54] 1948 in the middle of the war. Now, the[01:03:56] number 70,000 of course is much smaller[01:03:58] than 700,000, but it's still quite large[01:04:01] compared to the population, the Jewish[01:04:03] population of Palestine in 1948, which[01:04:06] was about 650 700,000. In other words,[01:04:10] 10% of the Jews living in Palestine were[01:04:12] uprooted from their homes and became[01:04:14] refugees in the course of the 48 war. If[01:04:17] say 10% of Americans were at war and[01:04:20] were turned into refugees, today 35[01:04:23] million Americans would be refugees. So[01:04:26] 70,000 Jews turning into refugees in[01:04:29] Palestine in 1948 was a serious refugee[01:04:32] problem. But most of these, almost all[01:04:34] of these were returned to their homes at[01:04:36] the end of the war after Israel won the[01:04:39] war and reconquered the villages which[01:04:41] they had been forced out of or had[01:04:43] abandoned or been kicked out of.[01:04:46] that was and that refugee problem[01:04:48] vanished uh by the end of the the the[01:04:52] signing of the Israel Arab Israeli Arab[01:04:55] armist disagreements in the course of[01:04:57] the first half of 1949. The second[01:05:00] though the third refugee problem created[01:05:02] by the 48 war was that of the Arab the[01:05:05] Jewish communities from Arab lands.[01:05:07] there were large Jewish communities[01:05:09] living in Arab lands more or less um[01:05:11] from long before Arabs existed in in[01:05:15] these areas from say 2500 BC there was a[01:05:19] community of Jews living in Iraq in the[01:05:21] area which became eventually Iraq but[01:05:23] there were large Jewish communities in[01:05:25] the Arab lands in the 20th century[01:05:28] hundreds of thousands in Morocco tens of[01:05:30] thousands in Egypt Syria Yemen Iraq so[01:05:33] on all these communities vanished as a[01:05:36] result of the 48 war they were either[01:05:38] kicked out by the Arab states[01:05:40] intimidated into flight by the Arab[01:05:43] governments or by the societies amid[01:05:45] whom they lived and most most of them[01:05:47] fled in 1948 4950[01:05:50] they fled these countries and some as I[01:05:53] say as in Egypt were actually kicked out[01:05:55] by the governments[01:05:58] um and these most of these refugees[01:06:00] arrived in Israel and were resettled in[01:06:03] Israel hundreds of thousands maybe as[01:06:05] many as 700,000 800,000 were resettled[01:06:08] in Israel and became Israeli citizens. A[01:06:11] small number arrived in Egyp in England[01:06:13] and in France. all of these the Arab[01:06:16] Jewish refugees and we're talking as I[01:06:19] say over 800,000 people um ceased to be[01:06:23] refugees and therefore there was no[01:06:26] [Music][01:06:28] Jewish Arab refugee problem in the wake[01:06:30] of 48 though it was created in the 48[01:06:33] war but as I say over the years they[01:06:35] were absorbed and became citizens of[01:06:37] other countries principally Israel. So[01:06:39] the war created three refugee problems.[01:06:41] Two of them were solved. The Israeli[01:06:43] refugee problem and the Arab Jewish[01:06:45] refugee problem. But the third problem,[01:06:47] the Palestine Arab refugees continued[01:06:50] and in fact um virgin in the course of[01:06:52] the decades since 1948.[01:06:55] >> Why wasn't it solved? Could the[01:06:56] Palestinians all those 700,000 um Arabs[01:07:00] could they have just started their new[01:07:02] lives in the new Palestinian territories[01:07:04] and created a state and and could they[01:07:06] have just why didn't other Arab states[01:07:08] accept them?[01:07:10] Look, theoretically they could have[01:07:12] turned into citizens of a Palestinian[01:07:15] Arab state had it arisen in the area of[01:07:17] the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which[01:07:19] had been conquered and were occupied by[01:07:21] Jordan and Egypt respectively.[01:07:24] No Palestinian Arab state came into[01:07:26] being. But still they could have been[01:07:28] resettled and absorbed as citizens by[01:07:31] Jordan, the Kingdom of Jordan or by the[01:07:33] Kingdom of Egypt or the Republic of[01:07:34] Egypt as it eventually became or they[01:07:36] could have been accepted as citizens in[01:07:39] Lebanon and in Syria where most of them[01:07:42] ended up.[01:07:45] The fact is that only Jordan gave them[01:07:47] citizenship and to a certain degree[01:07:49] absorbed them into its economy and into[01:07:52] the state structures. But other states,[01:07:54] Lebanon and Syria and Egypt, did not[01:07:57] absorb the Palestinians under their[01:08:00] Palestinian refugees under their control[01:08:02] post 1948. and they remained as in Gaza[01:08:06] very embittered and very impoverished um[01:08:09] refugees and[01:08:12] exploded periodically into violence[01:08:15] against Israel and in Lebanon against[01:08:17] the Lebanese state and the Christians in[01:08:19] Lebanon and in Jordan against the[01:08:21] Hasheite Kingdom in the 1970s. Um um so[01:08:25] this is what happened. They weren't[01:08:26] absorbed for part part of the reason for[01:08:29] this was that the Palestine Arab[01:08:31] refugees wanted to return to their homes[01:08:33] and lands. They didn't want to become[01:08:34] Jordanians or Syrians or Lebanese. They[01:08:37] wanted to be Palestinians living in[01:08:39] their state in Palestine. But it never[01:08:41] came into being. So they remained[01:08:44] refugees partly for that reason. They[01:08:46] didn't want to um settle resettle[01:08:49] properly in an organized fashion[01:08:50] anywhere. The other reason was another[01:08:53] major reason was that the Arab states[01:08:55] wanted them to remain refugees[01:08:57] especially Syria, Egypt and Lebanon to[01:09:01] use these refugees, miserable refugees[01:09:04] as a tool propaganda wise and eventually[01:09:07] also in in the form of terrorism against[01:09:10] the state of Israel. Here were the[01:09:11] people kicked out by Israel and want to[01:09:13] return and Israel won't let them back[01:09:15] and Israel is an evil entity. Um so the[01:09:19] there were these two major reasons for[01:09:21] the non-absorption of the Palestine Arab[01:09:24] refugees in the Arab states. Um in[01:09:27] addition returning 700 or resettling[01:09:30] 700,000 sorry resettling 700,000[01:09:33] refugees with large birth rate inc large[01:09:36] birth rates meaning there would be[01:09:37] larger numbers. As I say, there are 6[01:09:40] million Palestinian refugees today[01:09:42] involved enormous um e expenditure and[01:09:45] nobody was actually willing to lay out[01:09:47] the billions and billions of dollars[01:09:48] would that would be necessary to[01:09:50] resettle these people properly in the[01:09:52] Arab states or anywhere beyond.[01:09:55] >> Okay. So al I mean you mentioned Jordan[01:09:58] there about how they sort of the only[01:10:00] the only Arab country to sort of[01:10:02] integrate them. So I want to focus on[01:10:03] that. So by so by the end of the war[01:10:05] like you said they uh Jordan annexed um[01:10:09] the West Bank. Now only two countries I[01:10:11] believe it was around the world or only[01:10:13] very few countries around the world[01:10:14] listened to it and agreed to it. Um and[01:10:16] Egypt took Gaza but they kept it[01:10:18] separated. Why did the international[01:10:21] world refuse to accept the West Bank as[01:10:25] Jordans? Who who did they think it[01:10:27] belonged to at that time?[01:10:29] Well, the UN had passed a UN General[01:10:32] Assembly had passed a resolution[01:10:35] dividing Palestine into two states and[01:10:37] the West Bank was supposed to be the[01:10:39] core of the Arab state which was to have[01:10:41] emerged. The Jordanians occupied the[01:10:43] territory and didn't allow the emergence[01:10:46] of a Palestine Arab state. Um so in that[01:10:49] sense the the world refused to accept[01:10:52] the Jordanian occupation and annexation[01:10:55] of the West Bank and East Jerusalem was[01:10:57] supposed to be something else altogether[01:10:59] according to the UN General Assembly[01:11:02] 1947 and the same applies um to the Gaza[01:11:06] Strip. The Gaza Strip was supposed to be[01:11:08] part of the the Arab state created by[01:11:11] the UN partition resolution. um the um[01:11:16] world wouldn't accept its annexation by[01:11:18] is by Egypt. Israel I don't Egypt I[01:11:21] think didn't formally annex the[01:11:22] territory and administered it militarily[01:11:25] as a separate zone but never gave the[01:11:28] inhabitants[01:11:29] citizenship or even rights to move into[01:11:32] or through Egypt. Very few people from[01:11:35] the Gaza Strip were actually allowed to[01:11:37] leave the Gaza Strip and go to Egypt say[01:11:39] for studies or to go further beyond[01:11:41] outside Egypt. So the place was just a[01:11:44] terrible um enclave which later[01:11:47] everybody called a concentration camp, a[01:11:49] large concentration camp. But if it was[01:11:51] a concentration camp, it began with[01:11:53] Egypt between the years 1948 and 1967[01:11:57] when it controlled the Gaza Strip.[01:11:59] >> Why did Egypt do that? Did they were[01:12:01] they trying to keep it for a future[01:12:02] state or or did they not[01:12:04] >> Egypt? Egypt Egypt was a poor country.[01:12:07] didn't want to absorb hundreds of[01:12:09] thousands, but at the start there were[01:12:10] 250,000 Arabs in the Gaza Strip by 1949,[01:12:14] most of them refugees. They didn't want[01:12:16] to start paying for absorbing refugees.[01:12:19] They did receive international aid which[01:12:21] they siphoned off probably for their own[01:12:23] use as well through the fact that there[01:12:26] were refugees there. So that was[01:12:28] beneficial to Egypt. Keeping them as[01:12:30] refugees, as I say, was a good political[01:12:32] weapon against Israel, political and[01:12:34] eventually terroristic. They hired[01:12:36] terrorists to attack Israel from the[01:12:39] Gaza refugee community. Um, but they[01:12:43] didn't want to absorb them. Egypt was[01:12:44] very poor. It didn't want to absorb[01:12:46] large numbers of non-Egyptians. And they[01:12:48] always regarded the Arabs of Palestine[01:12:51] as non-Egyptian and ultimately as[01:12:54] subversive. The Arab the the the[01:12:57] Palestinian refugee populations wherever[01:12:59] they ended up were always in some way[01:13:01] subversive. They were miserable. They[01:13:03] were homeless. They were stateless. They[01:13:06] they um were never regarded as um either[01:13:10] proper Egyptians or proper Lebanese or[01:13:12] proper Syrians or even proper[01:13:14] Jordanians.[01:13:16] Nobody really wanted them.[01:13:18] >> So So basically the West Bank and Gaza[01:13:20] was that's almost supposed to be[01:13:22] dedicated towards a future Palestinian[01:13:24] state.[01:13:25] >> Yes. and still is when the world and the[01:13:28] when the world talks about a two-state[01:13:29] solution to the Israel Palestine[01:13:31] problem, they still envision the West[01:13:34] Bank and the Gaza Strip as being the[01:13:36] territories on which this state would[01:13:38] emerge.[01:13:39] >> Okay. So that's that's why when you said[01:13:41] before that um Israelis going in and[01:13:44] settling in the West Bank and Gaza or[01:13:46] Gushkif or in different places around[01:13:48] West Bank is is you know sort of settler[01:13:51] colonization.[01:13:53] Well, it's certainly an obstacle to a[01:13:55] two-state solution. The major obstacle[01:13:57] to the emergence of a two-state solution[01:13:59] has always been Arab antagonism,[01:14:02] resistance uh to the existence of a[01:14:05] Jewish state in any part of Palestine.[01:14:07] That's always been the major stumbling[01:14:08] block to reaching an agreement between[01:14:10] Israel and the Palestinians. But the[01:14:13] second major stumbling block has been[01:14:15] the introduction by Israel of a large[01:14:18] settlement enterprise especially in the[01:14:21] West Bank. Which means that the Arabs in[01:14:23] the West Bank should they ever try to[01:14:26] become the core of a Palestine Arab[01:14:28] state would have to face a situation in[01:14:30] which there were hundreds of thousands[01:14:32] today between 500 and 700 is thousand[01:14:36] Israeli settlers. they would face these[01:14:38] settlers who were sitting on much of the[01:14:41] land of the West Bank and in some ways[01:14:43] controlling large parts of it. How do[01:14:46] you establish a Palestine Arab state[01:14:48] with this a large settler community of[01:14:51] Jews in its midst?[01:14:54] >> Okay. So, I want to look at a different[01:14:55] part of the 1948 which is mainly focus[01:14:59] just to ask a question on Arugan and[01:15:01] Allei. Um would you call them war[01:15:03] criminals or like the people who did uh[01:15:07] >> well they're not war criminals but they[01:15:09] did pro probably commit war crimes in[01:15:11] the course of their terrorist attacks on[01:15:14] the um Palestinian Arabs but also[01:15:16] incidentally on the British in their[01:15:18] rebellion against the British during the[01:15:20] years 1937[01:15:22] 1948. These two dissident organizations[01:15:26] as the mainstream Zionist called them[01:15:28] were terroristic. They killed innocent[01:15:31] civilians, if there is such a thing as[01:15:33] innocent civilians incidentally, but[01:15:35] they killed civilians deliberately[01:15:39] um in their terrorist attacks in[01:15:41] marketplaces and and buses and so on.[01:15:46] So they they they were there and a[01:15:48] problem both for the mainstream Zionist[01:15:51] community and for the Arabs whom they[01:15:53] were attacking in the course of the 48[01:15:56] war but also in the years before. So I[01:15:58] if so if they are they did all those[01:16:00] different uh things is it concerning at[01:16:03] all that the leader of the the leader of[01:16:08] command of Ley later became prime[01:16:10] ministers I know it's much later on and[01:16:11] it's a different time era different time[01:16:13] period but is it concerning at all that[01:16:15] these things which might have been just[01:16:16] more of extremist things to do became[01:16:19] became main could have become much more[01:16:22] mainstream[01:16:24] >> well in some ways it's concerning but in[01:16:25] some way it's natural National[01:16:28] liberation movements, organizations[01:16:30] often their leaders eventually become[01:16:32] prime ministers of the states which[01:16:34] emerge. This occurred in South Africa in[01:16:36] some way. This occurred in Kenya where[01:16:39] the leaders of the the movements[01:16:42] described by the imperial conquerors as[01:16:44] terrorists eventually become you know[01:16:47] suited leaders who sound like normal[01:16:51] people. And this is true about Israel[01:16:53] begging from a terrorist leader in 1948[01:16:56] and he didn't regard himself as a[01:16:58] terrorist. He regarded himself himself[01:16:59] as a resistant you know a resistor of[01:17:02] imperialism when he fought against the[01:17:04] British. um he became a prime minister[01:17:08] by the 1977 elections and um um was[01:17:13] well-mannered in civil and various other[01:17:16] things um a a leader and the same appear[01:17:19] happened to Shamir who was one of the[01:17:21] heads of the Lei became prime minister[01:17:24] as a successor to to Begin they were[01:17:27] hardliners they wanted to occupy and[01:17:29] continue to occupy to annex the West[01:17:32] Bank but um this aside they were normal[01:17:36] leaders.[01:17:37] >> Uh going going all the way forward to[01:17:40] today, would you say Prime Minister[01:17:42] Netanyahu is some sort of follower of[01:17:44] those sort of perspectives or was it[01:17:46] even more extreme than that?[01:17:48] >> I don't know about more extreme. He's[01:17:50] corrupt. That's the the core the essence[01:17:53] of Netanyahu.[01:17:55] And he's in some ways pragmatic more[01:17:57] than they were. They were hardline[01:17:59] right-wing ideologues. He is a[01:18:01] right-winger by nature, but he's not I[01:18:03] don't think he's quite as hardline when[01:18:05] it comes to his deepest self, but he's[01:18:08] totally corrupt, a totally corrupt[01:18:10] politician. um um injecting into the[01:18:14] power structure in Israel other corrupt[01:18:17] even criminal elements including the[01:18:19] present head of um the Israel police[01:18:22] force the man the minister in charge of[01:18:24] the police or what's called national[01:18:25] security[01:18:27] was committed by Israeli committed by[01:18:30] Israeli courts convicted by Israeli[01:18:32] courts as a supporter of Jewish[01:18:34] terrorism but this goes all all the way[01:18:36] down the line that the head of the the[01:18:38] Israel prison system the present[01:18:40] ambassador of Israel in the United Arab[01:18:45] Emirates who's just been expelled by the[01:18:48] Arab United Arab Emirates for um acting[01:18:52] inappropriately with apparently women in[01:18:55] a bar in Abu Dhabi or Dubai. There's a[01:18:58] whole list of these people who are half[01:19:00] criminal, totally corrupt people who are[01:19:03] um important in government in the[01:19:05] government run by Netanyahu and he puts[01:19:08] them in these um positions of power[01:19:10] deliberately because he has this hold[01:19:12] over them because they are corrupt and[01:19:15] he can use that against them. But he[01:19:17] himself of course faces corruption[01:19:19] charges um in an Israeli court at the[01:19:22] moment constantly postponing the trial,[01:19:25] the the testimony he has to give, etc.[01:19:28] and trying to undermine the Israeli[01:19:29] judiciary at the same time as running a[01:19:31] war in Gaza, a war in Iran, a war in[01:19:34] Lebanon. Um it's actually quite a quite[01:19:37] an act this juggling act which he he[01:19:39] runs. It shows us a certain amount of um[01:19:43] um ability, a large amount of ability in[01:19:46] running a country while at the same time[01:19:48] standing trial on bribery and other[01:19:51] charges.[01:19:53] >> Um okay. So, so you mentioned Gaza. I[01:19:55] want to focus on that. Um once again,[01:19:57] complex question, but would you say[01:19:59] what's happening in Gaza is a genocide?[01:20:03] >> No, I've always opposed this definition.[01:20:05] And people use that definition in order[01:20:07] to um[01:20:09] in order to um um compare Israel to Nazi[01:20:14] Germany, in order to in some way deflect[01:20:17] the whole message and heritage of the[01:20:20] the Holocaust which which favored[01:20:22] Israel's existence and continued[01:20:24] existence.[01:20:26] You start saying Israelis are committing[01:20:28] genocide, you can forget about the[01:20:30] Holocaust and focus on Israel's[01:20:32] wrongdoing. A genocide is um um the act[01:20:37] of trying to destroy and kill a people[01:20:41] or the actual killing of these people[01:20:43] with intention with deliberation[01:20:45] systematically. None of this has[01:20:47] occurred in Gaza or anywhere else by[01:20:49] Israel. Israel has not tried to kill or[01:20:52] intended to kill the Palestinian people.[01:20:55] It may eventually want to expel them,[01:20:58] but this is not the same as genocide.[01:21:01] Ethnic cleansing, expulsion is not[01:21:03] genocide. It's even allowed incidentally[01:21:06] by the Geneva Conventions. That is the[01:21:08] removal of populations in the course of[01:21:11] war. Um with certain limitations of[01:21:14] course but genocide which means intent[01:21:17] the intent and the desire and the[01:21:19] implementation of killing a people this[01:21:21] is not is what is happening in Gaza.[01:21:23] Israel has killed lots of civilians. I[01:21:26] don't think most of them or almost all[01:21:28] of them deliberately[01:21:30] but as a side effect of trying to kill[01:21:33] Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters. Um[01:21:36] there have been I'm sure war crimes[01:21:38] committed by Israeli troops in the Gaza[01:21:41] Strip and only lightly punished if at[01:21:44] all by the Israeli military judicial[01:21:47] authorities. But genocide a far cry from[01:21:50] that.[01:21:51] >> At what point would you say it is?[01:21:54] Oh, it's not as a matter of point. It's[01:21:56] a matter of is there a policy, desire,[01:21:59] intention, policy and implementation of[01:22:02] the killing of the people, the the[01:22:04] Palestinian people. There has not been[01:22:07] there is no such intention. Some[01:22:09] ministers may speak loosely about Amal[01:22:11] or this or that driving out everybody,[01:22:15] demolishing the Gaza Strip, but none of[01:22:17] this is policy. the the policy has been[01:22:21] to demolish the Hamas and the Islamic[01:22:23] Jihad while allowing for accepting the[01:22:27] the danger of killing a lot of Gazan[01:22:31] civilians in so doing, but it's never[01:22:33] been the intention to kill Gaza[01:22:35] civilians.[01:22:37] >> So why do so many genocide experts and[01:22:39] historians come out almost like on a[01:22:41] daily basis at this point saying it is?[01:22:44] I'm not sure that there's that many[01:22:46] genocide experts actually saying that.[01:22:48] There are some who've been saying that.[01:22:50] I disagree with them. I don't think you[01:22:52] think it's just overblown.[01:22:54] >> Well, what they what what they do in in[01:22:55] in saying this, they understand there's[01:22:57] not been an intention or a policy or[01:23:00] actual implementation of a policy of[01:23:02] killing the Palestinian people. But what[01:23:04] they say is that certain definitions of[01:23:06] genocide and there are a number of[01:23:08] definitions include destroying their[01:23:10] cultural at artifacts,[01:23:13] removing them from certain areas etc. In[01:23:15] other words, things much below killing[01:23:18] of a people and they say well this also[01:23:20] is accepted as a definition of genocide.[01:23:22] I don't accept it as a definition of[01:23:24] genocide. I think people understand what[01:23:26] genocide is. Common sense tells you what[01:23:29] genocide is and this is not genocide. So[01:23:32] what is Israel's aim in Gaza then? Like[01:23:35] if they're there still. I know that[01:23:37] you're probably criticize it, but what[01:23:39] do[01:23:40] >> you know? That's the key question.[01:23:41] Nobody knows what the aim is except for[01:23:44] destroying the kamas and the Islamic[01:23:46] jihad. This Israel, this is Israeli[01:23:48] policy. whether it will be accomplished,[01:23:51] whether it's possible to do that[01:23:53] completely, whether having destroyed[01:23:55] much of Kamas's infrastructure, you've[01:23:57] actually already done this and you don't[01:23:59] have to kill every last Kamasnik in[01:24:01] every last underground tunnel.[01:24:05] It's not it's it's not that clear what[01:24:07] Israeli intentions are. The government[01:24:09] of Netanyahu is at the moment. But it[01:24:13] continues to say it wants to destroy the[01:24:16] these terrorist organizations and they[01:24:18] deserve being destroyed. They should be[01:24:20] destroyed because their existence means[01:24:22] that there will never be peace between[01:24:24] Israel and the Palestinians. Their[01:24:26] existence and their actions prevent any[01:24:28] possibility of movement towards peace.[01:24:32] Um, but what is being done at the moment[01:24:34] is unclear. Partly because the Arabs,[01:24:36] the Palestinians are still holding[01:24:38] hostages, which Israel says it also[01:24:40] wants released, but cannot actually[01:24:42] achieve their release militarily because[01:24:45] going after the people who are holding[01:24:48] them would mean killing the hostages as[01:24:50] well. And so the Israeli military is[01:24:52] very um restricted in some of the things[01:24:56] it has been trying to do during the past[01:24:58] two years.[01:25:00] So can you has Israel like destroyed[01:25:03] Hamas as a military and government or[01:25:05] not as a military and government[01:25:06] organization in Gaza already?[01:25:09] Not not really. It it has managed to[01:25:13] take apart Kamas's military[01:25:16] organization. It's killed most of its[01:25:18] commanders and leaders in in Gaza. um[01:25:22] it's disassembled all of its so-called[01:25:25] brigades and battalions in the Gaza[01:25:27] Strip or almost all of them but there[01:25:29] remain thousands perhaps 10,000 perhaps[01:25:31] even as many as 20,000 because they've[01:25:34] replenished their ranks in the course of[01:25:36] these two years[01:25:39] they've killed most probably most of the[01:25:42] veteran kamas and Islamic jihad fighters[01:25:44] but thousands remain in the tunnels and[01:25:47] can foray from the tunnels and fire RP[01:25:51] PGs and plant IEDs and kill Israeli[01:25:54] soldiers who are occupying large parts[01:25:57] of the Gaza Strip today. So whether[01:25:59] these organizations are actually[01:26:01] completely finished or not um it's[01:26:04] unclear but they are still their[01:26:05] fighters are still able to inflict[01:26:07] damage and probably more important[01:26:10] inflict damage on Israel but more[01:26:12] importantly are able through terror and[01:26:15] maybe through um acceptance by the Gaza[01:26:18] population of control of the Gaza[01:26:21] civilian population by intimidation,[01:26:23] terrorism and as I say much of the[01:26:25] civilian population accepts Ga Kamas's[01:26:29] leadership and doctrines.[01:26:32] And so long as they control in this way[01:26:34] the Gaza population, the civilian[01:26:36] population, Israel can't be said to have[01:26:39] won the war.[01:26:41] >> But if if they're just going in and[01:26:43] they're just killing Hamas members, if[01:26:44] that's the aim to kill Hamas members,[01:26:46] but like you said, they just replenish.[01:26:48] It seems like a a loop here cycle.[01:26:51] >> Yes, you're right. It's a loop and cycle[01:26:53] because there's no way of stopping the[01:26:56] um kamas the remainder of kamas[01:27:00] replenishing their ranks because all[01:27:02] they have to do is offer $200 or a[01:27:04] couple of sacks of flour or something to[01:27:06] a 17 or 18 year old youngster and there[01:27:09] are still hundreds of thousands of Gazan[01:27:12] youngsters waiting to join the ranks of[01:27:14] kamas to kill Israelis because the urge[01:27:17] for revenge against Israel must be[01:27:19] enormous among all Arabs in the Gaza[01:27:22] Strip. so they can replenish the ranks.[01:27:23] And there'll still be tens of thousands[01:27:26] in the tunnels, in the public spaces,[01:27:28] hiding behind civilians and among[01:27:30] civilians who will control the civilian[01:27:34] population and shoot at Israelis. So, I[01:27:37] don't really know how you get out of[01:27:38] this.[01:27:39] >> And and what you ask me for a solution[01:27:42] to the Gaza problem today, I have none.[01:27:45] >> Well, don't worry. I won't ask you about[01:27:46] that. Um, but I want I want to ask you[01:27:49] so what do you put as what do you think[01:27:50] of as well when you hear Beng and and[01:27:53] Smutridge say statements and I'll read[01:27:55] out some of them and you probably heard[01:27:56] them already before. So Smutri said[01:27:58] there are two million Nazis in the West[01:28:00] Bank. There are no half measures total[01:28:02] annihilation. Ben G said when we say[01:28:04] Hamas should be destroyed it also means[01:28:06] that those who sing, those who support[01:28:08] those who who give out candy they're all[01:28:10] terrorists they should all be destroyed.[01:28:11] When you hear that and knowing they are[01:28:13] part of the government, knowing that if[01:28:14] they both leave the government, they[01:28:16] will topple the government. So they're[01:28:17] not not just in any they're just not[01:28:19] that they have a lot of power. They're[01:28:21] not of course not on a day-to-day power.[01:28:22] They do have a lot of power on a big[01:28:24] decision and that if you don't follow[01:28:26] up, we we say then we're leaving the[01:28:28] government and it all collapses. When[01:28:29] you hear those statements and then when[01:28:31] you hear as well that when you said just[01:28:33] now that Isra killing people, but it's,[01:28:36] you know, it's just replenishing. How do[01:28:38] you put all of that together?[01:28:40] I don't know how you put it together.[01:28:41] Look, Netanyao put together this stupid,[01:28:44] incompetent,[01:28:46] vile government coalition. He could have[01:28:49] opted for a different coalition. He[01:28:51] preferred to have these people, Smutri[01:28:53] and Ben in in positions of power and[01:28:56] able to topple the government when they[01:28:57] when the government or Netanyahu objects[01:28:59] to things they demand. And he's the one[01:29:02] who's responsible for the this situation[01:29:04] which people as I say Smutric who barely[01:29:08] served in the Israeli army probably[01:29:10] never did. People say was on some desk[01:29:12] job for two months or something. And[01:29:14] Bengir who never served in the army[01:29:16] because army didn't want him because he[01:29:17] had been convicted by Israeli courts[01:29:19] repeatedly of helping Jewish terrorists[01:29:22] kill Arabs at least inciting them to do[01:29:24] so. These people shouldn't be in[01:29:27] government and they are in government by[01:29:28] virtue of the will of Binyamo and he put[01:29:32] together this cabinet and is facing the[01:29:35] consequences in various ways.[01:29:38] >> You mentioned before that whenever Hamas[01:29:40] need new fighters it's so easy to get[01:29:41] them on board. There's so many people[01:29:42] waiting to line up. I want to ask more[01:29:44] of a interesting question. If you were[01:29:47] in their position right now, you're born[01:29:49] into the Palestinian territories in Gaza[01:29:51] and you are raised through all of this[01:29:53] where you have Hamas controlling this[01:29:55] dictatorship sort of Islamic uh like you[01:29:57] said organization plus you have what[01:30:00] Israel is doing to you as well. Would[01:30:02] you be in the mindset of okay, I also[01:30:04] want to join Hamas?[01:30:06] >> I probably would. Look, I I'll quote[01:30:08] Barak, Israeli prime minister and[01:30:10] probably the most decorated Israeli[01:30:12] soldier ever. used to be the chief of[01:30:14] general staff, used to be prime[01:30:16] minister. He had himself said in one[01:30:17] interview later people criticized him[01:30:19] for it. If I were one of the Arabs, I[01:30:21] would join the Fatak as well. I would[01:30:23] join a resistance movement. I don't[01:30:25] think I would ever join something like[01:30:27] the Kamas because I'm not a religious[01:30:28] person. I'm not a believer. Certainly[01:30:30] not a religious fanatic like they are.[01:30:33] But certainly I would feel the urge to[01:30:35] resist the Israeli invader and killer of[01:30:38] my family.[01:30:40] How[01:30:40] >> how can Israel do anything to change[01:30:42] that?[01:30:44] I don't know. As you say, that demands a[01:30:46] solution, a political solution, and I[01:30:48] don't know if we're going to get there.[01:30:50] Certainly not with the Israeli[01:30:51] government of the day.[01:30:53] >> And I presume you think the best choice[01:30:55] would be to get in someone, a Democrat[01:30:57] like Yahoo Golan is the best sort of[01:30:59] like pathway to get. He would certainly[01:31:03] Golan who was deputy chief of the[01:31:05] general staff of the Israeli army would[01:31:07] definitely be a much better[01:31:10] prime minister than Binyamin Netanyahu.[01:31:12] I can think of another 5 million[01:31:14] Israelis who would be better prime[01:31:16] ministers in Netanyahu was proved[01:31:18] extremely incompetent both because of[01:31:20] his responsibility for the 7th of[01:31:22] October and for mismanaging this war[01:31:24] over two years except the the the se[01:31:28] sectors dealing with theaha and Iran[01:31:31] which were done well but this was of[01:31:32] course the Israeli army and air force[01:31:34] not binyamin Netanyao[01:31:36] >> I'm going if you in the past few weeks[01:31:38] so many countries have been coming out[01:31:42] uh saying you or in the past few days[01:31:43] almost saying, you know, we want we're[01:31:45] going to recognize a Palestinian state.[01:31:47] Does it make a difference to Israel? Are[01:31:49] they facing their biggest diplomatic[01:31:50] threat or does it not make a difference[01:31:51] as long as America is on their side?[01:31:54] >> It's both a diplomatic threat and a a[01:31:56] problem and nothing. Um, it's symbolic.[01:31:59] These are symbolic gestures. A[01:32:01] Palestinian state is not going to come[01:32:02] into existence anytime soon with these[01:32:06] declarations or without declarations. Um[01:32:09] but there is an undermining of Israel's[01:32:12] um position in on the world stage and[01:32:15] among the public in the west by the what[01:32:18] is going on the killing of babies the[01:32:20] the um[01:32:24] starvation in certain pockets probably[01:32:26] in the Gaza Strip. Um certainly the the[01:32:29] lack of food in many areas of the Gaza[01:32:32] Strip. All of this is undermining[01:32:34] Israel's position in the public in the[01:32:38] west and among governments because the[01:32:40] governments are of course democratic[01:32:41] governments who have to in some way[01:32:42] respond to the will of the public and um[01:32:46] that will is demonstrated on the streets[01:32:48] of London and Paris and Dublin quite[01:32:50] often. So it's a problem.[01:32:53] >> Uh thank you so much for coming on[01:32:55] Benny.[01:32:56] >> My pleasure. My pleasure.
11th Eminent Speaker Series Talk by Prof Efraim Inbar
In this 11th Eminent Speaker Series lecture, Professor Ephraim Inbar, a prominent figure in Israeli strategic studies and the president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies, addresses the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. He begins by expressing gratitude for the opportunity to speak to members of the Indian Air Force and acknowledges the deep-rooted ties between India and Israel, particularly in military and strategic cooperation.
Professor Inbar outlines the historical context of the conflict, emphasizing that Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 after violently ousting the Palestinian Authority (PA). This takeover marked a significant shift in the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations, as Hamas established itself as a governing entity characterized by its radical Islamist ideology and commitment to the destruction of the Jewish state. He notes that coexistence with Hamas has been fraught with challenges, including numerous terrorist attacks and missile strikes targeting Israeli civilians.
On October 7, 2023, a pivotal moment occurred when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, resulting in the deaths of over 1,300 Israelis, including civilians of all ages. This attack was unprecedented in its scale and brutality, marking a turning point in the conflict. Professor Inbar describes this day as one of the darkest in Israeli history, likening the trauma to that experienced during the Holocaust. He emphasizes that the Israeli response to this attack is not driven by a desire for revenge but rather by a necessity for survival and deterrence in a hostile region.
Inbar elaborates on the concept of deterrence, explaining that in the Middle East, perceived weakness invites aggression. He argues that Israel's military operations aim to restore deterrence by dismantling Hamas's military capabilities. The Israeli government has articulated a modest goal: to neutralize Hamas's military infrastructure rather than eliminate the organization entirely, which he deems impossible due to its entrenched support within Palestinian society. Recent polls indicate that approximately 60% of Palestinians support Hamas, illustrating the organization's significant popularity.
The professor outlines the military strategy Israel intends to employ, which includes ground operations in Gaza. He acknowledges the complexity of urban warfare and the extensive network of tunnels utilized by Hamas, which complicates aerial assaults. Inbar stresses that achieving military objectives will require a ground invasion, as air power alone cannot effectively dismantle the tunnel infrastructure or eliminate Hamas fighters who are well-embedded within civilian areas.
In discussing the current state of the conflict, Inbar notes the postponement of the ground invasion, attributing this delay to strategic considerations, including requests from the United States for additional time to bolster the defense of American forces in the region and to facilitate the evacuation of American citizens. He expresses frustration with the delay, emphasizing the urgency of the situation for Israel, which has suffered significant losses.
Inbar also highlights the role of Iran in the conflict, describing Hamas as an Iranian proxy that receives funding, training, and military technology from Tehran. He argues that Iran's influence extends beyond Hamas to various militant groups across the region, complicating the security landscape for Israel. Additionally, he points to Qatar's financial support for Hamas as a contributing factor to the ongoing violence, criticizing the international community's lack of accountability for these state sponsors of terrorism.
As the discussion shifts to the international response, Inbar acknowledges that many countries, particularly in the democratic world, support Israel's right to defend itself against Hamas. However, he also notes the challenges posed by the media narrative, which often emphasizes Palestinian suffering while downplaying Israeli casualties. He expresses concern over the potential for international pressure to impose ceasefires that could hinder Israel's military objectives.
In response to questions about Israel's intelligence capabilities, Inbar admits that the October 7 attack was a strategic surprise and that there will be an investigation into the failures that led to this oversight. He suggests that over-reliance on technology and a lack of understanding of Hamas's motivations contributed to the intelligence failure. He emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that incorporates both high-tech and low-tech intelligence-gathering methods.
Inbar's remarks also touch upon the broader implications of the conflict for regional stability and the future of Israeli-Arab relations. He asserts that many Arab states view Hamas as a threat to their own stability and are therefore supportive of Israel's efforts to defeat the organization. He warns that a failure to decisively defeat Hamas could jeopardize peace treaties and the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab nations.
In conclusion, Professor Inbar reiterates the importance of restoring deterrence as a means of ensuring Israel's survival in a volatile region. He expresses hope for a swift resolution to the conflict that will allow for the continuation of diplomatic relations and cooperation between Israel and its allies, including India. He emphasizes that the war against Hamas is not merely a military campaign but a critical struggle for the future of the Israeli state.
As the session transitions to a Q&A format, Inbar addresses various concerns raised by the audience, including the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the complexities of military operations in densely populated areas. He maintains that while Israel must act decisively against Hamas, it also seeks to minimize civilian casualties and provide humanitarian assistance where possible.
Overall, the lecture provides a comprehensive analysis of the current conflict, the historical context of Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the strategic considerations guiding Israel's military response to Hamas. Professor Inbar's insights reflect a deep understanding of the challenges facing Israel and the broader implications for regional security and international relations.
The speaker does not explicitly address the causes of the 1948 war or the displacement of Palestinians in the provided transcript, focusing instead on the contemporary conflict with Hamas. However, they do reference the historical context of Israel's military engagement with Hamas and the ongoing legacy of violence in the region. The speaker implies that the situation is rooted in a long-standing conflict marked by cycles of violence and military responses to perceived threats.
While there is no detailed exploration of the 1948 war, the speaker's narrative suggests a perspective where the historical context of conflict is critical to understanding current hostilities. They emphasize the importance of military strength and deterrence in the Middle East, which may indirectly allude to historical patterns of conflict, including the displacement of populations as a byproduct of warfare. The analysis provided predominantly reflects a pro-Israeli stance, as the speaker emphasizes Israel's right to defend itself and the necessity of military action against Hamas.
- [12:31] "...this was probably the worst day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust."
- [13:01] "...in order for us to survive in our troubled region we must restore deterrence..."
The speaker does not provide a direct analysis of population transfer in Zionist thought and practice during the 1948 period. Instead, the focus of the discussion is on contemporary issues surrounding Hamas and Israel's military responses. The transcript reflects a narrative that prioritizes military strategy and deterrence over historical considerations of population transfer, thereby suggesting that such discussions may be viewed as peripheral to the current conflict.
However, the speaker's acknowledgment of Hamas's ideology and its implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict indicates a belief that the motivations behind actions taken by both sides are deeply rooted in historical and ideological contexts. The speaker does not explicitly classify population transfer as a central component of Zionist ideology but does imply that the ongoing conflict is shaped by long-standing historical grievances.
- [15:12] "...their goal is to destroy the Jewish State..."
- [16:07] "...if you will have a new elections they'll win again..."
The speaker does not specifically address the failure of major peace negotiations, such as the 2000 Camp David process, in the provided transcript. The focus remains on the immediate conflict with Hamas and Israel's military strategy rather than a historical analysis of peace efforts. There is a general implication that the ongoing military actions are a response to failures in previous negotiations, suggesting a cyclical nature of violence as a consequence of unmet political aspirations and security concerns.
While the speaker does not explicitly assign responsibility for the failure of peace negotiations, their emphasis on military strength and deterrence points to a belief that past diplomatic efforts may have fallen short due to the aggressive actions of Hamas and the necessity for Israel to respond to existential threats. This perspective indicates a predominantly pro-Israeli stance, prioritizing security and military responses over political dialogue.
- [14:32] "...the goal as announced by the government is to dismantle the military capabilities of Hamas..."
- [19:32] "...Urban Warfare is protracted and costly..."
In the transcript, the speaker does not specifically reference international law or its application to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, the focus is on military strategy, deterrence, and the necessity for Israel to respond effectively to threats posed by Hamas. The absence of discussion regarding international legal frameworks suggests that the speaker prioritizes practical security considerations over legalistic approaches in addressing the conflict.
The speaker emphasizes the importance of military action as a means of ensuring Israel's survival and deterrence in the region, implying that while international law may exist, it is subordinate to the immediate needs of national security. This perspective aligns with a pro-Israeli position that seeks to justify military operations as essential for the protection of the state, sidelining legal considerations that might impose constraints on such actions.
- [13:05] "...weaklings are not surviving in the Middle East..."
- [22:38] "...is pounding Hamas positions..."
The speaker characterizes the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 as a pivotal moment in the ongoing conflict, describing them as unprecedented and catastrophic for Israel. The transcript highlights the substantial loss of life and the scale of the attack, which the speaker portrays as a direct assault on civilians, reinforcing a narrative of victimhood for Israel. This framing suggests a clear moral dichotomy where Hamas is depicted as the aggressor, and Israel's military response is framed as a necessary act of self-defense.
In discussing Israel's subsequent military campaign, the speaker emphasizes the goal of dismantling Hamas's military capabilities, which they argue is crucial for restoring deterrence in the region. The language used indicates a justification for military actions as not merely retaliatory but essential for survival. The moral implications of such military actions, including potential civilian casualties, are acknowledged but appear to be secondary to the imperative of national security. This perspective is distinctly pro-Israeli, as it centers on the narrative of self-defense against terrorism.
- [11:12] "October 7 is a turning point..."
- [12:40] "...this is about the necessary requirement for surviving in the Middle East..."
The speaker does not explicitly discuss the 1947 UN Partition Plan in detail, nor does he categorize it in the terms of being fair, unjust, or necessary. However, his overall narrative strongly positions Israel as a state that seeks survival and deterrence against threats from entities like Hamas. This framing suggests a perspective that might imply a justification for the partitioning as a means of ensuring a Jewish homeland, albeit indirectly.
He underscores the historical context of conflict since the establishment of Israel and highlights the continuous threat posed by Hamas and the need for Israel to protect itself. For instance, he states, [12:31] "our Ro on Hamas is not about revenge... it is about the necessary requirement for surviving in the Middle East." This indicates a defensive posture that could suggest a belief in the necessity of establishing a Jewish state as a response to historical persecution.
The speaker also notes the challenges faced by Israel, including terrorist acts and missile attacks from Gaza, which can reflect an argument for the legitimacy of Israel's existence based on the need for security. Nonetheless, there is no explicit assessment of the Partition Plan itself or a deep exploration of its implications for both Israelis and Palestinians within the provided transcript.
- [12:31] "our Ro on Hamas is not about revenge... it is about the necessary requirement for surviving in the Middle East."
- [14:29] "the goal as announced by the government is to dismantle the military capabilities of Hamas."
The speaker does not delve deeply into Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the Balfour Declaration or the British Mandate, within the provided transcript. There's an implied acknowledgment of historical injustices but no explicit critique of British policy. The speaker concentrates on the current geopolitical dynamics surrounding Israel and Hamas, rather than historical grievances against British colonial actions.
He does highlight the complexity of Israel's geopolitical situation, stating that, [13:01] "weaklings are not surviving in the Middle East" in the context of the broader regional instability that might trace back to colonial legacies, but he does not specifically attribute the roots of conflict to British actions. This omission indicates a focus on contemporary issues rather than historical accountability.
In summary, the speaker seems to emphasize the need for Israel to maintain a strong deterrent against threats without attributing those threats directly to historical British actions, thereby avoiding a detailed exploration of Britain's imperial strategy or humanitarian motives. His comments suggest a more immediate focus on survival in the present geopolitical landscape rather than a historical analysis of the conflict's origins.
- [13:01] "weaklings are not surviving in the Middle East."
The speaker does not provide specific details about the migration or displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948 in the provided transcript. His focus is primarily on the ongoing conflict with Hamas and the implications for Israel's national security. This absence indicates that while he acknowledges the complexities of the region, he does not draw direct comparisons between Jewish and Palestinian experiences of displacement.
However, he does allude to the difficulties faced by Jews historically, stating, [12:31] "this was probably the worst day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust." This highlights the trauma and historical context that frame Israeli perspectives on security and survival.
Without explicit commentary on the Jewish displacement narrative or a comparison with Palestinians, it is challenging to classify his position on this issue. He seems more focused on the current conflict dynamics rather than historical migration patterns or their implications.
- [12:31] "this was probably the worst day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust."
The speaker does not mention the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 specifically, nor does he frame them as civilian protests or Hamas-led violence. The transcript primarily focuses on the ongoing conflict with Hamas and the strategic military responses from Israel. His narrative centers around Israel's need to respond to threats posed by Hamas, without addressing the nature or implications of protests like the Great March of Return.
He discusses the need for military action and the perception that Israel must maintain a strong deterrent against attacks, stating, [14:20] "we have to be strong we have to Vanquish Hamas in this war." This indicates a willingness to use force in response to perceived threats, but it does not provide insight into the protest dynamics or Israel's use of force in those contexts.
Overall, the lack of specific references to the Great March of Return or a nuanced discussion of civilian protests suggests that the speaker's focus is primarily on military strategy and national security rather than the complexities of public dissent or protest actions in Gaza.
- [14:20] "we have to be strong we have to Vanquish Hamas in this war."
The speaker explains civilian casualties within the context of military necessity and the ongoing conflict with Hamas. He emphasizes that Israel's military actions are aimed at dismantling Hamas's capabilities and restoring deterrence, which he views as critical for Israel's survival in a hostile region. He states, [14:20] "we have to be strong we have to Vanquish Hamas in this war," indicating that military actions are framed as necessary for national security.
While discussing the potential for civilian casualties, he does not attribute these specifically to failures of precaution or deliberate policy, but rather frames them within the broader context of urban warfare and the complexities of targeting Hamas within civilian areas. He expresses understanding of the difficult realities of military operations, stating that [18:39] "Israel understands it... it’s going to be lengthy." This indicates an awareness of the potential for significant casualties, but he does not express acknowledgment of these as failures of the Israeli military strategy.
In summary, the speaker's position reflects a focus on military necessity and the justification of actions taken against Hamas, without a clear acknowledgment of the ethical implications of civilian casualties. This suggests a broadly pro-Israeli perspective as he primarily frames the actions within the context of survival and deterrence.
- [14:20] "we have to be strong we have to Vanquish Hamas in this war."
- [18:39] "Israel understands it... it’s going to be lengthy."
[00:00] former[00:01] Chiefs senior serving officers Air[00:04] Warriors military veterans ladies and[00:06] gentlemen good evening and welcome to[00:09] this 11th eminent speaker series lecture[00:13] we are indeed privileged to have[00:15] Professor ephra inbar an old friend of[00:17] India he's the president of Jerusalem[00:21] Institute for strategic strategy and[00:23] Security in Israel he was the professor[00:26] of political studies at bar Ilan[00:29] University[00:30] and the founding director of the begin[00:33] begin satat Center for strategic studies[00:36] the position he held for 23 years from[00:38] 1993 to[00:41] 2016 he's been a visiting professor at[00:43] Georg toown John's uh John Hopkins and[00:47] Boston University the visiting scholar[00:49] at the woodro Wilson International[00:51] Center for Scholars a man Fred daor[00:54] natto fellow and a visiting fellow at[00:57] the London based International Institute[00:59] for strategy IC studies he was president[01:02] of the Israeli Association of[01:04] international studies a member of the[01:05] political[01:07] strategic Committee of the national[01:09] planning Council and chairman of the[01:11] National Security curriculum committee[01:13] of the Ministry of[01:14] Education he's authored five books[01:17] Outcast countries in the world Community[01:20] 1985 War and Peace in Israeli politics[01:23] and labor party positions on National[01:25] Security[01:27] 1991 Rin and Israel's[01:30] National Security 1999 Israel's Turkish[01:34] at 2001 and Israel's National Security[01:38] issues and challenges since y kipur War[01:42] 2008 and he's addited 14 collections of[01:45] over 100 scholarly[01:47] articles inba's areas of specialization[01:51] is the Middle Eastern strategic issues[01:53] with special interest in politics and[01:56] strategy of Israeli National Security he[01:59] is an expert on Israeli strategic[02:01] Doctrine public opinion on National[02:03] Security issues us Middle East policy on[02:07] Israel Palestinian issues and Israel[02:10] turkey[02:11] relations after finishing the[02:14] undergraduate studies in political[02:16] science and English literature at Hebrew[02:18] University in Jerusalem oted his M and[02:21] PhD from the University of[02:23] Chicago paropa in the Israeli Defense[02:26] Forces Professor inbar later served as[02:29] idf's academic Committee of the historic[02:34] uh history studies uh since the[02:36] beginning of current Hamas Israel[02:38] conflict on October 7 he has been he has[02:42] written articles such as Israel DRS from[02:45] shock Hamas attack and Wars of a long[02:49] difficult war is written about Hamas war[02:52] crimes a strategic weapon for Israel in[02:54] the international Arena he written about[02:57] Israel Hamas War analysis and Comm mes[03:00] and what military experts say to look[03:02] out for in the Israel Hamas war and many[03:05] many more other articles some of which I[03:07] happen to have read Professor is also an[03:10] old friend of caps having visited caps[03:13] as an institution back in[03:15] 2010 and more recently in 2012 22 jss[03:21] and caps formerly affiliated with each[03:24] other uh since we have had since then we[03:27] have had two webinars uh professor[03:30] nbar had visited India in February last[03:34] year this year and he was arranged we[03:37] had arranged a talk for him in the Air[03:38] Force Auditorium conference h on 6[03:40] February[03:42] 2013 uh I myself was all booked to visit[03:45] Israel and deliver a talk at GS[03:47] International seminar early November[03:49] this year the conflict has forced ephra[03:52] to postpone the event most reluctantly[03:54] to next year India and Israel have an[03:57] extensive and comprehensive massive[04:00] economic military and political[04:02] relationship India formerly established[04:04] relations with Israel when it opened its[04:06] Embassy in tviv in January[04:09] 1992 1996 the defense ring was[04:12] established with the within the embassy[04:14] and we had the ever since we have had an[04:17] Air Force defense attacher there AAR[04:20] wisman became the first Israeli[04:22] president to visit India in[04:24] 1997 you would recall that wisman served[04:26] as the commander of the Israeli Air[04:28] Force between 19 58 and[04:31] 1966 in 2000 LK adwani became the first[04:35] Indian minister to visit the state of[04:37] Israel and relations have further[04:39] expanded during the current Indian prime[04:41] minister modi's Administration he has[04:42] also become the first Indian Prime[04:44] Minister to visit isra and the relations[04:47] have been dehy from the those with the[04:50] Arab Nations today we are both in i22[04:54] grouping Indian Israeli governments have[04:56] stated they have deep rooted ties and[04:59] India looks up to Israeli technology[05:01] applications India is the largest buyer[05:03] of Israeli military equipment and Israel[05:05] among the top three suppliers of[05:06] military equipment to India if has[05:09] Israeli uavs Falcon Radars for the aw[05:13] andc air defense systems Radars missiles[05:16] electronic warfare equipment and[05:18] avionics among many other things[05:19] military and strategic ties between the[05:21] two Nations uh have extended to[05:24] intelligence sharing and joint military[05:26] training Indian Air Force has been[05:27] participating in Israeli Air Forces[05:30] blue flag exercise since[05:33] 2017 there is a significant cooperation[05:35] in space there's an is data on India's[05:38] reset satellites in 2005 Israel's[05:42] tear you know satellite it was first[05:45] synthetic aparture radar Imaging[05:46] satellite which was launched by India's[05:48] pslv India Israel have significant trust[05:51] in Information Technology biotechnology[05:54] and agriculture the West Asian Regional[05:57] paths continue to fight prox Wars in[06:00] sectarian lines pumping large amounts of[06:02] money and weapons to bolster their own[06:05] favorite groups yet some some sort of[06:08] reproach has been taking place most[06:11] Indians led by the Prime Minister have[06:13] been very openly supporting and[06:15] sympathizing with Israel in the current[06:17] conflict yet we all want a long-term[06:21] Equitable solution for peace in the[06:23] region for all we could not have had a[06:25] better person to speak on the Genesis of[06:28] the isra Palestine conflict present[06:31] situation and the way[06:34] ahead other than the speaker and myself[06:36] all will be uh to mute after his talk we[06:40] will have a Q&A session which will be[06:42] conducted by uh air Vice Marshal Anil[06:45] gulani who the additional director[06:46] General in caps you all are requested to[06:49] put your questions in the chat box now I[06:52] hand you over to Professor ifra INB over[06:55] to you[06:57] sir thank you very much[07:00] um I really uh[07:04] appreciate uh your attitude toward the[07:07] Israel and uh your friendship personal[07:11] friendship and friendship to to my[07:14] country I'm very honored to speak to so[07:17] many members of the Indian Air[07:21] Force I want to tell you that my[07:25] encounter with the Israeli Air Force[07:28] always had a certain[07:30] twist since I was a paratrooper I had to[07:34] jump out of the airplanes and not land[07:36] with an air airplane which you know was[07:41] sometimes a bit awkward so uh but uh I[07:46] appreciate the power of the Air Force[07:48] and a good friend of mine was very proud[07:53] that Vice har Marshall Singh very proud[07:58] that the Israel Air Force and the Indian[08:00] Air Force has the same[08:02] acronym so now[08:04] I'll try to brief you on on the war on[08:10] Hamas by[08:12] Israel and first of all I want to uh to[08:16] you[08:17] to understand the importance of this[08:20] particular war in contrast to[08:24] other rounds of violence which we had[08:27] with Hamas Hamas took[08:30] over the Gaza Strip in a military CP in[08:38] 2007 and uh from you know[08:43] they literally you know threw the PA[08:47] Personnel out of Windows of highrises[08:50] and they took over and since then they[08:52] ruled over the Gaza[08:55] strep and we try to coexist with the[08:59] this uh[09:01] semi State uh[09:05] entity it was not a very successful[09:08] coexistence let's be blunt about it we[09:12] were faced we were we experienced many[09:16] terrorist[09:17] acts um we were successfully in[09:21] minimizing their effect and also their[09:23] number H and we were also uh[09:31] experiencing tens of thousand of missile[09:34] attacks on our civilian[09:38] population over time they[09:41] perfected their missile[09:44] Arsenal and actually most of the country[09:48] is covered by their[09:52] missiles and we are talking about[09:55] millions of people that are being wake[09:58] up by s they go to[10:02] a special room which[10:05] is able to[10:07] absorb some kind of explosion next to it[10:10] or even a direct[10:12] hit[10:14] and after 10 minutes they go out unless[10:17] there is a new siren waking them up this[10:21] type of experience has been[10:25] particularly very Vivid for the South of[10:29] our country which is close to the Gaza[10:32] Street close to the Gaza[10:35] border and uh from time to time Israel[10:40] used its military in[10:42] order what we call in the Israeli[10:46] parlons M the grass we entered we tried[10:50] to punish the bad guys we tried[10:56] to destroy their arm arms their[11:00] factories and uh they produced the[11:03] missiles and went[11:07] home October 7 is a turning point[11:12] October 7 as probably all of you[11:15] know was a day full of[11:19] atrocities it is the first time since[11:22] Israel's independence when[11:26] civilian[11:27] settlements were taken over capture by[11:33] Hamas[11:34] terrorists and[11:37] uh many civilians were killed over[11:43] 1,300 including babies elderly[11:47] women children and uh they also hijacked[11:53] about[11:56] 220 civilians we don't know exactly the[12:00] exact number because they are not[12:03] willing to give us a[12:04] list and uh we took a terrible beating[12:09] we lost as I mentioned 1,300 people[12:12] killed almost 4,000 were[12:17] wounded and we are a small country where[12:19] are just 10 million[12:23] people and this was probably the worst[12:26] day for the Jewish people since the[12:28] Holocaust[12:31] and um our Ro on Hamas is not about[12:36] revenge is not about[12:40] retribution it is[12:42] about the[12:46] necessary[12:47] requirement for surviving in the Middle[12:51] East and this is[12:54] deterrence basically weaklings are not[12:59] surviving in the Middle East it's a[13:01] tough neighborh you have to be strong to[13:04] be seen as[13:05] strong in order to make sure that you[13:10] are deterring[13:11] aggression if you are seen weak you[13:14] invite aggression it's[13:17] simple and of course Israeli Palestinian[13:21] you know conflict is not the only[13:23] conflict we have other Wars in in the[13:26] Middle East and this is always a rule[13:28] unless you are able to deter your rival[13:32] your enemy you are in[13:35] trouble therefore in order for us to[13:39] survive in our troubled[13:42] region we must restore deterrence and[13:46] deterrence means a simple thing that you[13:49] instill[13:50] fear into your enemies that they and[13:55] nowadays what we have to do is to exact[13:58] a heavy[14:00] price from our neighbors in[14:04] Gaza in order to make sure that nobody[14:08] in our region in the near future has the[14:12] appetite to attack us it's[14:17] simple so we have to be strong we have[14:20] to Vanquish[14:24] Kamas in this[14:26] war the goal[14:29] as announced by the government is to[14:32] dismantle the military capabilities of[14:36] Hamas this is it may sound strange it's[14:41] a modest goal we do not want to destroy[14:46] Hamas as an[14:47] organization because we understand that[14:50] this is Mission[14:53] Impossible Hamas is an idea Kamas is a[14:59] organization that has a very radical[15:03] extreme islamist[15:06] ideology that its goal is to destroy the[15:11] Jewish[15:12] State they are not bashful about it[15:16] their Charter says it the instructions[15:19] given to the their operatives the 2 to[15:22] Israel mentioned it and we have the[15:25] document so they want to destroy the the[15:28] Jewish[15:30] State this organization[15:34] unfortunately is very popular among the[15:38] Palestinian[15:41] Society a recent poll[15:45] September shows that[15:48] 60% I repeat 60 60% of the Palestinians[15:53] support[15:56] Hamas not uh[15:59] Abu ma if there are today elections in[16:04] the Palestinian territories Hamas wins[16:07] the[16:08] elections they won by the way the last[16:12] elections[16:14] in[16:19] 2005 and if you will have a new[16:21] elections they'll win[16:23] again so it is impossible to destroy the[16:27] idea[16:29] we want to destroy all their military[16:32] capabilities which the meaning is[16:36] clear we catch their weapons we[16:40] kill their military[16:44] leadership[16:46] we find the factories that produce[16:50] missiles destroys[16:53] them all military CET are going to be[16:57] destroyed[16:59] Search and Destroy This is a mission of[17:04] everything that[17:06] has a Famas signature on[17:10] it and so[17:13] politically our[17:15] goal is modest militarily it is[17:20] ambitious um and[17:22] uh this[17:25] goal requires a ground operation[17:30] with all due respect to the Air Force[17:32] Israeli Air Force the Indian Air Force[17:35] we realize that not every military goal[17:39] can[17:40] be[17:41] achieved with air power[17:45] only and you have to realize that in[17:50] Gaza there is a network of[17:54] tunnels we don't know exactly its length[17:57] it's several hundred kilometers maybe[17:59] more maybe over a[18:02] thousand which[18:05] provides refuge for much of the Kamas[18:11] force and you cannot always destroy a[18:14] tunnel from above you don't know exactly[18:17] what it is you have to go into[18:19] Gaza to find those[18:22] tunnels and it's going to be Urban[18:25] Warfare tunel Warfare and to uh get rid[18:30] of the Kamas[18:33] elements[18:36] therefore ground operation is needed[18:39] Israel understands[18:41] it we understand that it's going to be[18:45] lengthy you can't do it's not a Six Day[18:51] War you Urban Warfare is[18:55] protracted tunnel Warfare is protracted[18:59] and is[19:00] costly and Israel understands it and[19:03] despite the fact that we know that it's[19:06] going to be a difficult[19:10] War we'll probably go[19:13] for and uh I'll say a few about about[19:17] the mood in the country[19:20] immediately for the time being we[19:23] see a postponement of the war of the[19:29] Invasion and uh believe me it's very[19:35] frustrating it's very frustrating for me[19:39] that I usually[19:42] charge it's very frustrating for many[19:45] Israelis and many Israeli many friends[19:48] of[19:49] Israel and the reason for the[19:52] postm[19:54] are strategic and Tactical I'm not[19:58] sitting in the room that decides on the[20:03] timing of the attack but I can[20:05] understand the[20:07] deliberations first of all our important[20:10] Ally the United States is asking us for[20:14] more time in order to improve the[20:19] defense of the American forces in the[20:21] Middle[20:24] East they also want to[20:26] prepare for an evacuation[20:30] operation to evacuate their citizens[20:33] from from Gaza from Lebanon from other[20:36] places in the Middle East that might be[20:39] in[20:40] danger um[20:44] basically ER the Americans also want to[20:49] free the some of the host agents at[20:53] least[20:54] that have an American citizenship we[20:58] don't know exactly but about a a third[21:02] of the hostages have double citizenship[21:05] there Israelis but also citizens of[21:08] other[21:09] countries and the Americans want to take[21:12] care of their citizens don't forget we[21:15] are getting soon[21:17] into an election year in America[21:21] and President Biden want to show[21:24] something to to his[21:26] people h this is one reason another[21:30] reason is the hope that maybe there is[21:35] now a window opportunity to exchange[21:39] prisoners to get out some of the[21:43] hostages[21:45] um this is I must say a secondary cons[21:50] consideration but it's[21:53] there politicians want to show[21:56] success humanitarian[22:01] also I think there is a[22:03] clear belief[22:07] that the longer the air campaign is[22:11] taking place it will be easier for the[22:14] ground forces to move[22:19] inside and therefore is pounding Kamas[22:23] positions is leveling[22:26] part the northern part of Gaza[22:29] where we plan to operate[22:34] primarily and this also takes[22:38] time um Is it wise to[22:43] wait I'm not[22:46] sure my temperament is[22:49] different but I can[22:52] understand that people some of our[22:56] leadership are more C cautious than I[23:00] and Netanyahu has a clear record of[23:04] being very cautious in the use of[23:07] for he might be sometimes over cautious[23:11] but he he was a prime[23:14] minister I was a spectator an[23:20] analyst so we have this[23:22] pform and I would like to mention also[23:27] the role of[23:28] [Music][23:30] Iran[23:32] Iran is behind the attack in many ways[23:37] first of all[23:40] Hamas is to some extent Iranian[23:45] proxy it has an independent decision[23:48] making but is very close to Teran to the[23:52] islamist mil[23:54] militias to Islamic guards ER Iran has[24:00] funded for years[24:03] Hamas Iran has trained for years Hamas[24:10] troops Hamas received missile Building[24:15] Technology from[24:18] Iran Iran is also[24:22] smuggling weapons and missiles into the[24:24] Gaza[24:26] Strip via Egypt[24:29] primarily um for[24:34] years and it[24:37] is part Iran is part maybe the head of[24:41] the program to destroy the Jewish State[24:45] Iran as well as Hamas as well[24:49] asalah have a population Centric[24:54] strategy they understand that the[24:57] Israeli AR cannot be overcome by their[25:00] forces therefore they aim consistently[25:04] at the population centers in order to[25:07] make the Israelis citizens[25:12] uncomfortable and they hope that will[25:16] leave I think it's the wrong diagnosis[25:20] but this is what they[25:22] see and this is what explains their[25:26] attacks on civilian targets all the[25:31] time um there is another bad guy in the[25:35] Middle East that is connected to uh[25:40] Hamas and this is[25:42] qat[25:44] Qatar[25:46] um pours money into radical Islamic[25:53] movements Qatar hosts the leadership[25:58] of[26:00] Kamas they live nicely in five star six[26:05] star hotels in[26:08] Qatar very close to the American base of[26:13] udate Qatar also has a[26:17] tremendous influence in the Muslim World[26:21] particularly in the Arab world with its[26:25] voice El jazer Al jazer[26:30] is the mouthpiece of Hamas of Islamic[26:36] radicals[26:38] encouraging every radical islamist group[26:42] in the World to Change the[26:48] regime katar is part of[26:51] it[26:53] and I must say I[26:56] am um[26:59] disappointed with American[27:03] policy the Americans President Biden[27:07] did mention that Hamas is the enemy of[27:14] humanity because of its barbaric[27:17] acts I[27:19] agree but what about its[27:22] sponsor Iran[27:26] Qatar not too many words[27:31] about I want[27:33] to I know that there is concern about[27:37] this word being[27:40] expanded about[27:44] escalation um this is a clear[27:48] possibility we see[27:50] already that on the Northern[27:53] frontal is attacking[27:55] Israeli targets[27:58] at this time at a very low level there[28:01] is low intensity in the attacks on[28:05] Israel but it seems to signal to[28:10] Israel that if Israel will[28:13] go and on a for a ground operation they[28:18] may escalate in order to make the life[28:22] of Israel more[28:24] difficult nowal is a clear[28:28] Iranian[28:30] proxy in inah I don't think it has an[28:34] independent decision[28:37] making capability they take orders from[28:41] from from[28:43] Teran um and if we're talking about the[28:47] multif front War we are talking not only[28:51] about hisa we are talking also[28:55] about Iranian militias[28:58] in Syria on Israel's[29:01] border and we are talking also about[29:05] Hamas cells in the West[29:08] Bank and even among Israeli Arabs you[29:12] know to make it perfectly clear most[29:15] Israeli Arabs are low abiding[29:18] citizens but it's enough to have a few[29:21] thousand of[29:22] them making trouble rioting blocking[29:26] roads[29:30] this is a problem for[29:32] Israel so the possibility the potential[29:37] for escalation is decided in[29:41] Teran if Teran[29:44] believes that at this moment Israel is[29:48] weak[29:49] enough and a multi front war will bring[29:53] about an exodus of Israelis from Israel[29:58] they may the[30:00] site to ignite a multi front[30:04] War it's not an Israeli decision it's an[30:07] Iranian decision and will it remains to[30:11] be[30:11] seen how it will uh this issue will[30:17] develop much depends of course on the[30:20] success of the operation of the ground[30:23] uh operation if we are very successful[30:25] in a rather short time maybe this will[30:29] deter the Iranians for going for a[30:35] multi the only what I described is a[30:39] difficult situation for Israel the only[30:41] light in the situation is the Israeli[30:45] Spirit Israeli[30:48] mood is divided into two one very gloomy[30:52] because of the losses we have taken very[30:56] disappointed[30:57] it's a[30:59] initial surprise how can it[31:04] happen and at the same time determined[31:08] to go to war and Vanquish[31:11] Kamas and you have to understand[31:14] Israelis many of them have military[31:17] experience and understand very well the[31:21] consequences of such a ground operation[31:25] particularly when having to deal with[31:28] Urban Warfare and tunnel[31:30] workare it's everybody understand that[31:34] there will be a lot of[31:35] funerals within the war and after the[31:38] war and still we are ready to go you can[31:44] see in many[31:46] airports throughout the[31:48] world Israel is staying in line for a[31:53] day two three to be able to board an[31:57] Israeli airplane to go home and[32:02] fight those are young people that could[32:06] stay abroad no they go home[32:10] and report to their units actually in[32:13] some units we have over[32:16] 120% reports what does it mean 120 so[32:20] are people that were discharged from[32:22] their unit because of a variety of[32:24] reasons age health reasons they still[32:27] come back and to report to their[32:31] Union so this is the spirit of the of[32:34] the[32:35] nation and[32:39] uh hopefully everybody hopes that only[32:45] win a few words about the international[32:48] Arena of[32:50] course um there is a lot of support in[32:55] many capitals particular in the[32:57] Democratic[32:58] world for Israel after seeing the[33:01] atrocities committed by[33:05] Hamas so there is support[33:09] for a war against[33:11] samas many in many in capitals or just[33:17] people understand that[33:20] Hamas is bad news for[33:25] Humanity uh[33:27] and they hope that Israel will deal with[33:31] this issue in an effective[33:34] manner the Americans showed great[33:37] support they sent two[33:42] aircrafts but the American support and[33:47] involvement is also a bear's[33:53] hug they are as I mentioned before[33:56] trying to postpone to delay the[33:59] attack they[34:01] [Music][34:02] are they take care of their own[34:05] interests[34:07] obviously their most important interest[34:12] is that there will be no escalation they[34:15] don't want an escalation because it will[34:16] threaten American troops in the region[34:20] they don't want an escalation because an[34:22] escalation might bring about a multi war[34:27] in which Iran's role will be very[34:32] clear and America this[34:35] Administration wants to keep maintain[34:39] the tcid nuclear deal with Iran this is[34:42] one of the[34:44] successes of the Biden Administration[34:47] perceived[34:48] successes so they want to keep it they[34:51] don't want too much trouble in the[34:52] Middle East of course they don't say[34:55] anything about Iran that don't say[34:57] anything about[34:59] K if[35:02] Hamas is the enemy of humanity what[35:06] about their sponsors they're quiet about[35:09] also the Americans[35:13] are pushing us into position we don't[35:16] want for example to provide humanitarian[35:21] Aid to the gazin that fled South we[35:25] eventually agreed that humanitarian a[35:28] will come from Egypt today the issue I'm[35:31] not sure you are[35:34] aware gazans want also[35:38] gasoline gasoline is needed for the[35:41] Hamas military[35:43] effort we don't want to strengthen Hamas[35:48] we don't want to lose our leverage over[35:51] Hamas and Biden is pushing Israel into[35:55] accepting[35:59] ER the flow of gasoline into Gaza Street[36:05] I hope we'll be strong enough to tell[36:07] the[36:08] Americans we like[36:11] you we appreciate your support but[36:14] certain things we say[36:16] no we are a small state we have to you[36:19] know it's not easy to say no to our main[36:23] Ally[36:25] superpower so[36:28] um the American[36:31] role which is welcome is also[36:35] problematic and um we have to to deal[36:40] with it I[36:41] hopefully we'll deal with it in a in the[36:45] smartest way possible there's another[36:48] problem with American involvement and[36:51] this is what we call in Israel the[36:54] political clock in every[36:57] that Israel was involved[36:59] in after a certain time the[37:03] International Community particularly the[37:06] United State said enough and imposed[37:11] upon Israel a[37:14] CI and I'm afraid that this[37:19] time because of the postponing of the[37:22] ground operation we may have not enough[37:26] time[37:28] to accomplish our[37:30] mission it will be a disaster if we are[37:33] not able to accomplish our mission but[37:37] we should be aware that particularly[37:40] after you know pictures will come out of[37:43] Gaza the International Community which[37:46] is[37:47] sensitive to um Palestinian suffering[37:53] less so to Jewish suffering I'm not sure[37:56] you are aware[37:57] there are over a million refugees in[38:01] Israel that cannot live next to the[38:08] Border theal Community cares less about[38:11] the Jewish refugees than about the[38:13] Palestinian refuges so we may see at a[38:17] certain point that Israel will have to[38:20] agree to a[38:22] fire um before finishing the job we have[38:26] to finish the[38:28] job[38:31] and[38:34] because and I started with it we need[38:39] deterrence unless we accomplish[38:43] deterrence[38:45] and we may lose our[38:49] country we may lose our state and this[38:52] is why this[38:53] war is so extremely important for[38:59] Israel I want to thank Indian support to[39:03] for us I'm ready to take questions[39:12] now if for a wonderful talk you know[39:17] you've given us gani here I couldn't[39:20] meet you last time as I was traveling[39:22] when you had come to CS for the talk I[39:25] was in Singapore so what I'll do is I[39:27] will I will just look at the questions[39:30] and maybe combine two of them so that[39:33] you can give an answer so that we can[39:35] get more questions uh you know more[39:38] information from you uh the the first uh[39:41] question is about you know the human[39:43] intelligence uh capabilities that Israel[39:46] has inside Gaza and how did the Israelis[39:50] failed to predict that you know uh this[39:54] kind of an attack of 5,000 OD rocket[39:56] would take place on October 7th and the[39:59] second is uh is it because of you know[40:02] too much Reliance on technology or[40:04] intelligence replacing uh technology[40:07] with the man or the soldier or[40:11] overconfidence or internal politics uh[40:15] in in in Israel your comments on[40:19] this uh first of all we were indeed[40:21] surprised it was a strategic[40:24] surprise um we don't know it[40:28] exactly[40:29] why I'm sure this will[40:34] be thoroughly investigated after the[40:39] war one reason for being[40:42] surprised was the the Assumption or the[40:46] concept conception that[40:49] Kamas being not only a terrorist[40:52] organization but also a governing body[40:58] ER will take care will take into[41:03] consideration the needs of their[41:05] population and will be deterred they[41:09] will not like to pay heavy cost for[41:12] aggression we are[41:15] wrong um and uh I think partly it[41:21] is[41:23] because secular[41:25] Elites do not understand the power of[41:29] religion Hamas is a religious[41:33] organization they believe that God is on[41:37] their[41:38] side and you cannot really have a better[41:40] alies than[41:42] God God is infallible God is going to[41:47] Prevail so um this is the main reason[41:52] probably there will be[41:54] more reasons uh[41:56] after the investigation we[41:59] decided all this will be dealt after the[42:02] war[42:05] and about low Tech and[42:09] Hightech I think that there is an[42:13] addiction to Hightech among[42:16] many military[42:20] establishments and[42:23] um we should have you know rrange[42:26] rearrange the balance between low Tech[42:29] and high-tech you cannot rely only on on[42:32] high-tech[42:34] it's and we learned a lesson definitely[42:38] this is quite[42:39] clear they were successful in blinding[42:42] all[42:43] our sensors you know just by[42:48] snipers which is low Tech I'm not sure[42:51] you know if you are aware we of course[42:54] have full coverage electronic coverage[42:57] over the whole area West Bank Gaza there[42:59] is nothing that has a electronic[43:02] signature that we do not[43:05] detect but I some Palestinian[43:08] organizations use pigeons for[43:12] communications and we know pigeon is low[43:14] Tech and they are not detected by raders[43:17] what can we[43:18] do so this is indeed an important issue[43:22] that has to be addressed by all[43:25] military[43:28] thank you uh uh Professor eam the the[43:31] you did speak about the role of Qatar in[43:34] this crisis if you can uh elaborate a[43:37] little bit on that as well as your[43:40] thoughts on uh the recent changes in[43:44] relations between Israel and the Arab[43:46] states do in your opinion has this[43:49] contributed to this uh conflict which is[43:52] ongoing[43:54] now well to make it perfectly clear most[43:58] Arab[43:59] states are hoping for us to win the war[44:04] the tamas is an offsho of the Muslim[44:09] Brotherhood a radical[44:12] organization that tries to[44:15] change the regime in most of the Arab[44:19] world so Egypt[44:22] Jordan Saudi Arabia the Gulf States with[44:25] the exception of Qatar are all hoping[44:29] for an Israeli[44:31] Victory they're not going to say you[44:33] know there is difference in the Middle[44:35] East from what you say and what you[44:38] do they are not going to say it but they[44:40] hope that you'll do it by the way I'm[44:43] pretty sure that[44:46] unless we'll have a resounding Victory[44:50] the peace treaties are it in[44:54] danger the a Accords are predicated upon[44:59] a strong Israel that could help them[45:03] against Iran particularly when the[45:05] United States seems to leave[45:08] the so they want a strong Israel they[45:12] don't whatever they say whatever their[45:16] press is[45:17] saying it's their survival interest of[45:22] of the elites is a beating[45:26] of[45:29] Kamas by the way katar was isolated for[45:33] some time by the Arab[45:36] countries but this isolation process[45:39] failed because the qataris have a lot of[45:42] money you can buy many things with[45:46] money and of course they buy influence[45:50] in America they bu influence in Europe[45:53] you know many[45:56] soccer teams football teams carry C[45:59] Airways you know they have a lot of[46:03] influence they built a very effective[46:07] Lobby in[46:09] Washington and even Washington[46:13] declared Qatar as a nonn[46:18] Ally um when[46:22] katal[46:23] is er helping Iran to circumvent[46:28] American[46:31] sanctions when[46:33] Qatar[46:36] subsidizes radical Islamic movements in[46:41] America[46:42] still despite in my view being very[46:47] clearly a very[46:49] hostile element in the international[46:53] Arena they still buy their way[46:57] out and um I think that[47:03] Israel should exact a price from[47:06] Kat you[47:09] know gas Fields you know you come with[47:13] matches can cause a lot of trouble a few[47:15] matches[47:18] so unlawfully occupied their land and[47:22] you know uh the other thing is the the[47:26] question on the anti-israel feeling[47:28] which is not limited to individuals but[47:31] is an ideology with the Palestinian[47:34] people and uh if you look at the United[47:37] States it was not successful in[47:39] eradicating the Taliban ideology or Isis[47:43] ideology uh in more than 20 years and do[47:46] you think Israeli approach will succeed[47:49] and what is the end state of at which[47:52] you know Israel will call off operations[47:55] of what is Israel looking[47:58] at[48:00] um I I understand very well that the[48:03] Americans who[48:05] were unsuccessful in in Afghanistan[48:08] unsuccessful in[48:10] Iraq their attempt at political[48:12] Engineering in creating you know[48:15] democracies those countries was an utter[48:18] failure actually uh when I was in[48:21] Washington telling my friends what they[48:23] should do I always also[48:26] I always told them go[48:31] in beat the hell out of of the[48:36] leaders try to put your own son of a bit[48:39] General in power and get[48:42] out I'm talking you know in in military[48:45] terms of[48:48] punitive Expeditions Roman[48:52] style there are certain areas in the[48:55] world you cannot[49:00] fix not every country is able to become[49:03] a democr democracy let's face it we have[49:08] no ambition[49:11] whatsoever to fix the[49:15] Palestinians that's quite clear we said[49:19] already quite clearly the government[49:22] said after the ground operation we have[49:25] have no plan to stay in Gaza we have[49:30] no ambition to rule over[49:36] gazin we want[49:40] them to be responsible for their own[49:44] future they are not very good at that by[49:47] the way it's not only[49:49] them they established in the West Bank a[49:55] failed[49:56] State they Gaza is[50:00] an product of a failed[50:03] State a state is Monopoly over use of[50:08] force the Palestinian Authority was not[50:10] able to have Monopoly over use of force[50:14] and the militia named byas took over[50:17] Gaza in the West[50:20] B they lost control over several cities[50:24] J nabl[50:26] the Palestinian Authority hardly[50:29] controls effectively[50:32] ramala there are people that think that[50:34] okay the Gaza should be given to the[50:38] Palestinian Authority that's[50:42] nonsense many Arab countries are failed[50:45] states with no ability to exercise[50:48] Monopoly over a use of force look at[50:51] Syria look at Iraq look at Yemen look at[50:55] Libya this is a political[51:00] illness this is part of the very[51:04] problematic Arab political[51:07] culture so we are not in the business[51:14] of governing over over the Palestinians[51:18] or uh trying to make them a nice[51:23] democracy so uh[51:26] what will happen in Gaza after we finish[51:29] the[51:30] job to put it very bluntly it's not my[51:34] problem I want only one[51:38] thing to maintain freedom of military[51:43] action to hit the bad guys again and[51:47] again when it is[51:50] needed we don't mind a Somalia type of[51:54] Chaos[51:56] it's their problem it's their[51:57] responsibility to establish an effective[52:01] government it's not our[52:08] responsibility uh thank you Professor[52:10] amam the next two questions you know are[52:12] related uh one is uh considering that[52:15] Iran has less control over Hamas as[52:19] compared to the Hezbollah do you feel[52:22] Russia would have a role to play in this[52:25] you know to shift Focus from Ukraine and[52:28] uh what in your opinion was missing in[52:32] deterrence till now which embolden the[52:36] Hamas to carry out this[52:40] attack first of all you know I[52:47] hello yeah we can hear you we okay here[52:50] your good yes[52:54] the I was the architect of the mowing[52:57] the grass[52:59] strategy understanding that you cannot[53:02] change[53:06] Hamas and I uh advocated always military[53:11] action in order to minimize the military[53:17] capabilities of[53:22] Kamas the failure of deterrence is[53:26] tied to our[53:29] reluctance to use frequently enough[53:34] Force to eliminate the military[53:37] capability of[53:38] Kamas we became addicted to a formula[53:43] which said quiet for[53:46] quiet but[53:48] quiet gave Kamas the[53:52] time to Arms to train[53:55] to improve their military[53:59] capabilities and I understand for[54:01] politician it's not difficult it's not[54:04] easy to command the military to go to[54:08] war and to have you know[54:11] funerals it's costly War[54:15] financially and it's easy to falls for[54:20] the[54:22] illusion that if we allow them to live[54:26] well they'll allow us to live[54:30] well with Kamas it didn't[54:33] work so the basic in my view the basic[54:38] reason for[54:40] not having deterrence is that we did not[54:44] maintain the deterrence maintaining[54:47] deterrence requires demonstration of use[54:50] of fors not only capability but also[54:54] political[54:58] will and despite of having the military[55:03] capability to[55:05] hit Kamas once in a while we did not[55:09] have the political will and this is why[55:13] we had a deterrence[55:24] failure you are muted I don't hear[55:32] you you're muted yeah yeah yeah yeah[55:35] yeah I[55:37] am I there is a perception that Israel[55:41] is uh losing the narrative because with[55:45] every passing day uh it is only the[55:48] sufferings of the[55:50] Palestinian which is being depicted what[55:53] about the suffering of the Israelis[55:55] abducted and displaced and what is uh[55:58] Israel doing to stop this uh narrative[56:02] and do you feel in your opinion as a[56:05] permanent solution uh to this problem[56:07] could could NATO play a role in[56:12] this you know there are situations in[56:14] life which there is no[56:16] solution you know probably you know most[56:19] of our audience today is is[56:22] married and in marriage you live with[56:25] continuous[56:28] friction families you know have the[56:31] prerogative[56:32] of[56:35] divorce Hamas doesn't want to[56:39] divorce they want[56:41] us so I don't think that there is a a[56:45] clear solution in in[56:48] the near[56:50] future about the narrative What's called[56:53] the narrative[56:56] um I uh I agree with the[57:00] diagnosis that we may[57:03] lose the narrative[57:06] war and one of the reasons I'm talking[57:09] to you you know and talking most of the[57:12] day to various audiences is try to[57:16] recapture the moral[57:20] ground but the international[57:23] media is[57:25] very left[57:29] leaning um and uh we don't get a fair[57:34] hearing it's not something[57:37] new I'm not sure the Indians get a fair[57:40] Hearing in the international[57:42] media so[57:47] um we cannot shoot a[57:50] journalists so it is you know they are[57:54] with us we do our best to try to explain[57:57] to them but uh it's terrible what's[58:01] happening in universities what's[58:03] happening journalist schools they[58:06] grow with a[58:09] twisted view of life[58:13] and so I complain many Israelis complain[58:16] probably some Indians also complain[58:18] about the international[58:19] media[58:21] um that's life what is important[58:27] is uh what's happening on the ground[58:32] Less on the[58:34] screens correct and the screens I do not[58:37] belittle their importance I do not[58:39] belittle the importance of of[58:44] of the newspapers of the[58:47] media but what really will determine the[58:52] result is what what we are doing on the[58:56] ground and uh hopefully we'll do[59:02] well thank you thank you[59:05] Professor Mar Chopra DJ wants you know[59:08] his question is that Israel practically[59:11] controls water electricity food gasoline[59:15] supplies into Gaza and also the airports[59:18] and the Sea ports are under Israeli[59:20] control to what extent can Palestinians[59:23] start operating as an independent state[59:26] if this is a situation that is going to[59:30] continue well they have a clear[59:33] choice first of all it's not a full full[59:37] quarantine they have a border also with[59:39] Egypt so but the Egyptians[59:44] actually participate in our struggle[59:47] against Hamas in in a more limited[59:50] way the Famas has a choice[59:55] Hamas uh can say we don't want to fight[59:59] Israel any[01:00:01] longer we'll change our education system[01:00:05] we'll try to teach[01:00:10] coexistence and[01:00:12] then there will be no problem from us[01:00:16] will not why is there a[01:00:18] quarantine because we don't want them to[01:00:20] get[01:00:21] weapons by the way we are are I must say[01:00:27] stupid in providing them water and[01:00:31] electricity why should[01:00:34] we equip Kamas with water and[01:00:38] electricity I don't remember the Allies[01:00:41] in World War II providing Germany with[01:00:44] water and[01:00:46] electricity it's an[01:00:48] enemy we are at war with[01:00:52] them we are behaving in a very[01:00:55] humanitarian way we tell the citizens of[01:00:59] Northern Gaza move away this is going to[01:01:02] be a war[01:01:04] zone we tell them by radio by lifl lets[01:01:07] by telephone we call them in Arabic we[01:01:10] tell them move be careful we are taking[01:01:14] care you know we don't want you to[01:01:18] die what more can we do Kamas can say[01:01:23] enough is enough but they cannot they[01:01:26] they are ideologically committed to the[01:01:28] destruction of the[01:01:29] state so we don't want a state next to[01:01:33] us that wants our[01:01:38] death[01:01:39] simple so we do what we can in order to[01:01:42] prevent them becoming stronger I don't[01:01:45] think we didn't do enough we should have[01:01:48] done much more[01:01:50] before if the Palestinians want to be a[01:01:53] good neighbor[01:01:55] Sal sure go ahead change your education[01:02:01] system don't inight anymore against Jews[01:02:05] against Israel and will be a[01:02:09] partner but they are not doing[01:02:15] that if they'll do it we[01:02:19] can cooperate and have a wonderful[01:02:22] Middle East we cooperate to other Arab[01:02:25] country for the mutual[01:02:27] benefit why don't[01:02:30] the Palestinians[01:02:32] emulate what Abu Dhabi is doing the[01:02:36] Emirates why why what Bahrain is[01:02:40] doing or even[01:02:43] Egypt they are not interested in having[01:02:47] peace with Israel[01:02:50] simple so we are not going to help them[01:02:53] you know to become[01:02:55] strong it would be[01:02:59] idiotic to help them to become[01:03:05] strong uh Professor the next question is[01:03:09] as the Hamas has taken the war to the[01:03:12] tunnel[01:03:13] infrastructure and going inside by the[01:03:16] Israeli Defense Forces would uh[01:03:19] certainly entail heavy casualties like[01:03:21] you also mentioned uh your[01:03:24] are are the cbrn options on the[01:03:27] discussion table to take on Hamas inside[01:03:29] the Turnal[01:03:31] infrastructure with safety and efficacy[01:03:34] uh it'll use ensure safe usage of CBR[01:03:37] and options inside the tunnel and also[01:03:39] lead to a early termination of the issue[01:03:43] of[01:03:45] conflict Israel has a very good[01:03:49] technology in locating[01:03:53] tunnels[01:03:55] moreover the Israeli Army is training[01:04:00] for[01:04:01] tunnel[01:04:03] combat it's developing doctrines a[01:04:06] Doctrine to fight in a tunnel and how to[01:04:08] do it we build tunnels in Israel and the[01:04:12] military is training[01:04:15] them[01:04:19] um that's what Israel is trying of[01:04:22] course if we can uh[01:04:25] bomb some of the tunnels from Air we do[01:04:27] it if we can you know every tunnel has[01:04:30] an opening can destroy the opening[01:04:35] block you know electricity what whatever[01:04:39] those are very intricated sophisticated[01:04:42] tunnels it's not just you know you know[01:04:45] I've been in the DMZ of Korea you know[01:04:47] it's it's not a Korean tunnel it's it's[01:04:50] much more[01:04:51] elaborate so um[01:04:55] it's not going to be easy but we have to[01:04:57] do[01:05:00] it uh what in your opinion is the best[01:05:05] outcome of the war for Israel and what[01:05:07] is the worst outcome that it Israel[01:05:10] doesn't want or is not expecting I think[01:05:13] you did talk about it in your talk but[01:05:15] if you could you know elaborate Upon[01:05:17] This[01:05:18] World the best outcome is simply to uh[01:05:23] Vanquish to annihilate the military[01:05:28] capabilities of Hamas this is the best[01:05:31] outcome this is a goal of[01:05:35] course Very Bad outcome will be if we'll[01:05:38] have not enough time or talent to do the[01:05:43] job yeah this is would be very bad[01:05:47] because it will further erode our[01:05:50] deterrence which is critical[01:05:54] for our[01:06:00] surviv understanding that one of the[01:06:02] goal of the Hostile elements is to[01:06:05] derail the convergence of the Arab world[01:06:09] and Israel and you talked about about[01:06:12] the Abraham Accords is there any hope[01:06:14] that convergence is retained after the[01:06:17] conflict is[01:06:20] over if we win the war against Hamas[01:06:24] everybody in the or most of the people[01:06:26] in the Middle East with the exception of[01:06:28] Iran Qatar will be very happy and we[01:06:31] will go back to business as[01:06:34] usual that's that's the best outcome[01:06:37] most of the countries in the Middle East[01:06:39] are hoping[01:06:42] for[01:06:43] also vanquishing Hamas will weaken Iran[01:06:48] which is very feared by most Arab[01:06:53] countries[01:06:55] um a victory over[01:06:58] Hamas will[01:07:01] weaken the Russian[01:07:05] Chinese Iranian AIS in the Middle[01:07:11] East which[01:07:13] is something that the Americans should[01:07:18] share an interest maybe you and IND the[01:07:20] Indians should share an[01:07:22] interest[01:07:24] there is a[01:07:27] growing presence Chinese presence in the[01:07:30] Middle East which is not viewed in[01:07:33] Israel as[01:07:36] positive the Chinese position on this[01:07:39] conflict was terrible they even didn't[01:07:43] say one word against the atrocities[01:07:45] committed by Hamas and they called for a[01:07:49] cire they voted at the UN for a cire the[01:07:52] Chinese the Russian[01:07:55] is basically tries[01:08:00] to tie the hands of Israel so this is[01:08:05] their position and I uh I have[01:08:08] recommended already to my[01:08:12] government that the policy to China[01:08:15] should be[01:08:21] reconsidered thank you we we is running[01:08:24] out[01:08:49] of I don't hear any[01:08:52] question yeah there is[01:08:54] some problem on his audio uh can you[01:08:59] hear us anel yes I do hear you yeah no[01:09:03] you can hear me but can we hear yeah[01:09:06] anel are you there I'm there sir I'm[01:09:10] there yeah yeah okay you can put the[01:09:13] question again because we couldn't hear[01:09:14] you yes yeah I think you you talked[01:09:19] about the uh you know aial attacks[01:09:23] without any ground operations uh don't[01:09:25] isn't in[01:09:32] your when you sympathy or[01:09:41] the understand the question you know[01:09:44] yeah so the question is that I[01:09:47] understand you know more important than[01:09:49] the sympathy of the world is to Vanquish[01:09:53] tamas[01:09:56] ER the Jewish people have lived with not[01:09:59] much sympathy for much time of its[01:10:03] history particularly European history so[01:10:07] uh we can manage if we are not very much[01:10:10] liked we are used to it what is[01:10:13] important is to destroy our enemy and[01:10:17] this is what should be done is it too[01:10:20] late it's never too late to do the right[01:10:27] thing I understand that[01:10:31] the circumstances may be less[01:10:36] auspicious but still we'll have to do it[01:10:40] the Israel in my view has no[01:10:44] alternative but to go[01:10:47] in and eradicate[01:10:50] Kamas the military capability I I made[01:10:54] it clear in in my[01:10:56] talk so what has to be done this has to[01:10:59] be done if the world likes it fine if[01:11:02] they don't like it too[01:11:07] bad yeah okay it's so thank you yeah[01:11:12] thank you Professor ephra for that talk[01:11:15] and I think we in India do understand[01:11:18] the position of Israel because we[01:11:20] ourselves have been victims of uh Terror[01:11:22] and with you with we are with you at[01:11:25] this point of time and uh on behalf of[01:11:29] uh director General uh caps and the[01:11:32] entire Indian Air Force former Chiefs[01:11:34] and the fraternity who's listening today[01:11:37] I would like to thank you once again uh[01:11:39] for this wonderful talk and uh[01:11:51] uh uh for[01:11:58] yeah thank you thank you Professor if[01:12:01] always a pleasure listening to you and[01:12:03] we are looking forward to the war coming[01:12:05] to an end quickly so that we can do some[01:12:08] more events together between caps and JS[01:12:11] and you know all the very best to you[01:12:14] all and we hope that not too many lives[01:12:18] get lost on either side in the coming[01:12:20] days[01:12:21] yes I am at your service always thank[01:12:25] you thank you so very much and all the[01:12:26] very best to you and to Israel yes thank[01:12:30] you and thank you ladies and gentlemen[01:12:32] for being part of this talk and God[01:12:35] bless you all and have a great night[01:12:38] bye-bye[01:12:42] yes
Dr. Einat Wilf: Palestinianism has to die, in order for people to live.
Introduction
In a recent podcast, Dr. Anot shared insights into his background, experiences, and views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The discussion began with Dr. Anot's upbringing in Jerusalem, his military service as an intelligence officer, and his academic pursuits in the United States. He expressed a long-standing fascination with the intersection of Israel, the Jewish people, and global politics, which has shaped his career as a writer and speaker on these issues.
Political Background and Ideological Shift
Dr. Anot identified himself as a left-leaning individual in Israeli politics, particularly during the 1990s when the Israeli left was associated with the belief that peace with the Palestinians could be achieved through the establishment of a Palestinian state. He articulated that the prevailing hypothesis among the Israeli Peace Camp was that the only barrier to peace was the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the building of settlements. He opposed these actions, believing that the land should be designated for a future Palestinian state.
Throughout his career, Dr. Anot witnessed multiple attempts to negotiate peace, including significant efforts by Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, who engaged in direct negotiations with Palestinian leaders Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas. Despite these efforts, he noted that Palestinian leaders walked away from the negotiations, leading him to question what the Palestinians truly wanted and what stood in the way of peace. He began to explore the notion that the desire for a Palestinian state was not the sole issue at hand.
His research culminated in his book, "The War of Return," where he argued that Palestinians have historically expressed their desires, often in ways that were not taken seriously by the Israeli side. He cited the slogan "From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free," which he interpreted as a clear indication of the Palestinian aspiration for a state that excludes Jewish sovereignty.
Historical Context and British Parliamentary Insight
Dr. Anot referenced a quote from British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevan in February 1947, which described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as "irreconcilable." He emphasized that this statement was made before the establishment of settlements, occupation, or any of the contemporary issues often cited as causes of the conflict. Bevan articulated that the Jews sought a sovereign state, while the Arabs aimed to prevent the establishment of any Jewish sovereignty in the land. This fundamental divergence, according to Dr. Anot, renders the conflict irreconcilable.
He further explained that the conflict is not merely a territorial dispute but rather a clash of existential aspirations—where one side desires a state, and the other seeks to negate that existence. This perspective has led Dr. Anot to reassess his views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, moving away from the belief that a Palestinian state would automatically lead to peace.
Shift in Israeli Political Landscape
Dr. Anot observed that the traditional divisions between the left and right in Israeli politics have blurred, particularly in light of recent events, such as the violence following the breakdown of negotiations. He noted a growing consensus in Israeli society regarding the intentions of their adversaries, suggesting that many now recognize the Palestinian leadership's goals as fundamentally opposed to the existence of a Jewish state.
He articulated that the left's historical position—that peace could be achieved through concessions—has been challenged by the realities of ongoing violence and the lack of genuine Palestinian interest in coexistence. Dr. Anot expressed a desire for peace but emphasized that achieving it requires a transformation in Palestinian ideology, which he views as a significant and daunting challenge.
Palestinian Ideology and the Role of UNRWA
Dr. Anot discussed the role of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in perpetuating the Palestinian refugee status and the broader conflict. He criticized the agency for its failure to settle refugees and for reinforcing the narrative of a right of return, which he argues undermines the possibility of peace. He compared UNRWA's approach to historical instances where refugee populations were integrated into new societies, highlighting the contrast with the Palestinian situation.
He emphasized that the Palestinian identity has been hijacked by the ideology of Palestinianism, which negates Jewish self-determination. This ideology, according to Dr. Anot, must be dismantled for any meaningful resolution to the conflict to occur. He argued that the ongoing support for UNRWA by countries like Norway contributes to the perpetuation of this ideology and the conflict itself.
Perceptions of Anti-Zionism and the Jewish Diaspora
Throughout the podcast, Dr. Anot addressed the rise of anti-Zionism and its implications for Jewish communities worldwide. He noted that anti-Zionist sentiments often manifest as a form of betrayal among Jews, particularly those who align themselves with narratives that undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state. He expressed concern about the pressures faced by Jews in the diaspora, particularly in Europe, where anti-Zionism can lead to increased anti-Semitism.
Dr. Anot articulated that the Jewish community must navigate a complex landscape where dissenting voices are often amplified, creating divisions within the community. He emphasized the importance of solidarity among Jews and the need to confront anti-Zionist narratives that threaten their collective identity and safety.
Conclusion: The Path Forward
In conclusion, Dr. Anot's insights provide a multifaceted understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emphasizing the historical, ideological, and political dimensions that shape current realities. He advocates for a recognition of the fundamental differences in aspirations between Israelis and Palestinians, urging a reevaluation of the narratives that dominate discussions around peace. His call for a transformation of Palestinian ideology and a reassessment of international support mechanisms like UNRWA highlights the complexities of achieving a sustainable resolution to the conflict. Ultimately, Dr. Anot's perspective underscores the need for a candid dialogue about the realities on the ground, the historical context of the conflict, and the implications of ideological commitments on both sides.
The speaker discusses the causes of the 1948 war and the ensuing displacement of Palestinians, framing it primarily as a consequence of war rather than a planned policy. They reference the historical context of the conflict, particularly emphasizing the failure of the Palestinian leadership to accept the establishment of a Jewish state. The speaker highlights that the conflict existed before significant events such as the displacement of Arabs, suggesting that the roots of the conflict are not merely based on actions taken during the 1948 war but are deeply entrenched in a longstanding opposition to Jewish sovereignty.
One of the main arguments presented is that the Arab states and leaders had a declared intention to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state, which contributed to the conflict's irreconcilable nature. The speaker mentions the historical narrative that the Arabs attempted to hijack the name 'Palestine,' which had previously been associated with Jews. This historical perspective is intended to illustrate that the conflict's origins predate the war itself, contributing to the complexity of the displacement issue.
While the speaker acknowledges that displacement occurred, they suggest it was a byproduct of the broader conflict rather than a systematic attempt to transfer populations. This viewpoint implies that the actions taken during the war were reactions to the existing tensions and were not premeditated policies aimed at displacing Palestinians.
- [07:15] "...the conflict is not between the Jews wanting a state the Arabs wanting a state and just having a border issue... he's basically saying the conflict is irreconcilable..."
- [07:32] "...for the Jews the point of principle is to establish a sovereign Jewish State... for those Arabs the top priority is to resist to the last the establishment of any Jewish sovereignty in the land..."
The speaker's perspective on the role of population transfer in Zionist thought and practice before and during 1948 suggests that it is integral to the Zionist project rather than a marginal discussion or merely a contingent wartime policy. The speaker states that the ideology of Palestinianism, which negates Jewish sovereignty, has been a core issue since the establishment of the state. They argue that the failure of the Palestinian leadership to accept a Jewish state fundamentally shaped the events of 1948, indicating that the population transfer was not merely incidental but closely tied to the Zionist aims of establishing a sovereign Jewish state.
The speaker insists that the discussions surrounding population transfer were inherent in the Zionist project, arguing that the Jewish desire for self-determination conflicts directly with the Arab opposition to it. They present this view as a historical fact rather than an opinion, suggesting a systematic denial of Jewish sovereignty by Arab leaders at the time.
Furthermore, the speaker emphasizes that the conflicts have been misrepresented by those who portray them solely as a reaction to Jewish policies, stating that this narrative oversimplifies the historical context. They argue that the situation in 1948 was shaped by a long-standing Arab refusal to accept Jewish claims to the land.
- [01:44] "...my own personal journey is... the only thing standing between us and peace was the establishment of a Palestinian state..."
- [02:10] "...the top priority is to resist to the last the establishment of any Jewish sovereignty in the land by definition irreconcilable..."
The speaker assigns primary responsibility for the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly the 2000 Camp David process, to the Palestinian leadership. They argue that despite multiple attempts by Israeli Prime Ministers, specifically Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert, to negotiate peace settlements that included significant concessions such as the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Palestinian leaders consistently walked away from these negotiations. The speaker illustrates this by stating that in both 2000 and 2008, the Palestinian leadership failed to accept offers that would have resulted in an independent state, including control over significant territories and East Jerusalem.
The speaker's position suggests a belief that the Palestinian refusal to engage meaningfully in the peace process reflects a deeper ideological commitment to opposing the existence of a Jewish state rather than a genuine desire for peace. This is articulated through their emphasis on the repeated opportunities that were presented to the Palestinians, which they claim were dismissed.
While the speaker maintains a critical stance towards the Palestinian leadership, there is an implicit acknowledgment that the Israeli side also has responsibilities in the peace process. However, the predominant focus remains on the decisions made by Palestinian leaders, indicating a view that their actions were the primary obstacles to achieving lasting peace.
- [03:30] "...the Palestinian leaders walked away to no dissent among Palestinians..."
- [10:36] "...the hypothesis was actually tested several times... the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state as their top priority..."
The speaker addresses the role of international law in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting that they view it as selectively applied and subordinate to direct negotiations and security considerations. They imply that while international law is often cited in discussions about the conflict, its practical relevance is limited by the realities on the ground and the political context. The speaker indicates that the legal frameworks surrounding the conflict are often used to support particular narratives or agendas rather than serving as objective measures of justice.
Moreover, the speaker's commentary suggests that international law is often manipulated in the context of the conflict, particularly in relation to the actions of both parties. They argue that the narratives surrounding occupation and rights of return are frequently employed to delegitimize Israel while overlooking the complexities of the situation. This perspective suggests a skepticism towards the effectiveness of international legal mechanisms in resolving the conflict.
Overall, the speaker portrays international law as a tool that is utilized selectively by different actors in the conflict, rather than as a binding framework that can facilitate genuine peace. This aligns with their broader view that the ideological foundations of the conflict, particularly Palestinianism, must be addressed for any meaningful resolution to occur.
- [02:01] "...the only thing standing between us and peace was the establishment of a Palestinian state..."
- [10:04] "...the hypothesis was actually tested several times... the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state..."
The speaker characterizes the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza as a clear manifestation of the ongoing conflict characterized by violence and self-defense. They describe the attacks as a form of aggression that necessitated a strong Israeli response, framing it within the context of self-defense against terrorism. The speaker emphasizes the brutality of the attacks, suggesting that they were not merely military actions but part of a larger ideological battle against the existence of the Jewish state.
In discussing the moral and legal implications of the conflict, the speaker appears to justify Israel's military response as a necessary and proportional reaction to the existential threat posed by Hamas. They imply that such responses are not just about immediate security but also about a broader struggle against an ideology that seeks to negate Jewish sovereignty. The speaker does not seem to acknowledge any significant moral ambiguity in Israel's actions, framing them instead as a legitimate defense against terrorism.
Moreover, the speaker's characterization of the situation suggests a clear dichotomy between the aggressors (Hamas and Palestinian militants) and the defenders (Israel), reinforcing a narrative that sees the conflict in black and white terms, with less focus on the complexities of civilian casualties or broader humanitarian concerns.
- [04:11] "...the day of October 7th... is the most dramatic day in Israel's history since its founding..."
- [20:29] "...the evil on October 7th was the kind of monstrous evil that gets unleashed when it comes to Jews..."
The speaker, Dr. Anot, presents a critical view of the 1947 UN Partition Plan, suggesting it was not a fair compromise but rather an imposition that failed to address the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He emphasizes that the division of land was rejected by the Arab side, which highlights a fundamental unwillingness to accept any Jewish sovereignty in the region. The speaker's perspective indicates that the Partition Plan did not resolve the underlying tensions and animosities that existed before its proposal.
Dr. Anot argues that the historical context of the conflict, including the Balfour Declaration and subsequent British policies, played a significant role in shaping the attitudes of both Jews and Arabs towards statehood. He notes, "[02:10] the only thing standing between us and peace was the establishment of a Palestinian state..." This statement reflects his belief that while the plan aimed for peaceful coexistence, it did not account for the deep-rooted opposition to a Jewish state among Palestinian leaders.
Furthermore, he posits that the rejection of the Partition Plan by the Arab leadership was not merely a reaction to the proposal but a manifestation of a broader ideological stance against Jewish self-determination. Dr. Anot states, "[09:34] the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state..." This dichotomy underscores his argument that the conflict is fundamentally irreconcilable, as both sides have fundamentally opposing goals.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as he advocates for the recognition of Jewish historical claims to the land and underscores the failures of Palestinian leadership to engage in constructive negotiations.
- [02:10] "the only thing standing between us and peace was the establishment of a Palestinian state..."
- [09:34] "the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state..."
Dr. Anot interprets Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of inconsistency and failure, particularly regarding the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. He emphasizes that Britain's initial support for a Jewish homeland was not matched by effective policies that would ensure its realization. He states, "[07:03] basically the British failed..." This failure, according to him, stemmed from the British government's inability to navigate the conflicting national aspirations of Jews and Arabs in the region.
The speaker highlights that the Balfour Declaration was meant to provide a foundation for Jewish self-determination but was undermined by Britain's subsequent actions and its eventual withdrawal from its obligations. He refers to a quote from British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, stating that the British government faced an "[07:13] irreconcilable conflict," highlighting that this was recognized even before many of the subsequent events that are often cited as causes of the conflict.
Dr. Anot suggests that Britain's dual commitments—to both Jewish and Arab populations—created a situation where neither side felt satisfied or secure. This inconsistency contributed to the ongoing tensions and ultimately, the failure to establish peace. He implies that rather than acting as a neutral mediator, Britain’s actions reflected its imperial interests, which complicated the path towards a sustainable resolution.
In summary, the speaker's view of Britain's role can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as he critiques British policies for failing to support the establishment of a Jewish state while also suggesting that these failures set the stage for ongoing conflict.
- [07:03] "basically the British failed..."
- [07:13] "His Majesty's government is faced with an irreconcilable conflict..."
Dr. Anot describes the migration and displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948 as a significant but often overlooked aspect of the broader narrative surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He suggests that this migration is sometimes compared with Palestinian displacement, but he emphasizes that the two situations are not directly analogous. He notes that while both groups experienced displacement, the circumstances and motivations were fundamentally different.
He states, "[12:10] the Jews were fleeing persecution and anti-Semitism, whereas the Palestinians..." This statement indicates that he views the Jewish exodus as a reaction to existential threats, which were severe and life-threatening, while he implies that Palestinian displacement was a result of the broader conflict rather than direct persecution at that time. He also highlights the lack of acknowledgment of Jewish displacement in the mainstream discourse surrounding the conflict.
Furthermore, Dr. Anot argues that the Jewish migration from Arab countries is often minimized or ignored in discussions about the conflict, thereby providing a skewed narrative that emphasizes Palestinian suffering without acknowledging the parallel experiences of Jewish refugees. This approach suggests that he believes there is a need for a more balanced historical account that recognizes the suffering of both communities.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as he stresses the importance of recognizing Jewish suffering and displacement while also critiquing the one-sided narratives that dominate discussions about the conflict.
- [12:10] "the Jews were fleeing persecution and anti-Semitism, whereas the Palestinians..."
Dr. Anot characterizes the Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 as a complex phenomenon that is heavily influenced by the overarching ideology of Palestinianism. He suggests that while the protests may have included elements of civilian dissent, they were fundamentally driven by Hamas, which he sees as the executive arm of that ideology. This interpretation frames the protests not merely as a grassroots movement for rights but as a politically motivated action aimed at negating Jewish sovereignty.
The speaker states, "[14:11] the transformation of the Palestinian ideology... that's a much bigger borderline impossible ask..." This highlights his view that the protests, while they may have involved civilian participants, cannot be separated from the broader goals of Hamas and the Palestinian leadership.
Regarding Israel's response, Dr. Anot implies that the use of force was necessary due to the nature of the protests, which he views as aggressive and hostile. He suggests that the protests were not simply calls for rights but included violence and the intent to breach borders, thus justifying a military response from Israel. His perspective indicates that he perceives a clear distinction between peaceful protest and violence, underscoring that the latter necessitates a strong defensive posture from Israel.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as he emphasizes Hamas's role in the protests and justifies Israel's military actions as a necessary response to perceived threats.
- [14:11] "the transformation of the Palestinian ideology... that's a much bigger borderline impossible ask..."
Dr. Anot explains civilian casualties in Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza, as a result of a combination of factors, primarily emphasizing the conduct of armed groups like Hamas. He argues that the tactics employed by these groups often place civilians in harm's way, effectively using them as shields in the conflict. This assertion underscores his view that the responsibility for civilian casualties is not solely on the Israeli military actions but is significantly influenced by the actions and strategies of Hamas.
He states, "[10:41] the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state..." This captures his belief that the fundamental goals of Hamas and other Palestinian factions are inherently antagonistic towards Jewish self-determination, framing their actions as part of a broader ideological struggle that leads to violence and casualties on both sides.
Moreover, Dr. Anot suggests that Israel's military operations are often framed within the context of necessity, where the intent is to neutralize threats posed by Hamas rather than to inflict harm on civilians. He implies that while civilian casualties are tragic, they are a byproduct of a conflict where the opposing side operates under different rules of engagement, often disregarding the safety of their own population.
In summary, the speaker's position can be classified as broadly pro-Israeli, as he attributes a significant portion of civilian casualties to the actions and strategies of Hamas while justifying Israel's military responses as necessary for national defense.
- [10:41] "the Jews want a state and the Arabs want the Jews not to have a state..."
[00:00] Dr anot will thank you so much for being[00:02] with me on my podcast today thank[00:06] you it's um interesting times that we[00:09] live in and you're in are you in[00:11] Jerusalem right now in Tel Aviv in Tel[00:14] Aviv yes um can you please tell our[00:18] audience a little bit about uh your[00:20] background and where you grew up and um[00:24] how you[00:25] started sure uh I was born and raised in[00:29] Israel I grew grew up in[00:32] Jerusalem um had a very typical Israeli[00:36] childhood the English is thanks to two[00:38] years that my parents spent in the US[00:41] when uh I was a child uh I served in the[00:45] military as an intelligence officer I[00:48] studied in the US for my undergraduate[00:51] uh worked a bit there and I've been[00:54] fascinated from a fairly early age about[00:57] everything that would stand at the[01:00] intersection of Israel the Jewish people[01:04] and the World At Large uh I have some[01:06] background in politics I worked with[01:09] Shimon Perez I was a member of the[01:12] Israeli Parliament and ever since being[01:14] out of politics uh which is about 12 13[01:18] years by now I've been uh writing and[01:21] speaking on issues relating to Israel[01:24] the conflict the path to peace I've[01:27] written uh seven books and um that[01:30] brings us to the[01:32] present would you say that you've been[01:34] mostly on the left side of politics in[01:36] in[01:37] Israel uh I still consider myself on the[01:40] left side uh but my own personal journey[01:44] is uh I grew up uh in terms of uh the[01:47] Israeli political left at the time when[01:50] the Israeli political left especially in[01:52] the 90s uh became associated with the[01:56] idea that uh Israel has a path to peace[02:01] and especially uh when it comes to the[02:05] Palestinians Israel path to peace[02:08] depends on the establishment of a[02:10] Palestinian state so the idea was that[02:14] basically the only thing standing[02:15] between us and peace was the[02:18] establishment of a Palestinian state in[02:20] the West Bank in Gaza uh and that meant[02:24] that I was against Israel's military[02:26] presence in the West Bank in Gaza What's[02:28] called the occupation I was against a[02:30] settlement building thinking this should[02:32] be territory for a palestin state[02:36] and this is what you could C uh could[02:39] say the reigning[02:41] hypothesis of uh the Israeli Peace Camp[02:45] uh give the Palestinian estate and we[02:47] will have[02:48] peace and my story is that I lived[02:53] through the repeated efforts to test[02:56] this today people pretend as if it was[03:00] never tried but we actually had two[03:04] Israeli Prime Ministers eud Barack in[03:07] 2000 and uh and aood Almer in 2008 Who[03:13] directly negotiated with Arafat and abum[03:16] maen for a Palestinian state in the West[03:19] Bank in Gaza no occupation no[03:21] settlements capital in East Jerusalem[03:24] including holy sites and in both cases[03:28] the Palestinian leaders walked away to[03:31] no[03:32] dissent uh among[03:34] Palestinians uh I was in the Coalition[03:38] working with Shimon Paris and the[03:41] Coalition with Ariel Chiron when Israel[03:43] disengaged from[03:46] Gaza you know they are now talking about[03:49] all these like European and Palestinian[03:52] Authority monitors who will monitor the[03:56] Rafa Crossing well I was on the negot NE[03:59] iting team that was negotiating the[04:03] excruciating details of that agreement[04:07] only to see everybody run away to[04:10] ashalon all these European monitors just[04:14] run away to ashalon as soon as Hamas[04:17] took over the Gaza Strip uh so so I I[04:21] had very personal experience of the vast[04:24] gap between the high rhetoric the good[04:28] intentions the detailed negotiated[04:32] agreements and their complete[04:34] failure um so as I'm living through that[04:39] and I'm living through the violence that[04:42] followed every breakdown of[04:44] negotiations I live through what the[04:46] Palestinians have done with Gaza after[04:49] Israel[04:50] completely uh retreated from it and I[04:54] begin to ask a very simple question so[04:56] what do the Palestinians want what[04:58] stands between us and peace because it's[05:00] clearly not a Palestinian State that's[05:03] something they could have had multiple[05:05] times and they didn't take it and during[05:09] this time uh I begin to ask questions uh[05:14] I do research the research is what[05:16] became the book The War of return I um I[05:20] meet Palestinians oh thank you[05:24] um and I realized that they've always[05:27] told us what they wanted uh we just[05:29] didn't listen or when we listened it[05:32] sounded so outrageous that we didn't[05:34] think that they really meant it uh but[05:37] they've always told us you know from The[05:39] River To The Sea Palestine will be free[05:43] and if you're wondering free of what uh[05:45] in Arabic it's very clear they say from[05:48] water to water Palestine will be Arab[05:52] exclusively um and as I do the research[05:56] uh I come across a great quote uh it's a[05:59] quote by the U British uh foreign[06:03] minister after World War II uh Ernst[06:06] Bevan um it's from February 1947 when he[06:10] goes to the British Parliament to[06:12] explain why Britain failed to fulfill[06:16] the trust the Mandate that it received[06:18] unanimously from the League of Nations[06:21] you know once the Ottoman Empire[06:23] collapsed there was an understanding in[06:26] the spirit of ending world wars uh that[06:29] the peoples of the empires will have[06:31] Independence the Arabs the Jews the[06:35] Kurds the Armenians the Turks and the[06:39] Arabs got their states the Turks did[06:41] what they did to the Kurds and the[06:43] Armenians and got a state that was twice[06:45] as much as it was supposed to be and um[06:49] the Arabs tried to do to the Jews what[06:51] the Turks uh did to the Armenians and[06:53] the Kurds um but and and they succeeded[06:58] in preventing a Jewish state from[07:01] emerging so basically the British[07:03] failed and he needs to explain why they[07:07] failed so he goes to the British[07:09] Parliament and he says his Majesty's[07:11] government is faced with an[07:13] irreconcilable conflict now the reason[07:16] I've come to love and use this quote so[07:18] much is that it's from February[07:21] 1947 in February of 1947 there are no[07:24] settlements there's no occupation[07:27] there's no blockade of Gaza there's no[07:29] BB there's no smotrich there's no benang[07:32] there's no displaced Arabs uh you know[07:36] sometimes people tell you that the[07:38] original sin of the conflict is the[07:40] displacement of Arabs there's no[07:42] displaced Arabs in February[07:45] 1947 so this is a moment that he goes[07:49] and he says look his Majesty's[07:51] government is faced with an[07:52] irreconcilable conflict so he's calling[07:56] the conflict[07:57] irreconcilable irreconcilable[08:00] before a single thing has happened that[08:02] we are told today are the causes of the[08:05] conflict and then he goes on to explain[08:08] he says in the Land There are Jews and[08:10] Arabs as you know no one was called a[08:12] Palestinian at this point and he said[08:15] look each one of those groups has[08:18] something that they care about more than[08:19] anything he calls it the point of[08:21] principle so he says for the Jews the[08:24] point of principle is to establish a[08:26] sovereign Jewish State great so the Jews[08:28] want to exercise the universal principle[08:32] of self-determination right that's the[08:34] principle based on the breakdown of the[08:36] Ottoman Empire so the universal[08:38] principle of self-determination for the[08:41] Jewish people in their Homeland and then[08:44] he goes on to say and for the Arabs the[08:46] point of principle and these are not any[08:49] Arabs these are the Arabs that will one[08:51] day hijack the name Palestine which up[08:53] until that point was associated with[08:55] Jews to be called Palestinians and he[08:59] says for those Arabs the top priority is[09:02] to resist to the last the establishment[09:06] of any Jewish sovereignty in the land by[09:10] definition irreconcilable he's basically[09:12] saying the conflict is not between the[09:15] Jews wanting a state the Arabs wanting a[09:18] state and just having a border issue you[09:21] know they want 70% they want 70% we need[09:24] to divide the land somehow no he's[09:26] saying as a matter of top priority the[09:29] Jews want a state and the Arabs want the[09:32] Jews not to have a state that does make[09:34] the conflict[09:36] irreconcilable so you know sometimes[09:38] people listen to my talks and they say[09:41] things like oh a not youve changed your[09:44] views you've changed your opinions and[09:47] I'm like it's not an opinion uh it's not[09:51] a view I like think of it as a scientist[09:54] there was a hypothesis the hypothesis[09:58] was what stands between us and peace is[10:00] a Palestinian State okay good[10:03] hypothesis then comes the part that[10:05] Everyone likes to kind of uh erase it[10:08] was tested the hypothesis was actually[10:11] tested several times in a variety of[10:14] ways you know if you're good a scientist[10:15] to try in all kinds of ways direct[10:18] negotiations unilateral disengagement it[10:21] was tried and it[10:23] failed so if you're a good scientist you[10:25] say okay the data doesn't fit with the[10:28] hypothesis What alternative hypothesis[10:31] could fit the data and the alternative[10:34] hypothesis proposed already by bevon in[10:36] February 47 is the Jews want a state and[10:39] the ARs want the Jews not to have a[10:41] state as their top priority and[10:43] amazingly this hypothesis meets all the[10:46] data it actually has the best[10:49] explanatory and predictive power Bon[10:52] said this in February 47 but it[10:55] predicted the behavior of the signs from[10:58] his speech to the present so it's not a[11:01] view I tell people it's not a view it's[11:03] it's a description that meets the data[11:06] and if you think there's a better[11:08] description by all means but this as far[11:11] as I tried this one actually meets the[11:13] data so that's kind of my uh my personal[11:16] story and I've been writing and speaking[11:19] about these issues ever since what would[11:22] you think is the like the main[11:24] difference between the right side in[11:26] Israel and the left side on these topics[11:28] that you mention[11:31] now[11:33] H so I don't[11:36] know that there's much of a difference[11:40] now historically used to be the[11:42] difference that the rights would say we[11:46] don't care what the Palestinians want[11:49] because we want all of it and we're[11:50] going to find a way the Palestinians[11:52] will have an atomy or they can you know[11:56] um be taken by Jordan by but by and[11:59] large uh the Palestinians cannot have a[12:02] state uh we want to ennex most of the[12:05] territories and give them some you know[12:07] autonomy and the west and then the left[12:10] would say h no the Palestinians are[12:12] merely a people who want estate and[12:15] enter the occupation and therefore[12:17] that's what we need to do to get to[12:19] peace I don't know that this this[12:22] difference like stands any longer[12:26] because because I think today certainly[12:29] after October 7th there's a much broader[12:33] Acceptance in Israeli[12:35] society that this is what our enemies[12:38] want uh and then the question is what to[12:42] do with it how to best handle the[12:46] situation um but I think it's uh the[12:50] kind of division we used to have between[12:52] left and right in Israel um I think I[12:56] don't know that it exists much anymore[12:59] so you would say that the left and right[13:00] has actually come closer together and[13:02] has more of a um a similar approach to[13:07] this so let me tell you for many years[13:10] when I would give my talk about the[13:12] conflict and I would say look I as I[13:14] said I'm still of the left I still want[13:17] peace I call myself sometimes a[13:20] long-term peace activist saying look I[13:22] want peace I'm happy to share the land[13:27] um but I understand that what stands[13:31] between us and peace is not an entity[13:33] occupation or no settlements or get rid[13:36] of BBY you know all things that I'm[13:38] happy to do I just understand that they[13:40] have nothing to do with what the[13:42] Palestinians want um so I say I still[13:47] want peace I just understand that what[13:50] stands between us and peace now is[13:52] something much bigger and much harder[13:54] than what we thought in the beginning[13:56] you know even if it's difficult to[13:58] remove s ments or ultimately these are[14:01] things that can be done and that Israel[14:03] did several times[14:06] but now what I tell people is what what[14:09] stands between us and peace is the[14:11] transformation of the Palestinian[14:14] ideology the people really that's a much[14:18] much bigger borderline impossible uh ask[14:21] but but that's what stands between us[14:24] and peace that's it so um over the years[14:27] I would tell people look I'm happy to[14:30] make peace if tomorrow morning the[14:32] Palestinians are transformed into Arabs[14:36] who just simply want to live next to a[14:38] Jewish State I don't mind living next to[14:41] Palestinian State it's not like I'm not[14:43] like religiously or ideologically[14:45] opposed to it um you know as long as the[14:49] Jews have one state it could be smaller[14:52] I'm I'm okay with it you know as long as[14:54] it's really peace and not[14:57] pretend um so over the years people told[14:59] me who has your views in Israel not[15:03] because on the one hand I'm like[15:05] supposedly very left-wing right happy to[15:07] share and all that on the otherwi on the[15:10] other hand I'm very right-wing because I[15:13] say things that sound really hard for[15:16] people I basically tell them on this[15:19] issue of no Jewish State there are no[15:23] Palestinian exceptions this is the one[15:26] thing that I say that people have the[15:27] hardest time with because they're like[15:30] oh you're exaggerating you're[15:32] generalizing you're painting it with a[15:34] broad brush Strokes you know we the[15:37] Palestinians have their extremist you[15:39] have your extremist you know extremists[15:40] on both sides and and I'm like no[15:44] actually it's not the case on the[15:47] Palestinian side there are no[15:50] exceptions uh over 20 years of working[15:55] on this writing about it reading[15:57] researching I found only three[16:00] Palestinians who will clearly accept the[16:03] Jewish right to self-determination in[16:05] the land with all the implications that[16:07] there will be no return and no[16:09] refugeehood and all that um so that[16:13] sounds very right-wing you know[16:15] something so hard that basically you[16:18] know I even say things like Hamas[16:20] represents the Palestinians it's not[16:22] like some outside group that hijacked an[16:25] innocent bystander so on the one hand[16:27] that sounds very right-wing so people[16:29] would tell me a not who has your views[16:31] in Israel and I would always say look[16:33] it's either five people who by now are[16:36] my best friends because it's such a[16:38] boutique[16:39] combination or it's 80% of the Israeli[16:43] public because so let's go for a moment[16:46] with the[16:48] 80% I think that is where the broad[16:51] Israeli consensus lies which means as[16:55] long as the Palestinian vision is from[16:57] The River To The Sea the what do you[16:59] want from us that's not a negotiable[17:01] position okay so there's nothing just[17:04] there's nothing to ask us to[17:06] do but if they really finally end their[17:11] Century long war against Jewish[17:14] sovereignty then we'll talk we're happy[17:16] to negotiate we'll compromise we'll[17:18] share but but we need to know that it's[17:21] real so I think this is where this is[17:24] why I say that I I think this cuts[17:26] across right-wing leftwing I think this[17:28] is where most Israelis[17:31] are and also um the developments that[17:35] have been in Israel since October 7th[17:39] has that do you think that has brought[17:41] Israel closer together the inhabitants[17:44] of the people of Israel the Jewish[17:46] people has brought people close together[17:48] or does it also divide people in um in[17:52] differences of opinions regarding[17:54] this both um so some some part some[17:59] elements have definitely grown closer[18:02] together[18:04] especially uh what you would call the[18:06] serving and fighting elements of Israeli[18:09] Society so there there are clearly now[18:12] stronger divisions between what I call[18:15] um the th you know the servers those who[18:19] actually serve in the military who[18:21] defend the country and those who[18:24] don't um so on the Jewish side it's the[18:27] ultra orthodox on the Arab side it's[18:30] most Arabs especially Arab Muslims[18:34] um uh but it has brought that kind of[18:38] the the Israelis who serve their country[18:41] it has generally brought them together[18:44] uh I do think there is a broader and[18:47] better understanding of what our enemies[18:49] want but uh you know uh we're Jews so uh[18:54] you also have this very intense[18:56] argumentation precisely because of[18:58] October[19:00] 7th we by the way we're so far from even[19:04] processing what happened on that day[19:06] we're gonna have movies and[19:08] documentaries and books and research and[19:11] phds for the next 50 years at least on[19:16] what happened on that single day and[19:19] what brought it about and you know the[19:22] aftermath uh so we're we're far from[19:24] processing or even beginning to process[19:27] what happened that day but we do[19:30] understand that something dramatic[19:33] happened that day that in many ways it[19:35] is the darkest and perhaps the most[19:38] important day in Israel's history since[19:40] its[19:42] founding because you know that day is a[19:47] day of of of Holocaust imagery you know[19:50] entire families people basically losing[19:54] families you know until October 7th when[19:57] we read stories of the Holocaust of like[20:00] he came back from he came from the[20:02] Holocaust and lost his entire family uh[20:06] all his children the brother and the[20:07] sisters and like they and suddenly this[20:11] happened and you really you literally[20:14] had a had colleague who described what[20:17] the Palestinians did that day as Ein[20:19] sculpin just arabic speaking Ein sculpin[20:22] you know going door[20:24] too uh shooting people looking for them[20:27] in the safe room in the closets the idea[20:30] of people hiding in the closets like you[20:32] really got all this like Holocaust pgr[20:36] farhood[20:37] imagery and it happened in the sovereign[20:41] state of[20:42] Israel so this is the most dramatic day[20:47] in Israel's history since its founding[20:52] and I think a lot of the way we're still[20:56] dealing with it is yelling at each other[20:59] you know about whose fault it is and uh[21:03] so that's also[21:07] happening yeah it's almost like the[21:09] history books came alive right that's[21:11] how I view it because my family also I[21:14] live here in Norway but I'm Jewish as[21:16] well and my great-grandmother was[21:18] deported from Norway here and killed in[21:20] owitz uh so I always felt like this was[21:23] such a long time ago this was like seen[21:26] black and white pictures of them and it[21:28] all felt like this could never happen[21:30] again right this is like we're done with[21:31] that there's no more anti-Semitism right[21:33] people are people aren't that stupid[21:35] that they would like do that again and[21:38] then we come to 2023 and then we see the[21:42] same kind of thing happening again[21:44] granted not that the Six Million Jews[21:47] scale but still the same amount of evil[21:50] and the same the same intention right of[21:53] people are talking about this word[21:55] genocide all the time that's that was a[21:57] genocide an attempted gen asde to kill a[21:59] whole people it was certainly the plan[22:02] right you know the the biggest part by[22:04] the way people have people have now[22:06] misuse the word which is again is very[22:08] typical every word from occupation to[22:12] everything gets abused so that you can[22:14] blame Israel apartheid occupation these[22:16] words are all misused in order to blame[22:20] Israel uh the same of course with[22:22] genocide but one of the key issues in[22:24] genocide is[22:25] intent it's actually the most important[22:28] thing that's that's kind of what[22:30] separates it from Just War um is the[22:34] intent and it goes back to kind of how[22:36] we started our discussion that no one[22:38] takes the Palestinians seriously when[22:40] they declare their intent but they[22:43] declare their intent they did they[22:45] actually[22:47] did why don't we take them seriously why[22:49] why why don't we believe them when they[22:51] say it so I've struggled with that[22:54] question a lot um part of it is um okay[23:01] I think it has several parts uh part of[23:03] it I think is that if we had to take[23:06] them seriously there's something very[23:08] scary about[23:09] it like like I told you when I tell[23:12] people this is what they want and[23:14] there's no exceptions it's the I've seen[23:17] how people again and again are really[23:20] struggling with what I say because the[23:23] implications are are just very scary[23:26] that this is what we're standing with um[23:29] the other part is that it means that we[23:31] have a lot of hard work to do and[23:33] there's no easy solutions which is just[23:35] get rid of bb or just force Israel to[23:38] get out of the West Bank I'm like you[23:40] can do all those and it will make no[23:42] difference because that's not what they[23:44] care about and and I think the other[23:48] thing another element is I call it like[23:51] modern Neo colonialism sometimes people[23:54] call it the bigotry of low expectations[23:57] I actually had that happen happened[23:58] recently do you know um Colona there was[24:01] this Colona report to whitewash unus[24:04] crimes and uh I was asked to testify[24:07] before her and you know as I was[24:10] speaking I could see that she was really[24:12] unhappy but what I said because the her[24:14] mandate was officially to see how unra[24:18] can be can maintain its neutrality and I[24:21] was like it can't it's a Palestinian[24:23] organization devoted to the[24:24] non-existence of a Jewish state it can't[24:27] maintain neutrality[24:29] um and so I kept explaining it but I[24:31] could see she really didn't like hearing[24:33] what I had to say so at the end I said[24:35] you know what I see you're not happy[24:37] listening to me so don't listen to me[24:39] listen to what the Palestinians are[24:41] saying they're clearly telling you and[24:43] then she stood up and she left me[24:46] speechless because she said the most[24:47] neoc Colonial thing possible and she[24:50] said it in a very French neocolonial[24:52] tone they don't get to decide I'm like[24:57] uh they kind of do but it[25:01] was like so but but it's it's something[25:05] I struggle with um or and let me just[25:09] introduce the last element which is the[25:12] darkest one uh everything I said up[25:14] until now is is not dark in the sense[25:17] that[25:18] ultimately they don't want to really[25:20] listen because it's hard work because[25:22] it's a hard message because uh you know[25:26] neoc colonialism But ultimately itely[25:28] not that's not dark the dark explanation[25:31] that I definitely had to begin to[25:34] consider after October 7th is that that[25:37] it's not that they're not listening to[25:38] them it's that they listen they very[25:41] well they know exactly what they're[25:44] saying and doing and they just want them[25:46] to continue but it but they just want to[25:49] pretend that they don't understand[25:51] what's going on yeah I think there's a[25:54] part[25:55] ofely yeah we we also have to we can[25:58] stay on under a little bit for since[26:00] we're since I'm here in Norway and I'm[26:02] so ashamed to say that my government is[26:04] like one of the very few governments who[26:06] still support on financially and uh they[26:10] just announced that they were going to[26:12] send 275 million Norwegian croners um[26:16] down to to unra which is like I guess[26:19] like $27[26:20] million um what are your what are your[26:23] comments on that on on a country like[26:25] Norway supposed to be an enlightened[26:28] country uh Western count still doing[26:32] that so first of all you're right that[26:35] Norway is one of the most committed if[26:39] not the most committed country to HRA[26:43] and the one that is also the[26:46] most uh open about its support for[26:51] Andre's Miss political Mission so Norway[26:56] is on the record of saying that that the[26:59] refugees have a right of return which[27:02] again they don't but Norway supports[27:04] that and and that Norway uh you know[27:07] supports that politically so first of[27:09] all you're absolutely right that Norway[27:12] is one of the the most[27:14] committed uh supporters and Defenders of[27:17] unra uh including its political Mission[27:21] uh the only thing I have to say that is[27:23] that it's[27:25] terrible uh I was in the Norwegian go[27:29] Parliament I don't know three years ago[27:31] maybe something like that definitely[27:33] before October[27:34] 7 and I did this briefing before[27:38] Norwegian members of parliament and I[27:42] told to and I explained to them how how[27:46] terrible Andre's impact is I did it[27:49] comparing comparing it a bit to World[27:52] War I and World War II uh in very broad[27:56] brushstrokes one of the main problems at[27:59] the end of World War I is that it ends[28:01] with an with armistices right with a[28:04] bunch of ceasefires armistices[28:06] and as a result Germany can say we[28:10] didn't[28:11] lose uh and why why is everyone behaving[28:15] as if we lost we didn't lose it's an[28:18] Armistice and that created the whole[28:21] story of the stolen Victory and that[28:24] kind of lay the stage for appeasement[28:27] and the rise of Na[28:28] ISM so in World War II what the Allies[28:32] wanted to make clear is that this time[28:34] there will be no question about who won[28:37] and who lost there would there would not[28:39] be an Armistice there would not even be[28:41] just regular surrender there would be[28:43] unconditional surrender that they were[28:46] very clear and they were very ruthless[28:48] about making it clear that the losers[28:52] knew that they were[28:54] losers so what and and you know[28:57] sometimes I'm annoyed when Europeans um[29:00] are not aware that they are the[29:03] beneficiaries of some pretty ruthless[29:06] leaders and ideas you know over the[29:09] years I would have like delegations[29:11] coming let's say from Europe and people[29:14] be like why can't you get along look at[29:16] us you know French and German getting[29:18] along and I'm like let me remind you how[29:22] it happened that you got to get along[29:25] first of all I say you know for about a[29:27] thousand years you butchered each other[29:29] in a way that we're not even coming[29:30] close but more recently you got along[29:34] because Nazi Germany was completely and[29:37] utterly destroyed and defeated and[29:40] occupied and now you can get along so[29:45] and and I would tell them look that's[29:46] what I want what did HRA do actually[29:49] what HRA did[29:52] is rather than allow the Arabs like tens[29:56] of millions of refugees GES throughout[29:59] Europe and the Indian subcontinent and[30:02] Africa that basically we told look it's[30:06] tough It's tragic but this is over the[30:08] war is over these are the borders and[30:11] that's it you can settle where you are[30:13] you can find a new life but you don't go[30:16] back that's it like these are new states[30:18] new borders and it's over rather than[30:22] give them that message which was[30:23] actually a good message it was a tough[30:25] message but it was a good message uh[30:28] what the Arab refugees received through[30:31] unra is a message that said no no you[30:33] actually didn't lose the war and going[30:36] back to beon this war was fought on the[30:40] Arab side we're going back to intent for[30:43] the declared purpose of preventing the[30:46] Jewish state from declaring independence[30:48] and from coming into being that was[30:51] their purpose right otherwise there[30:53] would have been no need for war there[30:54] could have been an Arab state next to a[30:56] Jewish State no so their declared intent[30:59] in that war was to prevent the[31:01] establishment of a Jewish State given[31:03] that this was their declared intent they[31:06] lost but no one gave them the memo that[31:09] they[31:09] lost so rather than like telling them[31:13] look it's tough It's tragic you lost and[31:16] it's over nobody goes back you're not[31:19] refugees settle in Syria and Lebanon and[31:21] Jordan[31:22] Egypt they didn't get the memo and anra[31:25] is at the heart of not getting the memo[31:29] unra is basically like the Armistice for[31:32] Germany after World War I is the thing[31:34] that basically told them you didn't[31:36] really lose your Victory is delayed you[31:40] your victory was stolen from you uh and[31:43] and that creates[31:45] monsters but and that's what happened so[31:48] I I presented all that in the Norwegian[31:51] Parliament as you can sure people were[31:53] deeply deeply shocked um because I told[31:57] them the nicest things you can do for[31:59] Palestinians is to tell them that they[32:01] lost it's actually the nicest thing you[32:03] can finally tell them it's the nicest[32:05] thing that the world did for the Germans[32:07] and it's the nicest thing you can do for[32:09] the[32:09] Palestinians and then I highlighted[32:12] something and I said and I think it's[32:13] especially correct for Norway I told[32:16] them look I've come to appreciate that[32:18] in foreign policy just like parenting[32:21] and governance there's doing good and[32:25] there's feeling good now I was like you[32:28] just want to feel good you give money to[32:31] anra the poor Palestinians that makes[32:34] you feel really really good about[32:36] yourselves it does no good it does the[32:39] opposite of good and by the way you[32:42] Norwegians are not paying the price I'm[32:44] paying the price my people are paying[32:47] the price by the way Palestinians too[32:49] are paying the price we're paying the[32:52] price here but you and Oslo get to feel[32:55] all good about yourself like with a[32:57] little Halo[32:58] I have a colleague who told me once that[33:00] Norway before it became nominally[33:03] secular was the number one exporter of[33:06] missionaries to the world per[33:09] capita so and and[33:12] basically Norway merely secularized that[33:15] sentiment it still has this kind of[33:17] missionary Spirit just a secular[33:19] missionary Spirit but it was like you're[33:22] actually not doing good you think you're[33:24] being good missionaries spreading good[33:26] you're not you're fueling the conflict[33:30] as you could imagine that didn't[33:31] necessarily go well but that's what I[33:34] said but it's it's victim culture right[33:37] it's and it's also I think after having[33:39] spent a lot of time thinking about it I[33:41] think it's just about how people[33:42] identify with who they perceive as the[33:45] victim because they feel like victims[33:47] themselves so it's like oh I want to be[33:49] on that side I want to I want to support[33:51] that because I also feel like a little[33:53] bit of a victim so I'm going to root for[33:55] that team I'm going to be the good[33:56] person I'm going to be[33:58] the one who who's on the right side of[34:00] history as they love to say right but[34:03] unra um why is it that uh a status as a[34:08] refugee is able to go through[34:10] generations and be inherited to the next[34:13] generation is that is that isn't that[34:15] unique is that the case in any other[34:17] situation in the world that the their[34:19] victim status can be[34:21] inherited so what is really unique hon[34:24] created something that is absolutely[34:26] unique Al explain what are the not[34:28] unique things and how it becomes unique[34:31] what's not unique is that people become[34:34] refugees in war not special not unique[34:37] the Arab refugees are not[34:39] special uh what's not special of course[34:42] is that in the transition from Empires[34:44] to states there was war Bloodshed[34:47] refugees not special at all not special[34:51] is even the establishment of a temporary[34:54] agency to settle the refugees I always[34:57] bring the example that at the same time[34:58] of unra uh another temporary agency's[35:01] established called anra The Cha is for[35:05] Korea um if there were about 700,000[35:08] Arab refugees there were 3.1 million[35:11] Korean ones anra settles all of them in[35:15] four years with a third of hre's budget[35:19] nobody returns home and look at South[35:21] Korea today has its problems but by and[35:24] large a very successful country could[35:26] have been the the[35:28] Palestinians so that was not special[35:30] having a temporary agency is not special[35:33] what is special is keeping that agency[35:36] alive for 75 years and how did that[35:41] happen the[35:42] Arabs because they refused to accept[35:45] that they lost a war against the[35:47] establishment of a Jewish State what[35:49] they did is they hijacked anra the first[35:52] of many hijackings they hijacked anra to[35:56] serve as a weapon in that ongoing War[36:00] how did they do[36:01] that uh first they made sure that honor[36:05] will not settle a single Arab Refugee[36:09] they would torch down the the kind of[36:11] the offices they attacked the staff[36:15] which at that time was still foreign and[36:17] they made it clear that not a single[36:20] Arab Refugee will be settled That's[36:23] Unique the refusal to settle even a[36:26] single one when it became clear that HRA[36:30] cannot settle a single Arab refugees uh[36:33] the funders of hre at the time which[36:35] were mostly the US and the UK wanted to[36:37] close it down and the Arab countries[36:40] were like you're not going to close it[36:42] down why and this goes to your question[36:44] at the same time that unra was created[36:46] to settle the Arab refugees the UN[36:49] created the actual Refugee agency called[36:52] the UN High Commissioner for refugees[36:54] the UN High Commissioner for refugees is[36:57] in trusted with implementing the refugee[37:00] convention the refugee convention seeks[37:03] to settle[37:05] refugees however possible if they can go[37:09] home that's great but they don't have to[37:12] they cannot be forced to and it's and[37:15] it's not a priority if they can that's[37:18] great but if not it doesn't sit for 75[37:22] years and saying we're going to like no[37:25] they move on and they say can you you[37:27] settle where you are now great and if[37:31] not can we get you to settle in a[37:34] different country but basically the[37:37] refugee convention seeks to individually[37:41] end the refugee status for people now[37:44] the Arabs realized that very quickly[37:47] they realized that if the Arab refugees[37:50] would be treated according to the[37:53] refugee convention according to the[37:55] international standards that were just[37:57] being established within a few years[37:59] there would be no Arab[38:01] refugees so they created a loophole and[38:04] the loophole goes like[38:06] this it says that unhcr will take care[38:09] of all refugees in the world except[38:13] those that have an[38:16] agency and the only way to keep this[38:20] unra loophole is to make sure that hre[38:23] never closes because if hre closes they[38:26] all revert back to the international[38:29] standards so they created this loophole[38:33] and once they created this loophole a[38:35] bizarre thing was created whatever anra[38:38] does is legitimate so anra perpetuates[38:42] and inflates the number of refugees[38:44] generation after generation against[38:46] International standards it can do it[38:49] because it has a[38:50] loophole uh it doesn't settle a single[38:52] Arab Refugee it can do it it counts[38:56] refugees people who have citizenship in[38:58] Jordan and Germany it can do it um it[39:03] counts refugees people who live in rala[39:05] and gazam it can do it basically as soon[39:08] as anra had this loophole it can do[39:11] whatever it wants and what it wants[39:13] because it was hijacked by the[39:15] Palestinians and Arabs to serve the goal[39:17] of no Jewish State what it does is in[39:20] the service of destroying the Jewish[39:25] State uh and then as of late than Israel[39:28] and um the knesset right determined that[39:31] uh unra was supposed to be or will be[39:34] closed down is this a unilateral[39:36] decision that both the left and the[39:38] right in Israel agreed on to close down[39:41] unra so it's important to note Israel[39:45] cannot close down HRA that would be nice[39:47] but it can't H operates based on a[39:49] mandate and because it's temporary that[39:52] gets renewed every two to three years in[39:54] the UN General Assembly[39:57] what Israel can do and that's what it[40:00] did is to decide that it will no longer[40:03] cooperate with unra you know until 1967[40:07] Israel had no contact with unra because[40:10] unra operated in the West Bank Gaza[40:13] Jordan Syria and Lebanon all areas that[40:16] were not Israel after 1967 the West Bank[40:20] and Gaza come under Israeli military[40:22] control and Israeli agreed to an ad hoc[40:27] voluntary cooperation with HRA but it[40:31] was agreed that within a week's notice[40:34] each side can stop the[40:36] cooperation so uh 57 years too late uh[40:40] Israel basically said that it's no[40:42] longer cooperating with onra it cannot[40:44] close it[40:45] down uh but it can basically tell anra[40:48] we're not cooperating with you so[40:51] sometimes people tell me oh so if this[40:53] does not close down[40:55] HRA what good does it do and I compare[40:58] it to removing uh Iran's air defenses in[41:02] itself not enough but it sets the stage[41:07] for an effective campaign so one of the[41:11] big messages for decades by many[41:14] countries including Norway of why they[41:16] fund onra was that Israel supports onra[41:19] that Israel likes onra that Israel[41:21] cooperates with Andra and that was[41:23] actually true uh the Israeli[41:25] establishment both security and the[41:29] government uh believed in two Lawns the[41:33] first is that anra is a stabilizing[41:35] force in the region which it's not it's[41:38] actually the opposite it's a[41:39] destabilizing force because it keeps as[41:42] I said it's like the Armistice in[41:45] Germany post World War I it keeps[41:46] telling the Palestinians you didn't law[41:49] you didn't lose your Victory is merely[41:50] delayed one day there will be no Jewish[41:52] State and you will have return and in[41:56] parenthesis in case that anyone thinks[41:58] that the Palestinian vision of return is[42:00] just some innocent Nostalgia October 7th[42:04] is how Palestinians imagine return um[42:09] so uh so Israel uh had one lie that uh[42:16] onra is a stabilizing force and it's not[42:18] it's a destabilizing force and the other[42:20] lie was that it's the lesser of two[42:23] evils that HRA is better than Kamas that[42:25] HRA is not good but it's better than[42:27] Kamas which again is not true it's[42:30] actually worse for two reasons it's[42:32] worse because it actually gives birth to[42:35] a lot of chases you know the[42:38] perpetrators of the massacre of the[42:40] Israeli Olympics and the Munich and the[42:42] Munich Olympics the Israeli athletes[42:45] that was those were those were people[42:47] who came out of the refugee camps who[42:49] were educated in honor schools uh the[42:53] planner was an honor teacher so and[42:56] there was no Kamas then[42:58] uh this was the fat so this was Black[43:00] September so unra is like the basically[43:03] the soil that constantly gives grows to[43:07] new terrorist organizations which makes[43:09] it worse and the other thing that makes[43:12] it worse is everyone thinks it's a nice[43:13] organization because it has the letters[43:15] un which makes it harder to fight you[43:19] know for years when I would like speak[43:22] against honor and write about it be like[43:24] a not enough enough with this Obsession[43:27] what do you want from this nice[43:29] organization that has the letters un and[43:31] just helps people um so what the Israeli[43:37] knesset did and I have to emphasize[43:39] especially as a former member of knesset[43:42] how amazing is what the knesset did they[43:45] passed legislation which wasn't[43:48] necessary the government could have just[43:49] decided to stop cooperating with unra[43:52] but the members of knesset began to[43:54] realize uh that the government is now[43:56] moving moving that also goes to the[43:59] change in the Israeli public the Israeli[44:01] public I think is much less tolerant now[44:03] of[44:04] laes so uh so we we just we don't want[44:08] to live with lies anymore uh and[44:11] especially not the comforting lies oh[44:13] unre is good Kamas is like uh deterred[44:16] like we we don't want to hear lies from[44:18] our leadership anymore so the members of[44:20] Kess said began to realize that the[44:22] government is not moving so they they[44:26] passed legisl[44:27] against the government wishes against[44:30] International insane pressure uh I was[44:34] for examplea asked to meet with the[44:36] Scandinavian ambassadors who expressed[44:39] concern about legislation and I was like[44:42] not only should you not express concern[44:44] you should write back to your foreign[44:45] Ministries that they should support the[44:47] law um but um it was against[44:50] International pressure against the will[44:52] of the government that didn't want this[44:54] headache it was Coalition and opposition[44:58] all the parties of the Israeli[45:00] Parliament excluding the Arab parties[45:03] who voted against but it really shows[45:06] you where the Israeli public is there is[45:08] this broad consensus that says enough is[45:11] enough so I think it's actually a very[45:14] dramatic Milestone[45:18] um yeah and we've also seen evidence uh[45:22] for example from the work of Hill noer[45:25] and un watch seeing how many people who[45:27] were actually involved in October 7th or[45:30] rooted for October 7th and um thought[45:34] that was a good thing that that happened[45:36] in the unra system and and I'm curious[45:39] like just as an example when when[45:41] Norwegian government sends $27 million[45:45] to unra how much of that money would you[45:48] hypothetically say goes to actually goes[45:51] through anra and then forward to Hamas[45:53] and terrorists and actually ends up[45:55] buying weapons and funding terrorism[45:57] like practically actually funding[46:01] terrorism I'll explain why it's all of[46:03] it uh because you know uh when you when[46:08] you uh learn Finance the first thing[46:11] they teach you about money is that it's[46:13] fungible right the quality of money is[46:15] that you Mo you move it around if you[46:18] don't use it there use it there so um[46:20] okay what does giving money to unra[46:23] basically does it basically relieves[46:27] the government of Gaza which was Hamas[46:31] from the need to spend money on[46:35] education on health care and allows them[46:39] to[46:41] focus on butchering Jews so that's why[46:46] the man the money is so valuable because[46:49] it basically[46:50] releases the government from any[46:54] responsibility you know I'm on the[46:56] record for decades together with my[46:58] co-writer ad Schwarz we went to[47:01] parliaments all over Europe in the US in[47:03] the UK before October 7th to tell them[47:06] the following don't give money to unra[47:10] because it feeds the Palestinian vision[47:13] of return which is not some innocent[47:15] idea it's a violent vision and because[47:19] this is the Palestinian ideology if you[47:22] give money to that again I can show you[47:24] essays of Britain before October 7 on[47:27] the record saying this will go to[47:29] tunnels this will go to weapons we now[47:33] also have data that unre for years[47:36] demanded that the payment uh to teachers[47:39] in Gaza will come in in cash uh cash was[47:43] actually the only way to bribe the[47:46] Egyptians to get the weapons through the[47:49] tunnels from Egypt uh so hre's[47:53] insistence on getting paid in cash was[47:55] also key to the operation of bringing in[47:59] the weapons so you know when people said[48:04] oh but if we won't give money to unra[48:07] what will Kamas run the schools I I said[48:10] that's actually better and that made me[48:13] sound like a crazy person but I said[48:15] look why is it better first of all Kamas[48:18] runs the schools anyway so at least this[48:20] way it won't have the letters un and[48:22] we'll we'll all you know I'm talking[48:23] about no longer believing in lies at[48:26] least we'll get rid of La line but it's[48:28] important in a deeper level if Hamas had[48:31] to pay teacher salaries they might have[48:35] had fewer billions of dollars for[48:38] Tunnels for weapons so when I say that[48:41] all the money of unra goes to weapons[48:45] it's because money is[48:46] fungible so if if you're allowing the[48:51] people of Gaza if you're allowing the[48:53] government of Gaza to avoid[48:56] responsibility for paying teachers[48:58] salaries for paying for health care then[49:01] they have all the money they need to[49:03] focus on building tunnels and buying[49:07] weapons so basically the Norwegian[49:09] government is funding[49:11] terrorism of course it is worse than[49:14] that it's funding the soil for[49:17] terrorism uh you know uh before October[49:20] 7th I was in a panel which discussed[49:23] terrorism funding and it had some um[49:26] Europe an Parliament members and they[49:29] were like oh we have all these ways to[49:32] check that the money doesn't go to[49:34] terrorist groups and I was like I was[49:36] like this is stupid I was like you need[49:39] to understand that for the Palestinians[49:41] it's one ideology from The River To The[49:44] Sea no Jewish State and terrorism is[49:48] merely the executive arm but it's a[49:51] single[49:52] ideology so you can't like separate it[49:56] and I said to I said to them you want to[49:57] give money to Palestinians great ask[50:00] them a simple question do you recognize[50:03] the equal right of the Jewish people to[50:05] self-determination in their ancestral[50:07] Homeland do you want to live in an Arab[50:10] Palestinian state next to a Jewish State[50:12] rather than from The River To The Sea do[50:14] you understand this means you're not[50:16] refugees and there's no right of[50:17] returning to Israel I told them look if[50:20] the organization applying for your[50:22] funding says yes great give them money I[50:25] was like but if they're not willing to[50:27] say yes then don't give them money even[50:30] if they tell you that it's for Orphans[50:32] and food because that's how Palestinians[50:36] fund their war against Israel by getting[50:39] the West to pay for everything so that[50:42] they can focus on the[50:45] war we also have to get into the term[50:48] Palestinian ISM which you've coined in[50:51] your work and in your book can you[50:52] describe what is Palestinian[50:55] ISM yes the more I understood that the[50:59] complete negation of Jewish sovereignty[51:03] is what connects Arabs living in Gaza[51:06] Arabs living in the West Bank Arabs[51:08] living in Jordan in Syria and Lebanon in[51:11] Norway and in Colombia University that[51:14] the Palestinian identity is organized[51:17] around the negation of Jewish[51:19] sovereignty I began to think that the[51:21] most precise term for that is[51:23] Palestinian ISM and Palestinian ISM as[51:26] an[51:27] ideology uh and unfortunately also by[51:30] now an identity has four core tenants uh[51:33] from The River To The Sea there will be[51:35] no Jewish State and therefore we are[51:38] refugees through the generations until[51:41] return now these are all essentially[51:44] synonyms but they work[51:47] together to towards the goal of no[51:51] Jewish State and I've come to call this[51:53] Palestinian ISM and I found this a very[51:55] useful term to really highlight what[51:59] this is all[52:02] about yeah that's that's so interesting[52:04] because it seems like just from seeing[52:07] there are so many conflicts in the world[52:09] and how Obsessed the especially the[52:11] Western world is with the Israeli Gaza[52:14] situation when you could just as if you[52:16] were to be a rational being with logical[52:18] consistency people would be just as[52:20] concerned even more concerned perhaps[52:22] with the situation in Sudan with Iran[52:25] women's rights in Iran and there there's[52:27] so many different situations what do you[52:29] think is the cause of this this[52:31] Obsession that the Western world has[52:33] with Israel and the Gaza[52:36] situation so first we'll start with what[52:38] you said rationally you're absolutely[52:40] right for years I would tell people who[52:42] would come you know so many delegations[52:44] come to Israel which again that's my job[52:47] so I'm happy to talk to people and give[52:49] lectures but all these you know all[52:52] these students come from all these[52:53] universities they have you know they're[52:55] not Jewish they're not connected to this[52:57] region and they would come here and I[53:00] would tell them look rationally there's[53:01] no reason for you to be here I said if[53:04] what you want in life is to reduce human[53:07] suffering I was like objectively you're[53:10] wasting your time here this is not this[53:13] is not a place of major human suffering[53:17] you know and by any objective scale[53:20] number of deaths and all that like this[53:23] is not an important[53:25] conflict um[53:27] so it's clearly not objective and[53:31] rational and here we went I talked a bit[53:34] about how Norway has secularized a[53:36] missionary impulse um there's no doubt[53:40] that the West has secularized a lot of[53:44] theological ideas about Jews and they[53:47] became secularized into an obsession[53:49] with Israel um but of course it's there[53:53] uh I have a colleague who says notice[53:56] how in no other conflict do you get a[53:59] daily description of the dead children[54:03] but which again all you have to say is[54:06] the children in Gaza and you kind of uh[54:11] Connect into a long history of lials[54:15] about how Jews have a ritual desire for[54:19] the blood of non-jewish children I mean[54:22] it's it's these are very ancient ideas[54:25] the Jew je being nefarious up to no good[54:30] um so these are very ancient[54:34] ideas and even if they come in a secular[54:38] kind of uh kind uh Garb they're still[54:42] the same ideas and clearly the source of[54:45] obsession is from there uh otherwise[54:48] you're right it's not rational would you[54:50] say that the these ideas are so deep and[54:52] so ancient that people mostly have them[54:56] subconsciously that they're not even[54:57] aware what they're doing oh for sure not[55:01] only that by now people don't understand[55:06] how they operate they're like but this[55:08] is what I read they will say but this is[55:10] what I read on the[55:11] news but no one ever stops to say why is[55:15] this what I'm reading in the news why is[55:18] this what I'm constantly fed what why is[55:21] this on my front[55:24] pages like and[55:27] you know adults are not very different[55:29] from children we like to hear the same[55:31] stories again and again and again it[55:33] gives us Comfort to hear the same[55:36] stories um I'm sure you know Matty[55:38] fredman a wonderful writer and[55:40] journalist nearly 20 years ago he wrote[55:43] a seminal piece about his um time[55:46] writing for the Associated[55:49] Press and he said how he wanted to write[55:52] all these stories about Israel and[55:54] nothing would filter up through the[55:56] editorial process that the only stories[56:00] that would filter would be the ones that[56:02] he said that would fit the mold of the[56:05] moral failing of the Jew that's it and[56:09] those are the only stories that would[56:10] filter up so a lot of people just take[56:14] what's given and they assume that the[56:17] reason that they read so much about the[56:19] conflict is because this is a really[56:21] terrible conflict and nothing more[56:23] important is happening in the world and[56:26] very few people stop to say why is this[56:30] the story I'm constantly getting what[56:34] value exists in keeping telling me this[56:38] story but you're right it's very deep[56:41] it's like there's a sense of comfort of[56:43] hearing the same stories again now they[56:45] are[56:47] secularized but they're basically the[56:49] same stories and finally people have a[56:52] place to place their guilt all their[56:55] shame and guilt bu ah the Jew the[56:57] archetypal Black Sheep finally we know[57:00] where we can place all the evils of the[57:02] world[57:03] right of course but that's an old one[57:06] right who killed Jesus really the Romans[57:09] right but the Romans were like they they[57:11] became the Christian Empire right the[57:13] Romans took Christianity so they can't[57:16] be the ones who killed Jesus so you know[57:19] blame it on somebody else do you see[57:21] many parallels in our society in the[57:23] Western World now in 2025 if if you[57:26] compare it to let's say uh Europe in the[57:29] 1930s before um Hitler Rose to power and[57:33] in the same atmosphere the same way of[57:36] speaking about Jews and do you see many[57:38] parallels[57:40] there so the big parallel that I see[57:43] it's one that I've been tracking for the[57:44] last 20 years um I've come to call it[57:47] the placard strategy because you see it[57:50] on placards and anti-israel[57:52] demonstrations and it's ingenious the[57:54] placard strategy is very simple it uh[57:58] it's built like an equation and it says[58:00] Israel Zionism starve David then an[58:04] equation sign and the placard strategy[58:07] has been so successful that I've yet to[58:09] see a placard that says Zionism equals[58:12] the political movement for[58:13] self-determination and liberation of the[58:15] Jewish people in their ancestral[58:17] Homeland right it's a long plard but[58:19] it's the only true one the plr strategy[58:23] is so successful that that we all know[58:26] what's on the other side of the equation[58:28] sign right Zionism Israel star of David[58:31] equals uh imperialism colonialism racism[58:35] aarth white supremacy then it escalates[58:39] Nazism genocide[58:41] Holocaust now these words are not chosen[58:44] because they reflect reality if anything[58:47] they're the inversion of reality right[58:49] the Jews have been the victims of[58:51] literally each one of those from[58:53] imperialism to genocide to Nazism[58:55] they've the victims of all[58:57] that the words are chosen not because[59:01] not only because they invert reality but[59:03] because they are synonyms for evil so[59:07] what people are constantly exposed to is[59:09] that Israel Zionism starve David equals[59:11] evil Israel Zionism starve David equals[59:14] evil now what do you do with evil you[59:17] eradicate evil right you don't negotiate[59:20] with evil you don't negotiate a[59:21] two-state solution with evil so after[59:24] October 7th in New blackard[59:27] appeared and it said keep the world[59:30] clean and it had an image of a star of[59:33] David in the[59:34] trashin and I remember seeing that[59:37] placard and saying Bingo That's The[59:40] Logical conclusion of the plaer[59:43] strategy because if you build the story[59:48] that there is an evil out there then[59:51] what you create is the notion that there[59:53] is a Utopia a clean War World a[59:57] beautiful world and between us in this[01:00:01] terrible world and Utopia[01:00:04] salvation what stands between us and[01:00:07] salvation is the collective Jew that[01:00:09] needs to be placed in the trash bin by[01:00:12] any means necessary we also heard that I[01:00:15] mean if you go back to Nazi Germany that[01:00:17] was the foundational[01:00:19] ideology that there is a better world a[01:00:23] clean[01:00:24] world and what stands between us and the[01:00:27] clean world like if anyone has the[01:00:29] patience to actually read Nazi texts[01:00:33] Hitler's text he's very[01:00:36] clear you know anti-Semitism was not[01:00:38] just any normal racism yeah the the[01:00:42] Nazis had this whole uh uh have a friend[01:00:46] called it junk science of race but the[01:00:49] other races they did[01:00:51] not put through the final solution the[01:00:53] other races they wanted to conquer to[01:00:56] enslave but it was just the normal[01:00:59] hierarchy of races of of kind of control[01:01:02] but they needed to destroy the Jews[01:01:07] because the Jews stood between the Nazis[01:01:10] and salvation or their version of[01:01:13] Salvation um the same idea is here the[01:01:19] idea that between a perfect world a[01:01:22] clean world and this world stands the[01:01:25] collective Je Jew is the most ancient[01:01:28] and the most dangerous idea when it[01:01:30] comes to the Jewish people um and it's[01:01:34] no coincidence that while all the evil[01:01:37] words are on the side of Israel's[01:01:40] Zionism Star of David all the good words[01:01:44] Justice equality Freedom rights they're[01:01:47] on the side of the negation which is[01:01:50] Palestinian ISM right so you PA it here[01:01:53] a good versus evil a clean World Utopia[01:01:58] salvation and the destruction of the[01:02:00] collective Jew as necessary to get to[01:02:03] that Utopia so yeah it's a very[01:02:05] dangerous idea but but why aren't people[01:02:08] able to see what they're doing[01:02:09] themselves like uh you know educated[01:02:12] people in the Western World Europe it's[01:02:15] only been like 80 years since the end of[01:02:17] second world war why aren't people able[01:02:19] to see these patterns and see what[01:02:21] they're actually doing and wake up and[01:02:23] see hey what am I a part of here what am[01:02:25] I doing here[01:02:26] do you have any thoughts about why[01:02:28] people aren't able to see that in[01:02:31] themselves um It's a combination first[01:02:34] of all I'm not sure I know but I I can[01:02:37] point to some things first of all it[01:02:41] comes in in you in new clothes right[01:02:45] just like anti-Semitism came in new[01:02:48] clothes so the secular scientific[01:02:52] educated people of the 19th century and[01:02:55] early 20 Century could say oh I have[01:02:58] nothing with these old religious ideas[01:03:01] about the Jews I'm an educated modern[01:03:04] secular scientific person and[01:03:06] anti-Semitism is scientific you know for[01:03:09] many years um especially with young[01:03:12] people I would struggle to tell the[01:03:15] history of anti-Semitism because they're[01:03:17] very smug everybody thinks like oh I[01:03:20] would know for sure like anti-Semitism[01:03:23] is so obviously a bad idea like clear I[01:03:26] would know and like you're saying they[01:03:28] don't realize that they're going through[01:03:30] that now because they're so smug about[01:03:34] the past and I would always struggle to[01:03:37] tell them in its time anti-Semitism was[01:03:41] considered respectable educated[01:03:45] scientific um obviously it got[01:03:49] discredited and then it came back in a[01:03:51] new kind of new cloes by the way from[01:03:55] the same tailor uh I always say that the[01:03:58] Soviet Union and sist Russia don't get[01:04:00] enough credit for their contribution to[01:04:02] taking Jew ha Global right Sarah strasia[01:04:05] literally wrote the book The Protocols[01:04:08] of the Elders of Zion which the Nazis[01:04:10] didn't invent they just adopted and[01:04:12] again the world is not inventing[01:04:14] anything it's just adopting what the[01:04:16] Soviets created and the Soviets[01:04:17] literally created the placr strategy[01:04:20] laundering it through educational[01:04:22] institutions right you can get a PhD in[01:04:24] Zionism is colonialism you get tenured[01:04:26] for Israel's committing[01:04:28] apartheid uh they would launder it[01:04:31] through the UN through the international[01:04:34] court of justice Criminal Court that's[01:04:36] how the placard strategy works by giving[01:04:38] it respectability and when things are[01:04:41] respectable people fall for it uh and[01:04:45] and they're just too smug they don't see[01:04:49] that they're literally going through the[01:04:50] same[01:04:51] thing is it also about not being willing[01:04:55] to accepting the evil parts of yourself[01:04:58] and being accepting that if this was[01:05:01] 1940s that the person in the Gestapo or[01:05:06] in the Nazis that could be yourself[01:05:09] right that that unwillingness to accept[01:05:11] that the evil character of the story[01:05:14] could be[01:05:16] yourself so I have a colleague who[01:05:19] defined evil very beautifully he said[01:05:22] that evil or for evil to take place[01:05:26] you need to[01:05:28] believe that a person or a group of[01:05:31] people stands between you and[01:05:34] salvation because only that belief can[01:05:37] lead you to the greatest acts of evil if[01:05:39] you think you're on the way to doing the[01:05:41] greatest good right you're on the way to[01:05:44] Bringing Utopia and salvation to this[01:05:46] world then for that you're willing to[01:05:49] commit the greatest[01:05:50] atrocities um I've been struggling a lot[01:05:54] especially we're not a lot after after[01:05:56] um International Holocaust uh[01:05:59] day um I've been following very closely[01:06:03] uh how this day was hijacked too right[01:06:07] it started earnestly as an international[01:06:10] Holocaust commemoration day and then it[01:06:12] descended to what I came to call[01:06:15] International some bad people did[01:06:17] something bad to other people day and[01:06:20] then especially this year it descended[01:06:23] into let's show that the are Nazis day[01:06:27] uh and you can combine two and three but[01:06:30] never one and Ellie weizel has uh an[01:06:34] amazing phrase where he said that the[01:06:36] Holocaust was not about man's in[01:06:38] humanity to man it was about man's in[01:06:41] humanity to[01:06:43] Jews and again and again I've come[01:06:47] across the[01:06:49] universalizing element kind of let's[01:06:51] show that the Holocaust is about a[01:06:53] universal story about evil[01:06:56] Vil and and you also said you know is it[01:06:59] about people not willing to recognize[01:07:01] evil and I'm asking these days I'm[01:07:04] asking myself a deeper question what[01:07:06] makes it so difficult for people to[01:07:07] accept that it was that it was about[01:07:10] Jews why is that people are willing to[01:07:13] accept that evil is possible that they[01:07:15] are capable of[01:07:17] evil but there seems to be a massive[01:07:20] blind spot about Jews there's some they[01:07:24] somehow don't think that they're capable[01:07:26] of that kind of evil even though that is[01:07:29] literally the evil staring them in the[01:07:31] eye and I notic that pattern to in in[01:07:35] international media in this Holocaust[01:07:37] Memorial Day how they how almost none of[01:07:39] them were mentioning the word Jew they[01:07:41] were saying like six million people were[01:07:43] killed six million so and so but never[01:07:46] the word Jew I saw that[01:07:48] everywhere yeah and and I I'm it's it's[01:07:52] my thought in the last few days and[01:07:54] weeks what are people running away from[01:07:59] because Ellie wiel is right the[01:08:02] Holocaust was not about Universal evil[01:08:05] it was not man s Humanity to man it was[01:08:11] about it was about Jews and it was about[01:08:14] how insane societies become when it[01:08:18] comes to Jews we go back to October 7th[01:08:21] the pal you know if you look at the[01:08:23] Kamas Charter it's 50% Muslim[01:08:26] Brotherhood 50% Nazi uh you can you know[01:08:29] there's a lot of scholarship Professor[01:08:31] Jeffrey HF about the impact of the Nazi[01:08:33] propaganda and Arabic radio on the[01:08:36] Muslim Brotherhood and with implications[01:08:38] to the[01:08:39] present the evil on October 7th was the[01:08:44] kind of monstrous evil that gets[01:08:48] Unleashed when it comes to[01:08:50] Jews why is that a blind spot why are[01:08:53] people now willing to admit that there's[01:08:55] something there why is there an effort[01:08:58] again and again to universalize it it's[01:09:00] just some general cruelty or so it's[01:09:05] something I'm thinking a lot about what[01:09:06] are people running away from what don't[01:09:08] they want to[01:09:10] see is it too shameful or are they[01:09:12] unwilling to look into themselves that[01:09:15] it's easier to pretend that it isn't[01:09:18] there I don't know but there's clearly[01:09:22] something there that they don't want to[01:09:24] touch[01:09:26] yes definitely also um yeah here in[01:09:29] Norway speaking of the Holocaust[01:09:31] Memorial Day we had we have a lot of[01:09:33] Institutions who whose job it is to take[01:09:36] care of and and um remember and remind[01:09:40] people of the the memory of the[01:09:42] Holocaust to shua and everything that[01:09:44] happened there and we've seen the[01:09:46] pattern this year that who who are they[01:09:48] inviting to give speeches and so they[01:09:51] inviting those Jews who are anti-zionist[01:09:54] Jews the Jews that have the opinion that[01:09:56] they want them to have the good Jews[01:09:58] right the and thereby um causing a[01:10:01] divide and a split between the good and[01:10:03] the bad Jews so that we see that pattern[01:10:05] going on what do you think about what[01:10:07] are your thoughts about you know anti-[01:10:10] zionis Jews people who who are who go[01:10:14] along with this whole Palestinian ISM[01:10:17] like the the felstein phenomena almost[01:10:20] what what are your thoughts about what[01:10:21] is that about Jews doing[01:10:23] that so start by saying that it's the[01:10:26] permanent feature of Jewish life uh[01:10:29] again it's the secular conversion you[01:10:31] know during the medieval[01:10:33] debates who would the Jew debate the Jew[01:10:37] would debate the converted Jew right on[01:10:39] the other side representing the church[01:10:42] were always Jewish converts because you[01:10:44] know they were the ones that would bring[01:10:46] the talmudic quot quotes and all that um[01:10:50] so I'll start by saying that it's an old[01:10:52] phenomena and a permanent feature of[01:10:53] Jewish life um the tragic part of it is[01:10:58] the part that because Jews are a[01:11:01] minority there is always immense[01:11:03] pressure and tremendous rewards for[01:11:06] selling out your[01:11:08] people uh you know if to quote uh[01:11:12] Churchill una appeasement you know it's[01:11:14] feeding the crocodile hoping you'll be[01:11:16] uh fed you know you'll be fed last um[01:11:20] the notion that if you sell out your[01:11:23] people you will somehow be saved has[01:11:26] never proven to be true um and well[01:11:31] maybe individually but then people have[01:11:33] to live had to live with that all their[01:11:34] lives um but it's it's that it's when[01:11:39] you're in a minority and there's massive[01:11:42] pressure and rewards you know many many[01:11:45] years ago sitting in a knesset[01:11:47] discussion there was a young student who[01:11:49] said look I'm now looking into PHD[01:11:52] programs and my options are as follows I[01:11:55] can do an anti-zionist PhD in America[01:11:59] and I could do a post Zionist PhD in[01:12:01] Israel but she's like those are[01:12:02] basically my options uh the the tenure[01:12:07] the rewards the platforming like you[01:12:09] said getting invited to speak come to[01:12:13] selling out your people and[01:12:15] unfortunately there will be always those[01:12:18] who respond to those um incentives yeah[01:12:22] because we've had discussions here in[01:12:24] Norway in the jewry here in nor what[01:12:26] we're what our thoughts about this and[01:12:28] and and in one sense I think that it's[01:12:30] important especially in Jewish culture[01:12:32] to allow lots of differences of opinion[01:12:35] and have debates and discussions and and[01:12:37] you know that's a typical um part of[01:12:41] Jewish life is to disagree and and um[01:12:44] honor disagreement but but I think[01:12:46] there's something different about going[01:12:48] out and and[01:12:51] um and selling out your people yeah as[01:12:54] you said it's like that that's that[01:12:55] doesn't fall under the umbrella of[01:12:57] disagreement anymore that's something[01:12:58] about betraying your own[01:13:00] people yeah it pretends to be an honest[01:13:03] disagreement but you're right it's not[01:13:06] yeah uh also you know people here in[01:13:09] Norway you know I think like in in[01:13:11] general Society here believe that if[01:13:13] Netanyahu is kicked out of office then[01:13:16] Hamas will release the hostages and the[01:13:18] war will be over and people here believe[01:13:20] you know uh and that the that he and the[01:13:23] right-wing cabinet is the driving force[01:13:25] behind the war what would you say to[01:13:27] that that kind of[01:13:29] belief so first of all this is why I[01:13:31] bring the quote from February 47 because[01:13:34] as I said there's no BB there's no[01:13:37] excuses they just like so it's really[01:13:40] good like this is what they are but you[01:13:43] know uh this uh first of all the whole[01:13:46] hostage situation uh to me shows a real[01:13:49] betrayal of the world but and people[01:13:51] calling it a deal it's not a deal it's[01:13:54] Ransom it's extortion you know if if you[01:13:57] agree to pay a ransom you're not going[01:13:59] to go home and say I did a good deal[01:14:01] right you know you paid a ransom under[01:14:04] duress okay[01:14:06] so we're paying this Ransom in just a[01:14:09] terrible arrangement of this drip drip[01:14:11] drip week after week and every week[01:14:14] Kamas is now putting on Productions[01:14:16] right they have uh printing presses and[01:14:20] all that which again shows you like all[01:14:22] the lies about famine and gen side and[01:14:25] suffering and like but and again people[01:14:29] never ask why are those the lies that[01:14:31] I'm willing to believe what why am I so[01:14:34] eager to believe that let's put that[01:14:36] aside okay so they put on these[01:14:38] Productions and when they were uh[01:14:41] releasing when we ransomed our four um[01:14:45] Soldiers the female soldiers the[01:14:47] spotters they put a big[01:14:49] stage now those soldiers were very[01:14:53] dominant in the Israeli consciousness[01:14:55] they knew that they had all of Israel[01:14:58] watching their production right and they[01:15:01] put a big sign which they had a printing[01:15:03] press working um in Hebrew which which[01:15:07] means that this was intended for us to[01:15:09] read for the Israelis so when all of[01:15:12] Israel is watching them in the Hebrew[01:15:15] language what are they writing on the[01:15:18] poster the day of our freedom will come[01:15:21] we will one day have a state gaza's ours[01:15:24] for ever what they chose to write when[01:15:28] they have the attention of all Israelis[01:15:31] is Zionism will not win right they're[01:15:35] basically they're not saying anything[01:15:37] positive for themselves this goes to[01:15:40] back to what Palestinian ism is[01:15:42] Palestinian ism is about negating what[01:15:44] the Jews have built so they're not[01:15:48] they're not proposing a positive Vision[01:15:50] they're saying you will not get what you[01:15:53] want you will not have your Sovereign[01:15:56] Jewish State Zionism will not win that's[01:15:59] what they said so they're being very[01:16:02] clear at this moment they did not write[01:16:05] please get rid of netan that's seriously[01:16:08] not what they said right they could have[01:16:10] said get rid of netan and you're getting[01:16:13] the rest of the hostages right they[01:16:15] could have printed that that's not what[01:16:17] they're saying so we're getting back to[01:16:19] just listen to them they're telling us[01:16:21] in prime time in Hebrew we just need to[01:16:25] listen and read in in your opinion do[01:16:29] you think Netanyahu has been hard enough[01:16:31] on Hamas has he done enough to get rid[01:16:33] of that Terror[01:16:36] organization quite the opposite we are[01:16:39] ending a almost a year and a half of[01:16:44] fighting when Hamas is standing I I[01:16:47] think the problem was in the[01:16:50] beginning that Hamas was defined as the[01:16:52] enemy to me that was the First[01:16:56] Fundamental mistake and once you make[01:16:58] that mistake you you can't you can't[01:17:01] save anything I compare it to the[01:17:03] Americans declaring in December[01:17:06] 1941 war against Japanese Pilots they're[01:17:10] like sure Japan you go about your[01:17:13] Imperial racial supremacist ideology[01:17:16] we're cool with that we're just going to[01:17:18] go and find pilots and kill them that's[01:17:21] basically what Israel said when it said[01:17:24] that the war is against Hamas no Hamas[01:17:27] is merely the executive arm of[01:17:30] Palestinian ISM a brutal[01:17:33] one but just the executive arm of[01:17:35] Palestinian ISM they did not hijack the[01:17:39] peaceloving minding their own business[01:17:42] people of Gaza they were from them of[01:17:45] them they represent them um they share[01:17:50] the the their vision is the Palestinian[01:17:53] vision so when the Prime Minister agreed[01:17:57] to pretend that the war is merely[01:18:00] against Hamas at that moment we[01:18:04] lost yeah because how how how is one pos[01:18:08] how is it possible to designate and[01:18:10] differentiate between like civilian[01:18:13] people in Gaza and people who are Hamas[01:18:17] and that whole gray area in between like[01:18:20] are there is the data on this do we know[01:18:23] how many people actually support tamas[01:18:25] and want them to to to to eradicate the[01:18:28] Jewish State and how do we know and do[01:18:31] you know the is there data on[01:18:34] this what we know very[01:18:37] clearly is that even when you have[01:18:40] voices that criticize Kamas and you have[01:18:42] some of those voices they don't[01:18:44] criticize Palestinian ISM typically[01:18:47] their criticism of Kamas is that Kamas[01:18:49] failed like look at the destruction look[01:18:52] at the mess look at what you let but[01:18:55] they're not s but you don't hear voices[01:18:57] and again I've made it my business to[01:18:59] listen very carefully you know because[01:19:02] we're so eager to hear different things[01:19:07] you know if you just hear someone[01:19:08] criticizing Kamas you like there's[01:19:10] immediately news articles about them and[01:19:13] all that so I read all of them and I and[01:19:15] I read the quotes and I'm like none of[01:19:18] the quotes question the fundamental[01:19:22] ideology no one says[01:19:25] why have we spent the last century[01:19:27] fighting the Jewish state or Gaza could[01:19:30] have been a heaven we could have made it[01:19:33] into a flourishing Global Hub of export[01:19:37] and trade and instead we invested[01:19:41] everything and turning Gaza into an[01:19:43] integrated war machine where like you[01:19:45] said there's no differentiating line[01:19:48] between uh fighter and civilian because[01:19:50] the whole fighting I methodology based[01:19:55] on blurring that line uh that's not what[01:19:59] you hear people[01:20:00] saying so the criticism is that Kamas[01:20:04] didn't do it didn't succeed but when[01:20:08] they thought Kamas was successful on[01:20:10] October 7th what you had was[01:20:13] Euphoria and you did not see at the[01:20:17] moment when they thought Kamas was[01:20:18] successful in destroying the Jewish[01:20:20] state or at least beginning the[01:20:22] process they did not not only did they[01:20:25] not criticize Kamas nobody said what are[01:20:27] you doing murdering people there was[01:20:30] Euphoria all across the Gaza Strip in[01:20:32] the West Bank all across the the[01:20:36] Palestinian World University campuses[01:20:38] everything you did not see a single[01:20:41] poster in any demonstration in London in[01:20:45] Colombia I'm not that saying in Gaza you[01:20:47] know in London you did not see a single[01:20:49] sign by a Palestinian standing and[01:20:52] saying not in my name you had a billion[01:20:56] Jewish signs saying not in my name even[01:20:59] before Israel started doing[01:21:01] something but there was no Palestinians[01:21:03] saying not in my name you do not murder[01:21:06] people not in my name there was one guy[01:21:10] on Twitter he's my he's great and he's[01:21:12] one of the three that I know but but[01:21:14] yeah but like so that's the data the[01:21:18] data is that nobody speaks[01:21:21] up and how much of that would you say[01:21:23] that is the actual like real data versus[01:21:27] how much of that could also be because[01:21:29] if they speak of or they afraid to speak[01:21:32] up because of the consequences if they[01:21:33] say something against Hamas while living[01:21:35] in Gaza or these areas where Hamas[01:21:39] controls it at this point it's an excuse[01:21:42] this is why I say London Colombia fine[01:21:45] you know I'm like we see the Iranian[01:21:48] diaspora the Iranian diaspora they speak[01:21:51] up they love Israel they like you have[01:21:53] people in Iran[01:21:55] you had people in Nazi Germany trying to[01:21:57] assassinate Hitler okay you even had[01:22:00] that you're not seeing any of that you[01:22:03] didn't see anyone trying to help um to[01:22:07] help um hostages Escape yeah you don't[01:22:10] have stories of righteous among the[01:22:14] Nations so at one point you need to stop[01:22:17] making excuses and just accept that this[01:22:21] is what they[01:22:22] want and that's what I've heard from[01:22:24] from the hostages who have been released[01:22:26] also saying that the ones who have[01:22:27] stayed with families over there in Gaza[01:22:29] saying that you know what everybody[01:22:31] there is a terrorist everybody was in on[01:22:33] it and that's that's the impression I've[01:22:35] got from listening to them as well[01:22:38] Y and also if um if it is it possible to[01:22:43] explain like if you were to explain it[01:22:45] to a kid like the the actual historical[01:22:47] nature of the Israel Palestinian[01:22:49] Conflict for for like a child to[01:22:52] understand is it is it a way to SU Miz[01:22:55] that and so that people could understand[01:22:57] it simply oh it's actually really easy[01:23:00] uh I remember uh my son uh when he was[01:23:03] uh very young he used to come to me with[01:23:05] me to Television Studios and all that[01:23:07] and and at one point he said I want to[01:23:09] understand it was like he really want to[01:23:10] know and I sat with him and all you have[01:23:12] to do is show the partition map um Maybe[01:23:15] not maybe you can one of my favorite[01:23:18] visuals to show is um the one where you[01:23:23] show the partition map next to okay so[01:23:28] I'll you can then do it more[01:23:29] professionally but what you see is the[01:23:31] partition map and next to it the[01:23:33] incidence of[01:23:34] malaria in early 20th century in the[01:23:38] land so basically the land that was[01:23:41] allocated to the Jewish state was the[01:23:44] land that the Jews reclaimed from[01:23:46] malaria plus desert right and this is[01:23:48] after the Arabs were able to prevent the[01:23:50] Jewish state from emerging in the 30s[01:23:52] they had a lot of Victories along the[01:23:54] way closing the Jewish the pre um the[01:23:57] pre-state embryonic Jewish yesu to[01:24:01] Jewish[01:24:02] immigration uh basically they were[01:24:05] almost successful in preventing the[01:24:07] establishment of a Jewish State and[01:24:09] ultimately kind of the Jews were able to[01:24:12] secure a vote so that they can get the[01:24:15] lands reclaimed from malaria plus[01:24:17] desert and even that the Arabs said[01:24:20] absolutely not so it's really easy for a[01:24:23] child you say the Jews were willing to[01:24:25] share and the Arabs said absolutely not[01:24:29] you get nothing that's it that's the[01:24:31] easiest thing to explain to a[01:24:34] child one side is willing to share and[01:24:37] one side says you get[01:24:39] nothing I have some questions here that[01:24:41] my Jewish friend sent to me that I[01:24:44] wanted to ask you if you have the time[01:24:46] uh sure let's do it quickly yes uh one[01:24:50] question is that uh how can we reach[01:24:52] through with the message that Israel and[01:24:54] sanism is actually a legit cause how can[01:24:56] we get that message[01:24:59] through um my only uh my only suggestion[01:25:03] just keep at it because what I've uh[01:25:06] what I found over the years is because[01:25:09] anti Zionism is not really criticism of[01:25:13] Israel it really is about the placard[01:25:16] strategy and this idea that what stands[01:25:19] between us and Utopia is the collective[01:25:22] Jew they always[01:25:25] push and at one point what I found is if[01:25:30] people are not willing to listen[01:25:32] normally but then something will happen[01:25:35] they'll be like oh these anti-zionists[01:25:37] are or these Palestinian ISS you know[01:25:40] they're they're a little crazy they're[01:25:42] they're they're moving you know I have[01:25:44] friends telling me you know uh seeing[01:25:46] all these Kamas[01:25:48] Productions this like this mob uh like[01:25:52] with the hostages is an old man a young[01:25:56] woman a lot of people are like what's[01:25:58] going on there those are the moments[01:26:00] when people are like ah this is not[01:26:02] criticism of Israel those are the[01:26:04] moments when you can get through with[01:26:06] this message so my an my answer is keep[01:26:09] at it be consistent and there will be[01:26:13] moments when people are suddenly willing[01:26:15] to listen because they they will begin[01:26:17] to see things because the other side is[01:26:20] really not interested in peace two[01:26:22] states blah blah blah they're they're[01:26:24] their goal is no Jewish State they they[01:26:27] they cannot help themselves and Al and[01:26:29] that's when people are willing to[01:26:31] listen also what should we do in the[01:26:34] Jewish diaspora in general like and also[01:26:37] in Norway is it too late for us in the[01:26:39] diaspora do you are you worried about[01:26:41] the Jews in the[01:26:43] diaspora I'm worried about Jews[01:26:45] everywhere that's that's kind of what I[01:26:47] do um I'm worried about Jews here I'm[01:26:50] worried about Jews in the diaspora I'm[01:26:52] worried precisely because of that idea[01:26:54] AA of uh you are what stands between us[01:26:57] and a clean world it's a very dangerous[01:27:00] idea I have a colleague who like is an[01:27:02] anti-zionist and all that you know[01:27:04] doesn't care but but he says you know he[01:27:08] said like he's in Ai and he thinks that[01:27:11] we're in grave danger here in Israel[01:27:13] because he's like AI is moving quickly[01:27:16] and as long as people believe that you[01:27:18] are what stands between them in a better[01:27:21] world they'll find ultimately they'll[01:27:23] find the weapons and the means to make[01:27:25] you to kill you all[01:27:28] [Music][01:27:29] um so so yeah of course once once you[01:27:33] introduce the idea this is again a[01:27:35] person who's not lover of Israel but he[01:27:37] can recognize the danger in the idea[01:27:42] that you are what stands between us and[01:27:46] a better world uh so I I can't tell you[01:27:50] where the greatest danger is here there[01:27:52] anywhere but but that's the nature of[01:27:54] the danger uh and we need to be aware of[01:27:58] it that's um that's the most I can say[01:28:01] at this point what do you think of[01:28:04] people in journalism and Academia like[01:28:06] in Norway and in Europe who end up[01:28:08] supporting Hamas Hezbollah as like a[01:28:10] movement uh fighting for a just cause or[01:28:14] responding to oppression like what do[01:28:17] you think of[01:28:19] those so I hope that the moment that[01:28:22] they will realize that they should be[01:28:24] ashamed of themselves will happen before[01:28:27] too much[01:28:28] damage uh happens to the Jewish people[01:28:31] that's the most I can hope[01:28:33] for um and hypothetical question here if[01:28:36] the Oslo agreements would have been[01:28:39] accepted as Clinton proposed them in[01:28:41] 2001 at Camp David do you think we'd now[01:28:44] have a peace and a two-state[01:28:47] solution so it is literally uh a[01:28:51] non-existent hypothetical that was[01:28:54] everything I talked[01:28:55] about the the Palestinians could not[01:28:58] have said the what what was what made[01:29:01] the OA accord's work is that it did not[01:29:04] demand that the Palestinians give up on[01:29:07] the core tenants of Palestinian ISM they[01:29:10] kept perpetuating the refugee Hood they[01:29:13] kept believing in the right of return[01:29:16] all of these things were left for the[01:29:18] end which is why they could sign the oo[01:29:21] Accords but because it didn't force the[01:29:24] to forgo Palestinian[01:29:26] ISM when the time came to sign that's[01:29:30] when they ran away because that's when[01:29:33] Israel said you know this is it you have[01:29:36] to end your Century long war against[01:29:40] Jewish sovereignty and they were like uh[01:29:42] actually that's the one thing we We[01:29:44] can't agree to because that's our core[01:29:47] foundational ideology so what the[01:29:51] question basically assumes that the[01:29:53] Palestinians sto being Palestinian so[01:29:56] yes the answer is if one[01:29:59] day the Arabs will finally have an[01:30:02] identity that is no longer a Palestinian[01:30:07] identity no longer an identity that[01:30:09] negates Jewish self-determination then[01:30:11] absolutely we can have an agreement[01:30:14] that's what I hope for but during the[01:30:17] Alo years Unfortunately they they still[01:30:20] held to that ideology so in retrospect[01:30:23] there was no way they could sign an[01:30:25] agreement that forced them to let go of[01:30:29] them uh in the west one always assumes[01:30:32] that Israel is the one who holds the key[01:30:34] to peace is that the[01:30:37] case[01:30:39] um let me put it this way the one way[01:30:41] that Israel holds the key to peace is[01:30:43] that if Israel disappeared not that[01:30:46] there would be peace but at least this[01:30:48] conflict would no longer exist so yes we[01:30:50] have the key to committing suicide and[01:30:52] in that sense I agree[01:30:55] but Israel doesn't actually Israel again[01:30:59] except for its Sovereign existence has[01:31:01] never been the problem I say that Israel[01:31:04] always agreed to a two-state solution if[01:31:07] one of the two is the Jewish State and[01:31:10] the Arabs have always rejected any[01:31:12] two-state solution if one of the two is[01:31:14] the Jewish State that's why we're kind[01:31:16] of stuck that's the irreconcilable[01:31:18] conflict so we ex accept our Sovereign[01:31:23] existence our our one non-negotiable is[01:31:25] that we want a Jewish State[01:31:28] unfortunately their one non-negotiable[01:31:30] is that there should be no Jewish State[01:31:32] and again that's why we're stuck but[01:31:35] beyond that we've been flexible smaller[01:31:38] yeah I showed you the map malaran desert[01:31:40] I mean like it could be a smaller State[01:31:42] you know as long as we're Sovereign but[01:31:45] if the other side's position is[01:31:48] no you you need to have zero then we're[01:31:52] you know that's a problem[01:31:54] what do you believe personally like as a[01:31:57] solution for Gaza going forward and in[01:32:00] regards to like a two-state solution or[01:32:03] one- state solution or like who and who[01:32:06] should rule Gaza after all of this do[01:32:08] you have thoughts about that so I say[01:32:11] not who but what what should rule Gaza[01:32:15] is anyone who doesn't want to destroy[01:32:18] the Jewish State that's it that's that's[01:32:21] my condition just like I said for just[01:32:23] like for the terrorist funding I was[01:32:25] like stop trying to create all these B[01:32:28] just find if they're really if they[01:32:31] really want to live next to a Jewish[01:32:32] State and you know until that happens[01:32:34] you can find all kinds of Arrangements[01:32:37] in the Jordan or Egypt or something but[01:32:40] but it's very clear that if Gaza will[01:32:43] continue to be ruled by an ideology that[01:32:46] negates Jewish sovereignty then Gaza[01:32:48] will continue to be a platform for[01:32:51] War what about the two-state solution do[01:32:54] you have do you believe in that in in[01:32:56] the long term I'm agnostic I say look I[01:33:01] just want the Arabs of the West Bank and[01:33:03] Gaza to no longer want to destroy the[01:33:05] Jewish State once that[01:33:08] happens how they want to govern[01:33:12] themselves uh by being uh annexed to[01:33:15] Jordan or Egypt by creating seven[01:33:18] Emirates I have a colleague who proposes[01:33:20] seven Emirates but I don't know they[01:33:23] want whatever it is I'm agnostic they[01:33:26] want a state great as long as that state[01:33:30] is not about destroying the Jewish state[01:33:33] so I say I'm those are not important[01:33:36] issues how we arrange the polit make the[01:33:39] political Arrangement what's important[01:33:41] is does the ideology of Palestinian ISM[01:33:44] not the people the ideology can the[01:33:47] ideology finally die just like Nazism[01:33:52] was killed as an ideology[01:33:54] but most Germans lived to become a[01:33:58] pillar of world peace[01:34:01] but that's it that's what needs to[01:34:03] happen Palestinian ISM as an ideology[01:34:06] needs to die so that the people can[01:34:11] live yeah and I have I have a final[01:34:13] question here um the UN what's your[01:34:18] what's your perspective on the UN are[01:34:20] they trustworthy are they what are your[01:34:22] thoughts about the UN in general[01:34:25] General so like everything that[01:34:27] Palestinian ISM has hijacked from[01:34:30] airplanes to the UN they destroy it[01:34:32] because again it's a destructive[01:34:34] ideology so it brings destruction[01:34:37] everywhere um whether it's Arab[01:34:39] countries like Jordan or Lebanon whether[01:34:41] it's the Gaza Strip it's it's a[01:34:43] destructive ideology so it brings[01:34:46] destruction uh so I have so I have now a[01:34:50] crazy idea for the UN how to save the UN[01:34:53] from from complete destruction because[01:34:55] this is clearly where it's going like it[01:34:57] corrupted the UN the insertion of[01:34:59] Palestinian ISM by the Soviets in the[01:35:01] Muslims in the 70s really corrupted the[01:35:04] UN it's corrupting its institutions uh[01:35:07] so I have an idea to give Israel um a[01:35:10] spot on the UN Security Council a[01:35:13] permanent seat[01:35:15] because we go back a bit to the[01:35:17] international Holocaust day societies go[01:35:21] mad when they believe that the[01:35:24] collective Jews stands between them and[01:35:26] salvation so maybe if we actually put[01:35:30] the Jews give them a seat at the UN[01:35:33] Security Council maybe then the UN can[01:35:36] go back to actually doing what it was[01:35:38] supposed to do rather than being[01:35:40] obsessed with the Jewish Day so that's[01:35:44] my crazy I agree I agree Dr an W thank[01:35:48] you so much for your time and for[01:35:49] joining me on the podcast today it was[01:35:51] enlightening and so interesting[01:35:54] thank you my[01:35:55] pleasure all right thanks guys and[01:35:57] thanks for everybody who's been[01:35:58] listening and watching this podcast[01:36:01] thank you I'm is[01:36:03] hi absolutely
Israel-Palestine Debate: Finkelstein, Destiny, M. Rabbani & Benny Morris | Lex Fridman Podcast #418
Introduction
The discussion begins with a light-hearted comment about the speaker's slow speaking pace, which is often criticized by viewers who suggest increasing playback speed. The speaker explains that the reason for this deliberate pace is the value they place on each word spoken. This sets the tone for a debate filled with facts, historical context, and differing perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Debate Overview
The debate features four participants: Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani, and Steven Bonnell (Destiny). Each participant brings a unique perspective to the discussion, with Finkelstein and Morris being historians, Rabbani a Middle East analyst, and Bonnell a political commentator. The aim of the debate is not to win or score points but to explore the complex history, present circumstances, and potential future of Israel and Palestine in an open conversation.
Historical Context: The Year 1948
The conversation shifts to the pivotal year of 1948, a significant date for both Israelis and Palestinians. For Israelis, it marks the establishment of the state of Israel and the War of Independence, while for Palestinians, it represents the Nakba, or catastrophe, which resulted in the displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homes. The participants are asked to reflect on the importance of understanding the events surrounding 1948 to grasp the ongoing conflict.
Norman Finkelstein's Perspective
Finkelstein provides an overview of the political landscape post-World War II, explaining that the British no longer wanted to manage the Palestine question, which led to the involvement of the United Nations. He emphasizes that the UN was not attempting to arbitrate rights and wrongs but was faced with a practical problem of two national communities with irreconcilable differences. The UN's Partition Resolution recommended the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab, which Finkelstein supports as the correct decision given the historical context.
He cites the UN Special Committee on Palestine, which insisted that both states guarantee full equality of all citizens regarding political, civil, and religious rights. However, he questions the clarity of what it meant to label a state as Jewish or Arab if full equality was guaranteed. Finkelstein argues that the partition was the only viable option at the time, as he believes that coexistence was not practical due to the tensions between the two communities.
Benny Morris's Response
Benny Morris responds by discussing the UN's recommendation for partition, linking it to earlier proposals made by the Peel Commission in 1937. He highlights that the Arabs rejected the partition plan outright, which led to the civil war between the Jewish and Arab communities. Morris argues that the Arab rejectionism of the partition plan and subsequent attacks on the Jewish community contributed to the displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war.
Morris asserts that had the Arabs accepted the partition, a Jewish state with a significant Arab minority could have emerged. He emphasizes that the conflict escalated due to Arab aggression and that the resulting refugee problem was a consequence of the war initiated by the Arab states against Israel.
Mouin Rabbani's Analysis
Mouin Rabbani provides a critical perspective on the historical context of Zionism and the concept of transfer. He references Chaim Weizmann's assertion that the objective of Zionism was to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English. Rabbani argues that the establishment of a Jewish state necessitated Jewish political, demographic, and territorial supremacy, which inherently led to the displacement of Palestinians.
He also critiques the notion that the Holocaust should be used to justify the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, emphasizing that the responsibility for the Holocaust should not fall on the Palestinians, who had no role in the events of World War II. Rabbani argues that the partition resolution was deeply unjust, given the demographic realities of Palestine at the time.
Steven Bonnell's Perspective
Steven Bonnell, known as Destiny, challenges the narrative that places all blame for the conflict on Zionism. He argues that the historical context is often cherry-picked to support a moral narrative, neglecting the fact that the Arab leadership rejected multiple peace offers and partition plans. Bonnell emphasizes that the land acquired by Jewish organizations was often purchased from Palestinian Arabs and that the rejection of coexistence was not solely a result of Zionist ideology but also of Arab resistance to Jewish statehood.
The Role of International Law
The discussion transitions to the role of international law in the conflict, particularly regarding the legitimacy of Israeli actions and Palestinian claims. Morris argues that international law has often been disregarded in practice, while Finkelstein emphasizes the importance of preserving the historical record and recognizing the suffering of both sides. The participants debate the effectiveness of international law in resolving the conflict and whether it has been applied fairly to both parties.
October 7th Attacks and Their Implications
The conversation shifts to the recent attacks by Hamas on October 7th, which resulted in significant civilian casualties in Israel. Morris characterizes the attacks as genocidal, citing the Hamas charter's call for the eradication of Jews from Palestine. He argues that the ideology behind the attacks is rooted in a genocidal intent, while Bonnell counters that the historical context and the actions of both sides must be considered when discussing the legitimacy of the attacks.
Rabbani emphasizes the need for an independent investigation into the events of October 7th and the subsequent Israeli response, arguing that both sides have committed atrocities and that a balanced perspective is necessary for understanding the conflict.
Hope for the Future
As the debate progresses, the participants are asked to share their thoughts on the possibility of peace in the region. Finkelstein expresses skepticism about the potential for a two-state solution, given the current political climate and the actions of the Israeli government. He raises concerns about the increasing violence and the dehumanization of Palestinians in Israeli society.
Rabbani shares a similar sentiment, stating that the Palestinian people have shown resilience and determination in the face of adversity. He believes that while the situation is bleak, the struggle for Palestinian rights will continue, and there is hope for a future where both peoples can coexist peacefully.
Bonnell argues that a genuine peace settlement will require a change in leadership on both sides, with leaders willing to engage in meaningful negotiations and compromise. He emphasizes that the current trajectory of violence is counterproductive and that a focus on diplomacy and dialogue is essential for achieving lasting peace.
Conclusion
The debate concludes with a recognition of the complexities and challenges facing both Israelis and Palestinians. The participants acknowledge the need for continued dialogue and understanding, even in the midst of deep-seated divisions and historical grievances. The hope for peace remains, albeit tempered by the realities of the ongoing conflict and the political landscape.
The speakers present a complex narrative regarding the causes of the 1948 war and the subsequent displacement of Palestinians. Their positions suggest a blend of both planned policy and consequences of wartime dynamics. The discussion begins with Norman Finkelstein, who emphasizes that the aftermath of World War II left the British unwilling to manage the Palestine issue, leading to the United Nations' involvement. According to Finkelstein, the UN was faced with a practical problem rather than adjudicating rights and wrongs, given the irreconcilable differences between the two national communities in Palestine.
Finkelstein asserts that the Partition Resolution was a practical decision, concluding that neither side was committed to the resolution, as both acted on their national interests during the war. He cites the acceptance of the Partition Plan by Jews as evidence against the notion that they uniformly rejected coexistence with Palestinians. He states, "[05:51] 'The Partition Resolution was the correct decision.'" This indicates his belief that the Jewish community's acceptance of partition was a crucial turning point.
Benny Morris, on the other hand, suggests that the war's onset was precipitated by mutual hostilities, stating that the Arab states and Palestinians outright rejected the partition plan. He mentions, "[15:11] 'The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution.'" Morris argues that the conflict was exacerbated by the Arab side's military actions against the Jewish community, which he claims led to displacements during the war.
Overall, the speakers provide a nuanced view that portrays the displacement of Palestinians as a multifaceted result of both intentional policies and the chaos of war, indicating a mixed classification in their perspectives, with Finkelstein leaning towards a pro-Palestinian stance and Morris reflecting a more pro-Israeli viewpoint.
- [05:51] 'The Partition Resolution was the correct decision.'
- [15:11] 'The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution.'
In discussing the role of population transfer in Zionist thought and practice before and during 1948, the speakers present differing perspectives on its significance. Norman Finkelstein posits that although there were discussions of transfer within Zionist ideology, it was not a formal policy prior to the violence of 1947-48. He acknowledges that the concept existed but argues it was not central to the broader Zionist project. He states, "[41:29] 'Transfer was never policy of the Zionist movement before '47.'" Finkelstein stresses that the violence and the subsequent displacement were primarily reactions to the war's dynamics rather than a premeditated plan of the Zionist leadership.
In contrast, Benny Morris presents a more intricate view of the population transfer as integral to the Zionist project. He argues that the establishment of a Jewish state inherently required a significant reduction of the Arab population in the territory. Morris has been quoted saying, "[13:31] 'Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism...'" This suggests that he sees the transfer not merely as a consequence of conflict but as a necessary outcome of the Zionist goal of establishing a Jewish state.
The discussion highlights a key tension between the two speakers. Finkelstein emphasizes the lack of intention behind transfer before the war, while Morris provides evidence of a historical inevitability tied to Zionist ideology. As such, their positions can be classified as mixed, with Finkelstein's perspective leaning towards a pro-Palestinian interpretation, while Morris's aligns more closely with a pro-Israeli narrative.
- [41:29] 'Transfer was never policy of the Zionist movement before '47.'
- [13:31] 'Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism...'
The speakers offer a multifaceted examination of the failure of major peace negotiations, particularly focusing on the 2000 Camp David process. Norman Finkelstein attributes the breakdown of these negotiations partly to the Israeli leadership's unwillingness to offer a genuine two-state solution that acknowledged Palestinian rights. He states that Arafat, despite recognizing Israel, could not agree to terms that would imply a permanent acceptance of a Jewish state, indicating a psychological barrier on his part. He reflects, "[04:11:32] 'He was constitutionally, psychologically incapable of signing off on a two-state deal.'" This portrays Arafat as a figure trapped by the expectations and sentiments of his constituents.
Benny Morris, however, places more blame on the Palestinian side for rejecting what he considers reasonable offers from Israel. He asserts that during the Camp David negotiations, Israel was prepared to relinquish significant portions of land, but the Palestinians did not reciprocate. He mentions, "[15:50] 'The Arabs rejected partition and the Arabs of Palestine launched... war against the resolution.'" Morris suggests that the Arab refusal to accept partition deeply influenced their negotiating position and the subsequent violence.
Both speakers acknowledge the complexity of the situation but differ in their assignment of blame. Finkelstein emphasizes psychological and historical factors contributing to Arafat's decisions, while Morris attributes the failure largely to the Palestinian leadership's choices. This leads to a classification of their positions as mixed, with Finkelstein leaning more pro-Palestinian and Morris adopting a more pro-Israeli stance.
- [04:11:32] 'He was constitutionally, psychologically incapable of signing off on a two-state deal.'
- [15:50] 'The Arabs rejected partition and the Arabs of Palestine launched... war against the resolution.'
The speakers present varying viewpoints on the role and application of international law in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Norman Finkelstein treats international law as a crucial framework for understanding the legitimacy of claims made by both sides. He emphasizes that international resolutions, like UN Resolution 242, are binding and should guide negotiations and actions. He states, "[04:20:31] 'Every United Nations Security Council resolution irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding.'" This positions Finkelstein as someone who regards international law as central to the discourse surrounding the conflict.
Benny Morris, however, expresses skepticism about the practical relevance of international law. He suggests that while international law may exist, it often does not reflect the realities on the ground and is often ignored by both parties. He implies that international law has little impact on the negotiations and outcomes of the conflict, arguing that "[04:20:59] 'Nobody cares about international law.'" This indicates a more pragmatic approach, suggesting that political realities often supersede legal frameworks.
Mouin Rabbani seems to navigate a middle ground, acknowledging the importance of international law while also recognizing that it has been selectively applied and often dismissed in favor of direct negotiations. His position highlights the tension between legal standards and the political dynamics that shape the conflict. Thus, the classification of their positions can be seen as mixed, with Finkelstein advocating for the importance of international law, while Morris views it as limited in practical relevance.
- [04:20:31] 'Every United Nations Security Council resolution irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding.'
- [04:20:59] 'Nobody cares about international law.'
The speakers discuss the Hamas-led attacks on October 7 and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza with a focus on moral, legal, and political implications. Benny Morris characterizes the attacks as brutal and intentional, stating that the objective was the mass murder of civilians. He describes the events as a culmination of Hamas's genocidal ideology, referencing the charter of Hamas which calls for the eradication of Jews from the land. He states, "[02:09:06] 'the Jews must be eradicated...the driving ideology behind the massacre of the Jews on October 7th.'" This perspective portrays the attacks as a clear act of aggression with genocidal implications.
Norman Finkelstein, however, emphasizes the context of resistance and self-defense, suggesting that while the attacks were morally reprehensible, they were also a response to the ongoing oppression faced by Palestinians. He argues for a nuanced understanding of the situation, implying that the cycle of violence stems from broader systemic issues rather than a simple narrative of good versus evil. Finkelstein articulates that the situation has escalated due to continuous Israeli aggression and oppression, leading to desperation on the Palestinian side.
Additionally, the speakers discuss the legal ramifications of the actions of both sides. Morris states that Hamas's actions are outright war crimes, while Finkelstein calls for accountability on both sides, suggesting that Israel's military actions also warrant scrutiny under international law. This indicates a complexity in their positions, as both recognize the brutality of the conflict but differ in their interpretations of intent and justification. The classification of these positions is mixed, with Morris leaning towards a pro-Israeli narrative and Finkelstein advocating for a pro-Palestinian viewpoint.
- [02:09:06] 'the Jews must be eradicated...the driving ideology behind the massacre of the Jews on October 7th.'
- [04:22:56] 'the attacks were morally reprehensible, but they were also a response to the ongoing oppression faced by Palestinians.'
The speakers present a variety of views on the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which is seen as a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Norman Finkelstein argues that the Partition Plan was fundamentally a fair solution, as it attempted to address the irreconcilable differences between the two national communities in Palestine. He supports his position by emphasizing that the plan was an effort by the United Nations to create two states—one Jewish and one Arab—despite the inherent tensions. Finkelstein asserts that the acceptance of the plan by Israeli leaders indicates a willingness to compromise, although he critiques the subsequent actions of those leaders during and after the 1948 war.
Benny Morris, on the other hand, acknowledges the Partition Plan's original intent but highlights the Arab rejection of it. He emphasizes that the Arab leadership outright dismissed the partitioning of Palestine, which he believes undermined any potential for a peaceful resolution. Morris argues that this rejection led to conflict, reinforcing his position that both sides contributed to the failure of the plan.
Both speakers reflect on the historical context and demographic realities of the time. Finkelstein points out, "[04:51] For Palestinians, 1948 is a Nakba, which means catastrophe... the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes as a consequence of the war." This underlines the human impact of the partition, suggesting that while the plan aimed for compromise, it resulted in significant suffering.
- [05:12] "I do not believe that the Arab and Jewish communities could at that point be made to live together."
- [14:39] "The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution."
- [04:56] "In my view, the Partition Resolution was the correct decision."
In conclusion, the positions on the Partition Plan are mixed, with Finkelstein leaning towards a pro-Israeli interpretation of the necessity and potential fairness of the plan, while Morris emphasizes the implications of Arab rejectionism, revealing a more critical stance towards Palestinian leadership.
The speakers analyze Britain's role in the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly focusing on the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. Norman Finkelstein portrays Britain as initially reluctant to address the Palestine question directly, culminating in the Balfour Declaration, which he implies was driven by both humanitarian motives and imperial strategy. He emphasizes that the British were responding to a practical problem after World War II, as they sought to manage conflicting national aspirations within Palestine.
Benny Morris takes a somewhat critical stance towards the British, asserting that their policies were inconsistent and largely self-serving. He notes that while the Balfour Declaration indicated support for a Jewish national home, the British also imposed limitations on Jewish immigration in response to Arab opposition. Morris states, "[01:07] The Americans weren't happy to take in Jews," which implies that Britain was not the only nation with a dubious humanitarian record regarding Jewish immigration. He suggests that the British actions often exacerbated tensions rather than alleviating them.
This interplay of humanitarian concern and imperial strategy suggests that the British were attempting to balance their geopolitical interests with the moral imperatives arising from the aftermath of the Holocaust. Finkelstein's perspective reflects a belief that Britain's responsibility was to provide a safe haven for Jews, while Morris argues that the British actions contributed to the ongoing conflict.
- [10:04] "The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference."
- [15:22] "The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution."
- [01:13] "They weren't happy to take in Jews."
Thus, the positions articulated by the speakers suggest a complex view of Britain's role, recognizing both humanitarian aspirations and imperial interests.
The speakers present differing perspectives on the migration and displacement of Jews from Arab and Muslim-majority countries after 1948. Benny Morris emphasizes that while there was significant displacement of Jewish populations from these countries, it should not be equated with the Palestinian Nakba of 1948. He acknowledges the pain and suffering of those Jews forced to flee but portrays their displacement as a consequence of rising anti-Zionism and violence in their host countries rather than a calculated ethnic cleansing.
Norman Finkelstein, however, argues that the context of this Jewish migration is often misrepresented. He notes that Jewish communities in Arab nations were not uniformly supportive of Zionism and highlights the complex motivations behind their displacement. Finkelstein states, "[23:13] I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility for addressing this crisis," indicating a belief that the issue of Jewish displacement should be viewed within a broader international context rather than as a direct parallel to the Palestinian situation.
This comparison leads to nuanced discussions about the historical narratives each side has constructed around their experiences. Morris implies that while Jewish migration was significant, it does not negate the suffering experienced by Palestinians during the Nakba. Finkelstein suggests that the plight of Jewish refugees has been weaponized politically to dismiss or downplay Palestinian suffering.
- [21:19] "There was a lot of push, a lot of push."
- [27:45] "Without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established."
- [23:29] "The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution."
Overall, the positions reveal a complexity in addressing the narratives of displacement, with neither speaker fully equating or dismissing the experiences of the other.
The Great March of Return protests in Gaza in 2018 are characterized by the speakers as a complex phenomenon, reflecting both civilian protest and organized violence. Mouin Rabbani emphasizes the non-violent nature of the protests at the beginning, stating that they were largely peaceful demonstrations aimed at asserting Palestinian rights. He notes that while there were instances of violence, the overall intention was to draw attention to the plight of Palestinians. Rabbani states, "[21:27] The Great March of Return represented the First Intifada, represented the First Intifada, which was overwhelmingly non-violent," highlighting the peaceful aspirations of many participants.
Conversely, Benny Morris describes the protests as being manipulated by Hamas, suggesting that the organization sought to exploit the situation to further its own agenda. He argues that Hamas used the protests as a cover for more militant actions, stating that "[20:06] The Jews created a state, the Palestinian Arabs never bothered to even try to create a state before '48 and in the course of the 1948 war, and for that reason, they have no state to this day." This implies a belief that the protests were not entirely organic but rather orchestrated by militant elements within Palestinian society.
Regarding Israel's response, the speakers express differing views. Morris asserts that the Israeli military aimed to target militants, but acknowledges that civilian casualties were inevitable in such a volatile environment. He states that "[20:20] The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out, some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave." This statement reflects a nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in military engagement during such protests.
- [21:27] "The Great March of Return represented the First Intifada, represented the First Intifada, which was overwhelmingly non-violent."
- [20:06] "The Jews created a state, the Palestinian Arabs never bothered to even try to create a state before '48."
- [20:20] "The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out, some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave."
In summary, both speakers recognize the complexity of the protests, but they diverge in their interpretations of the motivations behind them and the justification of Israel's military response.
The speakers provide differing perspectives on the civilian casualties resulting from Israeli-Palestinian violence, particularly in Gaza. Benny Morris attributes these casualties to military necessity and the conduct of armed groups like Hamas, suggesting that Israel's strikes are primarily focused on militant targets. He argues that the casualties should not be viewed in isolation but rather as a consequence of Hamas's choice to embed itself within civilian populations. Morris asserts, "[20:20] The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out, some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave," which reflects his belief that the responsibility for civilian casualties lies partly with the operational tactics of armed groups.
Norman Finkelstein, on the other hand, emphasizes the moral implications of civilian deaths, suggesting that the loss of life must be seen in the context of the broader humanitarian crisis. He indicates that while military operations may aim at specific targets, the resulting civilian suffering raises ethical questions about the conduct of the military. He states, "[20:06] If the Arabs are attacking you. Yes." This implies a recognition of the complexities of warfare but also a condemnation of the disproportionate impact on civilians.
This discourse reveals a tension between justifying military actions and acknowledging the human cost of such actions. Morris's focus on military necessity suggests a more pragmatic view of civilian casualties as an unfortunate byproduct of conflict, while Finkelstein's emphasis on morality indicates a critical stance toward the toll of violence on non-combatants.
- [20:20] "The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war, Arab populations were driven out, some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave."
- [20:06] "If the Arabs are attacking you. Yes."
- [20:10] "If you want to kill civilians in Gaza, they could have killed 500,000 by now with the number of strikes they've done."
Overall, the perspectives on civilian casualties reveal a complex interplay between military necessity, ethical considerations, and the tragic realities of war.
[00:00] - That's a good point. No, no, that's a good point. - Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly[00:06] and they're advised on YouTube to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I'm on.[00:13] One of the reasons I speak slowly is because I attach value to every word I say.[00:20] - Norm will say this over and over and over again. "I only deal in facts. I don't deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts. I only deal in facts."[00:27] And that seems to be the case, except for when the facts are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you're trying to push.[00:32] The idea that Jews would've out of hand rejected any state that had Arabs on it[00:37] or always had a plan of expulsion is just betrayed by the acceptance of the '47 Partition Plan. - I don't think you understand politics.[00:43] - They forced the British to prevent immigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine. That's what they did. - Again, was Palestine-[00:50] - And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe- - Was Palestine the only spot of land on Earth?[00:56] - Yes, basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn't immigrate the world. - What about your great friends in Britain,[01:02] the architects of the Balfour Declaration? - By the late 1930s- - What about the United States? - They weren't happy to take in Jews[01:07] and the Americans weren't happy to take in Jews. - And why are Palestinians who were not Europeans,[01:13] who had zero role in the rise of Nazism, who had no relation to any of this,[01:18] why are they somehow uniquely responsible for what happened in Europe and uniquely- - They were helping to close[01:23] the only safe haven for Jews. - Professor Morris, because of your logic,[01:29] and I'm not disputing it, that's why October 7th happened. - [Steven] Oh my God. - Because there was no options left for those people.[01:38] - The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim, apart from the attacks on the military sites,[01:44] when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians and they killed family after family, house after house.[01:51] - Talk fast so people think that you're coherent. - I'm just reading from the UN. - [Norman] Yeah, but you see- - I know you like them sometimes.[01:56] Only when they agree with you though. But you've lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren't just on the beaches[02:01] as often stated in the article. Those kids were literally coming out of a previously identified Hamas compound that they had operated from.[02:07] They literally- - Mr. Borelli- - You can Google it. - Mr. Borelli, with all due respect. - Mr. Finkelsteiver. - With all due respect, you're such a fantastic moron,[02:15] it's terrifying. - Uh-huh. - The following is a debate on the topic of Israel and Palestine[02:22] with Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani and Steven Bonnell, also known online as Destiny.[02:29] Norm and Benny are historians. Mouin is a Middle East analyst, and Steven is a political commentator and streamer.[02:37] All four have spoken and debated extensively on this topic. The goal for this debate[02:42] was not for anyone to win or to score points. It wasn't to get views or likes.[02:49] I never care about those. And I think there are probably much easier ways to get those things if I did care.[02:57] The goal was to explore together the history, present and future of Israel and Palestine[03:02] in a free flowing conversation. No time limits, no rules.[03:07] There was a lot of tension in the room from the very beginning, and it only got more intense as we went along.[03:15] And I quickly realized that this very conversation in a very real human way was a microcosm[03:22] of the tensions and distance and perspectives on the topic of Israel and Palestine.[03:28] For some debates, I will step in and moderate strictly to prevent emotions from boiling. For this, I saw the value in not interfering[03:36] with the passion of the exchanges because that emotion in itself spoke volumes.[03:42] We did talk about the history and the future, but the anger, the frustration, the biting wit,[03:48] and at times respect and camaraderie were all there. Like I said, we did it in an perhaps all too human way.[03:59] I will do more debates and conversations on these difficult topics and I will continue to search for hope[04:05] in the midst of death and destruction to search for our common humanity[04:10] in the midst of division and hate. This thing we have going on, human civilization,[04:17] the whole of it, is beautiful and it's worth figuring out[04:23] how we can help it flourish together. I love you all.[04:29] This is a Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now, dear friends, here's Norman Finkelstein,[04:37] Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani, and Steven Bonnell. First question is about 1948.[04:45] For Israelis, 1948 is the establishment of the state of Israel and the war of independence.[04:51] For Palestinians, 1948 is a Nakba, which means catastrophe, or the displacement of 700,000 Palestinians from their homes[05:00] as a consequence of the war. What to you is important to understand about the events of 1948 and the period around there,[05:07] '47 '49, that helps us understand what's going on today[05:12] and maybe helps us understand the roots of all of this that started even before 1948.[05:18] I was hoping that Norm could speak first and Benny, then Mouin and then Steven. Norm.[05:24] - After World War II, the British decided that they didn't want to deal[05:32] with the Palestine question anymore, and the ball was thrown into the court[05:37] of the United Nations. Now, as I read the record, the UN was not attempting[05:45] to arbitrate or adjudicate rights and wrongs, it was confronting a very practical problem.[05:55] There were two national communities in Palestine[06:00] and there were irreconcilable differences on fundamental questions.[06:06] Most importantly, looking at the historic record on the question of immigration[06:12] and associated with the question of immigration, the question of land.[06:19] The UN Special Committee on Palestine, which came into being before the UN[06:26] 181 Partition Resolution, the UN Special Committee,[06:32] it recommended two states in Palestine. There was a minority position[06:39] represented by Iran, India, Yugoslavia.[06:45] They supported one state, but they believed that if forced to,[06:54] the two communities would figure out some sort of modus vivendi and live together.[07:03] United Nations General Assembly supported partition between what it called a Jewish state and an Arab state.[07:13] Now, in my reading of the record, and I understand there's new scholarship in the subject,[07:18] which I've not read, but so far as I've read the record, there's no clarity[07:25] on what the United Nations General Assembly meant[07:31] by a Jewish state and an Arab state, except for the fact[07:36] that the Jewish state would be demographically, the majority would be Jewish,[07:43] and the Arab state demographically would be Arab.[07:49] The UNSCOP, the UN Special Committee on Palestine, it was very clear and it was reiterated many times[08:00] that in recommending two states, each state, the Arab state and the Jewish state,[08:09] would have to guarantee full equality of all citizens[08:14] with regard to political, civil, and religious matters.[08:19] Now, that does raise the question if there is absolute full equality of all citizens,[08:27] both in the Jewish state and the Arab state with regard to political rights,[08:33] civil rights, and religious rights, apart from the demographic majority,[08:41] it's very unclear what it meant to call a state Jewish or call a state Arab.[08:49] In my view, the Partition Resolution was the correct decision.[08:56] I do not believe that the Arab and Jewish communities could at that point be made to live together.[09:06] I disagree with the minority position of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia.[09:12] And that not being a practical option, two states was the only other option.[09:20] In this regard, I would want to pay tribute to what was probably the most moving speech[09:28] at the UN General assembly proceedings by the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.[09:36] I was very tempted to quote it at length, but I recognized that would be taking too much time[09:48] so I asked a young friend, Jamie Stern-Weiner, to edit it and just get the essence[09:56] of what Foreign Minister Gromyko had to say. "During the last war," Gromyko said,[10:04] "the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering.[10:12] Without any exaggeration, this sorrow and suffering are indescribable.[10:21] Hundreds of thousands of Jews are wandering about in various countries of Europe[10:28] in search of means of existence and in search of shelter.[10:34] The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference.[10:42] Past experience, particularly during the Second World War,[10:48] shows that no western European State was able to provide adequate assistance[10:56] for the Jewish people in defending its rights and its very existence[11:03] from the violence of the Hitlerites and their allies.[11:08] This is an unpleasant fact, but unfortunately, like all other facts,[11:15] it must be admitted." Gromyko went on to say, in principle,[11:23] he supports one state, or the Soviet Union supports one state.[11:28] But he said, "If relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine proved to be so bad[11:39] that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful coexistence[11:44] of the Arabs and the Jews, the Soviet Union would support two states."[11:53] I personally am not convinced that the two states[11:59] would have been unsustainable in the long term. If, and this is a big if,[12:07] the Zionist movement had been faithful to the position it proclaimed[12:13] during the UNSCOP public hearings, at the time, Ben-Gurion testified,[12:23] "I want to express what we mean by a Jewish state.[12:29] We mean by a Jewish state simply a state where the majority of the people are Jews,[12:36] not a state where a Jew has in any way any privilege more than anyone else.[12:45] A Jewish state means a state based on absolute equality[12:52] of all her citizens and on democracy."[12:57] Alas, this was not to be. As Professor Morris has written,[13:06] "Zionist ideology and practice were necessarily and elementally expansionist."[13:16] And then he wrote in another book, transfer, the euphemism for expulsion,[13:24] "transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism[13:31] because it sought to transform a land which was Arab[13:37] into a Jewish state. And a Jewish state could not have arisen[13:43] without a major displacement of Arab population.[13:48] And because this aim automatically produced resistance among the Arabs, which in turn persuade[13:57] the Yeshuv's leaders," the Yeshuv being the Jewish community, "the Yeshuv's leaders that a hostile Arab majority[14:06] or a large minority could not remain in place[14:11] if a Jewish state was to arise or safely endure."[14:16] Or as Professor Morris retrospectively put it,[14:22] "a removing of a population was needed.[14:27] Without a population expulsion, a Jewish state would not have been established."[14:39] The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution.[14:44] I won't play games with that. I know a lot of people try to prove it's not true. It clearly, in my view, is true.[14:52] The Arab side rejected outright the Partition Resolution[14:58] while Israeli leaders acting on the compulsions[15:04] inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism,[15:11] found the pretext in the course of the first Arab-Israeli war[15:16] to expel the indigenous population and expand its borders.[15:22] I therefore conclude that neither side was committed to the letter of the Partition Resolution,[15:32] and both sides aborted it. - Thank you, Norm. Norm asked that we make a lengthy statement[15:38] in the beginning. Benny, I hope it's okay to call everybody by their first name in the name of camaraderie.[15:44] Norm has quoted several things you said. Perhaps you can comment broadly on the question of 1948[15:50] and maybe respond to the things that Norm said. - Yeah. UNSCOP, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine[15:59] recommended partition, the majority of UNSCOP recommended partition which was accepted by the UN General Assembly[16:05] in November 1947. Essentially, looking back to the Peel Commission in 1937,[16:13] 10 years earlier, a British Commission had looked at the problem of Palestine, the two warring national groups[16:19] who refused to live together, if you like, or consolidate a unitary state between them.[16:29] And Peel said there should be two states. That's the principle. The country must be partitioned in two states.[16:35] This would give a modicum of justice to both sides, if not all their demands, of course.[16:41] And the United Nations followed suit, the United Nations, UNSCOP, and then the UN General Assembly[16:47] representing the will of the international community said two states is the just solution[16:53] in this complex situation. The problem was that immediately with the passage[16:58] of the resolution, the Arab states and the Arabs of Palestine said no,[17:04] as Norman Finkelstein said. They said no, they rejected the partition idea,[17:10] the principle of partition, not just the idea of what percentage which side should get, but the principle of partition they said no to.[17:17] The Jews should not have any part of Palestine for their sovereign territory.[17:23] Maybe Jews could live as a minority in Palestine. That also was problematic in the eyes of the Palestinian Arab leadership.[17:29] Husseini had said only Jews who were there before 1917 could actually get citizenship and continue to live there.[17:37] But the Arabs rejected partition and the Arabs of Palestine launched, in very disorganized fashion, war against the resolution,[17:45] against the implementation of the resolution, against the Jewish community in Palestine.[17:51] And this was their defeat in that civil war between the two communities, while the British were withdrawing from Palestine[17:59] led to the Arab invasion, the invasion by the Arab states in May 1948 of the country.[18:06] Again, basically with the idea of eradicating or preventing the emergence of a Jewish state[18:12] in line with the United Nations decision and the will of the international community.[18:18] Norman said that the Zionist enterprise, and he quoted me, meant from the beginning[18:25] to transfer or expel the Arabs of Palestine or some of the Arabs of Palestine.[18:31] And I think he's sort of quoting out of context. The context in which the statements were made[18:38] that the Jewish state could only emerge if there was a transfer of Arab population[18:44] was preceded in the way I wrote it and the way it actually happened, by Arab resistance[18:51] and hostilities towards the Jewish community. Had the Arabs accepted partition, there would've been a large Arab minority[18:57] in the Jewish state, which emerged in '48, '47. And in fact, Jewish economists and state builders[19:05] took into account that there would be a large Arab minority and its needs would be cared for, et cetera.[19:13] But this was not to be because the Arabs attacked and had they not attacked, perhaps, a Jewish state with a large Arab minority[19:21] could have emerged but this didn't happen. They went to war. The Jews resisted. And in the course of that war,[19:28] Arab populations were driven out, some were expelled, some left because Arab leaders advised them to leave[19:36] or ordered them to leave. And at the end of the war, Israel said they can't return 'cause they just tried to destroy the Jewish state.[19:45] And that's the basic reality of what happened in '48. The Jews created a state,[19:50] the Palestinian Arabs never bothered to even try to create a state before '48 and in the course of the 1948 war,[19:58] and for that reason, they have no state to this day. The Jews do have a state 'cause they prepared to establish a state, fought for it,[20:06] and established it, hopefully lastingly.[20:11] - When you say hostility, in case people are not familiar, there was a full on war where Arab states invaded[20:20] and Israel won that war. - Let me just add to clarify. The war had two parts to it.[20:28] The first part was the Arab community in Palestine, its militiamen attacked the Jews from November 1947.[20:37] In other words, from the day after the UN Partition Resolution, it was passed, Arab gunmen were busy shooting up Jews[20:44] and that snowballed into a full scale civil war between the two communities in Palestine.[20:49] In May 1948, a second stage began in the war in which the Arab states invaded the new state,[20:56] attacked the new state and they too were defeated and thus, the state of Israel emerged.[21:03] In the course of this two stage war, a vast Palestinian refugee problem occurred.[21:11] - And so after that, the transfer, the expulsion, the thing that people call the Nakba, happened.[21:19] Mouin, could you speak to 1948 and the historical significance of it? - Sure. There's a lot to unpack here.[21:27] I'll try to limit myself to just a few points.[21:32] Regarding Zionism and transfer, I think Chaim Weizmann,[21:38] the head of the world's Zionist organization, had it exactly right when he said that the objective of Zionism[21:46] is to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English or France as French.[21:53] In other words, as Norman explained,[22:00] a Jewish state requires Jewish political, demographic,[22:08] and territorial supremacy. Without those three elements,[22:13] the state would be Jewish in name only. And I think what distinguishes Zionism is its insistence,[22:22] supremacy and exclusivity. That would be my first point. The second point is I think[22:29] what the Soviet foreign minister at the time, Andre Gromyko, said is exactly right, with one reservation.[22:39] Gromyko was describing a European savagery unleashed against Europe's Jews.[22:46] At the time, you know, it wasn't Palestinians or Arabs. The savages and the barbarians were European to the core.[22:55] It had nothing to do with developments in Palestine or the Middle East.[23:04] Secondly, at the time that Gromyko was speaking, those Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and others[23:13] who were in need of safe haven were still overwhelmingly on the European continent[23:20] and not on Palestine, not in Palestine. And I think given the scale of the savagery,[23:31] I don't think that any one state or country should have borne the responsibility[23:39] for addressing this crisis, I think it should have been an international responsibility.[23:46] The Soviet Union could have contributed, Germany certainly could and should have contributed,[23:52] the United Kingdom and the United States, which slammed their doors shut[23:57] to the persecuted Jews of Europe as the Nazis were rising to power,[24:03] they certainly should have played a role. But instead, what passed for the international community at the time[24:11] decided to partition Palestine. And here I think we need to judge the Partition Resolution[24:18] against the realities it obtained at the time. Two thirds of the population of Palestine was Arab.[24:28] The Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, constituted about one third of the total population[24:35] and controlled even less of the land within Palestine.[24:42] As a preeminent Palestinian historian, Walid Khalidi has pointed out the Partition Resolution[24:51] in giving roughly 55% of Palestine to the Jewish community[24:57] and I think 41, 42% to the Arab community,[25:03] to the Palestinians, did not preserve the position of each community[25:09] or even favor one community at the expense of the others.[25:15] Rather, it thoroughly inverted and revolutionized the relationship[25:22] between the two communities. And as many have written,[25:28] the Nakba was the inevitable consequence of partition[25:34] given the nature of Zionism, given the territorial disposition,[25:39] given the weakness of the Palestinian community whose leadership had been largely decimated[25:46] during a major revolt at the end of the 1930s, given that the Arab states were still very much[25:53] under French and British influence, the Nakba was inevitable,[26:00] the inevitable product of the Partition Resolution.[26:05] And one last point also about the UN's Partition Resolution[26:11] is yes, formally that is what the international community decided[26:16] on the 29th of November 1947. It's not a resolution that could ever have gotten[26:22] through the UN General Assembly today for a very simple reason. It was a very different General Assembly.[26:28] Most African, most Asian states we're not yet independent.[26:34] Were the resolution to be placed before the international community today,[26:39] and I find it telling that the minority opinion was led by India, Iran, and Yugoslavia,[26:47] I think they would've represented the clear majority. So partition, given what we know about Zionism,[26:57] given that it was entirely predictable what would happen, given the realities on the ground in Palestine,[27:06] was deeply unjust. And the idea that either the Palestinians[27:11] or the Arab states could have accepted such a resolution[27:17] is I think, an illusion. That was in 1947. We saw what happened in '48 and '49.[27:26] Palestinian society was essentially destroyed. Over 80%, I believe, of Palestinian's residents[27:34] in the territory that became the state of Israel were either expelled or fled,[27:40] and ultimately were ethnically cleansed because ethnic cleansing consists of two components.[27:45] It's not just forcing people into refuge or expelling them, it's just as importantly preventing their return.[27:53] And here, and Benny Morris has written, I think a article about Yosef Weitz[27:58] and the transfer committees. There was a very detailed initiative to prevent the return and it consisted[28:05] of razing hundreds of Palestinian villages to the ground, which was systematically implemented and so on.[28:11] And so Palestinians became a stateless people. Now, what is the most important reason[28:18] that no Arab state was established in Palestine? Well, since the 1930s, the Zionist leadership[28:27] and the Hashemite leadership of Jordan,[28:32] as it's been thoroughly researched and written about by the Israeli British historian Avi Shlaim,[28:39] essentially colluded to prevent the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine in the late 1940s.[28:52] There's much more here, but I think those are the key points I would make about 1948.[28:59] - We may talk about Zionism, Britain, UN assemblies, and all the things you mentioned, there's a lot to dig into.[29:06] So again, if you can keep it to just one statement moving forward. - Sure.[29:11] - After Steven, if you wanna go a little longer. Also, we should acknowledge the fact that the speaking speeds of people here are different.[29:18] Steven speaks about 10 times faster than me. Steven, if want to comment on 1948.[29:25] - Yeah, I think it's interesting where people choose to start the history. I noticed a lot of people like to start at either '47 or '48[29:33] because it's the first time where they can clearly point to a catastrophe that occurs on the Arab side that they want to ascribe 100% of the blame[29:40] to the newly emergent Israeli state to. But I feel like when you have[29:46] this type of reading of history, it feels like the goal is to moralize everything first and then to pick and choose facts[29:52] that kind of support the statements of your initial moral statement afterwards. Whenever people are talking about '48[29:58] or the establishment of the Arab state, I never hear about the fact that a civil war started in '47[30:05] that was largely instigated because of the Arab rejectionism of the '47 partition plan.[30:10] I never hear about the fact that the majority of the land that was acquired happened by purchases from Jewish organizations[30:17] of Palestinian Arabs of the Ottoman Empire before the mandatory period in 1920 even started.[30:24] Funnily enough, King Abdullah of Jordan was quoted as saying, "The Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in weeping about it."[30:31] I never hear about the multiple times that Arabs rejected partition, rejected living with Jews,[30:39] rejected any sort of state that would've even had any sort of Jewish exclusivity. It's funny because it was brought up before[30:45] that the partition plan was unfair and that's why the Arabs rejected it as though they rejected it because it was unfair,[30:51] because of the amount of land that Jews were given and not just due to the fact that Jews were given land at all, as though a 30% partition or a 25% partition[30:59] would've been accepted when I don't think that was the reality of the circumstances. I feel like most of the other stuff has been said,[31:04] but I noticed that whenever people talk about '48 or the years preceding '48,[31:09] I think the worst thing that happens is there's a cherry-picking of the facts where basically all of the blame is ascribed[31:15] to this built-in idea of Zionism that because of a handful of quotes[31:20] or because of an ideology, we can say that transfer or population expulsion or basically the mandate[31:26] of all of these Arabs being kicked off the land was always going to happen when I think there's a refusal sometimes as well to acknowledge that regardless of the ideas[31:33] of some of the Zionist leaders, there is a political, social and military reality on the ground that they're forced to contend with.[31:39] And unfortunately, the Arabs, because of their inability to engage in diplomacy and only to use tools of war[31:45] to try to negotiate everything going on in Mandatory Palestine, basically always gave the Jews a reason or an excuse to fight[31:52] and acquire land through that way because of their refusal to negotiate on anything else. Whether it was the partition plan in '47,[31:57] whether it was the Lausanne Peace Conference afterwards where Israel even offered to annex Gaza in '51,[32:03] where they offered to take in a hundred thousand refugees, every single deal is just rejected out of hand[32:08] because the Arabs don't want a Jewish state anywhere in this region of the world. - I would like to engage Professor Morris.[32:14] If you don't mind, I'm not with the first names. It's just not my way of relating. - You can just call me Morris. You don't need the professor.[32:21] - Okay. (Lex laughs) There's a real problem here and it's been a problem I've had over many years[32:29] of reading your work. Apart perhaps from a grandchild, I suspect nobody knows your work better than I do.[32:37] I've read it many times. Not once, not twice, at least three times, everything you've written.[32:43] And the problem is, it's a kind of quicksilver. It's very hard to grasp a point and hold you to it.[32:55] So we're gonna try here to see whether we can hold you to a point.[33:00] And then you argue with me the point. I have no problem with that.[33:07] Your name please. - Steven Bonnell. - Okay. Mr. Bonnell referred to cherry-picking[33:13] and handful of quotes. Now, it's true that when you wrote your first book[33:21] on the Palestinian refugee question, you only had a few lines on this issue of transfer.[33:28] - Four pages. - In the first book? - In the first book. Four pages. - Maybe four. You know, I'm not gonna quarrel. My memory's not clear.[33:35] We're talking about 40 years ago. I read it, I read it, but then I read other things by you.[33:41] And you were taken to task, if my memory is correct, that you hadn't adequately documented[33:49] the claims of transfer. Allow me to finish. And I thought that was a reasonable challenge[33:56] because it was an unusual claim for a mainstream Israeli historian to say,[34:03] as you did in that first book, that from the very beginning,[34:08] transfer figured prominently in Zionist thinking. That was an unusual,[34:13] if you read Anita Shapira, you read Shabtai Teveth. That was an unusual acknowledgement by you.[34:21] And then I found it very impressive[34:27] that in that revised version of your first book,[34:32] you devoted 25 pages to copiously documenting[34:40] the salience of transfer in Zionist thinking.[34:47] And in fact, you used a very provocative and resonant phrase.[34:55] You said that transfer was inevitable[35:02] and inbuilt into Zionism. We're not talking about circumstantial factors,[35:10] a war, Arab hostility. You said it's inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism.[35:21] Now, as I said, so we won't be accused of cherry-picking,[35:27] those were 25 very densely argued pages.[35:35] And then in an interview, and I could cite several quotes, but I'll choose one, you said,[35:44] "Removing a population was needed." Let's look at the words.[35:51] "Without a population expulsion,[35:56] a Jewish state would not have been established."[36:01] Now, you are the one, again, I was very surprised when I read your book.[36:09] Here I'm referring to "Righteous Victims." I was very surprised when I came to that page 37[36:17] where you wrote that territorial displacement[36:23] and dispossession was the chief motor[36:28] of Arab resistance to Zionism. Territorial displacement and dispossession[36:35] were the chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism. So you then went on to say[36:43] because the Arab population rationally feared[36:49] territorial displacement and dispossession, it of course opposed Zionism.[36:56] That's as normal as Native Americans opposing the Euro-American manifest destiny[37:05] in the history of our own country. Because they understood it would be at their expense.[37:12] It was inbuilt and inevitable. And so now for you to come along and say[37:20] that it all happened just because of the war, that otherwise the Zionists made all these plans[37:28] for a happy minority to live there, that simply does not gel, it does not cohere,[37:37] it is not reconcilable with what you yourself have written.[37:42] It was inevitable and inbuilt. Now in other situations you've said that's true,[37:50] but I think it was a greater good to establish a Jewish state[37:56] at the expense of the indigenous population. That's another kind of argument.[38:01] That was Theodore Roosevelt's argument in our own country. He said, "We don't want the whole of North America[38:08] to remain a squalid refuge for these wigwams and teepees.[38:15] We have to get rid of them and make this a great country." But he didn't deny that it was inbuilt and inevitable.[38:25] - I think you've made your point there. First, I'll take up something that Mouin said. He said that the Nakba was inevitable-[38:32] - As have you. - And predictable. No, no, no. I've never said that. It was inevitable and predictable[38:39] only because the Arabs assaulted the Jewish community and state in 1947/48.[38:45] Had there been no assault, there probably wouldn't have been a refugee problem. There's no reason for a refugee problem to have occurred,[38:52] expulsions to have occurred, a dispossession, massive dispossession to occur. These occurred as a result of war.[38:59] Now, Norman has said that I said that transfer was inbuilt into Zionism[39:06] in one way or another. And this is certainly true. In order to buy land, the Jews bought tracts of land[39:14] on which some Arabs sometimes lived. Sometimes they bought tracts of land on which there weren't Arab villages,[39:20] but sometimes they bought land on which there were Arabs. And according to Ottoman law, and the British, at least in the initial years[39:27] of the British mandate, the law said that the people who bought the land[39:33] could do what they liked with the people who didn't own the land, who were basically squatting on the land, which is the Arab tenant farmers.[39:39] We're talking about a very small number, actually, of Arabs who were displaced as a result of land purchases in the Ottoman period[39:47] or the mandate period. But there was dispossession in one way. They didn't possess the land, they didn't own it,[39:53] but they were removed from the land and this did happen in Zionism. And there's, if you like,[39:59] an inevitability in Zionist ideology of buying tracks of land and starting to work it yourself[40:06] and settle it with your own people and so on, that made sense. But what we're really talking about is what happened in '47/'48.[40:14] And in '47/'48, the Arabs started a war. And actually, people pay for their mistakes.[40:20] And the Palestinians have never actually agreed to pay for their mistakes. They made mistakes, they attack, they suffer as a result[40:27] and we see something similar going on today in the Gaza Strip. They do something terrible, they kill 1200 Jews,[40:34] they abduct 250 women and children and babies and old people and whatever.[40:40] And then they start screaming, please save us from what we did, because the Jews are counterattacking.[40:46] And this is what happened then and this is what's happening now. There's something fairly similar in the situation here.[40:53] Expulsion, and this is important, Norman, you should pay attention to this. You didn't raise that.[40:58] Expulsion transfer were never policy of Zionist movement before '47,[41:04] it doesn't exist in Zionist platforms of the various political parties[41:09] of the Zionist organization, of the Israeli state, of the Jewish Agency. Nobody would've actually made it into policy[41:17] because there was always a large minority. If there were people who wanted it, always a large minority of Jewish politicians and leaders[41:24] who would've said no, this is immoral. We cannot start a state on the basis of an expulsion.[41:29] So it was never adopted and actually was never adopted as policy even in '48, even though Ben-Gurion wanted as few Arabs[41:36] in the course of the war staying in the Jewish state after they attacked it. He didn't want disloyal citizens staying there[41:43] 'cause they wouldn't have been loyal citizens. But this made sense in the war itself.[41:48] But the movement itself and its political parties never accepted it. It's true that in 1937 when the British,[41:56] as part of the proposal by the Peel Commission to divide the country into two states, one Arab, one Jewish,[42:04] which the Arabs of course rejected, Peel also recommended most of the Arabs[42:10] in the Jewish state to be should be transferred because otherwise, if they stayed[42:15] and were disloyal to the emergent Jewish state, this would cause endless disturbances, warfare,[42:22] killing and so on. So Ben-Gurion and Weizmann latched onto this proposal[42:27] by the most famous democracy in the world, the British democracy,[42:32] when they proposed the idea of transfer side by side with the idea of partition 'cause it made sense.[42:40] And they said, well, if the British say so, we should also advocate it. But they never actually tried to pass it as Zionist policy[42:47] and they fairly quickly stopped even talking about transfer after 1938. - So just to clarify, what you're saying[42:54] is that '47 was an offensive war, not a defensive war.[43:01] - By the Arabs, yes. - By the Arabs. - Yeah. - And you're also saying that there was never a top-down[43:07] policy of expulsion. - Yes. - Just to clarify the point. - If I understood you correctly,[43:15] you're making the claim that transfer expulsion and so on[43:20] was in fact a very localized phenomenon resulting from individual land purchases.[43:29] And if I understand you correctly, you're also making the claim[43:35] that the idea that a Jewish state requires a removal or overwhelming reduction[43:46] of the non-Jewish population was- - If the Arabs are attacking you. Yes.[43:51] - But let's say prior to 1947, it would be your claim[43:57] that the idea that a significant reduction or wholesale removal of the Arab population[44:05] was not part of Zionist thinking. Well, I think there's two problems with that.[44:11] I think what you're saying about localized disputes is correct,[44:17] but I also think that there is a whole literature[44:23] that demonstrates that transfer was envisioned[44:29] by Zionist leaders on a much broader scale than simply individual land purchases.[44:35] In other words, it went way beyond we need to remove these tenants so that we can farm this land.[44:41] The idea was we can't have a state where all these Arabs remain and we have to get rid of them.[44:47] And the second, I think, impediment to that view is that long before the UN General Assembly convened[44:57] to address the question of Palestine, Palestinian and Arab and other leaders as well[45:03] had been warning ad infinitum that the purpose of the Zionist movement[45:08] is not just to establish a Jewish state, but to establish an exclusivist Jewish state,[45:15] and that transfer forced displacement was fundamental to that project.[45:25] And just responding to, sorry, was it- - Steven. - Bonnell or- - Or Bonnell, yeah.[45:31] - With a B? - Yeah. - Yeah. - You made the point that the problem here[45:39] is that people don't recognize is that the first and last result for the Arabs[45:45] is always war. I think there's a problem with that. I think you might do well to recall[45:52] the 1936 general strike conducted by Palestinians[45:58] at the beginning of the revolt, which at the time was the longest recorded general strike in history.[46:05] You may want to consult the book published last year by Lori Allen, "A History of False Hope,"[46:13] which discusses in great detail the consistent engagement[46:18] by Palestinians, their leaders, their elites, their diplomats, and so on, with all these international committees.[46:25] If we look at today, the Palestinians are once again going to the International Court of Justice.[46:33] They're consistently trying to persuade the chief prosecutor[46:39] of the International Criminal Court to do his job. They have launched widespread boycott campaigns.[46:46] So of course the Palestinians have engaged in military resistance.[46:53] But I think the suggestion that this has always been their first and last resort and that they have somehow spurned civic action,[47:02] spurned diplomacy, I think really has no basis in reality.[47:07] - I'll respond to that and then a question for Norm to take into account I think when he answers Benny because I am curious. Obviously I have fresher eyes on this[47:14] and I'm a newcomer to this arena versus the three of you guys for sure. A claim that gets brought up a lot has to do[47:20] with the inevitability of transfer in Zionism, or the idea that as soon as the Jews[47:25] envisioned a state in Palestine, they knew that it would involve some mass transfer population, perhaps a mass expulsion.[47:32] I'm sure we'll talk about Plan Dalet or Plan D at some point. The issue that I run into is,[47:38] while you can find quotes from leaders, while you can find maybe desires expressed in diaries, I feel like it's hard to truly ever know[47:45] if there would've been mass transfer in the face of Arab peace because I feel like every time there was a huge deal on the table[47:52] that would've had a sizable Jewish and Arab population living together, the Arabs would reject it out of hand.[47:58] So for instance, when we say that transfer was inevitable, when we say that Zionists would've never accepted sizable Arab population, how do you explain[48:06] the acceptance of the 47 partition plan that would've had a huge Arab population living in the Jewish state?[48:11] Is your contention that after the acceptance of that, after the establishment of that state, that Jews would've slowly started to expel[48:17] all of these Arab citizens from their country? Or how do you explain that in Lausanne a couple years later[48:23] that Israel was willing to formally annex the Gaza Strip and make 200,000 or so- - Of course it was. - People those citizens.[48:29] But I'm just curious how do we get this idea of Zionism always means mass transfer when there were times,[48:37] at least early on in the history of Israel and a little bit before it, where Israel would've accepted a state[48:43] that would've had a massive Arab population in it. Yeah, is your idea that they would've just slowly expelled them afterwards or?[48:48] - Is that question to me or Norm? - To either one, I'm just curious for the incorporation of the answer, yeah. - There is some misunderstandings here.[48:56] So let's try to clarify that. Number one, it was the old historians[49:04] who would point to the fact, and Professor Morris' terminology, the old historians,[49:09] what he called not real historians, he called them chroniclers, not real historians.[49:14] It was the old Israeli historians who denied[49:20] the centrality of transfer in Zionist thinking.[49:26] It was then Professor Morris who contrary to Israel's historian establishment,[49:35] who said, now you remind me it's four pages, but it came at the end of the book. - No, no, it's at the beginning of the book.[49:42] - [Norman] Transfer. - Transfer is dealt with in four pages at the beginning of my first book[49:47] on the Palestinian refugee problem. - It's a fault of my memory but the point still stands, it was Professor Morris who introduced this idea[49:55] in what you might call a big way. - Yeah, but I didn't say every, it was a central to the Zionist experiment or experience.[50:03] You're saying centrality. - Okay. - I never said it was central- - Okay. - I said it was there. - Okay. - The idea. - By the way, it's okay to respond back and forth.[50:09] This is great. And also, just a quick question if I may. You're using quotes from Benny, from Professor Morris.[50:18] It's also okay to say those quotes do not reflect the full context of the- - That would be fine. - So if we go back to quotes we've said in the past,[50:26] and you've both here have written, the three of you have written on this topic a lot,[50:31] is we should be careful and just admit like, "Well, yeah- - Real quick, just to be clear that the contention[50:37] is that Norm is quoting a part and saying that this was the entire reason for this whereas Benny saying it's a part of that.[50:42] - I'm not quoting a part, I'm quoting 25 pages[50:49] where Professor Morris was at great pains to document the claim[50:56] that appeared in those early four pages of his book. Now, you say it never became part[51:06] of the official Zionist platform. - It never became part of policy.[51:12] - Fine. Okay. - I know what you're saying, But it wasn't policy. - We're also asked, well, this is true, why did that happen?[51:18] Why did that happened? It's a very simple fact which everybody understands.[51:24] Ideology doesn't operate in a vacuum. There are real world practical problems.[51:32] You can't just take an ideology and superimpose it on a political reality[51:38] and turn it into a fact. It was the British mandate.[51:45] There was significant Arab resistance to Zionism.[51:51] And that resistance was based on the fact, as you said, the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession.[52:00] So you couldn't very well expect the Zionist movement to come out in neon lights and announce, "Hey,[52:09] we're going to be expelling you the first chance we get." That's not realistic.[52:14] - Okay. Can I- - Norm. - Let me respond. Look, you've said it a number of times that the Arabs from fairly early on in the conflict[52:26] from the 1890s or the early 1900s said the Jews intend to expel us.[52:31] This doesn't mean that it's true. It means that some Arabs said this, maybe believing it was true,[52:36] maybe using it as a political instrument to gain support to mobilize Arabs against the Zionist experiment.[52:43] But the fact is transfer did not occur before 1947.[52:48] And Arabs later said then and since then have said that the Jews want to build a third temple[52:55] on the Temple Mount as if that's what really the mainstream of Zionism has always wanted[53:01] and always strived for. But this is nonsense. It's something that Husseini used to use as a way to mobilize masses for the cause,[53:10] using religion as the way to get them to join him.[53:15] The fact that Arabs said that the Zionists want to dispossess us doesn't mean it's true,[53:21] it just means that there's some Arabs thought that, maybe said it sincerely or maybe even insincerely.[53:27] - Professor Morris- - Later it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is true. - Professor Morris- - Because the Arabs[53:33] attacked the Jews. - Professor Morris, I read through your stuff. Even yesterday, I was looking through "Righteous Victims."[53:40] - You should read other things. You're wasting your time. - No, no, actually no. I do read other things, but I don't consider it[53:47] a waste of time to read you. Not at all. You say that this wasn't inherent in Zionism.[53:59] Now, would you agree that David Ben-Gurion was a Zionist? - A major Zionist leader. - Right.[54:06] Would you agree Chaim Weizmann was a Zionist? - Yeah. - Okay. I believe they were.[54:12] I believe they took their ideology seriously. It was the first generation.[54:17] Just like with the Bolsheviks, the first generation was committed to an idea. By the 1930s, it was just pure realpolitik.[54:25] The ideology went out the window. The first generation, I have no doubt about their convictions. Okay?[54:32] They were Zionists. Transfer was inevitable and inbuilt in Zionism.[54:39] - You keep repeating the same thing. - Because as I said, Benny, Mr. Morris, I have a problem reconciling what you're saying.[54:48] It either was incidental or it was deeply entrenched.[54:54] Here I read it's deeply entrenched, two very resonant words, inevitable and inbuilt.[55:03] - Deeply entrenched I never wrote it. - Well, I'm not sure- - It's something you just invented. - Okay. - But it was there.[55:09] - Inevitable and inbuilt. - No, no. The idea. - Fine. - Let me concede something. The idea of transfer was there.[55:16] Israel Zangwill, a British Zionist talked about it early on in the century.[55:23] Even Herzl in some way talked about transferring population- - According to your 25 pages everybody talked about.[55:30] - Hold on a second, we keep bringing up this line, the 25 pages and the four pages.[55:36] We're lucky to have Benny in front of us right now. We don't need to go to the quotes. We can legitimately ask, how central is expulsion to Zionism[55:47] in its early version of Zionism and whatever Zionism is today,[55:53] and how much power, influence the Zionism and ideology have[55:59] in Israel and the influence, the philosophy, the ideology of Zionism have on Israel today?[56:06] - The Zionist movement up to 1948, Zionist ideology was central[56:11] to the whole Zionist experience, the whole enterprise up to 1948.[56:17] And I think Zionist ideology was also important in the first decades of Israel's existence.[56:25] Slowly, the hold of Zionism, if you like, like Bolshevism held the Soviet Union, gradually faded[56:35] and a lot of Israelis today think in terms of individual success and then the capitalism[56:40] and all sorts of things, which had nothing to do with Zionism. But Zionism was very important.[56:45] But what I'm saying is that the idea of transfer wasn't the core of Zionism. The idea of Zionism was to save the Jews[56:53] who had been vastly persecuted in Eastern Europe, and incidentally in the Arab world,[57:00] the Muslim world, for centuries and eventually ending up with the Holocaust.[57:05] The idea of Zionism was to save the Jewish people by establishing a state or reestablishing a Jewish state[57:12] on the ancient Jewish homeland, which is something the Arabs today even deny that there were Jews in Palestine[57:18] or the land of Israel 2000 years ago. Arafat famously said, "What temple was there on Temple Mount?[57:24] Maybe it was in Nalus," which of course is nonsense. But they had a connection,[57:30] a strong connection for thousands of years to the land to which they wanted to return and returned there.[57:35] They found that on the land lived hundreds of thousands of Arabs and the question was how to accommodate the vision of a Jewish state in Palestine[57:44] alongside the existence of these Arab masses living on,[57:49] were indigenous in fact, to the land by that stage. And the idea of partition[57:55] because they couldn't live together because the Arabs didn't want to live together with the Jews. And I think the Jews also didn't want to live together[58:02] in one state with Arabs in general. The idea of partition was the thing which the Zionists accepted,[58:09] okay, we can only get a small part of Palestine. The Arabs will get in '37.[58:14] Most of Palestine in 1947, the ratios were changed, but we can live side by side with each other[58:23] in a partitioned Palestine. And this was the essence of it. The idea of transfer was there,[58:29] but it was never adopted as policy. But in 1947/48, the Arabs attacked,[58:35] trying to destroy essentially the Jewish Zionist enterprise and the emerging Jewish state.[58:40] And the reaction was transfer in some way. Not as policy, but this is what happened on the battlefield[58:48] and this is also what Ben-Gurion at some point began to want as well. - Mouin. - Well, one of the first books on this issue I read[59:00] when I was still in high school because my late father had it, was "The Diaries of Theodor Herzl."[59:06] And I think you know, Theodore Herzl, of course, was the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement.[59:14] And I think if you read that, it's very clear for Herzl the model upon[59:20] which the Zionist movement would proceed, his model was Cecil Rhodes.[59:28] I think Rhodes, from what I recall, correct me if I'm wrong, has quite a prominent place in Herzl's diaries.[59:35] I think Herzl was also corresponding with him and seeking his support.[59:40] Cecil Rhodes of course, was the British colonialist[59:47] after whom the former white minority regime in Rhodesia was named.[59:54] And Herzl also says explicitly in his diaries that it is essential to remove[01:00:02] the existing population from Palestine. - Can I respond to this? - In a moment, please.[01:00:08] He says we shall have to spirit the penniless population across the borders and procure employment for them elsewhere or something.[01:00:15] And Israel Zangwill who you mentioned, a land without a people for a people without a land.[01:00:21] They knew damn well it wasn't a land without a people. I'll continue, but please, go ahead.[01:00:27] - Just to this, there is one small diary entry in Herzl's vast- - It's five volumes.[01:00:34] - Yeah, five volumes. There's one paragraph which actually mentions the idea of transfer. There are people who think that Herzl[01:00:41] was actually pointing to South America when he was talking about that, the Jews were going to move to Argentina[01:00:47] and then they would try and buy out or by off or spirit the penniless natives to make way for Jewish settlement.[01:00:56] Maybe he wasn't even talking about the Arabs in that particular passage. That's the argument of some people. Maybe he was.[01:01:02] But the point is it has only a 100th of a 1% of the diary,[01:01:10] which is devoted to the subject. It's not a central idea. - I'll defer- - In Herzl's thinking.[01:01:15] What Herzl wanted, and this is what's important, not Rhodes, I don't think he was the model.[01:01:21] Herzl wanted to create a liberal democratic western state[01:01:26] in Palestine for the Jews. That was the idea. Not some imperial enterprise serving some imperial master,[01:01:34] which is what Rhodes was about. But to have a Jewish state which was modeled on the western democracies in Palestine.[01:01:41] And this incidentally was more or less what Weizmann and Ben-Gurion wanted. Ben-Gurion was more of a socialist,[01:01:48] Weizmann was more of a liberal westerner, but they wanted to establish a social democratic[01:01:54] or liberal state in Palestine. And they both envisioned through most of the years[01:02:00] of their activity that there would be an Arab minority in that Jewish state. It's true that Ben-Gurion strived to have[01:02:07] as small as possible an Arab minority in the Jewish state because he knew that if you want a Jewish majority state,[01:02:14] that would be necessary but it's not something which they were willing to translate into actual policy.[01:02:20] - Just a quick pause to mention that for people who are not familiar, Theodor Herzl we're talking about over a century ago,[01:02:27] and everything we've been talking about has been mostly 1948 and before. - Yes. Just one clarification on Herzl's diaries.[01:02:34] The other thing that I recall from those diaries is he was very preoccupied with in fact[01:02:41] getting great power patronage. Seeing Palestine, the Jewish state in Palestine,[01:02:47] I think his words, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. - [Benny] Yes. - In other words,[01:02:52] very much seeing his project as a proxy[01:02:57] for western imperialism- - That's not the right word. - In the Middle East. - Not proxy. He wanted to establish a Jewish state[01:03:03] which would be independent. To get that, he hoped that he would be able to garner support from major imperial power.[01:03:10] - Including the Ottoman Sultan- - Yes. - Who he tried to cultivate. I just wanna respond to a point you made earlier,[01:03:18] which was that people expressed the rejection of the Partition Resolution[01:03:25] on the grounds that it gave the majority of Palestine to the Jewish community, which formed only a third.[01:03:33] Whereas in fact, if I understood you correctly, you're saying the Palestinians and the Arabs[01:03:38] would have rejected any Partition Resolution. - Yeah. - I think- - A couple things. The one they would've rejected any, two,[01:03:45] a lot of that land given was in the Negev, it was pretty terrible land at the time. And three, the land that would've been partitioned to Jews[01:03:52] I think would've been, I think I saw it would've been 500,000 Jews, 400,000 Arabs,[01:03:57] and I think like 80,000 Bedouins would've been there. So the state would've been divided pretty closely. - Well, I think you raised a valid point[01:04:04] because I think the Palestinians did reject the partition of their homeland in principle.[01:04:11] And I think the fact that the United Nations General Assembly then awarded the majority of their homeland[01:04:21] to the Zionist movement only added insult to injury. I mean, one doesn't have to sympathize with the Palestinians[01:04:30] to recognize that they have now been a stateless people for 75 years.[01:04:36] Can you name any country, yours for example, or yours,[01:04:42] that would be prepared to give 55%, 25%, 10%[01:04:48] of your country to the Palestinians? Of course not. And so the issue was not the existence of Jews in Palestine.[01:04:58] They had been there for centuries. And of course they had ties to Palestine[01:05:03] and particularly to Jerusalem and other places going back centuries if not millennia.[01:05:10] But the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state[01:05:17] at the expense of those who are already living there, I think it was right to reject that.[01:05:23] And I don't think we can look back now 75 years later and say, "Well, you should have accepted[01:05:30] losing 55% of your homeland because you ended up losing 78% of it and the remaining 22% was occupied in 1967."[01:05:38] That's not how things work. - Yeah. - And I can imagine[01:05:44] an American rejecting giving 10% of the United States[01:05:49] to the Palestinians, and if that rejection leads to war and you lose half your country,[01:05:56] I doubt that 50 years from now you're going to say, "Well, maybe I should have accepted that." - Sure, so I like this answer more[01:06:04] than what I usually feel like I'm hearing when it comes to the Palestinian rejection of the '47 Partition Plan.[01:06:09] 'Cause sometimes I feel like a weird switch happens to where the Arabs in the area are actually presented as entirely pragmatic people[01:06:16] who are simply doing a calculation and saying like, "Well, we're losing 55% of our land. Jews are only maybe one third of the people here[01:06:23] and we've got 45 and nah, the math doesn't work," basically. But it wasn't a math problem. I think, like you said-[01:06:28] - It was a matter of principle. - It was an ideology problem. - No, it was a matter of principle. - Yeah, ideologically driven, that they as a people[01:06:35] have a right to or are entitled to this land that they've never actually had an independent state on, that they've never had even a guarantee[01:06:41] of an independent state on, that they've never actually ruled a government. - That last point is actually not correct because for all its injustice,[01:06:50] the mandate system recognized Palestine as a class A mandate[01:06:55] which provisionally recognized the independence of that territory. - Of what would emerge from that territory,[01:07:02] but of not the Palestinians- - It was provisionally recognized. - The territory itself was, but not of the Palestinian people to have a right[01:07:10] or a guarantee to a government that would emerge from it. - Well, it was a British mandate of Palestine, not the British mandate of Israel. - The word exclusive which you keep using is nonsense.[01:07:18] The state which Ben-Gurion envisioned would be a Jewish majority state as they accepted the 1947 Partition Resolution,[01:07:27] as Steven said, that included 400,000 plus Arabs in a state which would have 500,000 Jews.[01:07:34] So the idea of exclusivity wasn't anywhere in the air at all among the Zionist leaders in '47, '48.[01:07:40] They wanted a Jewish majority state, but were willing to accept a state which had 40% Arabs.[01:07:46] That's one point. The second thing is the Palestinians may have regarded the land of Palestine as their homeland,[01:07:53] but so did the Jews. It was the homeland of the Jews as well. The problem was the Arabs were unable[01:07:58] and remain to this day unable to recognize that for the Jews, that is their homeland as well.[01:08:04] And the problem then is how do you share this homeland? Either with one binational state[01:08:10] or partitioned into two states. The problem is that the Arabs have always rejected[01:08:15] both of these ideas. - Absolutely. - The homeland belongs to the Jews as Jews feel[01:08:20] as much as it does if not more- - I would say Zionists- - than for the Arabs. - Not Jews. - I would say for the Jews. It's the Jewish people's homeland.[01:08:26] - Real quick, I just want for both of you guys, 'cause I haven't heard these questions answered. I really want these questions to be, I'm just so curious how to make sense of them.[01:08:33] It was correctly brought up that I believe that Ben-Gurion had, I think Shlomo Ben-Ami describes that[01:08:38] as an obsession with getting validation or support from Western states, Great Britain and then a couple decades later it becomes-[01:08:44] - That explains the Suez War, The Suez Crisis. - Yeah, exactly. Correct. That was one of the major motivators, the idea to work with Britain and France[01:08:50] on a military operation- - An imperial stooge. - But then the question again I go back to, if that is true,[01:08:56] if Ben-Gurion, if the early Israel saw themselves as a Western-fashioned nation, how could we possibly imagine[01:09:03] that they would've engaged in the transfer of some 400,000 Arabs after accepting the partition plan?[01:09:08] Would that not have completely and totally destroyed their legitimacy in the eyes of the entire Western world? - No. - Would there not have been-[01:09:13] How not? - Well, first of all, I think that the Zionist leadership's acceptance[01:09:20] of the Partition Resolution, and I think you may have written about this,[01:09:26] that they accepted it because it provided international endorsement of the legitimacy[01:09:34] of the principle of Jewish statehood. And they didn't accept the borders.[01:09:39] And in fact, later expanded the borders. Second of all- - No, they didn't- - The borders were expanded[01:09:45] At war. - They accepted the UN Partition Resolution, borders and all. That's how they accepted it.[01:09:50] You can say that some of the Zionists, deep in their hearts had the idea that maybe at some point,[01:09:55] - Including their most, - They'd be able to get more. - Including their most senior leaders who said so and I think you've quoted them saying so.[01:10:00] - They begrudgingly accepted what the United Nations, the world community had said, "This is what you are going to get."[01:10:06] - Yes. And second of all, I mean, removing dark people? Darker people? - Jews are dark.[01:10:12] - It's intrinsic. - In Israel, Jews as dark as Arabs. - It's intrinsic to Western history.[01:10:17] So the idea that Americans or Brits or the French would have an issue with, I mean, French had been doing it[01:10:25] in Algeria for decades. The Americans have been doing it in North America for centuries. So how would Israel forcibly displacing Palestinians[01:10:36] somehow besmirch Israel in the eyes of the West? - In fact, even in the 1944 resolution of the Labor Party,[01:10:45] and at the time, even Bertrand Russell was a member of the Labor Party, it endorsed transfer of Arabs out of Palestine.[01:10:54] As Mouin's pointed out, that was a deeply entrenched idea in Western thinking[01:10:59] that there was nothing, it doesn't in any way contradict or violate or breach any moral values[01:11:06] to displace the Palestinian population. Now, I do believe there's a legitimate question.[01:11:15] Had it been the case, as you said, Professor Morris, that the Zionists wanted to create a happy state[01:11:24] with a Jewish majority, but a large Jewish minority.[01:11:29] And if by virtue of immigration, like in our own country. In our own country, given the current trajectories,[01:11:37] non-whites would become the majority population in our United States quite soon.[01:11:43] And according to Democratic principles, we have to accept that. So if that were the case,[01:11:50] I would say maybe there's an argument that had there been mass Jewish immigration[01:11:56] that changed the demographic balance in Palestine, and therefore Jews became the majority,[01:12:05] you can make an argument in the abstract that the indigenous Arab population should have been accepting of that[01:12:13] just as whites in the United States, "whites" have to be accepting of the fact[01:12:18] that the demographic majority is shifting to non-whites in our own country.[01:12:23] But that's not what Zionism was about. I did write my doctoral dissertation on Zionism,[01:12:30] and I don't wanna get now bogged down in abstract ideas, but as I suspect you know, most theorists of nationalism[01:12:39] say there are two kinds of nationalism. One is a nationalism based on citizenship.[01:12:45] You become a citizen, you're integral to the country. That's sometimes called political nationalism.[01:12:52] And then there's another kind of nationalism, and that says the state should not belong to its citizens,[01:13:01] it should belong to an ethnic group. Each ethnic group should have its own state.[01:13:09] It's usually called the German romantic idea of nationalism. Zionism is squarely in the German romantic idea.[01:13:21] That was the whole point of Zionism. We don't wanna be bundists[01:13:27] and be one more ethnic minority in Russia. We don't wanna become citizens[01:13:34] and just become a Jewish people in England or France.[01:13:42] We want our own state. - Like the Arab 23 states. - No, wait.[01:13:50] Before we get to the Arabs, let's stick to the Jews for a moment. Or the Zionists. "We want our own state."[01:13:58] And in that concept of wanting your own state,[01:14:05] the minority, at the best, lives on sufferance[01:14:11] and at worst, gets expelled. That's the logic of the German romantic[01:14:19] Zionist idea of a state. That's why they're Zionists.[01:14:25] Now, I personally have shied away from using the word Zionism[01:14:31] ever since I finished my doctoral dissertation because- - It was that painful.[01:14:37] - Because as I said, I don't believe it's the operative ideology today.[01:14:43] It's like talking about Bolshevism and referring to Khrushchev.[01:14:48] I doubt Khrushchev could have spelled Bolshevik. But for the period we're talking about, they were Zionists,[01:14:59] they were committed to their exclusive state with a minority living on sufferance[01:15:08] or at worst expelled. That was their ideology.[01:15:13] And I really feel there's a problem with your happy vision[01:15:19] of these Western Democrats like Weizmann and they wanted to live peacefully with the Arabs.[01:15:27] Weizmann described the expulsion in 1948 as, "the miraculous clearing of the land."[01:15:35] That doesn't sound like somebody shedding too many tears at the loss of the indigenous population.[01:15:42] - Let me just respond to the word on sufferance. - Let him respond. - The sufferance I don't agree with. I think that's wrong.[01:15:47] The Jewish state came into being in 1948. It had a population which was 20% Arab[01:15:53] when it came into being, after Arab refugees, many of them had become refugees but 20% remained in the country.[01:16:00] 20% of Israel's population at inception in 1949 was Arab.[01:16:06] - 80% went missing. - No, no, no, no. I was talking about what remained in Palestine/Israel[01:16:12] after it was created. The 20% who lived in Israel received citizenship and all the rights of Israelis,[01:16:20] except of course, the right to serve in the Army, which they didn't want to. And they have Supreme Court Justices,[01:16:26] they have Knesset members. They enjoyed basically- - They lived under emergency laws until 1966.[01:16:32] - For a period, sure. They lived under emergency. - So they didn't have citizenship- - No, no wait a second. - This is just fantasy.[01:16:37] - At the beginning. It's not fantasy. At the beginning, they received citizenship, could vote in elections for their own people,[01:16:43] and they were put into parliament. But in the first years, the Israeli, the Jewish majority suspected[01:16:50] that maybe the Arabs would be disloyal 'cause they had just tried to destroy the Jewish state. Then they dropped the military government[01:16:57] and they became fully equal citizens. So if the whole idea was they must have a state[01:17:03] without Arabs, this didn't happen in '49, and it didn't happen in subsequent decades.[01:17:11] - Professor Morris. - Yes. - Then why did you say without a population expulsion,[01:17:18] a Jewish state would not have been established? - You're missing the first section of that paragraph,[01:17:24] which was they were being assaulted by the Arabs and as a result, a Jewish state could not have come into being[01:17:31] unless there had also been an expulsion of the population which was trying to kill them. - Norm, I'm officially forbidding you[01:17:37] referencing that again. Hold on a second, wait. We responded to it so the main point you're making,[01:17:44] we have to take Benny at his word, is there was a war[01:17:50] and that's the reason why he made that statement. - I think, just one last point on this.[01:17:55] I remember reading your book when it first came out and reading one incident after the other[01:18:04] and one example after the other and then getting to the conclusion where you said[01:18:10] the Nakba was a product of war, not design, I think were your exact words. And I remember reacting almost in shock to that,[01:18:17] that I felt you had mobilized overwhelming evidence that it was a product of design, not war.[01:18:25] And I think our discussion today very much reflects, let's say, the dissonance[01:18:33] between the evidence and the conclusion. You don't feel that the research[01:18:40] that you have conducted and published demonstrates that it was in fact inherent and inbuilt and inevitable.[01:18:50] And I think the point that Norm and I are making is that your own historical research[01:18:56] together with that of others indisputably demonstrates that it does. I think that's a fundamental disagreement we're having here.[01:19:02] - Can I wait, yeah. Can I actually respond to that? 'Cause this is actually, I think this is emblematic of the entire conversation.[01:19:09] I watched a lot of Norm's interviews and conversations in preparation for this. And I hear Norm will say this over and over and over again.[01:19:16] "I only deal in facts. I don't deal in hypotheticals. I only deal in facts. I only deal in facts." And that seems to be the case, except for when the facts[01:19:22] are completely and totally contrary to the particular point you're trying to push. The idea that Jews would've out of hand rejected[01:19:29] any state that had Arabs on it or always had a plan of expulsion is just betrayed by the acceptance of the 47 partition plan. - I don't think you understand politics.[01:19:37] Did I just say that there is a chasm that separates your ideology[01:19:45] from the limits and constraints imposed by politics and reality?[01:19:53] Now, Professor Morris I suspect would agree that the Zionist movement from fairly early on[01:20:02] was committed to the idea of a Jewish state. I am aware of only one major study,[01:20:09] probably written 40 years ago, the Binational Idea in Mandatory Palestine by a woman.[01:20:16] I forgot her name now. You remember her? - I'm trying to. - Yeah. Okay, but you know the book.[01:20:22] - I think so. - Yeah. She is the only one who tried to persuasively argue[01:20:28] that the Zionist movement was actually, not formally,[01:20:33] actually committed to the binational idea. But most historians of the subject agree[01:20:41] the Zionist movement was committed to the idea of a Jewish state. Having written my doctoral dissertation on the topic,[01:20:50] I was confirmed in that idea because Professor Chomsky, who was my closest friend for about 40 years,[01:20:57] was very committed to the idea that bi-nationalism was the dominant trend in Zionism,[01:21:04] I could not agree with, I couldn't go with him there. But Professor Morris, you are aware[01:21:10] that until the Biltmore Resolution in 1942, the Zionist movement never declared[01:21:17] it was for a Jewish state. Why? Because it was politically impossible at the moment[01:21:25] until 1942. There's your ideology, there are your convictions,[01:21:30] there are your operative plans. And there's also, separately, what you say in public.[01:21:38] the Zionist movement couldn't say in public, "We're expelling all the Arabs." They can't say that.[01:21:44] And they couldn't even say "We support a Jewish state" until 1942.[01:21:51] - You're conflating two things. The Zionists wanted a Jewish state, correct?[01:21:56] That didn't mean expulsion of the Arabs. It's not the same thing. They wanted a Jewish state with a Jewish majority,[01:22:02] but they were willing, as it turned out, both in '37 and in '47 and subsequently,[01:22:08] to have an Arab minority- - In '37 was supposed to be a transfer. - A large Arab minority. - In '37 there was a transfer.[01:22:14] - They were willing to have a large Arab minority- - Oh, come on. In the country. And they ended up with a large Arab minority in the country.[01:22:20] 20% of the population- - They ended up- - In '49 was Arab and it still is 21%. - They ended up for about five minutes before they were expelled.[01:22:28] They agreed to it up until '47 and then they were gone by March 1949. - No they weren't. - What happened in between[01:22:35] the rejection of the partition plan and the expulsion of the Arabs? - The Arabs launched the war. - Well, yeah. It wasn't random.[01:22:41] There's a potential that even- - I agree. It wasn't random. I totally agree with that. It was by design.[01:22:46] It wasn't random. - You can say that but in this case, the facts betray you. There was no Arab acceptance of anything[01:22:53] that would've allowed for a Jewish state to exist. - Of course not. - Number one and number two, I think that it's entirely possible[01:22:58] given how things happen after war, that this exact same conflict could have played out and an expulsion would've happened[01:23:04] without any ideology at play, that there was a people that disagreed on who had territorial rights to a land,[01:23:09] there was a massive war afterwards, and then a bunch of their friends invaded after to reinforce the idea that the Jewish people in this case couldn't have a state.[01:23:16] There could have been a transfer regardless. - Anything could have been, but that's not what history is about.[01:23:22] - History is about Palestinian rejectionism to any peace deal over and over and over again. - As I said, when the war was thrown into the court[01:23:32] of the United Nations, they were faced with a practical problem.[01:23:37] And I, for one, am not going to try to adjudicate[01:23:42] the rights and wrongs from the beginning. I do not believe that if territorial displacement[01:23:51] and dispossession was inherent in the Zionist project, I do not believe[01:23:56] it can be a legitimate political enterprise. Now, you might say that's speaking from 2022 or 2020-[01:24:06] where are we? - Four I think. - Okay. But we have to recognize that from nearly the beginning,[01:24:15] for perfectly obvious reasons having nothing to do with antisemitism,[01:24:23] anti-Westernism, anti-Europeanism, but because no people that I am aware of[01:24:32] would voluntarily cede its country. - Except for all the people that sold land voluntarily.[01:24:39] - You can perfectly understand Native American resistance[01:24:45] to Euro-colonialism. You can perfectly well understand it without any anti-Europeanism, anti-whiteism,[01:24:53] anti-Christianism. They didn't wanna cede their country to invaders.[01:24:59] That's completely understandable. - You're minimizing the antisemitic element- - You minimized it. - In Arab nationalism-[01:25:06] - In all your books you minimized it. - No, no, no. Husseini was an antisemite.[01:25:11] The leader of the Palestinian national movement in the thirties and forties was an antisemite.[01:25:17] This was one of the things which drove him and also drove him in the end to work in Berlin for Hitler for four years,[01:25:24] giving Nazi propaganda to the Arab world, calling on the Arabs to murder the Jews. That's what he did in World War II.[01:25:30] That's the leader of the Palestinian Arab National Movement. And he wasn't alone. He wasn't alone.[01:25:36] - Professor Morris, why is it if you read your book, "Righteous Victims," you can read it and read it[01:25:43] and read it and read it, as I have, you will find barely a word[01:25:49] about the Arabs being motivated by antisemitism. - It exists, though. - I didn't say it doesn't exist.[01:25:55] - Ah, you agree that it exists? - Hey, I don't know a single non-Jew who doesn't harbor antisemitic sentiments.[01:26:01] - [Benny] We're talking about Arabs now. - Yeah, but I don't know anybody. That's just part of the human condition.[01:26:08] - Antisemitism? - Yes- - Husseini was an ordinary antisemite? - And among the Arabs. - So Professor Morris, here's my problem.[01:26:16] I didn't see that in your "Righteous Victims." Even when you talked about the First Intifada,[01:26:22] and you talked about the Second Intifada, and you talked about how there was a lot of influence[01:26:29] by Hamas, the Islamic movement. You even stated that there was a lot of antisemitism[01:26:35] in those movements. But then you went on to say, "But of course, at bottom, it was about the occupation.[01:26:44] It wasn't about," and I've read it. - Yeah, but you're moving from different ages- - No, I'm not moving. - Across the ages.[01:26:50] - I'm talking about your whole book. - The occupation began in '67. - Your whole book. - [Benny] The one you're talking about.[01:26:55] - I looked and looked and looked for evidence of this antisemitism as being a chief motor of Arab resistance to Zionism,[01:27:05] I didn't see it. - You like- - Did he make that claim? - I don't remember the word chief. - Yeah. - It's one of the elements.[01:27:11] - You have a very binary thinking when it comes to the- - Binary? - Yes. Binary. - Don't give me this postmodernism binary.[01:27:18] You're the one- - No, but you are thinking in terms of black and white. - You're the one that said the chief motor- - Steven has a point. - Do you have your book here? - You talk about black and-[01:27:25] - Page 137. - You talk in black and white. - [Norman] Excuse me, page 37. - You're talking in black and white concepts[01:27:30] when history is much grayer. Lots of things happen because of lots of reasons, not one or the other.[01:27:35] And you don't seem to see that. - Can I ask you a quick, 'cause it's for them to talk too. Just a very quick question. - Yes.[01:27:40] - What do you think the ideal solution was on the Arab side from '47? What would they have preferred[01:27:46] and what would've happened - They were explicit. - And then the second one, what would've happened if Jews would've lost the war in '48? What do you think would've happened[01:27:52] to the Israeli population or Jewish population? - I think the Palestinians and the Arabs were explicit,[01:27:58] that they wanted a unitary, I think federal state.[01:28:04] And they made their submissions to UNSCOP. They made their appeals at the UN General Assembly.[01:28:12] - What do you mean by unitarian and federal? I don't get that. They wanted an Arab state. They wanted Palestine to be an Arab state.[01:28:19] - Yes, yes. - Put it simply. - But I think- - Not the word unitary, federal, they wanted Palestine as an Arab and exclusively Arab state.[01:28:26] - No, it wasn't an exclusively Arab state. I think we have to distinguish[01:28:31] between Palestinian and Arab opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine on the one hand,[01:28:37] and Palestinian and Arab attitudes to Jewish existence in Palestine[01:28:44] and there's a fundamental difference. - Well Husseini, the leader of the movement, said that all the Jews who had come since 1917,[01:28:51] and that's the majority of the Jews in Palestine in 1947- - That's correct. - Shouldn't be there.[01:28:56] - Well, he did say- - They shouldn't be citizens and they shouldn't be there. - He did say that. - PLO said that in '64 - Yes, they said the same. - I'm not gonna deny it.[01:29:02] - PLO said that. - It's true. I can understand the sentiment, but I think it's wrong. - But also, you guys are the ones-[01:29:07] - We agree on this. I also agree. - You guys had used the words earlier that it was supremacy and exclusivity that the Zionist-[01:29:14] - Well, I wanna answer your question. As you mentioned, Husseini did say that, and I'm sure there was a very substantial body[01:29:22] of Palestinian Arab public opinion that endorsed that. But by the same token, I think unitary Arab states,[01:29:33] as you call it, or a Palestinian state, could have been established with arrangements,[01:29:39] with guarantees to ensure the security and rights[01:29:45] of both communities. How that would work in detail had been discussed and proposed, but never resolved.[01:29:54] And again, I think Jewish fears about what would've happened- - A second Holocaust. That's what we're talking-[01:30:01] - [Mouin] Well, no I think that- - That was the Jewish fear, a second Holocaust. - That may well have been the Jewish fear,[01:30:06] it was an unfounded Jewish fear. - It was unfounded? - Of course it was unfounded. - What about in '48 and '56-[01:30:12] - You really think that the Palestinians, had they won the war, were going to import[01:30:19] ovens and crematoria from Germany? - I don't know about that but there were pogroms in almost every single Arab state[01:30:24] where there were Jews living after '48, after '56, after '67, there were always pogroms,[01:30:30] there were always flights from Jews from those countries to Israel afterwards. I don't think it would be- - I wouldn't say there were always pogroms[01:30:35] in every Arab state. I think there was flight of Arab Jews for multiple reasons.[01:30:43] In some cases, for precisely the reasons you say. If you look at the Jewish community in Algeria,[01:30:48] for example, their flight had virtually nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict.[01:30:55] The issue of Algerian Jews was that the French gave them citizenship[01:31:00] during their colonial rule of Algeria and they increasingly became identified with French rule.[01:31:07] And when Algeria became independent and all the French ended up leaving out of fear[01:31:16] or out of disappointment or out of whatever, the Jews were identified as French rather than Algerian.[01:31:22] - This is a bit of a red herring. There were pogroms in the Arab countries, in Bahrain even where there's almost no Jews, there was a pogrom in 1947.[01:31:31] There was a pogrom in Aleppo in 1947. - [Mouin] I'm not denying any of that history. - There were killings of Jews in Iraq and Egypt[01:31:38] in 1948/49. - I'm not denying any- - But the Jews basically fled the Arab states,[01:31:44] not for multiple reasons, they fled because they felt that the governments there and the societies amid which they had lived[01:31:52] for hundreds of years no longer wanted them. - Look, without getting into the details, I think we can both agree that ultimately[01:31:59] a clear majority of Arab Jews who believed that after having lived in these countries for centuries-[01:32:06] - Way before the Arabs. Way before the Arabs arrived there. - For centuries. - Way before the Arabs arrived[01:32:12] in Iraq. - For centuries, if not millennia, came to the unfortunate conclusion[01:32:17] that their situation had become untenable. - [Benny] Yes. - I also think that we can both agree[01:32:24] that this had never been an issue prior to Zionism and the emergence of the state of Israel. - [Benny] There were pogroms prior to Zionism.[01:32:30] - [Mouin] Look, I'm not- - The pogroms didn't begin with Zionism in the Arab world. - The issue is the point I raised,[01:32:37] which is whether these communities had ever come to a collective conclusion[01:32:42] that their position had become untenable in this part of the world. No, they were Arab Jews.[01:32:48] - Well, because untenable meant there was no alternative. But with the creation of Israel, there was an alternative, right? A place where they could go and not be discriminated against[01:32:55] or live as second class citizens or be subject to Arab majority states. I also think it's interesting that when you analyze[01:33:01] the flight of Jewish people, and I've seen this, that it wasn't just, I agree with you, it wasn't just a mass expulsion from all the Arab states,[01:33:08] there were definitely push factors. There were also pull factors. Now I don't know how you guys feel about the Nakba, but when the analysis the Nakba comes in,[01:33:14] again, it's back to that, well, that was actually just a top-down expulsion. You know, the retreat of wealthy Arab people[01:33:20] in the thirties, didn't matter. Any of the messaging from the surrounding Arab states didn't matter, it was just an expulsion from Jewish people[01:33:27] or people running from their lives from Jewish massacres. Again, I feel like it's selective critical analysis-[01:33:33] - I'm a little uncomfortable with the term Jewish here. Because it wasn't the Jews of England or the Soviet Jews.[01:33:40] - I say Jewish because prior to '48 saying Israeli, the issue, whatever. - I think it's useful to refer to Zionists before 1948[01:33:49] and Israelis after '48. We don't need to implicate Jews elsewhere. - Well, sure, but the Jewish people that were being attacked[01:33:55] in Arab states weren't Zionists, they were just Jews living there. - I need to just comment on that. I was rereading Shlomo Ben-Ami's last book.[01:34:05] And he does at the end discuss at some length the whole issue of the refugee question bearing on the so-called peace process.[01:34:12] And on the question of '48 and the Arab immigration, if you'll allow me, let me just quote him.[01:34:19] "Israel is particularly fond of the awkwardly false symmetry[01:34:25] she makes between the Palestinian refugee crisis and the forced immigration of 600,000 Jews[01:34:32] from Arab countries following the creation of the state of Israel as if it were,[01:34:38] 'an unplanned exchange of populations.'"[01:34:43] And then Mr. Ben-Ami, for those of you who are listening, he was Israel's former foreign minister,[01:34:49] and he's an influential historian in his own right. He says, "In fact, envoys from the Mossad[01:34:56] and the Jewish Agency worked underground in Arab countries and Iran[01:35:05] to encourage Jews to go to Israel. More importantly, for many Jews in Arab states,[01:35:13] the very possibility of immigrating to Israel was the combination of millennial aspirations.[01:35:21] It represented the consummation of a dream to take part in Israel's resurgence as a nation."[01:35:29] So this idea that they were all expelled after 1948,[01:35:36] that's one area, Professor Morris, I defer to expertise. That's one of my credos in life.[01:35:43] I don't know the Israeli literature, but as it's been translated in English,[01:35:49] there's very little solid scholarship on what happened in 1948 in the Arab countries[01:35:55] and which caused the Jews to leave. - Arab Jews. - The Arab Jews. Right. But Shlomo Ben-Ami knows the literature,[01:36:04] he knows the scholarship. - He also come from Tangiers. - Yeah. - He's from Morocco. And you have Avi Shlaim from Iraq[01:36:10] has written on this issue as well. - And the Jews in the Arab lands were not pro-Zionists, they weren't Zionists at all.[01:36:17] Certainly Avi Shlaim's family was anti-Zionist. - And Avi Shlaim when he was interviewed by Marin Rappaport on this question,[01:36:23] he said, "You simply cannot say that the Iraqi Jews were expelled. It's just not true."[01:36:29] And he was speaking as an Iraqi Jew who left with his family in 1948.[01:36:35] - They were pushed out. They weren't expelled. That's probably the right phrase. They were pushed out. - I think it's more complex than that.[01:36:42] I think it was, sorry, I interrupted you. - No, you're not interrupting me 'cause I only know what's been translated into English.[01:36:49] And the English literature on the subject is very small and not scholarly.[01:36:56] Now, there may be Hebrew literature, I don't know. But I was surprised that even Shlomo Ben-Ami,[01:37:04] stalwart of his state, fair enough, on this particular point, he called it false symmetry.[01:37:10] - No, no. Steven is right. There was a pull and a push mechanism in the departure of the Jews from the Arab lands post '48.[01:37:17] But there was also a lot of push, a lot of push. - That's indisputable. There was push, yeah. - And on the point of agreement,[01:37:24] on this one brief light of agreement, let us wrap up with this topic of history[01:37:32] and move on to modern day but before that, I'm wondering if we can just say[01:37:38] a couple of last words on this topic. Steven? - Yeah, I think that when you look at the behaviors of both parties[01:37:44] in the time period around '48, or especially '48 and earlier, there's this assumption[01:37:51] that there was this huge built-in mechanism of Zionism and that it was going to be inevitable from the inception[01:37:57] of the first Zionist thought I guess that appeared in Herzl's mind that there would be a mass violent population transfer[01:38:03] of Arab Palestinians out of what would become the Israeli state. I understand that there are some quotes that we can find[01:38:10] that maybe seem to possibly support an idea that looks close to that, but I think when you actually consult the record[01:38:16] of what happened, when you look at the populations, the massive populations that Israel was willing to accept[01:38:22] within what would become their state borders, their nation borders, I just don't think that the historical record agrees with the idea[01:38:29] that Zionists would've just never been okay living alongside Arab Palestinians.[01:38:34] But when you look at the other side, Arabs would out of hand reject literally any deal that apportioned any amount of that land[01:38:41] for any state relating to Jewish people or the Israeli people. I think it was said even on the other end of the table[01:38:47] that Arab Palestinians would've never accepted, the Arabs would've never accepted any Jewish state whatsoever.[01:38:52] So it's interesting that on the ideology part where it's claimed that Zionists are people of exclusion[01:38:57] and supremacy and expulsion, we can find that in diary entries but we can find that expressed in very real terms[01:39:04] on the Arab side, I think in all of their behavior around '48 and earlier where the goal was the destruction of the Israeli state,[01:39:10] it would've been the dispossession of many Jewish people. It probably would've been the expulsion of a lot of them back to Europe and I think that very clearly plays out[01:39:16] in the difference between the actions of the Arabs versus some diary entries of some Jewish leaders. - Benny?[01:39:22] - Well, one thing which stood out and I think Mouin made this point, is that the Arabs had nothing to do with the Holocaust,[01:39:30] but then the world community forced the Arabs to pay the price for the Holocaust. That's the traditional Arab argument.[01:39:38] This is slightly distorting the reality. The Arabs in the 1930s did their utmost[01:39:44] to prevent Jewish immigration from Europe and reaching Palestine, which was the only safe haven available[01:39:51] 'cause America, Britain, France, nobody wanted Jews anywhere and they were being persecuted in central Europe[01:39:56] and eventually would be massacred in large numbers. So the Arab effort to pressure the British[01:40:03] to prevent Jews reaching Palestine's safe shores contributed indirectly[01:40:09] to the slaughter of many Jews in Europe 'cause they couldn't get to anywhere and they couldn't get to Palestine[01:40:14] 'cause the Arabs were busy attacking Jews in Palestine and attacking the British to make sure they didn't allow Jews to reach the safe haven.[01:40:23] That's important. The second thing is, of course, there's no point in belittling the fact that the Palestinian-Arab National Movement's leader,[01:40:31] Husseini, worked for the Nazis in the 1940s. He got a salary from the German foreign ministry,[01:40:38] he raised troops among Muslims in Bosnia for the SS, and he broadcast to the Arab world[01:40:45] calling for the murder of the Jews in the Middle East. This is what he did. And the Arabs since then[01:40:51] have been trying to whitewash Husseini's role. I'm not saying he was the instigator of the Holocaust,[01:40:59] but he helped the Germans along in doing what they were doing[01:41:06] and supported them in doing that. So this can't be removed from the fact that the Arabs,[01:41:12] as you say, paid a price for the Holocaust, but they also participated in various ways in helping it happen.[01:41:21] - Mouin. - I'll make two points. The first is, you mentioned Hajj Amin al-Husseini[01:41:28] and his collaboration with the Nazis, entirely legitimate point to raise.[01:41:34] But I think one can also say definitively had Hajj Amin al-Husseini never existed,[01:41:41] the Holocaust would've played out precisely- - Certainly. - As it did. - Certainly. - As far as[01:41:48] Palestinian opposition to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 1930s is concerned,[01:41:55] it was of a different character than, for example, British and American rejection of Jewish immigration.[01:42:04] They just didn't want Jews on their soil. - Objectively, it helped the Germans kill the Jews. - In the Palestinian case,[01:42:10] their opposition to Jewish immigration was to prevent the transformation of their homeland[01:42:16] into a Jewish state that would dispossess them and I think that's an important distinction to make.[01:42:22] The other point I wanted to make is we've spent the past several hours talking about Zionism, transfer and so on[01:42:31] but I think there's a more fundamental aspect to this, which is that Zionism, I think would have emerged[01:42:40] and disappeared as yet one more utopian political project[01:42:46] had it not been for the British. What the preeminent Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi[01:42:52] has termed the British Shield. 'Cause I think without the British sponsorship,[01:42:58] we wouldn't be having this discussion today. The British sponsored Zionism for a very simple reason,[01:43:08] which is that during World War I, the Ottoman armies attempted to march on the Suez Canal.[01:43:15] Suez Canal was the jugular vein of the British Empire[01:43:20] between Europe and India. And the British came to the conclusion[01:43:25] that they needed to secure the Suez Canal from any threat.[01:43:31] And as the British have done so often in so many places, how do you deal with this? Well, you bring in a foreign minority,[01:43:41] implant them amongst a hostile population, and establish a protectorate over them.[01:43:47] I don't think a Jewish state in Palestine had been part of British intentions[01:43:54] and the Balfour Declaration very specifically speaks about a Jewish national home in Palestine.[01:43:59] In other words, a British protectorate. Things ended up taking a different course.[01:44:07] And I think the most important development was World War II.[01:44:13] And I think this had maybe less to do with the Holocaust and more to do with the effective bankruptcy[01:44:20] of the United Kingdom during that war and its inability to sustain its global empire.[01:44:26] It ended up giving up India, ended up giving up Palestine. And it's in that context, I think,[01:44:34] that we need to see the emergence of a Jewish state in Palestine.[01:44:40] And again, a Jewish state means a state in which the Jewish community enjoys[01:44:48] not only a demographic majority, but an uncontestable demographic majority,[01:44:55] an uncontestable territorial hegemony, and an uncontestable political supremacy.[01:45:03] And that is also why after 1948, the nascent Israeli state confiscated,[01:45:10] I believe, up to 90% of lands that had been previously owned by Palestinians[01:45:19] who became citizens of Israel. It is why the new Israeli state imposed a military government[01:45:25] on its population of Palestinian citizens between 1948 and 1966.[01:45:34] It is why the Israeli state effectively reduced[01:45:41] the Palestinians living within the Israeli state as citizens of the Israeli state to second class citizens,[01:45:49] on the one hand, promoting Jewish nationalism and Jewish nationalist parties, on the other hand, doing everything within its power[01:45:56] to suppress and eliminate Palestinian or Arab nationalist movements.[01:46:02] And that's why today there's a consensus among all major human rights organizations[01:46:08] that Israel is an apartheid state, what the Israeli human rights organization[01:46:14] B'Tselem describes a regime of Jewish supremacy between the river and the sea.[01:46:19] - You're really tempting a response from the other side on the last few sentences and- - Propaganda, yeah, okay.[01:46:25] - [Lex] We'll talk about the claims of apartheid and so on. It's a fascinating discussion. We need to have it.[01:46:31] Norm. - On the question of the responsibility[01:46:36] of the Palestinian Arabs for the Nazi Holocaust, direct or indirect. I consider that an absurd claim.[01:46:45] As Gromyko said, and I quoted him, "The entire Western world turned its back on the Jews."[01:46:53] To somehow focus on the Palestinian strikes me as completely ridiculous.[01:47:00] Number two, as Mouin said, there's a perfectly understandable reason why[01:47:07] Palestinian Arabs wouldn't want Jews, because in their minds and not irrationally,[01:47:14] these Jews intended to create a Jewish state, which would quite likely have resulted in their expulsion.[01:47:21] I'm a very generous person. I've actually taken in a homeless person for two and a half years.[01:47:27] But if I knew in advance that that homeless person was going to try to turn me out of my apartment,[01:47:35] I would think 10,000 times before I took him in.[01:47:42] As far as the actual complicity of the Palestinian Arabs,[01:47:49] if you look at Raul Hilberg's three volume classic work, "The Destruction of the European Jewry,"[01:47:56] he has in those thousand plus pages, one sentence,[01:48:02] one sentence on the role of the Mufti of Jerusalem. And that I think is probably an overstatement,[01:48:10] but we'll leave it aside. The only two points I would make aside from the Holocaust point is, number one,[01:48:17] I do think the transfer discussion is useful because it indicates that there was a rational reason[01:48:25] behind the Arab resistance to Jewish or Zionist immigration to Palestine,[01:48:31] the fear of territorial displacement and dispossession. And number two, there are two issues.[01:48:39] One is the history, and the second is being responsible for your words.[01:48:47] Now, some people accuse me of speaking very slowly, and they're advised on YouTube[01:48:53] to turn up the speed twice to three times whenever I'm on. One of the reasons I speak slowly[01:49:01] is because I attach value to every word I say.[01:49:06] And it is discomforting, disorienting where you have a person who's produced of voluminous corpus[01:49:17] rich in insights and rich in archival sources[01:49:25] who seems to disown each and every word[01:49:32] that you pluck from that corpus by claiming that it's either out of context[01:49:37] or it's cherry-picking. Words count.[01:49:43] And I agree with Lex, everybody has the right to rescind what they've said in the past,[01:49:50] but what you cannot claim is that you didn't say what you said.[01:49:56] - I'll stick to the history, not the current propaganda. 1917, the Zionist movement began way before the British[01:50:06] supported Zionist movement for decades. In 1917, the British jumped in and issued the Balfour Declaration[01:50:13] supporting the emergence of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which most people understood to mean[01:50:18] eventual Jewish statehood in Palestine. Most people understood that, in Britain and among the Zionists and among the Arabs.[01:50:27] But the British declared the Balfour Declaration, or issued the Balfour Declaration not only because of imperial self-interest,[01:50:34] and this is what you're basically saying, they had the imperial interests, a buffer state, which would protect the Suez Canal from the East.[01:50:42] The British also were motivated by idealism. And this incidentally is how Balfour described[01:50:48] the reasoning behind issuing the declaration. And he said, "The Western world, Western Christendom owes the Jews a great debt,"[01:50:56] both for giving the world and the West, if you like, values, social values as embodied in the Bible,[01:51:06] social justice, and all sorts of other things, "and the Christian world owes the Jews because it persecuted them for 2000 years."[01:51:14] This debt we're now beginning to repay with the 1917 declaration favoring Zionism.[01:51:21] But it's also worth remembering that the Jews weren't proxies[01:51:26] or attached to the British imperial endeavor. They were happy to receive British support in 1917[01:51:34] and then subsequently when the British ruled Palestine for 20, 30 years,[01:51:41] but they weren't part of the British imperial design or mission. They wanted a state for themselves.[01:51:47] The Jews happy to have the British support them, happy today to have the Americans support Israel.[01:51:53] But it's not because we're stooges or extensions of American imperial interests.[01:51:59] The British incidentally always described in Arab narratives of propaganda as consistent supporters of Zionism, they weren't.[01:52:07] The first British rulers in Palestine, 1917, 1920. - Herbert Samuel. - No, before Herbert Samuel.[01:52:13] Samuel came in 1920. The British ruled there for three years previously. And most of the leaders, the British generals and so on[01:52:21] who were in Palestine were anti-Zionist. And subsequently, in the twenties and thirties, the British occasionally curbed[01:52:29] Zionist immigration to Palestine, and the 1939 switched horses and supported the Arab National Movement and not Zionism,[01:52:36] they turned anti-Zionist and basically said, "You Arabs will rule Palestine within the next 10 years.[01:52:42] This is what we're giving you by limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine." But the Arabs didn't actually understand[01:52:48] what they were being given on a silver platter, Husseini again. And he said, "No, no, we can't accept[01:52:54] the British White Paper of May 1939," which had given the Arabs everything they wanted basically,[01:52:59] self-determination in an Arab majority state. So what I'm saying is the British at some point[01:53:06] did support the Zionist enterprise, but at other points were less consistent in the support.[01:53:12] And in 1939 until 1948, when they didn't vote even for partition for Jewish statehood in Palestine[01:53:19] in the UN resolution, they didn't support Zionism during the last decade of the mandate.[01:53:24] It's worth remembering that. - I'd like to respond to that. Speaking of propaganda,[01:53:31] I find it simply impossible to accept that Balfour,[01:53:37] who as British Prime Minister in 1905, was the chief sponsor of the Aliens Act,[01:53:44] which was specifically- - He changed his mind. - Which was specifically designed to keep persecuted Eastern European Jews[01:53:52] out of the streets of UK. - He changed his mind. - And who was denounced as an antisemite[01:53:58] by the entire British Jewish establishment. A decade later, all of a sudden-[01:54:03] - [Benny] Changed his mind. - People change their minds, but when the changing of the mind[01:54:11] just coincidentally happens to coincide with the British imperial interest,[01:54:18] I think perhaps the transformation is a little more superficial[01:54:24] than he's being given credit for. It was clearly a British imperial venture.[01:54:30] And if there had been no threat to the Suez Canal during World War I,[01:54:35] regardless of what Balfour would've thought about the Jews and their contribution to history[01:54:41] and their persecution and so on, there would've been no Balfour Declaration. - May I ask real quick, it's a question on that, why did the British ever cap immigration then[01:54:49] from Jews to that area at all? - Well, we're talking now about 19-[01:54:54] - Twenties to thirties. - Sure, but I'm saying that if the whole goal was just to be an imperialist project, like there were terrorist attacks from Jewish, from-[01:55:01] - Yes. But I'll answer you. - Yeah, in the forties. Yeah. - And we're talking now about 1917[01:55:07] and as I mentioned earlier, I don't think the British had a Jewish state in mind.[01:55:13] That's why they used the term Jewish national home. I think what they wanted was a British protectorate[01:55:19] loyal to and dependent upon the British. I think an outstanding review[01:55:27] of British policy towards these issues during the mandate has been done by Martin Bunton[01:55:33] of the University of Victoria. And he basically makes the argument[01:55:39] that once the British realized the mess they were in, certainly by the late twenties, early thirties,[01:55:47] they recognized the mess they were in, the irreconcilable differences[01:55:54] and basically pursued a policy of just muddling on. And muddling on in the context of British rule in Palestine,[01:56:05] whose overall purpose was to serve for the development of Zionist institutions, Yeshuv's economy and so on,[01:56:15] meant even if the British were not self-consciously doing this,[01:56:21] preparing the groundwork for the eventual establishment of a Jewish state. I don't know if that answers your question.[01:56:26] - Except they did turn anti-Zionist in 1939. - Yes, of course. - And maintained- - They were being shot up by- - And maintain that Zionist-[01:56:33] No, no, before they were being shot up. But maintain that anti-Zionist posture until 1948. - Okay.[01:56:39] - And if I may just also one point, you mentioned Hajj Amin al-Husseini during World,[01:56:45] entirely legitimate. But what I would also point out[01:56:51] is that you had a Zionist organization, the Lehi. - 300 people were-[01:56:57] - 300 people, one of whom happened to become an Israeli prime minister, an Israeli foreign minister, speaker of Israeli parliament.[01:57:04] - Maybe you should give his name. - Yitzhak Shamir, proposing an alliance[01:57:10] with Nazi Germany in 1941. - Shamir proposed an- - Well no, the Lehi proposed-[01:57:16] - Some people in the Lehi proposed- - [Mouin] Of which Shamir was a prominent leader. - Yeah, but that this is a red herring also. - No, no. Okay well, if he's a red herring,[01:57:24] Hajj Amin al-Husseini is a red whale. I'm sorry. - The Lehi was an unimportant organization in the Yeshuv.[01:57:30] 300 people versus 30,000 belonged to the Haganah. So it was not a very important organization.[01:57:35] It's true before the Holocaust actually began, they wanted allies against the British where they could find them- - Were talking 1941 here-[01:57:41] - 1940. - Not 1931. - Before 1940. - '41 from what I recall. - 1940. They approached the German emissary in Istanbul[01:57:49] or something. - Yes. - [Benny] Istanbul. - And if I may, proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany[01:57:56] on what the Lehi described as on the basis of- - Reviled by- - Shared ideological,[01:58:01] shared ideological principles. - No, they didn't share ideological. - Well, they said they did. - [Benny] No, they reviled-[01:58:06] - Why are you doing these things? Of course they said that. - The Lehi was reviled by the majority- - But you know what the statement said,[01:58:13] on the basis of a shared ideology. Why do you say no? - Do you think that the Lehi people were Nazis?[01:58:20] Is that what you're saying? - I'm saying- - They said they were. - They said. - No you're saying that. Forget statements. You like to quote things.[01:58:27] - I do like to quote things- - But were they Nazis? - It's called facts. - Were the Lehi Nazis? That's what I'm asking.[01:58:32] - What did he just say? - [Benny] Some of them supported Stalin, incidentally. - Did he say that the basis of the pact was their agreement on ideology?[01:58:38] - There wasn't any pact. They suggested. - I said wasn't there- - They proposed an agreement. - Right. And what did the agreements say?[01:58:43] - They wanted arms against the British. That's what they wanted. - What did the agreement say? - Well, that's what Hajj Amin al-Husseini wanted also.[01:58:48] That's what- - No, no, but they didn't- - Others in India- - Lehi people didn't work in Berlin helping the Nazi regime.[01:58:54] - It's what the IRA wanted also. - No, but this is what Hajj Amin al-Husseini did. You know that he was an antisemite,[01:59:00] you've probably read some of his works. Yes, he wasn't just anti-British- - Yes and- - He was also antisemitic.[01:59:06] He had a common ground with Hitler. Simple as that. - I think we can agree- - Not every anti-Semite is a Hitlerite.[01:59:12] - I think we could- - That part- - He literally worked with the Nazis to recruit people. He wasn't just a guy posting-[01:59:18] - And he was absolutely revolting, disgusting human being. - [Benny] There's something happen here.[01:59:24] - But the problem is you're saying that Husseini was as influent- you're saying the Mufti was- - I don't even understand of all the crimes[01:59:32] you want to ascribe to the Palestinian people, trying to blame them directly, indirectly,[01:59:38] indirectly or indirectly three times removed for the Nazi Holocaust is completely lunatic.[01:59:46] - Hold on. Wait, he's not blaming them for the Holocaust. He's saying that from the perspective. Wait, wait, wait. No, he's saying that from the perspective[01:59:51] of Jews in the region, Palestinians would've been part of the- - That's not what he's saying. - That is exactly what he said. - You've not read him, I've read him.[01:59:57] - You've read him and you don't understand him! He's sitting right here. - Believe me, I'm a lot more literate than you, Mr. Barelli.[02:00:03] - [Steven] I'm gonna believe the guy that wrote the stuff! - You read what Wikipedia said. - That's great. - I read Benny Morris- - And you don't even speak Hebrew and you call yourself an Israeli historian.[02:00:10] We're all on different grounds. Okay. - If I could just respond to you. - Well, no, I'm just saying that there were two tricks.[02:00:16] - Saying nothing as always. - That's fine. There were two tricks that are being played here that I think is interesting. One is you guys claim that the Lehi[02:00:21] was trying to forge an alliance with Nazi Germany because of a shared ideology. - That's what they said. - Yeah, but hold on. No, no, no, no. Wait, wait.[02:00:27] No, no. It's about what you said. You brought that up to imply that Zionism must be inexorably linked.[02:00:33] - No, I'm sorry. - Oh, come on. - No, you're putting words in my mouth. - No, no. Okay, wait. Well then what was the purpose of saying[02:00:39] that the Lehi claimed that they, the Lehi who were- - The reason I brought it up- - Small group of people that were reviled by many in Israel- - Not many by everybody, practically.[02:00:45] They were called terrorists. The Zionist movement called them terrorists. - Yes. Yes. - And hunted them.[02:00:51] - And Shamir called himself a terrorist. They were so irrelevant that their leader[02:00:57] ended up being kicked upstairs to the leader of the Israeli parliament. - That's Israeli politics 50 years in.[02:01:02] - To Israeli foreign minister. - And Begin was also a part- - Yes. You wanna you wanna characterize him as irrelevant as well?[02:01:09] Go ahead. - No, no. Characterize him as relevant or irrelevant based on what happens decades later. The timeline matters.[02:01:14] The question is what is the point of saying that the Lehi tried to forge an alliance- - Why is, why is, why is-[02:01:19] - The fact that it's relevant is bringing up the Mufti of Jerusalem and trying to blame the Holocaust indirectly-[02:01:26] - The Holocaust- - The Mufti was the leader of the Palestine Arab National Movement.[02:01:31] - And he had about as much as- - The Lehi was 300 people. - And he had as much to do with the Nazi Holocaust as I did. - No, he recruited people for the SS.[02:01:38] How can you get away from that? - No, he recruited soldiers in the Balkans, mostly Kosovars,[02:01:45] which was disgusting. I have no doubt about that. But he had one- - He even wrote letters to foreign ministers saying don't let the Jews out.[02:01:53] - Can I say something? - Hungarian foreign minister, Italian foreign Minister received letters from Husseini[02:01:59] during the Holocaust. - One sentence. One sentence. - During the Holocaust. "Don't let the Jews out." Don't let the Jews out.[02:02:05] I'm not saying he was a major architect of the Holocaust. - He wasn't even minor. - But if we're agreed- - One sentence.[02:02:11] - If we're agreed that Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem,[02:02:17] collaborated with the Nazis during World War II and actively sought their sponsorship, why is it irrelevant-[02:02:23] - [Benny] And probably wanted the destruction of European Jewry. - He probably wanted a lot of things. - Okay. - Okay?[02:02:30] If that's relevant, why is it irrelevant that a prime minister of Israel-[02:02:35] - Not prime minister. In 1941, he wasn't prime minister of Israel. He was a leader of a very small terrorist group.[02:02:42] - So do you consider- - Denounced as terrorists by the mainstream of Zionists. - Do you consider it irrelevant that many years ago,[02:02:49] Mahmoud Abbas wrote a doctoral thesis, which is basically tantamount- - Show me something about Mahmoud Abbas. - Okay but- - But I didn't bring it up.[02:02:56] You're the one who's bringing it up. - [Mouin] Yes, but do you consider that- - Belittling the Holocaust. That's what you're saying. The president of the Palestinian National Authority[02:03:04] belittled the Holocaust saying it didn't happen- - I think that- - Or only a few Jews died. - I think that's a fair characterization of Mahmoud-[02:03:09] - But I didn't bring it up. - I brought it up. - Yeah. - Okay. Because my question is, then why is Shamir's antecedence irrelevant?[02:03:18] - He was a terrorist leader of a very small, marginal group. - Who became Israel- - Hajj Amin al-Husseini[02:03:23] was the head of the movement at the time. - Also, the point of bringing Husseini- - There's no comparison. - The point of bringing up Husseini stuff wasn't to say[02:03:29] that he was a great further of the Holocaust, it's that he might have been a great further in the prevention of Jews fleeing to go to Palestine[02:03:36] to escape the Holocaust. - Yes, but the point I made- - That was the point. - And I explained why I think[02:03:41] that's not an entirely accurate characterization.[02:03:47] And then I wanted to make another point. If it's legitimate to bring up his role during World War II,[02:03:53] why is it illegitimate to bring up a man who would become Israel's Speaker of Parliament, foreign minister-[02:04:01] - 40 years hence. - Yes. Why is it? And also- - He was a young terrorist. - And was also responsible for the murder[02:04:08] of the United Nations' first international envoy, Bernadotte, Folke Bernadotte.[02:04:15] Why is all that irrelevant? - I don't think anybody- - I don't understand. - I think the reason why he was brought up[02:04:20] was because Jewish people in this time period would've viewed it as there was a prevention of Jews[02:04:26] leaving Europe because of the Palestinians pressuring the British to put a curb, that 75,000 immigration limit, yes.[02:04:33] But it's not about them furthering the Holocaust or being an architect major, minor player in the Holocaust. - Well, actually- - He was a major player[02:04:39] in that region. So if you wanted to bring up- - Benny Morris made the specific claim that the Palestinians played an indirect role[02:04:46] in the Holocaust. - The indirect role would've been the prevention of people escaping from- - Yes. - Europe to Palestine. - And my response to that is, first of all,[02:04:54] I disagree with that characterization, but second of all- - How can you disagree with that? They forced the British[02:05:01] to prevent immigration of Jews from Europe and reaching safe shores in Palestine. That's what they did.[02:05:07] And they knew that the Jews were being persecuted in Europe. - Was Palestine the only spot of land on Earth?[02:05:14] - Yes, basically that was the problem. The Jews couldn't immigrate anywhere else. - What about your great friends in Britain,[02:05:19] the architects of the Balfour Declaration? - By the late 1930s they weren't happy- - [Mouin] What about the United States? - To take in Jews and the Americans[02:05:25] weren't happy to take Jews. - And why are Palestinians, who were not Europeans, who had zero role in the rise of Nazism,[02:05:33] who had no relation to any of this, why are they somehow uniquely responsible[02:05:38] for what happened in Europe and uniquely- - They were helping close the only safe haven for Jews. That's all. - Oh really? The United States wasn't a potential safe haven?[02:05:47] The only one was Palestine? - [Benny] At the time. - The United States had no room[02:05:52] From the Atlantic to Pacific- - It did have room. - For Jews? - [Benny] It did have room, but it didn't want Jews. - So that wasn't the only safe haven.[02:05:59] - Shouldn't you be focusing your anger and outrage- - America, it should be blamed for not letting Jews in during the 30s and 40s.[02:06:04] - They are blamed but nobody blames them for the Holocaust. - Well, indirectly. - I've never heard it said that Franklin Delano Roosevelt[02:06:13] was indirectly responsible for the Holocaust. I never heard that. Now maybe it's in Israeli literature[02:06:19] because the Israelis have gone mad. Yes, your prime minister said the whole idea[02:06:24] of the gas chambers came from the Mufti of Jerusalem. - That's nonsense. We all know that's nonsense.[02:06:30] - But we also know that Netanyahu said it, correct? - Netanyahu says so many things which are absurd.[02:06:36] - And he happens to be the longest serving Prime Minister of Israel. - I can't be responsible. - You're not responsible for them but it is relevant[02:06:44] that he's the longest serving Prime Minister of Israel. - Unfortunately it says something about the Israeli public. I agree. - Yes and he gets selected[02:06:50] not despite saying such things, but because he says such. - His voters don't care about Hajj Amin al-Husseini[02:06:56] or Hitler, they know nothing about his voters, his base know nothing about anything[02:07:02] and he can say what he likes and they'll say yes so they don't care if he says these things. - You may well be right, but anyway,[02:07:09] not to beat a dead horse. But I still don't understand- - [Benny] Let's not beat a dead horse. You're right.[02:07:14] - I'll just conclude by saying I don't understand why the Mufti of Jerusalem is relevant. - He is relevant, he is relevant.[02:07:20] The head of the national- - But Shamir is not relevant. - Because Shamir wasn't the head of the national movement.[02:07:26] He represented 100 or 200 or 300 gunmen who were considered terrorists by the Zionist movement at the time.[02:07:32] The fact that 30 years later he becomes prime minister, that's the crux of history. - And his history- - Hajj Amin al-Husseini[02:07:39] was the head of the Palestine Arab National Movement at the time. - Anyway, I- - What can you do? - I think we're speaking past each other.[02:07:45] - We're not, I'm talking facts. - Let's move to the modern day and we'll return to history,[02:07:51] maybe '67 and other important moments but let's look to today in the recent months.[02:07:56] October 7th. Let me ask sort of a pointed question. Was October 7th attacks by Hamas on Israel genocidal?[02:08:05] Was it an act of ethnic cleansing? Just so we lay out the moral calculus[02:08:11] that we are engaged in. - The problem with October 7th is this,[02:08:18] the Hamas fighters who invaded Southern Israel were sent,[02:08:28] ordered to murder, rape, and do all the nasty things that they did and they killed some 1200 Israelis that day[02:08:35] and abducted them as we know, something like 250 mostly civilians, also some soldiers,[02:08:44] took them back to Gaza, dungeons in Gaza. But they were motivated, not just by the words of their current leader[02:08:52] in the Gaza Strip, but by their ideology, which is embedded in their charter from 1988,[02:08:59] if I remember correctly. And that charter is genocidal. It says that the Jews must be eradicated[02:09:06] basically from the land of Israel, from Palestine. The Jews are described there as sons of apes and pigs.[02:09:13] The Jews are a base people, killers of prophets, and they should not exist in Palestine.[02:09:20] It doesn't say that they necessarily should be murdered all around the world, the Hamas charter, but certainly the Jews should be eliminated from Palestine.[02:09:27] And this is the driving ideology behind the massacre of the Jews on October 7th,[02:09:35] which brought down on the Gaza Strip. And I think with the intention by the Hamas[02:09:40] of the Israeli counter offensive 'cause they knew that that counteroffensive would result in many Palestinian dead[02:09:47] because the Hamas fighters and their weaponry and so on were embedded in the population in Gaza.[02:09:53] And they hoped to benefit from this in the eyes of world public opinion as Israel chased these Hamas people[02:09:59] and their ammunition dumps and so on and killed lots of Palestinian civilians in the process.[02:10:05] All of this was understood by Sinwar, by the head of the Hamas and he strived for that.[02:10:10] But initially, he wanted to kill as many Jews as he could. in the border areas around the Gaza Strip.[02:10:18] - I'll respond directly to the points you made and then I'll leave it to Norm[02:10:23] to bring in the historical context. That Hamas charter is from the nineties, I think.[02:10:30] - [Benny] 1988. - 1988. So it's from the eighties.[02:10:35] I think your characterization of that charter as antisemitic[02:10:40] is indisputable. I think your characterization of that charter[02:10:47] as genocidal is off the mark. - It's implicit. - And more importantly,[02:10:54] that charter has been superseded by a new charter. In fact has been, well, there is a-[02:11:01] - There is no new charter. - There is a- - There is an explanation, a statement they made- - 2018- - In 2000 and something.[02:11:07] - 2018. - 2018, supposedly clarifying things which are in the charter, but it doesn't actually step back[02:11:13] from what the charter says, eliminate Israel, eliminate the Jews from the land of Israel. - And in 2018, the Hamas charter,[02:11:21] if we look at the current version of the charter- - It's not called a charter. You're calling it a charter. It wasn't.[02:11:26] The only thing called the charter is what was issued in 1988 by Yassin himself. - Anyway, it makes a clear distinction[02:11:33] between Jews and Zionists in 2018. Now you can choose to dismiss it, believe it.[02:11:40] It's sincere, it's insincere. Whatever. - Insincere is the probably the right word. - Secondly, I am really unfamiliar with fighters[02:11:50] who consult these kinds of documents before they go on- - No, they're brought up on this in their education system.[02:11:56] In the kindergarten, they're told, "Kill the Jews." They practice with make-believe guns and uniforms[02:12:02] when they're five years old in the kindergartens of the Hamas- - At the instruction of the commissioner general[02:12:07] of UNRWA, right? - I didn't say that. I said the Hamas has kindergartens and summer camps[02:12:13] in which they trained to kill Jews, children aged five and six. - Secondly, you keep saying Jews,[02:12:19] to which I would respond- - They use the word Jews. - To which I would respond that Hamas does not have a record[02:12:26] of deliberately targeting Jews who are not Israelis. And in fact, it also doesn't have a record[02:12:33] of deliberately targeting either Jews or Israelis outside Israel and Palestine.[02:12:38] So all this talk of- - Unlike the Hezbollah, which has started targeting Jews[02:12:45] outside Palestine. - We're talking about October 7th and Hamas. If you'd also like to speak about Hezbollah,[02:12:51] let's get to that separately if you don't mind.[02:12:56] So again, genocidal, well, if that term is going to be discussed,[02:13:04] my first response would be let's talk about potentially genocidal actions against Israelis[02:13:12] rather than against Jews for the reasons that I just mentioned. And again, I find this constant conflation[02:13:18] of Jews, Israel, Zionism to be a bit disturbing. Secondly, I think there are quite a few indications[02:13:30] in the factual record that raise serious questions about the accusations of the genocidal intent[02:13:38] and genocidal practice of what happened on October 7th. And my final point would be,[02:13:44] I don't think I should take your word for it, I don't think you should take my word for it. I think what we need here[02:13:51] is a proper independent international investigation. And the reason we need that- - Of what?[02:13:57] - Of genocide during this conflict, whether by Palestinians on October 7th or Israel thereafter.[02:14:04] And the reason that we need such an investigation is because Hamas is, there won't be any hearings[02:14:13] on what Hamas did on October 7th at the International Court of Justice because the International Convention[02:14:21] on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide deals only with states and not with movements.[02:14:27] I think the International Criminal Court, and specifically its current prosecutor, Karim Khan lacks any and all credibility.[02:14:35] He's been an absolute failure at his job. He's just been sitting on his backside for years on this file.[02:14:41] And I think I would point out that Hamas has called for independent investigations of all these allegations.[02:14:51] Israel has categorically rejected any international investigation, of course fully supported by the United States.[02:14:58] And I think what is required is to have credible investigations of these things.[02:15:06] Because I don't think you're going to convince me, I don't think I'm going to convince you. And this is two people[02:15:12] sitting across the table from each other. - There's certain things you don't even have to investigate. You know how many citizens, civilians died[02:15:19] in the October 7th assault- - Yes. But that's not, - You know that there are lots of allegations of rape. I don't know how persuaded you are of those.[02:15:26] They did find bodies without heads, which is- - There were no beheadings of infants.[02:15:31] - There were some beheadings, apparently. - The Israelis didn't even claim that in the document they submitted before the ICJ.[02:15:39] Go read what your government submitted. It never mentioned beheadings. - Well as far as I know, some people were beheaded.[02:15:45] - We could bring it up right now. - You also deny that there were rapes there. - I didn't deny, I said I've not seen convincing evidence[02:15:53] that confirms it. I've said that from day one and I'll say it today, four and a half months later. - Do you know that they killed eight[02:15:59] or 900 civilians in their assault? - Absolutely. That seems to me indisputable. - Oh, okay. Well I'm glad that you're considering something.[02:16:06] - I've said that from day one. - Well, to be clear, you haven't. You did a debate, I don't remember the talk show,[02:16:12] but you seem to imply that there was a lot of crossfire and that it might've been the IDF that killed a lot of- - I said that there is no question[02:16:18] because the names were published in Haaretz. There is no question that roughly of the 1200 people killed,[02:16:26] 800 of them were civilians. - 850. - 850, fine. So I never said that.[02:16:31] But then I said, "No, we don't know exactly how they were killed." But 800 civilians killed, 850, no question there.[02:16:40] And I also said on repeated occasions, there cannot be any doubt, in my opinion as of now,[02:16:47] with the available evidence, that Hamas was responsible for significant atrocities and I made sure to include the plural.[02:16:54] - There's a lot of tricky language being employed here. Do you think of the 850- - There's nothing tricky. It's called attaching value to words[02:17:01] and not talking like a motor mouth. I am very careful about qualifying[02:17:07] because that's what language is about. - That's great. Then let me just ask a clarifying question. Do you firmly believe that the majority of the 850 civilians[02:17:14] were killed by Hamas? - My view is, even if it were half, 400 is a huge number by any reckoning.[02:17:24] - Why not- - Okay, wait. You didn't- - I said even if- - Wait, wait, wait- - Because Benny, because Professor Morris, I don't know.[02:17:34] I agree with Mouin Rabbani. I'm not sure if he concedes the 400. I'll say-[02:17:40] - Why 400? - Because I have- - Whoever thought up the 400? - As I said- - 800 of the 850[02:17:45] were slaughtered by Hamas. Maybe a couple of individuals were killed in Israeli action.[02:17:51] - I don't know. - You're saying from day one- - Professor Morris- - You believe this particular thing- - Professor Morris- - You clearly don't,[02:17:56] you clearly don't believe this thing. You don't. - From day one I said- - You said people died. That's not controversial.[02:18:02] - [Mouin] Wait, hold on, hold on. If I may. - That's not controversial. - Mr. Bonnell. Mr. Bonnell, I attach value to words.[02:18:10] - Yes, you've said that. If you value them, then stop repeating so much. - Mr. Bonnell, please slow down the speech[02:18:15] and attempt to listen. When I was explicitly asked by Piers Morgan,[02:18:21] I said, "There can be no question that Hamas committed- - Committed atrocities. I've heard this, yes.[02:18:27] - On October 7th. If you want me to pin down a number, I can't do that-[02:18:33] - [Steven] I didn't ask you to pin down a number. You can listen to what I'm saying. No, my question is, I'll ask a very precise- - Mr. Bonnell, I cannot speak to you because you're not-[02:18:40] - It's a very easy question. - Excuse me. If I understood your question correctly- - My question is do you think the majority of the people that were killed on October 7th,[02:18:46] the civilians were killed by Hamas or are we subscribing to the idea that the IDF killed hundreds, four or 500 in crossfire?[02:18:52] - Let me explain why that's a difficult question to answer. The total number of civilians killed was 800, 850.[02:19:00] We know that Hamas is responsible probably for the majority of those killings.[02:19:07] We also know that there were killings by Islamic Jihad.[02:19:12] We also know- - We're bunching together the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, that's splitting hairs now. - [Norman] The question was specifically-[02:19:17] - No but he means the raiders. He means the raiders. - I'm speaking in opposition to the conspiracy theory[02:19:23] that people like, do you prefer Norm or Professor Finkelstein or what do you, I don't know what you're, how do you prefer-[02:19:29] - Well, it's not a conspiracy theory- - Well, the conspiracy theory is the idea that the IDF killed the majority of them. - [Mouin] It's not a conspiracy theory.[02:19:34] - And then there's also a theory that as Norm pointed out on the show that he was on, that he thought that it was very strange[02:19:40] that given how reputable Israeli services are when it comes to sending ambulances, retrieving bodies,[02:19:47] he thought it was very strange that that number was continually being adjusted. - And do you know why? - So when you say that in combination with, "Well, I'm not sure[02:19:53] how many were killed by Hamas and the IDF-" - Do you know why the number went down? The number went down because the Israeli authorities[02:20:00] were in possession of 200 corpses that were burned to a crisp that they assumed were Israelis[02:20:10] who had been killed on October 7th. They later determined that these were in fact Palestinian fighters.[02:20:18] Now, how does a Palestinian fighter get burnt to a crisp? - No, you're mixing two things.[02:20:23] Some of the bodies they weren't able to identify and eventually they ruled that some of them were actually Arab marauders[02:20:31] rather than Israeli victims. A few of them also of the Jews were burnt to a crisp.[02:20:36] And it took 'em time to work this out. And they came out initially with a slightly higher figure, 1400 dead and eventually reduced it to 1200 dead Israelis.[02:20:45] - And the reason is that a proportion of Israeli civilians killed on October 7th, I don't believe it was a majority.[02:20:51] We don't know how many. Some were killed in crossfire, some were killed by Israeli shell fire,[02:21:00] helicopter fire, and so on, and the majority were killed by Palestinians.[02:21:07] And of that majority, we don't know. I mean, again, I understood your question[02:21:13] as referring specifically to Hamas, which is why I tried to answer it that way. But if you meant generically Palestinians, yes.[02:21:21] If you mean specifically Hamas, we don't have a clear breakdown of how many- - No, I don't mean specifically Hamas.[02:21:26] But I just think when you use the word some, that's doing a lot of heavy lifting. - [Norman] Who used some? - That's fine, but some can mean anywhere from 1% to 49%.[02:21:32] - Who used some? - But we don't know. - So the numbers here in the details are interesting[02:21:37] and important almost from a legal perspective, but if we zoom out, the moral perspective,[02:21:43] are Palestinians from Gaza justified in violent resistance? - Well, Palestinians have the right to resistance.[02:21:52] That right includes the right to armed resistance. At the same time, armed resistance[02:21:59] is subject to the laws of war. And there are very clear regulations that separate[02:22:06] legitimate acts of armed resistance from acts of armed resistance that are not legitimate-[02:22:13] - The attacks of October 7th, where did they land for you? - There's been almost exclusive focus[02:22:19] on the attacks on civilian population centers and the killings of civilians on October 7th.[02:22:29] What is much less discussed to the point of amnesia[02:22:35] is that there were very extensive attacks on Israeli military and intelligence facilities[02:22:42] on October 7th. I would make a very clear distinction between those two.[02:22:48] And secondly, I'm not sure that I would characterize[02:22:56] the efforts by Palestinians on October 7th[02:23:02] to seize Israeli territory and Israeli population centers[02:23:07] as in and of themselves illegitimate. - You mean attacking Israeli civilians legitimate?[02:23:13] - [Mouin] No, no. That's not what I said. - I didn't understand what you said. - I think what you had on October 7th was an effort by Hamas[02:23:21] to seize Israeli territory and population centers- - And kill civilians. - That's not what I said.[02:23:26] What I said is I think, I would not describe the effort to seize Israeli territory[02:23:34] as in and of itself illegitimate as a separate issue from the killing of Israeli civilians[02:23:41] where in those cases, where they had been deliberately targeted. That's very clearly illegitimate. - All families were slaughtered in kibbutzim.[02:23:48] - But I'm making- - Wait, wait, quick, quick. - Many of them left wingers incidentally who helped Palestinians go to hospitals in Israel and so on.[02:23:55] - Again- - Even drove Palestinian cancer patients to hospitals. - Again, I'm making a distinction here.[02:24:01] - [Benny] But you don't seem to be very condemnatory of what Hamas did. - Well, I don't do selective condemnation.[02:24:06] - [Benny] I'm not talking about selective- - I don't do selective outrage. - But specific condemnation of this specific- - Well, you know what it is? - Assault of civilians.[02:24:12] I would, for example, condemn Israeli assaults on civilians, deliberate assaults on civilians.[02:24:19] - Yes. - I would condemn them. But you're not doing that with Hamas. - [Mouin] You know what the issue is? - What?[02:24:24] - I've been speaking in public now, I would say since the late 1980s and interviewed and so on.[02:24:30] I have never on one occasion ever been asked to condemn any Israeli act.[02:24:37] When I've been in group discussions, those supporting the Israeli action or perspective,[02:24:43] I have never encountered an example where these individuals are asked to condemn[02:24:49] what Israel is doing. The demand and obligation of condemnation[02:24:55] is exclusively applied, in my personal experience over decades,[02:25:00] is exclusively applied to Palestinians. - But this is not. Israel is condemned day and night[02:25:06] on every television channel, on every, and has been for the last decades. - I'm telling you about personal experience lasting decades.[02:25:13] - You said quote: - Uh-oh. Oh no. - I'm trying to quote what you just said.[02:25:18] - I shouldn't have said anything at any point. - Professor Morris? - Yes. - You just said, "I would condemn[02:25:26] anytime Israel deliberately attacks civilians." - Yes. - Okay?[02:25:33] The problem, Professor Morris, is over and over again,[02:25:39] you claim in the face of overwhelming evidence,[02:25:45] that they didn't attack civilians. - That's not true. I've said Israel has attacked civilians.[02:25:50] - Professor Morris. - In Qibya, Israel attacked civilians. - [Norman] Right, right. Professor Morris- - And I've written extensively about it. - Okay. I know that. - In Kafr Qasim,[02:25:56] they killed civilians and I've written about it. - Now lets- - So you're just eliminating. You're selecting. As Steven said, you cherry-pick.[02:26:04] - If I were you- - You cherry-pick. - Let's fast forward when you were an adult.[02:26:09] What did you say about the 1982 Lebanon War? - What did I say? - You don't remember?[02:26:16] Okay. Allow me. - Uh-oh. - Okay. So it happens that I was not at all by any,[02:26:25] I had no interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict as a young man until the 19- - This is true. - Until the 1982 Lebanon war.[02:26:34] - Yeah. He lost the passage. - I'll find it. - Okay real quick, while he's searching for that, - Yeah allow me- - You bring up something[02:26:39] that's really important that a lot of people don't draw a distinction between in that there is just causes for war[02:26:45] and there is just ways to act within a war. And these two things principally do have a distinction from one another. - [Mouin] Correct. - However, while I appreciate[02:26:52] the recognition of the distinction, the idea that the cause for war that Hamas was engaged in,[02:26:58] I don't believe if we look at their actions in war or the statements that they've made, it doesn't seem like it had to do with territorial acquisition.[02:27:04] - [Mouin] No, no, no, no. The point I was making was- - Like taking land back.[02:27:10] - What was Hamas trying to achieve militarily on October 7th.[02:27:16] And I was pointing out that the focus has been very much on Hamas attacks on civilians and atrocities and so on.[02:27:25] And I'm not saying those things should be ignored. What I'm saying is that what's getting lost in the shuffle[02:27:32] is that there were extensive attacks on military and intelligence facilities.[02:27:38] And as far as the other aspects are concerned,[02:27:44] because I think either you or Lex asked me about the legitimacy of these attacks.[02:27:49] I said I'm unclear whether efforts by Hamas[02:27:55] to seize Israeli population centers in and of themselves are illegitimate as opposed to actions[02:28:04] that either deliberately targeted Israeli civilians or actions that should reasonably have been expected[02:28:15] to result in the killings of Israeli civilians. Those strike me as by definition illegitimate.[02:28:21] And I want to be very clear about that. I have where I- - Illegitimate means you condemn them?[02:28:26] - Illegitimate means they are not legitimate. I have a problem- - Condemning your side, yes.[02:28:31] - No, not condemning my side. I have a problem with selective outrage and I have a problem with selective condemnation.[02:28:38] And as I explained to you a few minutes ago, in my decades of appearing in public and being interviewed,[02:28:46] I have never been asked to condemn an Israeli action,[02:28:52] I've never been asked for a moral judgment on an Israeli action. Exclusive request for condemnation[02:28:59] has to do with what Palestinians do more and just as importantly, I'm sure if you watch BBC or CNN,[02:29:07] when is the last time an Israeli spokesperson has been asked to condemn an Israeli act?[02:29:12] I've never seen it. - I don't think we condemn the Arab side either though. I don't think there's any condemnation. - No, but now that we're talking about Israeli victims,[02:29:20] all of a sudden morality is central. - Well, I think the reason why it comes up is because there's no shortage of international condemnation for Israel.[02:29:26] As Norm will point out a million times that there are 50 billion UN resolutions, you've got Amnesty International, you've got multiple bodies of the UN,[02:29:33] you've got now this case for the ICJ so there's no question of if there's condemnation- - Sorry, if I can interrupt you. In 1948, the entire world stood behind[02:29:42] the establishment of a Jewish state and the entire world- - No, except Arab states and the Muslim states. - Well- - Not the entire world.[02:29:48] - Okay. But I think you know what I mean by that. - The Western democracies. That's what you're saying. - Well, and then also just my quick question.[02:29:54] - Western democracies supported the establishment of Israel. - My quick question was you said that you believe that, it's a very short one you don't have to, it's just that you think that there's an argument to be made[02:30:02] that the people in Gaza, that Hamas and Islam Jihad, or whoever participated had a just cause for war. Maybe they didn't do it in the correct way,[02:30:07] but they maybe had a just cause for war. - I don't think there's a maybe there. The Palestinians- - Okay, do you think they absolutely had a just cause.[02:30:12] Do you think that Israel has a just cause for Operation Swords of Iron? - No, of course not. - Okay. - Alright.[02:30:18] You can say your quote. - Okay. First of all, on this issue of double standards,[02:30:25] which is the one that irks or irritates Mouin,[02:30:31] you said that you are not a person of double standards, unlike people like Mouin.[02:30:38] You hold high a single standard and you condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on-[02:30:46] - Civilians. - On Civilians. - [Benny] When they occur, yeah. - And I would say that's true for the period up till 1967.[02:30:55] And I think it's accurate your account of the First Intifada.[02:31:02] There, it seems to me you were in conformity with most mainstream accounts[02:31:08] and the case of the First Intifada, you also used, surprisingly,[02:31:13] he used Arab human rights sources like Al-Haq, which I think Mouin worked for, during the Intifada.[02:31:21] That's true. But then something very strange happens.[02:31:27] So let's illustrate it. - Wait, there's something strange which happened is the Arabs rejected- - Okay, wait. - Peace offers.[02:31:33] That's what happened. - By accepting the Oslo agreements. - By rejecting, he's talking about Camp David and Taba. - Talking about Camp David.[02:31:39] - If we have time, I know the record very well. I'd be very happy to go through it with you.[02:31:45] But let's get to those double standards. So this is what you have to say[02:31:50] about Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. You said, "Israel was reluctant to harm civilians,[02:32:00] sought to avoid casualties on both sides,[02:32:06] and took care not to harm Lebanese[02:32:11] and Palestinians civilians." You then went on to acknowledge[02:32:17] the massive use of IDF firepower against civilians during the siege of Beirut,[02:32:24] which traumatized Israeli society. Morris quickly enters the caveat the Israel[02:32:31] "tried to pinpoint military targets, but inevitably many civilians were hit."[02:32:39] That's your description of the Lebanon War. As I say, that's when I first got involved in the conflict.[02:32:47] I am a voracious reader. I read everything on the Lebanon War.[02:32:53] I would say there's not a single account of the Lebanon War[02:32:58] in which the estimates are between 15 and 20,000 Palestinian Lebanese were killed, overwhelmingly civilians.[02:33:08] The biggest bloodletting until the current Gaza genocide.[02:33:14] Biggest bloodletting. I would say I can't think of a single mainstream account[02:33:21] that remotely approximates what you just said. So leaving aside, I can name the books,[02:33:29] voluminous huge volumes. I'll just take one example. Now you will remember,[02:33:35] 'cause I think you served in Lebanon in '82. Am I correct on that? - Yeah, yeah. - Yeah. So you will remember that Dov Yermiya kept a war diary.[02:33:44] So with your permission, allow me to describe what he wrote during his diary.[02:33:52] So he writes, "The war machine of the IDF is galloping[02:33:58] and trampling over the conquered territory, demonstrating a total insensitivity[02:34:06] to the fate of the Arabs who are found in its path. A PLO-run hospital suffered a direct hit.[02:34:15] Thousands of refugees are returning to the city. When they arrive at their homes,[02:34:21] many of which have been destroyed or damaged, you hear their cries of pain[02:34:26] and their howls over the deaths of their loved ones. The air is permeated with the smell of corpses,[02:34:32] - Oh, I think we- - Destruction and death are continuing- - Yeah, point made. - Does that-[02:34:37] - [Benny] The point you're making actually- - Does that sound like your description of the Lebanon War? - Forget my descriptions.[02:34:43] - Forget it? - The point you're making- - Words are important. We can't just forget them. - Let me just finish my sentence.[02:34:48] The point you're making, which you somehow forget, is that there are Israelis who strongly criticize their own side[02:34:55] and describe how Israelis are doing things which they regard as immoral. You don't find that on the Arab side.[02:35:02] - I'm talking about you. - You don't find that. - Mr. Morris. I'm not talking about Dov Yermiya. - [Benny] Don't hear me out is the left wing-[02:35:08] - I'm talking about you, the historian. How did you depict the Lebanon War? - 'Cause I believe that the Israeli military[02:35:15] tried to avoid committing a civilian casualty. - So Dov- - Sabra and Shatila as well? - And I think they- - All the accounts[02:35:22] by Robert Fisk and "Pity the Nation"- - Robert Fisk is an anti-Zionist journalist. - I know. - Has always been.[02:35:29] - Right. So that's why you can say with such confidence[02:35:34] that you don't condemn deliberate Israeli attacks on civilians because there weren't any.[02:35:41] - No, I didn't say there weren't any. - Yeah, you didn't? - And you agreed that I have condemned Israeli attacks- - Yes, there are- - On civilians.[02:35:47] - I never quarrel with facts. Your description of the 1982 war is so shocking,[02:35:55] it makes my innards writhe. And then your description of the Second Intifada,[02:36:01] your description of Defensive Shield- - When the Arabs were bombing- - They are worse[02:36:06] than apologetics. - When Arab suicide bombers- - That's like the Stalinist- - Were destroying Jews - School of falsification. - En masses in buses and in restaurants.[02:36:15] That's the Second Intifada. Do you remember that? - You can try everything- - Suicide bombers in Jerusalem's buses and restaurants and in Tel Aviv-[02:36:21] - I am completely aware of that. But if you forgot the numbers- - I don't forget. - It was three to one,[02:36:28] the number- - They killed mostly armed Palestinian gunmen. - That's what you say in your book.[02:36:34] - That's what I say. - But that's not what Amnesty International said. That's not what Human Rights Watch said.[02:36:40] - I don't remember what they said. - I do. That's not what B'Tselem said. - [Benny] I don't know whether their figures are right.[02:36:45] - Listen, listen. - My figures are right. - In the Second Intifada, some 4,000 Palestinians were killed-[02:36:51] - Professor Morris. - Most of them armed people. And Israelis, a thousand Israelis were killed,[02:36:57] almost all of them civilian. - No Professor, Professor Morris, Fantasy. But I'm not gonna argue with here,[02:37:03] here's a simple challenge. You said not to look at the camera. - Sometimes. - It scares the people. I'll make the open challenge.[02:37:09] - You are going to scare them. - No. Professor Morris. - Open challenge. - Words are in print.[02:37:16] I wrote 50 pages analyzing all of your work.[02:37:21] I quote, some will say cherry-pick, but I think accurately quote you.[02:37:28] Here's a simple challenge. Answer me in print.[02:37:33] Answer what I wrote and show where I'm making things up. Answer me in print. - I'm not familiar. I'm sorry.[02:37:40] - Okay. - I'm not familiar with- - No, that's no problem. You're a busy man. You're an important historian.[02:37:45] You don't have to know everything that's in print, especially by modest publishers.[02:37:51] But now you know. And so here's the public challenge. You answer and show where I cherry-picked,[02:38:00] where I misrepresented. - Send me the article, I'll respond. - And then we can have a civil scholarly discussion.[02:38:07] - [Benny] I'm not sure we will agree, even if I- - We don't have to agree. - Yeah, understand. Okay. - It's for the reader to decide, looking at both sides,[02:38:15] where this truth stands. - Norman, and if I may ask, it's good to discuss ideas[02:38:21] that are in the air now as opposed to citing literature that was written in the past as much as possible[02:38:27] because listeners who are not familiar with the literature. So whatever was written, just express it,[02:38:34] condense the key idea and then we can debate the ideas or discuss the ideas. - No, there are two aspects. There's a public debate, but there's also written words.[02:38:42] - Yes, I'm just telling you that you as a academic historian put a lot of value in the written word[02:38:47] and I think it is valuable. But in this context- - He's incidentally not the only historian who puts value to words.[02:38:53] I also do actually. - Yes. But in this- - More than just one or two sentences at a time. - But in this context,[02:39:00] just for the educational purpose of teaching people- - Well, the educational purpose is, why would people commit what I have to acknowledge?[02:39:08] Because I am faithful to the facts. Massive atrocities on October 7th.[02:39:14] Why did that happen? And I think that's the problem. The past is erased[02:39:21] and we suddenly went from 1948 to October 7th, 2023.[02:39:28] And there is a problem there. - So first of all, you have complete freedom to backtrack and we'll go there with you.[02:39:34] Obviously we can't cover every single year, every single event. But there's probably critical moments in time.[02:39:39] - Can I respond to something relating to that? The Lebanon War. I looked at the book that he got this from, or what the quote was from.[02:39:45] It sounds cold to say it, but war is tragic and civilians die. There is no war that this has not happened in,[02:39:52] in the history of all of humankind. The statement that Israel might take care[02:39:57] not to target civilians is not incompatible with a diary entry from someone who said they saw civilians getting killed.[02:40:03] I think that sometimes we do a lot of weird games when we talk about international humanitarian law or laws that govern conflict where we say things like[02:40:09] civilians dying is a war crime or civilian homes or hospitals getting destroyed is necessarily a war crime[02:40:15] or is necessarily somebody intentionally targeting civilians without making distinctions between military targets or civilian ones.[02:40:21] I think that when we analyze different attacks or when we talk about the conduct of a military, I think it's important to understand perspectively[02:40:28] from the unit of analysis of the actual military committing the acts, what's happening[02:40:33] and what are the decisions being made, rather than just saying retrospectively, "Oh well, a lot of civilians died.[02:40:39] Not very many military people died comparatively speaking, so it must have been war crimes." Especially when you've got another side.[02:40:47] I'll fast forward to Hamas, that intentionally attempts to induce those same civilian numbers because Hamas is guilty of any war crime[02:40:54] that you would potentially accuse and this is according to the Amnesty International, people that Norm loves to cite, Hamas is guilty of all of these same war crimes,[02:41:00] of them failing to take care of the civilian population, of them essentially utilizing human shields to try to fire rockets, free from attacks-[02:41:06] - Essentially? - Essentially, yes. I'm just saying that essentially as in terms[02:41:11] of how international law defines and not how Amnesty International defines it, but Amnesty International describes times of human shielding, but they don't actually apply[02:41:17] the correct international legal standard. - You don't know what's the correct international law. - I absolutely do, Norm. - You haven't a clue.[02:41:22] - [Steven] I absolutely do. But I'm just saying- - Can't find it on Wikipedia. - I'm just saying- - You can't find it on Wikipedia. - Believe it or not, Norm,[02:41:28] the entire Geneva Convention is all on Wikipedia. It's a wonderful website. But I'm just saying that on the Hamas side, if there's an attempt to induce[02:41:34] this type of military activity, attempt to induce civilian harm, that's not just enough to say like, "Well, here's a diary entry[02:41:39] where a guy talks about how tragic these attacks are." - I think the problem with your statement[02:41:45] is that if you go back and listen to it, the first part of it is "War as hell. Civilians die.[02:41:52] It's a fact of life." And you state that in a very factual matter. Then when you start talking about Hamas,[02:42:00] all of a sudden you've discovered morality and you've discovered condemnation and you've discovered intent[02:42:06] and you are unfortunately far from alone in this. You know who for me is a perfect example?[02:42:13] - Well wait, hold on just for second. We don't need examples. - Go ahead. - The false equivalency of the two sides is astounding.[02:42:19] When Hamas kills civilians in a surprise attack on October 7th, this isn't because they are attempting to target[02:42:25] military targets and they happen to stumble into a giant festival of people that- - Well, they did happen to stumble into it. - They did, but- - And they killed 300 people.[02:42:32] - But when they stumbled into it, that wasn't an issue of trying to figure out a military target or not, they weren't failing a distinction.[02:42:38] There wasn't a proportionality assessment done, it was just to kill civilians. Even the Amnesty International in 2008 and in 2014,[02:42:44] and even today will continue to say these types of attacks- - I don't think you'll find anyone who will deny that Hamas has targeted civilians.[02:42:51] - Sure. - You gave the example of- - [Steven] But there's a difference because- - Of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada.[02:42:57] I mean, facts are facts. - Sure and I'm just saying that the Hamas targeting of civilians is different than the incidental loss of life[02:43:03] that occurs when Israel does- - You know, genocide is the intentional mass murder.[02:43:08] - Genocide is a entirely separate claim. - Yeah, but the idea that Israel is not in the business of intentionally targeting civilians,[02:43:16] I know that's what we're supposed to believe. But the historical record stands-[02:43:24] - No, no. - Very clearly. - I don't believe it does. - You've written it yourself. - When you say historical, do you mean like in the forties to the sixties[02:43:30] or do you mean like over the past- - I would say from the thirties of the last century to the twenties of this century.[02:43:36] I just like to make you know, the way you characterized it.[02:43:41] I think the best example of that I've come across during this specific conflict is John Kirby,[02:43:47] the White House spokesman. I've named him Tears Tosterone for a very good reason.[02:43:53] When he's talking about Palestinian civilian deaths, war is hell, it's a fact of life, get used to it.[02:44:02] When he was confronted with Israeli civilian deaths on October 7th, he literally broke down in tears in public.[02:44:07] - But he understood that one is deliberate and one isn't. He understood that. - [Mouin] No, that's what he tried to make us understand.[02:44:12] - No, no. He was speaking facts. The Hamas guys who attacked the kibbutzim,[02:44:18] apart from the attacks on the military sites, when they attacked the kibbutzim, were out to kill civilians.[02:44:24] And they killed family after family, house after house. The Israeli attacks on Hamas installations-[02:44:31] - You know better. - And fight, I don't know better. No, you don't know Israeli pilots, that's the problem. - [Norman] Thank God.[02:44:36] - No, you don't know Israeli pilots. - [Norman] I know, thank God. - They believe that they are killing Hamas snakes.[02:44:42] They're given certain objectives- - I'm sure they believe it. - And that's who they attack. And if the Hamas is hiding behind civilian, civilians die.[02:44:48] - Every time they target- - Simple as that. - Every time they target a kid, I'm sure they believe it's Hamas. When they kids, when they, yeah.[02:44:54] When they killed the four kids in the- - They believe- - I know they believed it. Even though they were diminutive size,[02:45:03] - From that angle you don't see the sizes. - Yeah, no. They saw the size. - You don't see the size. - Let's see the size. - Oh, I know what he's quoting.[02:45:08] You've lied about this particular instance in the past. Those kids weren't just on the beaches as often stated in articles, those kids were literally coming out[02:45:14] of a previously identified Hamas compound that they have operated from. They literally did. You could could Google it. - Mr. Borelli. Mr Borelli.[02:45:20] With all due respect. - Mr. Finkelsteiver. - With all due respect, you're such a fantastic moron, it's terrifying. - Uh-huh.[02:45:27] - That wharf was filled with journalists. There were tens scores of journalists.[02:45:35] That was an old fisherman's shack. What are you talking about? It's so painful.[02:45:42] - Hamas naval- - It's so painful to listen to this idiocy. - And to be clear on the other side,[02:45:48] you're implying that a strike was okayed on the Israeli side where they said, "We're just gonna kill four Palestinians today for no reason."[02:45:54] - Do you believe that? - Do you believe that? Do you believe that? After you said rightfully, there was a hotel of journalists,[02:45:59] do you think that they would intentionally kill- - That they were out to kill four children? - Here we go. - [Steven] He will never answer that question. - I will answer the question. - Pilots were out to kill-[02:46:05] - I will even answer- - Four children. - Moron's question. - Because that was a strike, that was a drone strike. That was approved all way up the chain[02:46:11] that we're gonna kill children today. We're gonna kill Palestinian children today. - Do you want me to answer or do you want your motor mouth to go?[02:46:16] Okay? Answer. In 2018, there was the Great March of Return in Gaza.[02:46:25] By all reckonings of human rights organizations and journalists who were there,[02:46:32] it was overwhelmingly non-violent. - Organized by the Hamas. - With whoever organized it.[02:46:39] - It was organized by Satan. Let's start with that. - No, by Hamas. - Okay, Satan. I agree. Let's go for the big one, the big magilla.[02:46:46] It's Satan. Okay? Overwhelmingly nonviolent. Resembled at the beginning-[02:46:53] - With bombs here and there. - The First Intifada, represented the First- - They threw bombs here and there, yeah. - Yeah, okay. Not bombs. - They tried to make holes in the defense.[02:47:00] - Okay. - Obviously. - Let's continue. - Yeah. - So- - But I'm not sure Israel behaved morally in that respect.[02:47:06] - Okay, okay. But you're- - No, no, no. - [Norman] Okay, wait, wait, wait, wait. - I'm willing to grant you that. - Please, please.[02:47:11] - I'm willing to grant you- - Allow me- - You don't have to proceed- - Allow me to- - I'm willing to grant- - Allow me to finish. - I don't know anything about this I'd like to hear.[02:47:17] - Okay. So as you know, along the Gaza perimeter,[02:47:24] there was Israel's best trained snipers, correct? - I don't know best trained. There were snipers.[02:47:30] - Fine. - Snipers. - Okay. All right? - Editorializing story. - Hey, laugh. It's hilarious.[02:47:35] The story's so funny. - You're lying about, the Great March of Return had aspects of violence to it, even the UN says it themselves.[02:47:41] - [Norman] Okay, okay. - But you only select what the UN says that you like. - You see, the problem Mr. Morelli is,[02:47:47] is you don't know the English language. - I can read from the UN website itself. In regards to the Great March of Return they said-[02:47:53] - Please stop with your- - "While the vast majority of protests were enacted in a peaceful manner, - Listen to what he's saying. - During most protests, dozens have approached the fence,[02:47:59] attempting to damage it, burning fires, throwing stones, and Molotov cocktails towards Israeli forces[02:48:06] and flying incendiary kites and balloons into Israeli territory. The latter results in extensive damage to agricultural land[02:48:12] and nature reserves inside Israel and risked the lives of Israeli civilians. Some instance of shooting, throwing an explosive also-"[02:48:18] - Talk fast, talk fast so people think that you're coherent. - I'm just reading from the UN! - [Norman] Yeah, but you're saying- - I know you like them sometimes,[02:48:24] only when they agree with you though. - You got the months wrong. You got the months wrong. We're talking about the beginning in March 30th, 2018.[02:48:32] - You just described that march as mostly people. - Okay, allow me to finish. So there were the snipers.[02:48:38] Now you find it so farfetched, Israelis purposely deliberately targeting civilians?[02:48:46] That's such a farfetched idea. An overwhelmingly non-violent march.[02:48:53] What did the international investigation- - It wasn't a march, it was a campaign- - Whatever you wanna call it. - Going on for months. - Whatever you wanna call it. - For months.[02:48:59] - Yeah. What did the UN investigation find? - Well, he just read it to you.[02:49:05] - I read the report. I don't read things off of those machines. I read the report. What did it find?[02:49:13] Brace yourself. You thought it was so funny the idea of IDF targeting civilians.[02:49:21] It found, go look this up on your machine. - I already know what you're gonna say. You're gonna say they found only one or two of them[02:49:27] were justified killings. - Targeted children, targeted journalists, targeted medics.[02:49:34] And here's the funniest one of all. It's so hilarious. They targeted disabled people[02:49:41] who were 300 meters away from the fence[02:49:47] and just standing by trees- - If this is true, if what you're saying is true- - If it's true- - If what you say is true- - Just quick pause.[02:49:54] I think everything was fascinating to listen to except the mention of hilarious. Nobody finds any of this hilarious.[02:50:00] And if any of us are laughing, it's not at the suffering of civilians or suffering of anyone,[02:50:06] it's at the obvious joyful comradery in the room. So I'm enjoying it. And also the joy of learning.[02:50:12] So thank you. - Can we talk about the targeting civilian thing a little bit? I think there's an important underlying,[02:50:17] not necessarily that I just, I think it's important to understand. Yeah, I think it's important to understand there's three different things here that we need to think about.[02:50:23] So one is a policy of killing civilians. So I would ask the other side, I'm gonna ask all three 'cause I know there won't be a short answer.[02:50:29] Do you think there is a policy top-down from the IDF to target civilians? That's one thing. - Yeah. - A second thing is-[02:50:35] - He said yes. - When I under, yeah, sure. Okay, that's fine. - Mouin answered yes. - But then the second thing is- Or there's two distinctions I wanna draw between.[02:50:41] I think Benny would say this, I would say this, I am sure undoubtedly there have been cases[02:50:47] where IDF soldiers for no good reason have targeted and killed Palestinians that they should not have done.[02:50:53] That would be prosecutable as war crimes as defined by Rome Statute- - And some have been prosecuted. - Yeah. And I'm absolutely sure-[02:50:58] - According to you with your book, practically none. - [Steven] I'm sure, I'm sure, I'm sure. - According to you in your books, probably not. - I'm sure that we would all agree for soldiers[02:51:05] that that happens. But I think that it's important. I think that it's important that when we talk about military strikes or we talk about things[02:51:11] especially involving bombings or drone attacks, these are things that are signed off by multiple different layers of command,[02:51:18] by multiple people involved in an operation, including intelligence gathering, including weaponeering. And there also have typically lawyers involved.[02:51:24] When you make the claim that an idea of a soldier shot a Palestinian, those three people, the three hostages that came up with white flags[02:51:30] and something horrible happened, I think that's a fair statement to make and I think a lot of criticism is deserved. But when you make the statement that four children were killed by a strike,[02:51:38] the claim that you're making- Yeah. - Deliberately, yes. - The claim that you're making is that multiple levels of the IDF signed off.[02:51:44] - I never- - On just killing- - I have no idea what motivate them. - If you don't understand the process, then let me educate you, I can tell you.[02:51:49] - [Norman] No, you don't understand the process. - I do understand the process, I'm telling you. I'm trying to explain to you right now. - You're in the IDF? - No, it's basic milli-[02:51:54] You can ask anybody to talk about- - Aside from Wikipedia, can you tell me what your knowledge of the IDF is? - You can talk to people-[02:52:00] - Apart from Wikipedia, - Who work in the military- - What's your knowledge of the IDF? - Your audience can look this up. Do you think that bombing and strikes[02:52:06] are decided by one person in the field? Do you think one person- - Can I respond? - Takes control of an airplane on a drone strike- - A pilot doesn't do it on his own-[02:52:12] - Strike cells have entire apparatuses that are designed to figure out how to strike and who to strike. So when you say that four children are targeted,[02:52:19] you're saying that a whole apparatus is trying to murder- - You made my argument- - Four Palestinian children. - You make my argument better than me.[02:52:24] - [Steven] Which is a ridiculous argument. - Because, oh really? That it's impossible at the command level.[02:52:30] It's impossible at the command level. But you said that they couldn't have done it at the bottom if it weren't also at the top.[02:52:36] - You don't understand the strength of the claim that you're making. You're saying that from a top-down level that lawyers, multiple commanders, intelligence,[02:52:42] all these people signed off. - [Norman] Do not tell me what I don't understand. - On killing four Palestinians. - It's true- - Children.[02:52:47] - It's true I don't spend my nights on Wikipedia. I read books. I admit that as a- - A waste of time.[02:52:54] - Yeah, I know, books are a waste of time. With all due regard- - Clearly you think they are[02:52:59] if the only thing take from them are two or three quotes that you use to push people around. - I completely respect the fact, and I'll say it on the air.[02:53:06] As much as I find totally disgusting what's come of your politics,[02:53:13] a lot of the books are excellent. And I'll even tell you because I'm not afraid of saying it.[02:53:19] Whenever I have to check on the basic fact, the equivalent of going to the Britannica,[02:53:25] I go to your books. I know you got a lot of the facts right. - Benny Morris' books for the listener. - I would never say books are a waste of time.[02:53:35] And it's regrettable to you that you got strapped with a partner- - I never said books were a waste of time.[02:53:40] - [Norman] Who thinks that all the wisdom- - Only your books. - He didn't say they're a waste of time. - I'd like to respond to what you were saying.[02:53:49] I think the question that we're trying to answer, I think- - I think you don't understand Israel, you know?[02:53:55] Neither of you- - Let me finish, please. - Really understands Israel. - I think we're all- - And how it works. - I think we're all agreed that Palestinians[02:54:03] have deliberately targeted civilians. Whether we're talking about Hamas and Islamic Jihad today[02:54:09] or previously. - I prefer the word murdered and raped rather than targeted. Targeted is too soft for what the Hamas did.[02:54:16] - I'm okay with it. - I'm not talking about- - I'm talking about this now. - Yeah, but I'm trying to answer his question.[02:54:21] - [Benny] Yeah, yeah. - Historically, there is substantial evidence[02:54:27] that Palestinians have targeted civilians. Whether it's been incidental or systematic[02:54:34] is a different discussion, I don't wanna get into that now. For some reason there seems to be a huge debate[02:54:40] about whether any Israeli has ever sunk so low as to target a civilian.[02:54:47] - No, agreed both said that- - We just agreed, we concede- - This has happened here and there. - And I think- - We've agreed on that. - [Mouin] Okay. I think-[02:54:53] - What we're saying is it's not policy, which is what you guys are implying, that they kill civilians deliberately.[02:54:59] - If I understand you correctly, you're basically making the claim that none of these attacks could have happened[02:55:06] without going through an entire chain of commands- - For strike cells that are involved in drone attacks or plane attacks or, yes. - Yes.[02:55:13] My understanding of the Israeli military and you could perhaps, you've served in it,[02:55:18] you would know better, it's actually a fairly chaotic organization. - No, no, that's not true. Especially not the Air Force.[02:55:24] Extremely, extremely organized. The Air Force works in a very organized fashion.[02:55:29] As he says, with lawyers, a chain of command, and ultimately the pilot drops the bomb where he's told to drop it. - Protective Edge,[02:55:35] was that 200 strikes in like 60 seconds, I think? I think at the opening of Protective Edge?[02:55:41] Yeah, the coordination between- - You're talking about 2008? - I think Protective Edge was 2014. But I'm just saying that the coordination in the military[02:55:48] is pretty tight. - Well, my understanding of the Israeli military- - [Benny] It's very organized. Very organized. - Is that it's quite chaotic[02:55:54] and there's also a lot of testimonies from Israel. But be that as it may, okay,[02:56:00] I'm prepared to accept both of your contentions that it's a highly organized[02:56:06] and disciplined force. - Especially Air Force. - Air Force under any scenario is going to be more organized than the other branches.[02:56:13] And you're saying such a strike would've been inconceivable. - Well, I'm not necessarily saying inconceivable, I'm just saying that would've required-[02:56:19] - Okay you're basically- - Murderous intent on so many different levels. - Yes. You're- - I don't think good evidence has presented to say that's- - Your basic claim is it would be fair to assume[02:56:28] that such a strike could have only been carried out with multiple levels of authorization and signing off.[02:56:36] Okay, let's accept that for the sake of argument. We have now seen incident after incident[02:56:45] after incident after incident where entire families are vaporized in single strikes.[02:56:52] - Who is in the families? Who lives in the house- - Family members. - Inside. - Family members. - Or next to the house-[02:56:57] - [Mouin] Family members. - In which these families are killed? - We have seen incident after- - Do you know that Hamas weren't in that house?[02:57:03] Do you know that their ammunition dumps were in those houses? - Why do I have to prove a negative? - You are saying that the deliberately targeted families.[02:57:10] If Israel wanted to kill civilians in Gaza, they could have killed 500,000 by now[02:57:17] with the number of strikes they've done. - [Mouin] And therefore- - And the fact that they've only killed a certain small number- - 30,000 is a small number?[02:57:23] - [Benny] Small number in proportion- - [Mouin] You consider 30,000 a number? - Small number in proportion over four months. Probably is an indication that it's targeted[02:57:31] and that there Hamas targets in these places. - So I've given- - 12,000 children is only,[02:57:38] and if that's the case, why is it- Yeah, you said only. Only.[02:57:44] So Professor Morris, here's a question for you. If we take every combat zone in the world[02:57:51] for the past three years, every combat zone in the world. - In Vietnam, the Americans killed a million people.[02:57:56] - I'm not talking about Vietnam. - They could have killed 40 million. - I wasn't, yeah, I was again in the anti-war movement.[02:58:01] So don't strap me. - Americans killed a million people in Vietnam. - Fine, fine. And 30 million Russians were killed during World War II[02:58:09] so everything else is irrelevant. Okay. Here's the question. - Stick to proportionality.[02:58:15] - Professor Morris, here's a question. It's very perplexing. If you take every combat zone in the world[02:58:22] for the past three years and you multiply the number of children killed by four,[02:58:31] every combat zone in the world, you get Gaza. Okay? So when you say-[02:58:36] - What is that supposed to prove? - Okay, I'm gonna tell you- - Firstly, you're lying. - [Norman] Just shut up. - You're relying on Hamas numbers.[02:58:42] - No, I'm not lying. - Hama numbers are not necessarily true. - I'm lying in the numbers. I'm not lying in the numbers. - Even if we take the numbers though, what does that prove?[02:58:48] - Those are Hamas numbers. - Okay. Okay. - Which may not be true. - Fine, fine. - They could invent anything. - Fine. - Anything 'cause you know[02:58:54] that they are mendacious organization. - I know mendacious. Believe me. - You like words. - Mendacious as in[02:59:00] the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Okay, so here's the thing.[02:59:06] You say they could have killed 500,000, but they only killed only. That's your words.[02:59:11] - I'm not saying- - They only killed 30,000. - If you believe that they deliberately target civilians, they would've killed many, many more.[02:59:18] The fact is that Hamas targets civilians. - Professor Morris. For a hist-[02:59:24] - And you don't understand Israeli society. - I don't want to understand Israeli society if you wanna know the truth. I don't want to. I don't wanna get inside their heads.[02:59:31] - That's the problem. - 90% of the- - A good historian tries to get into the heads[02:59:38] - There's a limit. - Of the Protagonist. - There's a limit. When 90%- - [Benny] That's what a good historian does. - When 90% of Israelis think that Israel's using enough[02:59:47] or too little force in Gaza, I don't wanna get inside that head.[02:59:52] 40% think that Israel's using insufficient force in Gaza.[02:59:57] I don't wanna get inside that head. I don't wanna get inside the head of people who think[03:00:03] they're using insufficient force. - Historians must understand- - Against the population. Against the population, half of which is children.[03:00:10] I don't wanna get inside that head. But here's the point, because your partner wants to know the point.[03:00:18] You don't understand political constraints. One of your ministers said,[03:00:23] "Let's drop an atomic bomb on Gaza." - You think he really meant that? - He said it three times. - No, no, no.[03:00:29] It was said in a sort of a- - Professor Morris- - Very questionable way. He didn't say they should drop the atomic bomb. - He said it the day after- - I'm not supporting,[03:00:35] he's an idiot. - Mr. Morris- - This minister. This minister is a Messianic idiot.[03:00:41] He didn't say drop an atomic bomb. - None other than Israel's chief historian.[03:00:48] The famed, justifiably famed, Benny Morris thinks we should be dropping nuclear weapons on Iran.[03:00:56] - Iran has for years, its leaders for years have said, "We should destroy Israel." You agree with that? They said, "We should destroy Israel.[03:01:04] Israel must be destroyed." Is that correct? This is what the Iranian leaders have been saying[03:01:09] since Khomeini. - I would say Iranian leaders have sent mixed messages. - Okay, okay. But some of them have said, including-[03:01:15] - Mr. Burelli. - Khomeini- - If you don't know the evidence, why are you laughing? - The slightest skepticism, it's very funny.[03:01:21] - It's funny because- - Iran that supports Hezbollah and the Houthis and Hamas. Maybe they want Israel destroyed. - Brace yourself. - Wait, wait, wait.[03:01:27] - To the extent- - It's complicated. that the Houthis are trying- - Its complicated. - To the extent that the Houthis are trying to stop the genocide in Gaza-[03:01:34] - There's no genocide. They don't have the right to attack civilian ships. I know you selectively support international law[03:01:40] when it agrees with you. And then when it doesn't, you decide to throw international law to win. - There's no genocide in Gaza. - If you like-[03:01:45] - Hold on a second. Norm, Norm. - Want me read what you said? - Norm, Norm. Stop, please. Norm, just for me, please.[03:01:51] Just give me a second. You said that there's no genocide going on in Gaza. Let me ask that clear question.[03:01:56] The same question I asked on the Hamas attacks. Is there, from a legal, philosophical, moral perspective,[03:02:02] is there genocide going on in Gaza today? - Is there a genocide going on in Gaza?[03:02:09] Well, in several years we will have a definitive response- - But at the moment- - To that question.[03:02:14] - What has happened thus far is that on the 29th of December, the Republic of South Africa[03:02:20] instituted proceedings against Israel[03:02:26] pursuant to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[03:02:33] South Africa basically accused Israel of perpetrating genocide in the Gaza Strip.[03:02:41] On the 26th of January, the court issued its initial ruling.[03:02:50] The court at this stage is not making a determination[03:02:56] on whether Israel has or has not committed genocide. So just as it has not found Israel guilty,[03:03:04] it certainly also hasn't found Israel innocent. What the court had to do at this stage[03:03:11] was take one of two decisions, either South Africa's case was the equivalent[03:03:18] of a frivolous lawsuit and dismiss it and close the proceedings, or it had to determine[03:03:25] that South Africa presented a plausible case that Israel was violating its obligations[03:03:34] under the genocide convention and that it would on that basis hold a full hearing.[03:03:40] Now, a lot of people have looked at the court's ruling[03:03:46] of the 26th of January and focused on the fact that the court did not order a ceasefire.[03:03:52] I actually wasn't expecting it to order a ceasefire. And I wasn't surprised that it didn't,[03:03:57] because in the other cases that the court has considered, most prominently Bosnia and Myanmar,[03:04:06] it also didn't order a ceasefire. And South Africa in requesting a ceasefire[03:04:13] also didn't ask the court to render an opinion on the legitimacy or lack thereof[03:04:19] of Israel's military operation. From my perspective, the key issue on the 26th of January[03:04:27] was whether the court would simply dismiss the case or decide to proceed with it.[03:04:33] - And decided to proceed. - And it decided to proceed. And I think that's enormously- - I thought that was beautiful-[03:04:38] - You said they committed genocide. You already said they committed genocide. That Israel is committing genocide.[03:04:44] - But if I can just- - Allow me, - Use that word. - That's correct.[03:04:49] - Now- - I don't run away. - So Norman, you did say Israel committed genocide? - Norm, can you let Mouin finish? - Well the end of the story is you specifically asked[03:04:57] whether I think Israel is committing genocide. I explained formally there is no finding,[03:05:02] and as you said, we won't know for a number of years. And I think there's legitimate questions to be raised.[03:05:08] I mean, in the Bosnia case, which I think all four of us would agree, was clearly a case of genocide.[03:05:14] The court determined- - You mean by the Serbs? - Yes. In the Bosnia case, the court determined[03:05:20] that of all the evidence placed before them, only Srebrenica qualified as genocide[03:05:26] and all the other atrocities committed did not qualify as genocide.[03:05:31] You know, international law is a developing organism. I don't know how the court is going to respond in this case[03:05:39] so I wouldn't take it as a foregone conclusion how the court is going to respond.[03:05:44] - But Norman has determined already. - I have too because you are asking my personal opinion. - Personal opinion is also-[03:05:49] - So as a matter of law, I wanna state very clearly, it has not been determined[03:05:55] and won't be determined for several years. Based on my observations and the evidence before me,[03:06:05] I would say it's indisputable that Israel is engaged in a genocidal assault[03:06:11] against the Palestinian people with the Gaza Strip. - Which is a PLO line. - Get with the program. The PLO is long passed.[03:06:17] - Okay, the Palestinian authority. - As you were saying, genocide is not a body count.[03:06:27] Genocide consists of two elements. The destruction of a people in whole or in part.[03:06:35] So in other words, you can commit genocide by killing 30,000 people. - Or five- - It doesn't have, well, five probably is below threshold.[03:06:41] - There is a problem of numbers. - Yes, but I think 30,000 crosses the threshold and not reaching 500,000 is probably irrelevant.[03:06:49] And the second element is there has to be an intent. In other words- - And you believe there's an intent?[03:06:55] - Yes, if there is any other plausible reason for why all these people are being murdered,[03:07:02] it's not genocide. And as far as intent is- - What about hiding behind a human shield?[03:07:08] You don't think that's the reason for them being killed? - Well, let's get the intent part out of the way first.[03:07:13] South Africa's- - Forget South Africa. - I'd like to finish. - Hamas government.[03:07:19] That's got nothing to do with anything. - I think they're pro-Satan as well last time I checked. - [Benny] No, they're pro Hamas.[03:07:25] - You know, for some reason you don't have a problem with people being pro-Israeli at the time of this,[03:07:31] but if they support Palestinians' right to life or self-determination, they get demonized[03:07:37] and de-legitimized as pro-Hamas? - They supported an organization which murdered 1200 people deliberately.[03:07:42] That's my problem. - But supporting a state that has murdered 30,000- - But they haven't because these are 30,000 are basically human shields used by the Hamas[03:07:49] in which the Hamas wanted killed. They wanted them killed. - Alright. If I could- - Hamas wanted these people killed.[03:07:55] - Sure. If I could just get- - [Benny] You don't think they wanted them killed? - No, I don't. - They didn't provide them with shelters. They build tunnels for their fighters, but not one shelter-[03:08:03] - Can I get back to my point? for their own civilian. - [Mouin] You asked me about intent. - Of course they want them killed. - You asked me about intent.[03:08:08] And the reason that I bought in the South African application is because it is actually exceptionally detailed on intent[03:08:17] by quoting numerous- - All sorts of idiotic ministers in Israel. - Well, yeah, including the prime minister,[03:08:23] the defense minister- - The prime minister didn't say kill- - The chief of staff- - Didn't say genocide. - No, he said Amalek. He said Amalek. - Used the word Amalek.[03:08:30] Since the Hamas are a really evil organization. - If I may- - According to Asa Kasher, the philosopher of the IDF,[03:08:39] he said that Netanyahu was vowing genocide.[03:08:45] Now he's an idiot? - I didn't say he's an idiot but he's passed it. - So the reason I raised the South African application[03:08:52] is twofold, Hamas or no Hamas. It's exceptionally detailed on the question of intent.[03:08:59] And secondly, when the International Court of Justice issues a ruling, individual justices have the right,[03:09:08] can give their own opinion. And I found the German one to be the most interesting on this specific question because he was basically saying[03:09:17] that he didn't think South Africa presented a persuasive case. But he said their section on intent was so overpowering[03:09:29] that he felt he was left with no choice but to vote with the majority. So I think that answers the intent part of your question.[03:09:38] - So for the ICJ case that South Africa's brought, I think there's a couple things that need to be mentioned. One is, and I saw you two talk at length about this,[03:09:46] the plausibility standard is incredibly low. The only thing we're looking for is a basic presentation of facts that make it conceivable,[03:09:53] possible that- - Plausible. - Plausible, which legally, this is obviously below criminal conviction, below-[03:10:00] - Yes, of course. - Yeah. Below- - Think of it as an indictment. - Sure. Possibly. Maybe even a lower level than even an indictment.[03:10:08] So plausibility is an incredibly low standard, number one. Number two, if you actually go through[03:10:13] and you read the complaint that South Africa filed, I would say that if you go through the quotes,[03:10:21] and you even follow through to the source of the quotes, the misrepresentation that South Africa does[03:10:26] and their case about all of these horrendous quotes, in my opinion, borders on criminal.[03:10:31] - Well, 16 ICJ judges disagree with you. - That's fine if 16 ICJ judges disagree- - They must be awfully incompetent.[03:10:37] - You know, they could be, but- - You must be, oh, even the American judge, she must have been awful incompetent[03:10:44] if she was unable to see the misrepresentations that Mr. Bonnell, based on his Wikipedia entry,[03:10:52] was able to find. - So this is based on the official ICJ report that was released, I'm not sure if you read the entire thing[03:10:58] or not. - I read every- - Okay, that's great. - Aspect. - Did you go through and actually identify any of the sources of the underlying quotes?[03:11:03] - Actually, brace yourself for this and Mouin could confirm it. Yaniv Kogan, an Israeli,[03:11:10] and Jamie Stern-Weiner, half Israeli, they checked every single quote in the Hebrew original[03:11:20] and Yaniv Kogan, love the guy, he has terrifying powers of concentration.[03:11:27] He checked every single quote. Is that correct, Mouin? And Jamie checked every single quote[03:11:35] in the English in the context. And were there were any contextual questions,[03:11:42] they told us. - I think they found one. - Yeah, I think they found one. So I do not believe that those 16, 15 judges,[03:11:52] it was 15 to two. - 16 to two I think. - They are 15 in the court, plus two so it's 17.[03:11:58] So it's 15 to two. I don't think those 15 judges were incompetent[03:12:05] and I certainly don't believe the president of the court, an American,[03:12:14] would allow herself to be duped. - Well, let me, let me- - You might recall-[03:12:20] - Let me read, let me read - Mr. Burrell- - Let me read it, let me read it! - Hey, hey, let him read. - Sure, so this was taken from the South African complaint.[03:12:28] There's tons of these. But, so here's one. In the complaint for the ICJ they said, "That on the 12th of October 2023,[03:12:35] President Isaac Herzog made clear that Israel was not distinguishing between militants and civilians in Gaza[03:12:42] stating in a press conference to foreign media, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, over 1 million of whom are children,[03:12:50] 'It's an entire nation out there that is responsible. It is not true this rhetoric about civilians[03:12:56] not aware, not involved- - I saw that. - It's absolutely not true. And we will fight until we break their backbone.'"[03:13:03] If you actually go to the news article they even state, they even link it in their complaint.[03:13:08] The full context for the quote was, "It is an entire nation out there that is responsible.[03:13:14] It's not true this rhetoric about civilians not being aware, not involved, it's absolutely not true. They could have risen up,[03:13:19] they could have fought against that evil regime, which took over Gaza in a coup d'etat, but we are at war. We are defending our homes. We are protecting our homes.[03:13:27] That's the truth. And when a nation protects its home, it fights and we will fight until we break their backbone."[03:13:32] He acknowledged that many Gazans had nothing to do with Hamas, but was adamant that others did. "I agree there are many innocent Palestinians[03:13:39] who don't agree with this, but you have a missile in your goddamn kitchen and you wanna shoot it at me. Am I allowed to defend myself? We have to defend ourselves.[03:13:47] We have the right to do so." This is not the same as saying there's no distinction between militants and civilians in Gaza.[03:13:53] His statement here is actually fully compliant with international law to the letter. Because if you are storing military supplies[03:14:00] in civilian areas, these things become military targets and you're allowed to do proportionality assessments afterwards.[03:14:05] So this is supposed to be one of many quotes that they've shown that is supposed to demonstrate genocidal intent, but it is very easily explained[03:14:13] by military intent or by a conflict between two parties- - I saw that press conference. - Wait, let me just say something.[03:14:19] All of this talk is a bit irrelevant because it may sound to the listeners that the court in the Hague[03:14:26] has ruled that Israel is committing genocide. - No, I think we- - But it hasn't. It's just going in the next few years[03:14:32] to look at the whole subject. There has been no determination at all. And as Steven says,[03:14:39] some of the quotes are not exactly accurate quotes or taken out context. - They're total mischaracterization. - Yes. - Okay.[03:14:46] It is correct as Mouin put it, that'll be several years[03:14:52] before the court makes a determination. - And my guess is that it'll determine there was no genocide.[03:14:59] That's my guess. I'm just giving you my guess. - I can't predict. I got it all wrong, actually as Mouin will attest,[03:15:06] I got all wrong the first time. I never thought the American judge would vote in favor of plausibility.[03:15:12] - So you admit that you were wrong? - Yeah, of course. I think I tell Mouin twice a day I was wrong about this[03:15:18] and I was wrong about that. I'm not wrong about the facts. I try not to be, but my speculations, they can be wrong.[03:15:25] Okay, leaving that aside. First of all, as Mouin pointed out, there's a difference between the legal decision, the ruling,[03:15:34] and an independent judgment. Now, South Africa was not filing a frivolous case.[03:15:41] That was 84 pages. It was single spaced- - Even 84 pages can be frivolous.[03:15:46] - It takes an hour and a half to read. It was not a massive case. - It was single spaced[03:15:51] and it had literally hundreds of footnotes- - It can still be frivolous. - It's possible. - Of course,[03:15:57] but this one wasn't. - Yeah, I read the report. To tell you the truth, I followed very closely[03:16:03] everything that's been happening to October 7th, I was mesmerized. I couldn't believe the comprehensiveness[03:16:09] of that particular report. Number two, there are two quite respected judges. Excuse me.[03:16:15] There were two quite respected experts of international law sitting on the South African panel,[03:16:22] John Dugard and Vaughan Lowe. Vaughan Lowe, as you might know, he argued the wall case in 2004[03:16:30] before the International Court of Justice. Now, they were alleging genocide,[03:16:37] which in their view means the evidence in their minds, not yet at the court. The evidence in their minds[03:16:44] compels the conclusion that genocide is being committed. I am willing, because I happen to know[03:16:51] Mr. Dugard personally and I correspond with Vaughan Lowe, I've heard their claim, I've read the report.[03:16:57] I would say they make a very strong case. But let's agree plausible.[03:17:04] Now, here's a question. If somebody qualifies for an Olympic team,[03:17:14] let's say a regional person qualifies for Olympic team, it doesn't mean they're going to be on the Olympic team.[03:17:22] It doesn't mean they're gonna win a gold medal, a silver medal, or a bronze medal.[03:17:27] - But they can swim. That's what you're saying? - No, I would say that's a very high bar- - You're saying they can swim. - To even qualify.[03:17:33] - They can swim well enough to have a realistic prospect at winning a medal. - So to even make it to plausible-[03:17:41] - That is not true. That is not what plausible means. It is absolutely not. You're dead wrong.[03:17:46] - Mr. Berelli, please don't teach me about the English language. - So the declaration judge- - I said, I said-[03:17:54] Plausibility- - Said the court is not asked at this present phase - Is the same concept as qualifying. - The court is not asked at this present phase of the proceedings[03:18:01] to determine whether South Africa's allegations of genocide are well founded. They're not well founded.[03:18:06] They're not even well-founded. The court is- You said that plausible was a high standard. It's absolutely not.[03:18:12] It is a misrepresentation of the strength of the case against Israel just like the majority of the quotes they have in this case are. - Not every-[03:18:18] - And also you said it was an extremely well-founded case, they spend like one fourth of all of the quotations, some even pulled from the Goldstone Report,[03:18:24] that actually deal with the intent part. Which is, by the way, I think you guys,[03:18:29] I don't know if you used the phrase the dolus specialis, that the intentional part of genocide- - Sorry, I don't know that term. - I think it's called dolus specialis.[03:18:36] It is the most important part of genocide, which is proving the special, it is a highly special intent to commit genocide.[03:18:42] It's possible that Israel could- - That's mens rea. - No. - It should prove the mens rea. - Yes, I understand the state of mind,[03:18:48] but for genocide it's called dolus specialis. It's a highly special intent. Did you read the case?[03:18:53] - Yeah. - It's a highly special intent depicted of genocide. - I'm gonna ask you again. Please stop displaying your imbecility.[03:19:01] - Okay, I'm sorry if you think the declaration of the charge is imbecility. - Don't put on public display that you're a moron.[03:19:07] At least have the self possession to shut up. Did I read the case? - I'm comfortable putting my[03:19:12] display on camera if you're comfortable putting yours in books. - Mr. Berelli. I read the case around four times.[03:19:18] I read all of the majority opinion, the declarations.[03:19:24] I read Aharon Barak's declaration. - Then why are you lying and saying plausible is a high standard?[03:19:30] - Because I said even reaching the benchmark of plausibility[03:19:38] is a very high standard in the world. It's the equivalent of a regional player[03:19:45] qualifying for an Olympics. It's still two steps removed. You may not be on the team, and you may not get a medal,[03:19:54] but to get qualified, which in this context is the equivalent of plausible,[03:20:00] you must be doing something pretty horrible. - But the court- - And as it happens-[03:20:06] - The court will rule- - Professor Morris- - There was no genocide. That's what the court will rule.[03:20:11] Remember what I just told you. The court will rule- - I don't expect to be even around when the court reaches[03:20:16] its final decision. - Why? - Why? It'll take a long, long time. - [Benny] Two years, three years. - No, I don't think they'll take two or three years.[03:20:22] - Bosnia, which was admittedly a special type of case because they were accusing Serbia[03:20:29] of sponsoring the Bosnian Serbs, that took I think 17 years from '90-[03:20:35] - I assume they'll take two or three years. - But the point you're making, so this is a legal- - I'm saying that something horrible must be happening[03:20:42] to even achieve- - It is horrible, it's a war. - Yeah. - That is true, yes. - It's horrible. - But I think- - Except they weren't rendering a ruling on the war,[03:20:50] they were rendering a ruling on the genocide. - And I think the suggestion- - They said it was plausible. They also said it was plausible[03:20:56] that Israel is committing a military operation as well. - Yeah, but I think the problem with your characterization is you're saying in so many words,[03:21:03] the South Africans basically only have to show up in court with a coherent statement. - Right. - That is correct. - In today's atmosphere, that's probably correct.[03:21:10] - They needed to do a lot more. They needed to persuade- - The American judge. - Today's atmosphere. - The American judge.[03:21:16] - They needed to persuade- - Judges go according to what the majority want to hear. - Yeah, but they need- - She was the president.[03:21:22] - They needed to persuade the court that it was worth investing several years of their time[03:21:28] in hearing this case. - They're probably well paid- - They're well paid whether take this case or not.[03:21:34] They have a full docket whether they accept or reject this case. And I don't think we should-[03:21:41] - Remember what I just said. They won't rule there was genocide. Remember what I said. - Also, I recommend people actually read the case[03:21:47] and follow through a lot of the quotes, that they just don't show genocidal intent. - Mr. Berelli, brace yourself. - The Israeli minister of finance[03:21:53] on the 8th of October, 2023. This is taken from the ICJ, this is from South Africa submission, Bezalel Smotrich, I can't read this.[03:22:00] Stated, there you go. Okay. - Bezalel Smotrich. - At a meeting of the Israeli cabinet, that quote, "We need to deal a below that hasn't been seen in 50 years[03:22:06] and take down Gaza." But again, if you click through and you read the source, their own linked source, it says, as per this own source,[03:22:13] "The powerful finance minister, settler leader, Bezalel Smotrich," I can't pronounce this, demanded at the cabinet meeting late Saturday[03:22:19] that the army "hit Hamas brutally and not take the matter of the captives into significant consideration."[03:22:25] "As in war you have to be brutal." He was quoted as saying, "We need to deal a blow that hasn't been seen in 50 years and take down Gaza."[03:22:33] You can't strip the quotation of Hamas, a entity you have war with, and then pretend that there's genocidal intent.[03:22:38] That's not how- - That's not genocidal intent. - So when the Ukrainians say we need to defeat Russia-[03:22:44] - Take down Gaza? That's not genocidal? - No. When Ukraine says we need to defeat Russia, is that genocidal?[03:22:49] Do they mean killing all Russian citizens? - Professor Morris, here's another one. - It's ridiculous. - When the defense,[03:22:54] yeah, ridiculous? - Yes. Ridiculous. - The American judge- - He also doesn't determine policy,[03:22:59] but that's neither here nor there. - The American judge read- - You are holding the American judge to, you know-[03:23:05] - Well, she was the president. - He'll appeal to authority when it agrees with him and we won't deal with the actual facts of the matter ever.[03:23:11] - The American judge read several of the quotes. - Look at the American Supreme Court today,[03:23:17] they may support Trump. Shows you how worthy American judges are. - Professor Morris, without going too far afield,[03:23:25] if you heard a statement by the defense minister, the defense minister said, "We are going to prevent[03:23:35] any food, water, fuel, or electricity from entering Gaza." - They do that. Did Israel do that?[03:23:41] - [Norman] Okay. No I'm wondering- - What he said- - I'm asking you- - Isn't Israeli government policy. - But we're talking about statements now, intent.[03:23:48] How would you interpret that? - After 1200 of your citizens are murdered the way they were, I would expect extreme statements[03:23:55] by lots of politicians. By lots of politicians. - But you don't accept extreme Palestinians. - That's not Israeli policy. - Wait. But you don't accept-[03:24:01] - What he said isn't Israeli policy. - But you don't, please. - They let in water, they let in gas. - I'm sure- - But you don't accept- - They in let electricity.[03:24:06] - But you don't accept extreme Palestinian statements after they lost their entire country, not just 1200 people.[03:24:12] - That's a good point. No, no, that's a good point. - And on that (laughs),[03:24:18] on that brief moment of agreement, let's just take a quick pause. We need a smoke break, we need a water break,[03:24:24] a bathroom break. - [Norman] Take down Gaza is not a genocide. - [Steven] Defeat Russia is a genocidal statement. - What does take down Gaza mean? - When we went to war with Iraq[03:24:30] and we wanted to destroy Iraq, that was a genocidal statement. There's a reason why genocide is so, is such an importantly guarded concept[03:24:36] and it's not to condemn every nation that goes to war. - [Norman] Mr. Bonnell. - Wait, you do know how to pronounce my name.[03:24:41] Are you mispronouncing it intentionally? - He made you into an Italian all the time. - [Norman] I'm so assured by your solicitude[03:24:47] for international laws. - You should try learning it sometime. It would help you sort out a lot of the civilian deaths. - [Norman] Unfortunately 15 judges disagree.[03:24:55] - You could keep citing the judges. You should actually try reading the actual statements. - [Benny] This is tiring.[03:25:01] You've invited us to a tiring session. - [Lex] Yeah, there you go. How are you guys doing?[03:25:06] - [Benny] Okay. Okay. There are major things to discuss here, not just what some court is doing and gonna judge[03:25:13] in two years time. - Yes. Okay. So what you just said is my whole, one of the reasons why I feel so strongly[03:25:19] about this particular conflict is because there are really important things to discuss, but they will never be discussed. - They're not going to be discussed-[03:25:25] - We're not gonna talk about area A, B, and C or what a transference of territory, instead we're gonna talk about apartheid.[03:25:30] We're not gonna talk about the differences in how do you conduct war in an urban environment where people using, we're just gonna talk about genocide.[03:25:36] We're not gonna talk about- - No, no, no. - What's a good solution for the Palestinians? We're just gonna say ethnic cleansing. - [Lex] Is it possible to talk,[03:25:41] be productive over the next two hours and talk about solutions? - About solutions, I have no idea what to say.[03:25:47] I mean, I don't see any solutions on, if you wanted a positive end to this discussion,[03:25:52] which is what you said at the beginning, I can't contribute to that 'cause I'm pessimistic. I don't see any way forward here.[03:25:59] - But the lack of, the solution is easy, the reason why the solution is hard is 'cause the histories and the myths are completely,[03:26:05] there's a different factual record, right? - [Lex] One of the things would be good to talk about solutions with the future[03:26:10] is going back in all the times that it's failed. So every time- - But even at that, we're probably not gonna agree.[03:26:15] He's gonna say, you could write that, I can predict the whole line. He's gonna say from '93 to '99, he's gonna say Israel didn't adhere to the Oslo courts ever,[03:26:21] settlement expansion continued, raids happened into the West Bank, that there was never a legitimate,[03:26:27] that Netanyahu came in and violated the Wye memorandum, the transference.[03:26:32] He's gonna say all of this and he's not gonna bring up anything on the Palestinian side. And then for Camp David, he's gonna say that yeah, that Arafat was trying, that the maps[03:26:38] and the territorial exchange wasn't good enough, that they were asking Palestinians to make all the concessions, that Israel would've-[03:26:44] Yeah. Oh God. - Well, lay it all out. Lay it out. - You do talk quickly. - Yeah, I know, yeah.[03:26:51] - Anyhow, my future book should interest you guys. - Oh, what are you working on? - No, not working on, it's actually going to come out.[03:26:59] - [Mouin] Ah. - It deals with Israeli and Arab atrocities, war crimes, I call them, in the '48 war.[03:27:06] - Oh really? - That's the book. Yeah. Just deals with that subject. - Is this, 'cause I know you've also talked about[03:27:14] the closure of the archives and stuff. - Well, it's marginal. It deals with that as well,[03:27:20] but they have tried to seal off documents, which I've already used and seen.[03:27:25] Now they don't let people see them. That's happened. But it's marginal in terms of its effect on production-[03:27:32] - [Mouin] Were the British archives useful for you for this new book? - Yeah. Well, for this list it's mostly Israeli archives.[03:27:38] The British and the Americans and the UN did deal with these subjects, but not as well as Israeli documents.[03:27:44] - What's your casualty count for Deir Yassin? - It's about a hundred. I think there's agreement on that by Israelis and Arabs.[03:27:51] - Yeah. - A hundred, 105. - Because before they were- - They used to say 245 or 254.[03:27:57] Those were the figures. The British and the Arabs and the Haganah agreed on it at the beginning- - Because the Red Cross,[03:28:03] I think was the one that first put out that number. - I don't remember. Maybe it was, what's his name? Jacques de Reynier, maybe.[03:28:10] Maybe he came up with that number, but they didn't count. They didn't count bodies. They just threw the number out.[03:28:17] And everybody was happy to blame the Irgun and the Lehi for killing more Arabs than actually-[03:28:23] - Well, and they put it to good use as well. - Well, they said that it helped precipitate more evacuation so they were happy.[03:28:30] - I think Begin in his memoirs - Yeah, yeah, they also used that number. - [Mouin] Yeah. - Yeah. - So first of all, thank you for that heated discussion[03:28:37] about the present. I would love to go back into history[03:28:44] in a way that informs what we can look for[03:28:49] by way of hope for the future. So when has in Israel and Palestine have we been closest[03:28:55] to something like a peace settlement, to something that where both sides would be happy[03:29:03] and enable the flourishing of both peoples? - Well, from my knowledge of the 120 years or so[03:29:12] of conflict, the closest I think the two sides have been to reaching some sort of settlement[03:29:18] appears to have been in the year 2000 when Barak and then subsequently Clinton offered a two-state settlement[03:29:29] to PLO Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. And Arafat seemed to waver.[03:29:36] He didn't immediately reject what was being offered,[03:29:42] but ultimately came down at the end of Camp David in July 2000, he came down against the proposals.[03:29:48] And Clinton who said he wouldn't blame him, later blamed Arafat for bringing down the summit[03:29:54] and not reaching a solution there. But I think there on the table,[03:30:01] certainly in the Clinton parameters of December 2000, which followed the proposals by Barak in July,[03:30:10] the Palestinians were offered the best deal they're ever going to get from Israel unless Israel is destroyed[03:30:16] and then there'll just be a Palestinian Arab state. But the best deal that Israel could ever offer them,[03:30:22] they were offered, which essentially was 95% of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, half of the Old City of Jerusalem,[03:30:30] some sort of joint control of the Temple Mount and the Gaza Strip, of course, in full.[03:30:36] And the Palestinians said no to this deal. And nobody really knows why Arafat said no.[03:30:41] Some people think he was trying to hold out for slightly better terms.[03:30:47] But my reading is that he was constitutionally,[03:30:52] psychologically incapable of signing off on a two-state deal, meaning acceptance of the existence[03:30:58] of a Jewish state. This was really the problem and- - Of Israel or of a Jewish state? - Of a Jewish state. The Jewish state of Israel.[03:31:04] He wasn't willing to share Palestine with the Jews and put his name to that. I think he just couldn't do it. That's my reading.[03:31:12] But some people say it was because the terms were insufficient and he was willing, but was waiting for slightly better terms.[03:31:19] I don't buy that. I don't think so. But other people disagree with me on this. - What do you think?[03:31:25] - Well, just briefly in response, Arafat formally recognized Israel in 1993.[03:31:35] - [Benny] Yeah, earlier. - I don't think actually that in 2000, 2001,[03:31:41] a genuine resolution was on offer because I think the maximum Israel was prepared to offer,[03:31:50] admittedly more than it had been prepared to offer in the past, fell short of the minimum[03:31:55] that the Palestinians considered to be a reasonable two state settlement. Bearing in mind that as of 1949,[03:32:05] Israel controlled 78% of the British mandate of Palestine. The Palestinians were seeking a state on the remaining 22%[03:32:15] and this was apparently too much for Israel. My response to your question would be-[03:32:20] - Wait, they were being offered something like 22 or 21%. - They were being offered, I think less than a withdrawal[03:32:28] to the 1967 borders with mutual and minor and reciprocal land swaps and the just resolution of-[03:32:37] - The refugee problem was one of the problems. - Yes. I worked for a number of years[03:32:43] with international crisis group, and my boss at the time was Rob Malley,[03:32:48] who was one of the American officials present at Camp David- - Who was recently thrown out of the State Department or whatever.[03:32:55] - The point I want to make about Rob was he wrote,[03:33:00] I think, a very perceptive article in 2001 in "The New York Review of Books." I know that you and Ehud Barak have had a debate with them,[03:33:07] but I think he gives a very compelling reason of why and how Camp David failed.[03:33:15] But rather than going into that, I'll- - He wrote that together with Hussein Agha - Hussein Agha, yes. Who was not at Camp David.[03:33:24] But in response to your question, I think there could have been a real possibility[03:33:33] of Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace in the mid 1970s, in the wake of the 1973 October War.[03:33:45] I'll recall that in 1971, Moshe Dayan,[03:33:50] Israel's defense minister at the time, full of triumphalism about Israel's victory in 1967,[03:34:00] speaking to a group of Israeli military veterans, stated, "If I had to choose between[03:34:08] Sharm el-Sheikh without peace, or peace without Sharm el-Sheik," this is referring to the-[03:34:14] - Sinai. - Resort in Egyptian Sinai, which was under Israeli occupation. Dayan said "I will choose for Sharm el-Sheik without peace."[03:34:25] Then the 1973 war came along, and I think Israeli calculations[03:34:32] began to change very significantly. And I think it was in that context[03:34:37] that had there been a joint US-Soviet push[03:34:45] for an Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian resolution[03:34:53] that incorporated both an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines[03:34:58] and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories,[03:35:05] I think there was a very reasonable prospect for that being achieved.[03:35:11] It ended up being aborted, I think for several reasons. And ultimately, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat[03:35:22] decided for reasons we can discuss later to launch a separate unilateral initiative[03:35:31] for Israeli-Egyptian rather than Arab-Israeli peace. And I think once that set in motion,[03:35:39] the prospects disappeared because Israel essentially saw its most powerful adversary[03:35:47] removed from the equation and felt that this would give it a free hand in the occupied territories, also in Lebanon[03:35:54] to get rid of the PLO and so on. And you ask when were we closest?[03:36:02] And I can't give you an answer of when we were closest. I can only tell you when I think we could have been close[03:36:10] and that was a lost opportunity. If we look at the situation today,[03:36:16] there's been a lot of discussion about a two-state settlement. My own view, and I've written about this,[03:36:24] I don't buy the arguments of the naysayers that we have passed the so-called point of no return[03:36:32] with respect to a two-state settlement. Certainly if you look at the Israeli position[03:36:39] in the occupied territories, I would argue it's more tenuous than was the French position in Algeria in 1954,[03:36:48] than was a British position in Ireland in 1916, than was the Ethiopian position in Eritrea in 1990.[03:36:57] And so as a matter of practicality, as a matter of principle, I do think the establishment of a Palestinian state[03:37:09] in the occupied territories remains realistic. I think the question that we now need to ask ourselves,[03:37:15] it's one I'm certainly asking myself since October 7th[03:37:22] and looking at Israel's genocidal campaign, but also looking at larger questions, is it desirable?[03:37:28] Can you have peace with what increasingly[03:37:35] appears to be an irrational genocidal state[03:37:40] that seeks to confront and resolve each and every political challenge with violence?[03:37:47] And that reacts to its failure to achieve solutions[03:37:52] to political challenges with violence by applying even more violence,[03:37:57] that has an insatiable lust for Palestinian territory,[03:38:03] that a genocidal apartheid state that seems increasingly incapable[03:38:10] of even conceiving of peaceful coexistence with the other people on that land?[03:38:18] So I'm very pessimistic that a solution is possible.[03:38:23] I grew up in Western Europe in the long shadow of the Second World War.[03:38:31] I think we can all agree that there could have been no peace in Europe[03:38:36] had certain regimes on that continent not been removed from power.[03:38:42] I look at Southeast Asia in the late 1970s, and I think we're all agreed[03:38:48] that there could not have been peace in that region had the Khmer Rouge not been ousted.[03:38:55] I look at Southern Africa during the 1990s, and I think we can all be agreed[03:39:01] that had the white minority regimes that ruled Zimbabwe in South Africa not been dismantled,[03:39:08] there could not have been peace in that region. And although I think it's worth having a discussion,[03:39:15] I do think it's now legitimate question to ask, can there be peace[03:39:22] without dismantling the Zionist regime?[03:39:28] And I make a very clear distinction between the Israeli state and its institutions on the one hand,[03:39:34] and the Israeli people who I think, regardless of our discussion about the history,[03:39:41] I think you can now talk about an Israeli people and the people that have developed rights over time[03:39:48] and a formula for peaceful coexistence with them[03:39:55] will need to be found, which is a separate matter from dismantling the Israeli state and its institutions.[03:40:03] And again, I haven't reached clear conclusions about this except to say as a practical matter,[03:40:09] I think a two-state settlement remains feasible.[03:40:14] But I think there are very legitimate questions about its desirability[03:40:21] and about whether peace can be achieved in the Middle East[03:40:26] with the persistence of an irrational genocidal apartheid regime.[03:40:33] Particularly because Israeli society is beginning to develop[03:40:42] many extremely, extremely distasteful supremacist, dehumanizing aspects[03:40:49] that I think also stand in the way of coexistence that are being fed by this regime.[03:40:58] - So if you look back into history when we were closest to peace and do you draw any hope from any of them?[03:41:06] - I feel like in 2000, I feel like the deal that was present, at least at the end of the Taba Summit,[03:41:12] I think in terms of what Israel, I think had the appetite to give and what the Palestinians would've gotten,[03:41:17] would've definitely been the most agreeable between the two parties.[03:41:22] I don't know if in '73, I'm not sure if the appetite would've ever been there for the Arab states to negotiate alongside the Palestinians.[03:41:30] I know that in Jordan, there was no love for the Palestinians after 1970, after Black September.[03:41:36] I know that Sadat had no love for the Palestinians due to their association with the Muslim Brotherhood's[03:41:43] attempted assassinations in Egypt. - Sorry, which? PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood?[03:41:49] - Sadat was upset because there were attempted assassinations by people in, oh no, an assassination.[03:41:54] It was a personal friend of his, Yusuf Al-Sibai, I can't pronounce that, he was assassinated by a- - Cyprus. - Palestinian-[03:41:59] - He was killed by the Abu Nidal organization. - Sure. - Which was not part of- - Admittedly, he says as much belongs to center group, not PLO directly, but I think that there was a history[03:42:08] of the Palestinians sometimes fighting with their neighboring states that were hosting 'em[03:42:13] if they weren't getting the political concessions they wanted. The assassination of the Jordanian king in '51 might be another example of that in Jordan.[03:42:20] It feels like over a long period of time, it feels like the Palestinians have been kind of told[03:42:25] from the neighboring Arab states that if they just continue to enact violence, whether in Israel or abroad,[03:42:32] that eventually a state will materialize somehow. I don't think it's gotten them any closer to a state.[03:42:37] If anything, I think it's taken them farther and farther and farther away from one. And I think as long as the hyperbolic language[03:42:43] is continually employed internationally, the idea that Israel is committing a genocide, the idea that there is an apartheid,[03:42:49] the idea that they live in a concentration camp, all of these words, I think further the narrative for the Palestinians[03:42:54] that Israel is an evil state that needs to be dismantled. I mean, you said as much about the institution, at least to the Zionist government.[03:43:00] Israel's government is probably not going anywhere. All of the other surrounding Arab states have accepted that, or at least most of them down in the Gulf,[03:43:06] Egypt and Jordan have accepted that, the Palestinians need to accept it too. The Israeli state[03:43:12] or the state apparatus is not going anywhere. And at some point they need to realize like, "Hey, we need a leader that's gonna come out and represent us,[03:43:18] represent all of us, is willing to take political risks, is willing to negotiate some lasting piece for us."[03:43:23] It's not gonna be the international community or some invocation of international law[03:43:28] or some invocation of morality or justice that's going to extricate us from this conflict, it's gonna take some actual difficult political maneuvering[03:43:35] on the ground- - Of accepting Israel. - [Steven] Of accepting Israel. Yeah. - Which they formally did in 1993.[03:43:41] - Which they formally did in 1993. Yeah but then no lasting piece came after that in 2000.[03:43:46] - No, because 1993 was not a peace agreement. - Sure, the Oslo accords weren't- - Were an interim. - Didn't have final solution-[03:43:53] - Were an interim agreement. And Palestinians actually began clamoring[03:43:59] for commencing the permanent status resolutions on schedule[03:44:06] and the Israelis kept delaying them. In fact, they only began, I believe in '99[03:44:12] under American pressure on the Israelis and- - I think you're being a bit one sided. Both sides didn't fulfill the promise of Oslo[03:44:21] and the steps needed for Oslo. There was Palestinian terrorism, which accompanied Israel's expansion of settlements[03:44:28] and other things. The two things fed each other and led to what happened in 2000,[03:44:34] which was a breakdown of the talks altogether when the Palestinians said no. But I don't agree incidentally[03:44:41] with this definition of Israel or the Israeli state as apartheid, it's not.[03:44:46] There is some sort of apartheid going on in the West Bank. The Israeli regime itself is not an apartheid regime.[03:44:52] That is nonsense. By any definition of apartheid which- - Well, by the formal definition, I think it qualifies.[03:44:58] - No, it doesn't qualify. Apartheid is a race-based distinction[03:45:03] between different segments of the population. - Correct. - And some of them don't have any representation at all,[03:45:09] like the Blacks in South Africa. - That's not a requirement. - No rights at all. In Israel itself, the minority,[03:45:16] the Arabs do have representation, do have rights and so on. I don't think Israel is also genocidal,[03:45:21] I don't think it's been genocidal. It wasn't so in '48, it wasn't so in '67, and it hasn't been recently in my view.[03:45:29] And talk about dismantling Israel, and that's what you're talking about, I think Steven said it correctly, is counterproductive.[03:45:38] It just pushes Israelis further away from willing to give Palestinians anything.[03:45:44] - Please Norm, tell me you have- - Something optimistic to say. - Optimistic to say. - No, even though I agree, I've thought about it a lot[03:45:52] and I agree with Mouin's analysis. I'm not really in the business of punditry.[03:46:00] I'd rather look at the historical record where I feel more comfortable and I feel on terra firma.[03:46:06] So I'd like to just go through that. I don't quite, I agree and I disagree with Mouin[03:46:12] on the '73 issue. After the 1973 war, it was clear that Israel was surprised[03:46:21] by what happened during the war and it took a big hit.[03:46:28] The estimates are, I don't know what numbers you use, but I hear between two and 3000 Israeli soldiers were killed[03:46:35] during the 19- - It was 2,500? - Yeah, 2700. - Yeah. Okay. So I got it right. I read different numbers.[03:46:41] It's a very large number of Israelis who were killed.[03:46:47] There were moments at the beginning of the war where there was a fear that this might be it, in fact-[03:46:52] - [Benny] No, there wasn't. There wasn't. - No, the Israelis. - Everybody forgets Israel's atomic weaponry. - I know, but-[03:46:58] - So how could they have been defeated? - Because Dayan- - Didn't Dayan talk about the collapse of the third temple- - He did, but it was hysterical and silly.[03:47:05] - Well, I can't- - Because Israel had atomic weapons. They wanted to stop the Syrians or the Egyptians. - But we're talking about perceptions here.[03:47:12] - I can't tell you if he was hysterical or not. - No, he was. - I wasn't in the same room with him. - For a day he was hysterical.[03:47:17] - Let's not bog down on that. The war is over. And when President Carter comes into power,[03:47:25] Carter was an extremely smart guy. Jimmy Carter, extremely smart guy. And he was very fixed on details.[03:47:31] He was probably the most impressive of modern American presidents, in my opinion, by a wide margin.[03:47:37] And he was determined to resolve the conflict on the big scale, on the Arab-Israeli scale.[03:47:44] On the Palestinian issue, he wouldn't go past what he called a Palestinian homeland, he wouldn't accept-[03:47:51] - Palestinian national home. - On the Palestinian national home. He wouldn't go as far as the Palestinian state.[03:47:56] I'm not going to go into the details of that. I don't think realistically given the political balance of forces[03:48:03] that was going to happen, but that's a separate issue. Let's get to the issue at hand, namely,[03:48:09] what is the obstacle or what has been the obstacle since the early 1970s? Since roughly 1974,[03:48:16] the Palestinians have accepted the two-state settlement and the June 1967 border.[03:48:21] Now, as more pressure was exerted on Israel,[03:48:28] because the Palestinians seemed reasonable, the Israelis, to quote the Israeli political scientist, Avner Yaniv,[03:48:34] he since passed from the scene. Yaniv in his book, "Dilemmas of Security,"[03:48:39] he said that the big Israeli fear was what he called the Palestinian peace offensive.[03:48:47] That was their worry, that the Palestinians were becoming too moderate.[03:48:53] And unless you understand that, you can't understand the June 1982 Lebanon War.[03:49:00] The purpose of the June 1982 Lebanon War was to liquidate the PLO in Southern Lebanon,[03:49:07] because they were too moderate. The Palestinian peace offensive.[03:49:13] I'm going to have to fast forward. There are many events. There's the First Intifada, then there's the Oslo Accord.[03:49:20] And let's now go to the heart of the issue, namely the 2000-2001 negotiations.[03:49:30] Well, the negotiations are divided into three parts[03:49:36] for the sake of listeners. There's Camp David in July 2000, there are the Clinton parameters in December 2000,[03:49:45] and then there are negotiations in Taba in Egypt in 2001.[03:49:52] Those are the three phases. Now, I have studied the record probably to the point of insanity,[03:50:00] because there are so many details you have to master. - I'll vouch for that. The insanity part, yeah,[03:50:06] - Actually, I will vouch for it. I will personally vouch for it.[03:50:12] There is one extensive record from that whole period, from 2000 to you could say 2007.[03:50:21] And that is what came to be called the Palestine Papers, which were about 15,000 pages[03:50:28] of all the records of the negotiations. I have read through all of them, every single page.[03:50:36] And this is what I find. If you look at Shlomo Ben-Ami's book, which I have with me.[03:50:42] "Prophets Without Honor," it's his last book. He says going into Camp David, that means July.[03:50:50] Going into Camp David, July 2000, he said the Israelis were willing to return about,[03:50:59] not return, but will withdraw from- - Relinquish. - Relinquish. 92% of the West Bank.[03:51:04] - Ben-Ami was at Camp David. - Yeah. He was at Taba. Oh yeah, he was also at Camp David.[03:51:13] Israel wanted to keep all the major settlement blocks.[03:51:18] It wanted to keep roughly 8% of the West Bank.[03:51:24] They were allowing for, you put it at 84 to 90% in your books.[03:51:31] They put it at roughly 92% Israel was willing to give up. - It also depends how you calculate.[03:51:39] - It depends what stage Camp David 'cause it was two weeks- - [Norman] Yeah, I'll get to that.[03:51:44] - The proposals changed during those two weeks. - So Israel wants to keep all the major settlement blocks.[03:51:49] - [Benny] Means the border area of the West Bank. - Well, not the border. We have Ari'el, we have Ma'ale Adumim,[03:51:57] Condoleeza Rice called Ari'el, she said it was a dagger into the heart of the West Bank.[03:52:05] So they want to keep 8% of the land, they want to keep the settlement blocks,[03:52:13] they want to keep 80% of the settlers. They will not budge an inch on the question of refugees.[03:52:22] To quote Ehud Barak in the article he co-authored with you in "The New York Review of Books,"[03:52:28] "We will accept," and I think the quote's accurate, "no moral, legal or historical responsibility[03:52:34] for what happened to the refugees." So forget about even allowing refugees to return, we accept no moral, legal or historical responsibility[03:52:42] for the refugees. And on Jerusalem, they wanted to keep large parts of Jerusalem.[03:52:50] Now, how do we judge who is reasonable and who is not?[03:52:56] Ben-Ami says, "I think the Israeli offer was reasonable." That's how he sees it.[03:53:02] But what is the standard of reasonable? My standard is, what does international law say?[03:53:10] International law says the settlements are illegal. Israel wants to keep all the settlement blocks.[03:53:19] 15 judges, all 15, in the wall decision in 2004,[03:53:25] in July 2004, all 15 judges, including the American judge, Buergenthal,[03:53:31] ruled the settlements are illegal under international law.[03:53:36] They want to keep 80% of the settlers. Under international law,[03:53:42] all the settlers are illegal in the West Bank. They want to keep large parts of East Jerusalem.[03:53:53] But under international law, East Jerusalem is occupied Palestinian territory.[03:54:00] That's what the international- - No, not Palestinian because- - Excuse me. - There was no Palestine. - Okay. Under- - There's never been[03:54:05] a Palestinian state. How could it be Palestinian? - I listened patiently to you. - [Benny] Sorry.[03:54:11] - Under international law, if you read the decision, all territory, the 2004 wall decision,[03:54:20] all territory beyond the green line, which includes East Jerusalem,[03:54:27] is occupied Palestinian territory. - With the exception of the Golan Heights.[03:54:34] - The designated unit, according to the International Court of Justice, the designated unit for Palestinian self-determination.[03:54:43] And they deny any right whatsoever on the right of return.[03:54:49] The maximum. I don't wanna go into the details now. The maximum formal offer was by Ehud Olmert in 2008.[03:54:59] He offered 5,000 refugees could return under what was called family reunification,[03:55:07] 5,000 in the course of five years and no recognition of any Israeli responsibility.[03:55:15] So if you use as the baseline what the UN General Assembly has said[03:55:25] and what the International Court of Justice has said, if you use that baseline, international law,[03:55:33] by that baseline, all the concessions came from the Palestinian side.[03:55:41] Every single concession came from the Palestinian side. None came from the Israeli side.[03:55:49] They may have accepted less than what they wanted,[03:55:56] but it was still beyond what international law[03:56:01] allocated to them. Now, you say- - Allocated to the Palestinians. - Allocated to Palestinians, yes.[03:56:08] Thank you for the clarification. Now, about Arafat.[03:56:14] Like the Mufti, never liked the guy. I think that was one of the only disagreements[03:56:19] Mouin and I had when Arafat passed. You were a little sentimental, I was not.[03:56:25] Never liked the guy. But politics, you don't have to like the guy. There was no question, nobody argues it[03:56:32] that whenever the negotiation started up, the Palestinians just kept saying the same things.[03:56:39] - No. - No. - They kept saying no. - No. Professor Morris, with due respect, incorrect.[03:56:46] They kept saying international legitimacy, international law, UN resolutions.[03:56:53] They said, "We already gave you what the law required." We gave that in 1988, November 1988,[03:57:01] and then ratified again at Oslo in 1993. And they said, "Now we want what was promised us[03:57:13] under international law." And that was the one point where everybody on the other side agreed.[03:57:19] Clinton, don't talk to me about international law. Livni, during the Olmert administration,[03:57:27] she said, "I studied international law. I don't believe in international law." Every single member on the other side,[03:57:35] they didn't want to hear from international law. And to my thinking that that is the only reasonable baseline[03:57:45] for trying to resolve the conflict and Israel has along with the US- - When has international law been relevant[03:57:55] to any conflict basically in the world? - Hey, that's why- - Over the last 150 years. - That's why the Palestinians have to recognize Israel,[03:58:01] because that's international law. - Yeah, but international law is meaningless. - That was UN resolution 242. - Conflicts are not solved[03:58:06] by international law or in accordance with international law. - Yeah, but then. Professor Morris, for argument's sake,[03:58:15] let's agree on that, strictly for argument's sake. What's the alternative?[03:58:20] Dennis Ross said, "We're going to decide who gets what on the basis of needs."[03:58:30] So he says, "Israel needs this, Israel needs that. Israel needs that." Dennis Ross decide to be the philosopher king.[03:58:38] He's going to decide on the basis of needs. Well, if you asked me,[03:58:45] since Gaza's one of the densest places on earth, it needs- - Tel Aviv. - Yes it needs-[03:58:51] - It needs part of Sinai. - It needs a nice big chunk- - Of Sinai. - Well, not Sinai- - [Benny] That's what it actually needs.[03:58:57] - Okay. I don't even wanna go there. It needs a nice big chunk. But I have to accept international law says no. Okay?[03:59:06] - [Benny] International law is irrelevant. - Now, Ben-Ami says- - Well, the- - "I think the Israeli offer was reasonable."[03:59:15] Okay, that's your- - And he's a reasonable guy. - He seems it even though, okay, I don't I'm wanna go there. I've debated him and partly agree with you.[03:59:24] But who decides what's reasonable? I think the international community[03:59:30] in its political incarnation, the General Assembly,[03:59:35] the Security Council, all those UN Security Council resolutions saying[03:59:40] the settlements are illegal, annexation of East Jerusalem is null and void,[03:59:45] and the International Court of Justice, that to me is a reasonable standard.[03:59:52] And by that standard, the Palestinians were asked to make concessions, which I consider unreasonable[03:59:59] or the international community considers unreasonable. - I think that the issue is when you apply international law[04:00:05] or international standards, I wouldn't say what Benny Morris says that they're irrelevant, but I think that these have to be seen[04:00:11] as informing the conversation, I don't think these are the final shape of the conversation. I don't think historically Israel has ever negotiated[04:00:17] within these strict bounds of, whether we're talking Resolution 242, whether we're talking about any General Assembly resolutions.[04:00:24] That's just not how these negotiations tend to go. You might consider international opinion on things[04:00:29] but at the end of the day, it's the bilateral negotiations oftentimes historically started in secret, independent of the international community,[04:00:36] that end up shaping what the final agreements look like. I think the issue with this broad appeal to international law is, again,[04:00:42] going back to my earlier point about all of the euphemistic words, all it simply does is drive Palestinian expectations[04:00:48] up to a level that is never going to be satisfied. For instance, you can throw that ICJ opinion all you want.[04:00:54] It was an advisory opinion. That came in 2004. How Palestinians gained more or less land[04:00:59] since that 2004 advisory opinion was issued. - What would your standard be then? - Both sides have to have a delegation[04:01:05] that confronts each other and they assess the realistic conditions on the ground and they try to figure out within the confines[04:01:11] of international law, then both sides are reasonable for it. But like for instance, this statement of full retreat[04:01:16] from the West Bank, what is it, 400,000 settlers? How many settlers live on the West Bank now? - Probably half a million. - Yeah, you're gonna- - Depends if you include[04:01:22] the Jerusalem suburbs of- - Yeah. Four or 500,000 people have never- - [Benny] I think its 700,000. - With the Jerusalem suburbs perhaps.[04:01:27] - Half a million people- - Jerusalem, not settlements. - I know that, but that's not what the law,[04:01:32] the law calls it null and void. - You can say whatever we want until we're blue in the face, but there's half a million Israeli people[04:01:39] are not being expelled from the West Bank, it's not gonna happen. - You're basically saying if I understand correctly, there's only one way to resolve this[04:01:45] and that is through direct bilateral negotiations? - Probably. Yeah. - Okay. So- - Or ideally, but- - I've taken over your house.[04:01:54] You're not gonna go to the police because you know, the law's only of limited value.[04:01:59] So you come over and sit in what is now my living room that used to be your living room and we negotiate.[04:02:07] The problem there is that you're not gonna get anything unless I agree to it.[04:02:12] And standards and norms and law and all the rest of it be damned. So you need to take into account[04:02:20] that when you're advocating bilateral negotiations that effectively, that gives each of the parties veto power.[04:02:29] And in the current circumstances, the Palestinians have already recognized Israel.[04:02:36] They have- - What, you keep bringing that up like it's a significant confession. - It's not true. It's not. - And even if it- - Not even true.[04:02:44] - The recognition from Palestine isn't doing anything for- - You're- - Hama totally rejects-[04:02:49] - [Mouin] I'm not talking about Hamas. - Hamas is the majority among the Palestinian people. They won the elections in 2006. Every opinion-[04:02:56] - [Mouin] They won the majority of the seats. - Yes, exactly. - They didn't win a majority of the votes. - Every opinion poll today says the majority of Palestinians-[04:03:02] - That sounds right. - Support the Hamas. - That sounds right. - But Hamas absolutely rejects Israel. - But, but- - So if Arafat in 2003, 1993 or whatever,[04:03:11] issued a sort of recognition of Israel- - [Mouin] It wasn't a sort of recognition. - Okay, a recognition of Israel. It doesn't, it's meaningless. It's meaningless.[04:03:17] - It's meaningless. - And anyhow, I don't believe that Arafat was sincere about it. - Does it matter what you or I think about what you felt?[04:03:23] - [Benny] Well, most Israelis do, and that does matter. - Okay, so- - That does matter. But Hamas says no and Hamas is the majority state.[04:03:28] - So for years the Israeli and the US demand[04:03:34] was that the Palestinians recognize 242 and 338, they did.[04:03:39] But you're saying, okay, we demanded that they do this but it was meaningless when they did it. Then the demand was that-[04:03:46] - [Benny] It was a tactical thing, yes. - Then the demand was that the PLO recognizes Israel.[04:03:51] - [Benny] Tactical. - Okay, we demanded that they did this and they did it, but it's meaningless. - And they never changed their charter, the PLO.[04:03:57] You may remember that. - In fact, in 19- - They supposedly abrogated the old charter, but never came up with a new one.[04:04:02] - No, but- - There's no new charter. - But in 1996- - And Faruq Qaddoumi said, of course the old charter is still enforced. - Yes, yes.[04:04:08] But the point is the Palestinians, demands are constantly made of them.[04:04:15] And when they- - As is Israel. - And when they exceed to those demands, they're then told, "Actually, what you did is meaningless,[04:04:21] so here's a new set of demands." I mean, you know, it's like a hamster. - [Benny] There's no new set of demand. - It's like a hamster. - Let me, let me- - It's like a hamster[04:04:27] stuck in a wheel - Let me tell you- - That will be told if you run fast enough, you'll get out of the cage. - No, no.[04:04:32] The bottom line is that Israel would like a Palestinian Sadat.[04:04:38] It wants the Palestinians- Listen, listen. Just let me finish. - [Mouin] This is really a worst case scenario. - Okay, let me just, yeah. 'cause they shot Sadat.[04:04:44] But anyhow, - For good reason. The Israelis want- - For good reason? - The Palestinians, Israelis want the Palestinians[04:04:52] to actually accept the legitimacy of the state of Israel and the Zionist project[04:04:58] and then live side by side with them in two states. That's what the Israelis, I don't even know it's true- - And what is the formal position-[04:05:03] - [Benny] I don't even know if that's true today. - And what is the formal position of this Israeli government? - [Benny] No, I'm saying I don't know if it exists today.[04:05:10] - Its predecessor and its predecessor and its predecessor. - Professor Morris. - Come on. - That's what Israelis want.[04:05:15] They want a change of psyche among the Palestinians. - Mouin has an interesting- - If that doesn't happen, there won't be a Palestinian state.[04:05:22] - Professor Morris, Mouin has an interesting point. - [Benny] Forget international law.[04:05:28] - I know you wanna forget it just like you wanna forget the genocide charge. I know you wanna forget that.[04:05:34] - [Steven] Well, the Palestinians wanna forget it too and it doesn't suit them as well. - But here's the problem. And it's exactly the problem that Mouin just brought up.[04:05:42] Now, I read carefully your book, "One State, Two States." With all due respect, absolutely a disgrace.[04:05:47] Coming from you- - Most reviewers didn't agree with you. - Yeah. Coming from you it was like you wrote it in your sleep.[04:05:55] It's nothing compared to what you wrote before. I don't know why you did it. In my opinion, you ruined your reputation.[04:06:01] Not totally, but you undermined it with that book. But let's get to the issue that Mouin wrote.[04:06:08] Here's what you said. You said formally, you said yes, it's true.[04:06:14] The Palestinians recognize Israel. But then you said viscerally in their hearts,[04:06:20] they didn't really recognize Israel. So I thought to myself, how does Professor Morris[04:06:28] know what's in the hearts of Palestinians? I don't know. I was a little- - You don't accept-[04:06:33] - I was explained, I was surprised as a historian you would be talking about[04:06:39] what's lurking in the hearts of Palestinians. But then you said something which was really interesting.[04:06:44] You said, "Even if in their hearts they accepted Israel,"[04:06:50] you said, "Rationally, they could never accept Israel because they got nothing."[04:06:57] They had this beautiful Palestine, and now they're reduced to just a few parcels of land.[04:07:03] - They will never accept it. - So yes. So you said there's no way they can accept it.[04:07:08] - I would say that as well. - Yeah. - The two-state solution as proposed doesn't make any sense.[04:07:14] - Exactly as Mouin said, you keep moving the goalpost.[04:07:20] - No, no, no. - Until we reach the point where we realize, according to Benny Morris,[04:07:26] there can't be a solution. So why don't you just say that outright? Why don't you say it outright?[04:07:33] That according to you, the Palestinians can never be reasonable, because according to you-[04:07:42] - They want all of Palestine. - According to you, they couldn't possibly, they couldn't possibly agree to a two-state summon,[04:07:51] because it's such a lousy settlement. That's what you say. - They want all of Palestine. - But you said rationally they couldn't accept it.[04:07:58] Not their feelings. - It's both. - You said rational. You went from formally, viscerally, rationally.[04:08:06] So now we're reaching the point where according to Benny Morris, the Palestinians can't be reasonable[04:08:15] because reasonably, they have to reject two states. - They want all of Palestine. - Mouin is absolutely correct.[04:08:22] There's no way to resolve the problem according to your logic. - They want all of Palestine. He said that himself. He said they should dismantle Israel.[04:08:28] That's what he's saying. - What I said- - Dismantle Israel. - What I said and I've written-[04:08:34] - I'm glad you didn't deny it. Go ahead. - I've written extensively on this issue on why a two-state settlement is still feasible[04:08:44] and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart you can see[04:08:49] that I was just bullshitting, but that's what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago.[04:08:56] And just as a matter of historical record, beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate[04:09:04] within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject.[04:09:10] And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine.[04:09:17] There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority[04:09:22] on Palestinian soil, which they saw- - As a springboard. - As a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine.[04:09:28] And there was a third school that believed that under current dynamics and so on,[04:09:33] that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our friend and correspondent, Colter Louwerse,[04:09:42] has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO already in 1976 came out in open support[04:09:50] of a two-state resolution at the Security Council.[04:09:56] PLO accepted it, Israel, of course, rejected it, but the resolution didn't pass[04:10:01] because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them. - I think it was nine to five. - Ah, okay. Yeah.[04:10:08] But fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept[04:10:16] a two-state settlement. Why they did it, I think is irrelevant.[04:10:21] And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement.[04:10:27] The reason I think, and I think Norm, you've written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent[04:10:35] on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards[04:10:44] was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get.[04:10:49] If his intention had been, I'm not accepting Israel, I simply want to springboard,[04:10:56] he would've accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho. But he didn't. He insis- - That's something I've never understood.[04:11:02] He should have logically accepted the springboard and then from there, launched his next stage. - [Norman] No, he understood what-[04:11:07] - He should have done that. - International law would put a real constraint on him.[04:11:13] Once he accepted, it was over. - Constitutionally, he was incapable of signing that. - [Norman] I know all that.[04:11:18] - You're right, that he should accepted it. - But if you're correct, okay, that he was really out to eliminate Israel,[04:11:26] then he wouldn't have cared about the borders. He wouldn't have cared about what the thing said about refugees.[04:11:32] He would've gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose. - The springboard. - But I think it was precisely because he recognized[04:11:39] that he was not negotiating for a springboard, he was negotiating permanent status. That he was such a stickler about the details.[04:11:47] The second, yeah. - Just as a factual matter, he wasn't such a stickler.[04:11:52] When they asked him how many refugees, the numbers- - It was the principle rather than the numbers. - The principle.[04:11:58] - [Benny] He said, "I would be pragmatic about it." - Yes and the numbers that were used at Annapolis[04:12:05] were between 100 and 250,000 refugees over 10 years.[04:12:10] That was the number. Arafat, when he was asked at Camp David, he kept saying,[04:12:16] "I care about the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon," which came to about 300,000. - It was his priority.[04:12:23] - Which was a large concession from the, whether you accept the number or not,[04:12:28] that he wasn't talking about 6 million. He was talking about between 100 and 250,000 over 10 years.[04:12:36] Now, the best offer that came from the Palestinians, excuse me, the best offer that came from Israel[04:12:42] was the Olmert offer. - Can we just pretend like we didn't all lay out[04:12:47] the exceptionally pessimistic view of a two-state- Hold on a second. Two-state solution.[04:12:53] Let's pretend that in five years, in 10 years, a two-state peace settlement is reached[04:13:01] and as historians, you'll still be here and writing about it 20 years from now. How would it have happened?[04:13:08] - I think that historically, I think that the big issue is I think that both sides have had their own internal motivations to fight[04:13:15] 'cause they feel like they have something to gain from it. But I think as time has gone on, unfortunately the record proves[04:13:20] that the Palestinian side is delusional. The longer that the conflict endures, the worse position they'll be in.[04:13:26] But for some reason, they've never had a leader that convinced them of that as much. That Arafat thought that if he held on,[04:13:32] there was always a better deal around the corner. Abbas is more concerned with trying to maintain any legitimacy amongst Palestinians[04:13:38] than actually trying to negotiate anything realistic with Israel, that Palestinians are always incentivized[04:13:43] to feel like as long as they keep fighting, either the international community is going to save them with the five millionth UN resolution condemning whatever,[04:13:50] that another ICJ advisory opinion is finally going to lead to the expulsion of half a million Jews from the West Bank,[04:13:56] or that some other international body, the ICJ and the genocide charge is gonna come and save the Palestinians. As long as they in their mind feel like[04:14:02] somebody is coming to save them, then they feel like they're going to have the ability to get something better in the future. But the reality is, is all of the good partners for peace[04:14:09] that the Palestinians had have completely and utterly abandoned them. Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States,[04:14:16] whether you're talking bilateral peace or the Abraham Accords, most of the Arab leaders in negotiating peace with Israel[04:14:22] have just not had as much of an interest in maintaining the rights and the representations[04:14:27] of what the Palestinian people want and the only people they have today to draw legitimacy from or to have on their side to argue with them[04:14:34] are people that I guess write books or tweet or people in the international community that do resolutions or Amnesty International reports.[04:14:42] And the reality is, we can scream until we're blue in the face on these things, none of it has gotten any closer to helping the Palestinians in any sense of the word.[04:14:48] The condition has only gotten worse. The settlements only continue to expand. The military operations are only gonna get more brutal.[04:14:54] The blockade is gonna continue to have worse effects as long as we use international law as the basis[04:14:59] and there isn't a strong, a Sadat-like Palestinian leader that's willing to come up and confront Israel with the brave peaceful negotiations[04:15:06] to force them to acquiesce, nothing is gonna happen. And I think that the issue you come up with is, you know, whether it's people like Norm[04:15:12] that talk about how brave the October 7th attacks were or how much respect they have for those fighters,[04:15:18] Israel, in a way, and I think people have said as much about Netanyahu, the right wants violence from the Palestinians 'cause it always gives them[04:15:25] a perpetual excuse to further the conflict. Well, we have to go in on October 7th and we've got to remove Hamas. Well, we can't trust these people in the West.[04:15:31] We have to do the night raids because of the Second Intifada made us feel like the Palestinian people didn't want trust with us.[04:15:38] I feel like the biggest thing that would force Israel to change its path would be an actual, a real, not for like two weeks,[04:15:45] but an actual peaceful Palestinian leader, somebody committed to peace that is able to apply those standards[04:15:51] and hold the entire region of Palestine to those standards. Because I think over time, the mounting pressure from[04:15:57] without the international community and the mounting pressure from within, because Israel hosts a lot of its own criticism.[04:16:02] We talked about B'Tselem, we talked about Haaretz, Israel will host a lot of its own criticism. I think that that pressure would force Israel towards[04:16:08] an actual peace agreement, but it's never gonna come through violence. Historically It hasn't. And in the modern day, violence has just hurt[04:16:15] the Palestinians more and more. - If you paint a picture of the future, now's a good moment for both Palestine and Israel to get new leadership.[04:16:23] Netanyahu is on the way out, Hamas possibly is on the way out. Who should rise to the top[04:16:29] such that a peaceful settlement can be reached? - The problem is like Benny said, yeah, it's difficult because Hamas enjoys so much widespread support[04:16:39] amongst the Palestinian people. I think that the, well, I don't know. There's opinions on whether democracy are pushing them towards elections was the right or wrong idea,[04:16:45] but with an Islamic fundamentalist government for Hamas, I don't know if a negotiation with Israel[04:16:50] ever happens there. And then when the international pressure is always, you know, 67 borders, infinite right of return for refugees[04:16:57] and a total withdrawal of Israel from all these lands to even start negotiations, I just don't see realistically on the Palestinian side[04:17:04] no negotiations are ever gonna start in a place that Israel's willing to accept. - If you want to dismiss international law, that's fine,[04:17:14] but then you have to do it consistently. You can't set standards for the Palestinians,[04:17:22] but reject applying those standards to Israel.[04:17:27] If we're gonna have the law of the jungle, then we can all be beasts and not only some of us.[04:17:34] So it's either that or you have certain agreed standards[04:17:40] that are intended to regulate our conduct. All of our conduct. Not just some of us.[04:17:45] - What standards you think I'm saying to abandon? - Well, you're saying international law and the millionth UN resolution,[04:17:51] you're being very dismissive about all this. - Well, I'm saying- - And that's fine. - Well, I'm not being- - [Mouin] But then you have to be dismissive. - I'm saying for instance 242- - Across the board.[04:17:57] - That was a Chapter VI resolution. That's non-binding. But 242 is- - Of course it's binding. - It's absolutely not binding.[04:18:03] - What is binding? Do you know anything about how the UN system works? - If you read the language of the resolution,[04:18:09] binding is typically if it commits you to uphold a particular international law or if it establishes a new rule- - You just throw out words. You hear binding, not binding-[04:18:17] - Does 242 mention a Palestinian state? Norm. - Of course not- - That's part of the problem.[04:18:23] - That was the reason why the Palestinians didn't wanna recognize 242 'cause they only referred at the very end[04:18:28] the refugee problem. - Yeah, but the PLO recognized 181 and 242 when they say they're- - Yeah, hold on, on hold on. Every United Nations Security Council resolution[04:18:35] irrespective of under which chapter it was adopted, is by definition binding.[04:18:41] Binding not only on the members of the Security Council, but on every member state of the UN.[04:18:48] Read the UN charter. It's black and white. - Sure. People could look that up. - Now regarding, yes. - But the language even of 242[04:18:54] is kept intentionally vague such that it doesn't actually provide, again, the final concourse- - It's actually not that vague[04:18:59] because the term land for peace originates in 242.[04:19:05] - Sure but the talk about- - The idea is- territorial acquisition and Israel's need to give it up was kept vague. That's why in '79, Israel thought they had fulfilled[04:19:12] their obligations under 242 in terms of withdraw- - [Norman] Allow me points of information. - (sighs) Yeah.[04:19:17] - The first principle in UN Resolution 242 is that the inadmissibility of the acquisition[04:19:24] of territory by force- - Which is meaningless. - It may be meaningless to you, Mr. Bonnell.[04:19:29] - It was meaningless to everyone in the region. - Mr. Bonnell, that principle was adopted[04:19:36] by the Friendly Nations Resolution, the UN General Assembly in 1970.[04:19:41] That resolution was then reiterated in the International Court of Justice,[04:19:48] this ruling advisory opinion in 2004. That was the basis of the coalition against Iraq[04:19:58] when it acquired Kuwait and then declared it a province of Kuwait. - [Steven] Yep. Which Arafat supported.[04:20:04] - That's what's called- - [Benny] That's true. Arafat. - Arafat did support it. - Arafat did support it. - That's why it's a shitty deal with the Oslo Accords.[04:20:10] - That's not accurate. I'm not gonna go there. I'm not gonna go there. - It's not accurate that Arafat endorsed? - Okay, I'm not gonna go there.[04:20:17] It's called under international law jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law,[04:20:24] the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. That is not controversial. It's not vague.[04:20:31] You couldn't put it more succinctly. You cannot acquire territory by force[04:20:38] under international law. - On the West Bank before '67. Who owned the strip before '67? - Mr. Bonnell, don't change the subject.[04:20:47] If you don't know what you're talking about- - It's not about changing- - At least have the- - I'm curious- - At least have the humility.[04:20:52] - How close has 242 gotten to the Palestinian peace? - You don't know Chapter VI from tweet five.[04:20:59] You have no idea what you're talking about. It's just so embarrassing. At least have some humility.[04:21:06] Between us who have read maybe 10,000 books on the topic and you've read two Wikipedia entries[04:21:13] and you start talking about Chapter VI. Do you know what Chapter VII is? - Answer me- - Do you know what Chapter VII is? - Norm, answer the question.[04:21:20] How close has 242 got in the Palestinians to a state? How close has the 2004 advisory opinion gotten the West Bank settlements-[04:21:26] - [Mouin] What's your alternative? - The alternative is it's not this, whatever this making money off the conflict is.[04:21:31] The actual alternative. The actual alternative- - Destiny should talk about making money off of idiocy. - Yeah, your media list[04:21:37] where you go and talk to 50 million different people about your awesome solution, right? - But he has a point there. - The issue is you have to negotiate- - All these resolutions[04:21:43] have gotten the Palestinians no closer to a state. - Because they haven't been enforced because of the US veto.[04:21:49] - They're not gonna be enforced. - [Mouin] Wait, wait, wait, wait. If I may, if I may. - Not been enforced, the ICJ doesn't even enforce[04:21:55] their mechanism. - You know what, Professor Morris? - Talking about the case for genocide. - Professor Morris, because of your logic, and I'm not disputing it,[04:22:03] that's why October 7th happened. - [Steven] Oh my God. - Because there was no options left for those people.[04:22:11] Exactly what Mouin said- - And now what options are left after October 7th- - This has been the Palestinian mentality for 60 years.[04:22:18] The only option is conflict. - Listen to this. Mr. Bonnell- - The only option is combat. - Is now an expert on Palestinian mentality.[04:22:24] - You're contradicting yourself. - [Steven] I only deal with facts. I only deal with facts. Egypt didn't find it necessary.[04:22:29] - Tell me about chapter five. - Egypt didn't find it necessary to negotiate peace for the Palestinians. Jordan didn't find it necessary[04:22:35] to negotiate peace for Palestinians. - If I may- - Abraham Accords didn't- - You're contradicting- - You talk faster and faster and faster.[04:22:40] - Everybody, Mouin. - You're contradicting yourself. On the one hand you're saying all the Palestinians do[04:22:47] is fight and violence and terrorism and all the rest of it, but on the other hand you're saying[04:22:52] they're expecting salvation from UN resolutions[04:22:57] and international court. Those aren't violent. - No, but it's part of maintaining- - [Norman] It's the law.[04:23:02] - It's the continual putting off of negotiating any solution. - They've negotiated- - As in when Arafat takes 10 days to respond.[04:23:09] When Arafat takes 10 days to respond and hops on a jet all over the world to visit his friends. Yes. Putting the conflict off indefinitely.[04:23:14] - Mouin said they accepted two states in 1975. Brace yourself. - They didn't. - Then why didn't they accept the Taba Summit then?[04:23:21] Why didn't they accept the Camp David? - That's a half century ago. - They didn't accept the two state solution-[04:23:26] - [Norman] He quoted a very good article- - You can quote Arafat talking about how he's lying and he's just gonna use in '94 and in '95[04:23:32] when he's making trips around the world how he just wanted to use this as the starting ground- - Talk faster. - I'm sorry, I can't talk slow.[04:23:38] You can watch it and slow down to 0.5 speed if you don't understand what I'm saying. - There's a very lengthy history[04:23:44] of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. You wanna deny that those negotiations took place-[04:23:49] - Where it feels like there was a good faith effort where there was a good faith effort,[04:23:54] where it was a good faith effort. - We have a written record. - With all due respect- - We have a written record. - Mr. Pop historian. You can't even read the written records.[04:24:00] I don't know why you're referring to it. - Excuse me. I just just said there are 15,000 pages on Annapolis.[04:24:06] - And I'm sure you cherry-picked your favorite quotes from all of them. - I don't cherry-pick. - That's great. That's great. - Mr. Burrell, at least I had a quote to cherry-pick.[04:24:13] - That's great. - All you have is Wikipedia. - I gave you quotes- - All you have is Wikipedia. - You want quotes?[04:24:19] Find me the information that shows the Palestinian cause has been furthered by any international law. You can't do it. - I think the problem is different.[04:24:26] You you want to say the Palestinians were only fighting and then when I point out they've also gone to the court[04:24:34] and the UN and say, "Well, all they do then is these things and they should be negotiating." And I demonstrate that there was a lengthy record[04:24:43] of negotiations, you said, "Yeah, but they didn't go in good faith," again, you're placing the hamster in the wheel[04:24:49] and telling him if he runs fast enough, maybe one day he'll get out of the cage. - [Steven] What was the best good faith negotiation[04:24:54] on the side of the- - If I could just finish. I think the fundamental problem here is not what the Palestinians have and haven't done[04:25:02] and it's perfectly legitimate to have a discussion about whether they could have been more effective.[04:25:08] Of course they could have been more effective. Everyone could have always been more effective. The fundamental issue here[04:25:15] is that Israel has never been prepared to concede the legitimacy of Palestinian national rights in the land[04:25:26] of the former British Mandate of Palestine. - How do you explain Taba Summit? How do you explain the Camp David? - Barak and Olmert did-[04:25:33] - How do you explain Olmert's offer to Abbas? - Legitimacy of Palestinian demands. - Well, those- - But they just didn't want[04:25:39] to give the Palestinians all of Palestine, that's all. - No, all of Palestine? - All of Palestine. - You mean all of the occupied territories?[04:25:46] - You're talking about all of Palestine- - Well, wait, what is the occupied territories? - The occupied territories- - All of Israel?[04:25:52] - The occupied territories are those territories that Israel occupied in June of 1967.[04:25:58] - Palestinians often use- - Could you show me- - That term to define the whole of Palestine. - Could you show me- - Not just the West Bank.[04:26:03] - Could you show me Professor Morris, in all the negotiations,[04:26:09] all of the negotiations, and all the accounts that have been written, can you show me one[04:26:16] where the Palestinians in the negotiations, 'cause that's what we were talking about, wanted all of Israel.[04:26:22] The maximum I- - They can't say that 'cause international community won't accept it. - They didn't say it, they didn't ask for it.[04:26:29] - Hamas did. Hamas always had all of it. - Hamas only negotiated with Israel about prisoner exchanges and the blockade.[04:26:36] - I know, but they represent a lot of the Palestinian people, you will agree. - The only place I saw pieces of Israel were the land swaps.[04:26:45] And the land swaps accounted for about two to 5% of Israel. Nobody asked for all of Israel.[04:26:51] Why do you say- - What do you mean? They asked for all of Israel in '48. They asked for all of Israel in '67. What do you think those reports were about?[04:26:57] - You talk so- - You're not gonna respond to anything I'm saying 'cause you have no answer. - I'll respond to you. - That's correct. Okay. Yeah. - Mr. Bonnell,[04:27:03] we were talking about the diplomatic negotiations beginning with 2000, 2001-[04:27:10] - I understand but you can't pretend that the first ask for Israel was in diplomacy. It was through war.[04:27:15] - You don't know what you're talking about. - Is the international law argument ever going to get the Palestinians closer to state? Is the Israeli state ever gonna be dismantled?[04:27:22] Do you think that's like realistic coming up, ever in the next 20 years? - Again, I'm posing a question[04:27:29] and the question is regardless of what's feasible or realistic today,[04:27:36] the question I'm posing is can you have peace in the Middle East with this militant, irrational,[04:27:45] genocidal, apartheid state and power? - Hamas? I don't think so, no.[04:27:50] - Okay and the question I'm asking is, can you have peace with this regime[04:27:56] or does this regime and its institutions need to be dismantled similar to the examples I gave[04:28:03] of Europe and Southern Africa. - How do you contend with the fact that most of the surrounding Arab states seem to agree[04:28:08] that you can? - Yeah, you're correct. Several of them, most importantly, Egypt,[04:28:14] Jordan have made their peace with Israel. I should add that Israel's conduct since then[04:28:22] has placed these relations under strain. I had very little,[04:28:29] I didn't take the reports of a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement particularly seriously before October 7th,[04:28:37] the reason being that it was really a Saudi-Israeli-US deal, which committed the US[04:28:44] to make certain commitments to Saudi Arabia that would probably never get through Congress. - Do you not consider the Egypt-Israeli peace deal[04:28:50] legitimate then since the United States made a great financial contribution to Egypt? - I don't think the question[04:28:56] is whether that deal is legitimate or not. I think that deal exists.[04:29:03] But the point is whether, the core of this conflict is not between Israel and Egypt.[04:29:12] The core of this conflict is between Israel and the Palestinian people.[04:29:18] And the reason that Israel agreed to relinquish the occupied Egyptian Sinai[04:29:25] and the reason that Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in 1979 is because Israel in 1973 recognized[04:29:35] that its military superiority was ultimately no match for Egypt's determination[04:29:42] to recover its occupied territories and that there would come a point when Egypt would find a way to extract an unbearable price.[04:29:48] - Maybe just Israelis wanted peace. - [Mouin] Well, the Israelis wanted- - Not just because they were afraid of what Egypt might do at some point.[04:29:54] - If you're talking about the average Israeli citizen, I think that's a fair characterization. If you're talking about the Israeli leadership,[04:30:01] I think they looked at it in more strategic terms. How do you remove the most powerful Arab military states-[04:30:07] - Two points. Simple points. - From the equation? What was the terms of that Egypt-Israel peace treaty?[04:30:14] International law. Egypt demanded every- - Nobody's scared about international law.[04:30:20] - Allow me to finish. Every single inch of Egyptian- - Nobody talked about international law.[04:30:27] Begin and Carter and Sadat talked about the reality of- - No, Professor- - Israel occupying territory[04:30:32] and wanting peace. - Professor Morris. Professor Morris. I know the record.[04:30:39] They demanded, as you know, 'cause you've written about it, they demanded every square inch.[04:30:45] As you know, they demanded the oil fields be dismantled. - No, that's in the- - The airfield be dismantled[04:30:50] - No, not dismantled. They wanted the oil fields. - [Norman] And they wanted the settlements dismantled. - They wanted the settlements dismantled.[04:30:55] - The settlements, the oil fields and the airfield. They demanded all three back. You can't have-[04:31:01] - What do you mean back? The airfields weren't there when the Egypt were there. - Okay. That's incorrect. You're incorrect. They built an air airfield.[04:31:08] The Israelis built an airfield in the occupied Sinai- - Yes. - And they wanted it back-[04:31:13] - They didn't want it back, it wasn't theirs. - [Norman] No. Okay. - They wanted the territory in which the airfields- - Okay. - Israel had built back.[04:31:19] - The oil fields, the air fields, the settlements have to be dismantled. - Yes. - Begin said,[04:31:24] "I don't wanna be the first prime minister to dismantle- - But he did. - A settlement." But he did. Why? - But he did.[04:31:30] - Because of the law. - No. - No. It was because of- It was normalization- - Nobody cares about the law. The law had nothing to do with anything.[04:31:36] It was a negotiation. - Mr. Morris, Mr. Morris- - Two states, each of which wanted certain things. - [Norman] The Palestinians wanted-[04:31:42] - The law had nothing to do with anything. - As was said repeatedly in the negotiations- - [Benny] You're not listening. You're missing my point. - I've read the negotiation.[04:31:48] - The law has nothing to do with anything. - There are two foreign relations of US volumes on it. - [Benny] Nobody cared about the law.[04:31:54] - The Palestinians kept saying we want exactly- - Forget the Palestinians. They weren't there. - Allow me to finish.[04:32:00] The Palestinians kept saying, "We want what Egypt got. We want what Egypt got."[04:32:06] - Yeah. - Egypt got everything back. - But nothing to do with the law. - Okay. - Nothing to do with the law. - And number two, I'm not saying it's the whole picture,[04:32:14] but as Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan said at the time, he said, "If a car has four wheels[04:32:23] and you remove one wheel, the car can't move."[04:32:29] And for them, removing Egypt from the Arab front[04:32:34] would then remove any Arab military threat to Israel. - It's got nothing to do with international law.[04:32:40] - No, the first part did. And that's what the Palestinians kept saying- - I don't know what the first part is.[04:32:46] - [Norman] We want what Egypt got from the settlement. - Yeah, that's true. But forget international law. - And by the way- - Had nothing to do[04:32:51] with these negotiations. - One last thing. Last thing on a personal note. The quote about Sharm el-Sheik without peace-[04:32:57] - Yeah. Yeah. - Okay. That's the only thing you ever cited from a book of mine.[04:33:04] - I cited from your book? - Yes. I was absolutely shocked at your betrayal of your people.[04:33:10] That was pure treason. It was one- - I apologize for that. I apologize.[04:33:16] - [Norman] Okay, I accept. I accept. - All right. Well, let me try once again.[04:33:21] For the region and for just entirety of humanity, what gives you hope? We just heard a lot of pessimistic cynical takes.[04:33:29] What gives you hope? - People don't like war. That's a good reason. That's hope. In other words, the fear of war,[04:33:34] the disaster of war should give people impetus to try and seek peace.[04:33:41] - When you look at people in Gaza and people in the West Bank, people in Israel- - They should want- - Fundamentally,[04:33:46] no, but fundamentally they hate war. - [Benny] Yes, I think so. - What gives you hope?[04:33:52] - There is no hope, no. It's an extreme. No, I'm, hey, I'm not happy to say that.[04:33:58] - Of course you are. - It's a very bleak moment right now because-[04:34:06] - That I agree with, I agree with that. - Israel believes it has to restore what it calls[04:34:11] its deterrence capability. I think you've written about it actually, I just realized.[04:34:18] Israel has to restore its deterrence capability. And after the catastrophe of October 7th,[04:34:25] restoring its deterrence capacity means, this part you didn't write about, the annihilation of Gaza[04:34:31] and then moving on to the Hezbollah. - No, no, that- - So the Israelis[04:34:37] are dead set on restoring that deterrence capability.[04:34:42] On the Arab side, and I know Mouin and I have disagreed on it, and we're allowed to disagree.[04:34:49] I think the Arab side, the lesson they learned from October 7th is Israelis aren't as strong as we thought they were.[04:34:57] - That would be an they unfortunate message, if that's really what the Arabs come to believe.[04:35:02] - And they think that there is a military option though. And I think it's a zero-sum game at this point[04:35:10] and it's very, very bleak. And I'm not going to lie about that. Now, I will admit my predictive capacities[04:35:19] are not perfect- - Are limited. - Are limited. But for the moment, it's a very bleak situation.[04:35:25] - That I agree with. - And I don't see right now a way out. However, at the very minimum,[04:35:33] permanent ceasefire ended in human and illegal blockade of Gaza. And-[04:35:38] - Why is it illegal? - Free the hostages. They were shooting rockets at Israel for 20 years. Why is that illegal to blockade Gaza?[04:35:45] - [Steven] He thinks it's bottle rockets, that's what he calls them multiple times. - Why is it illegal? I'll tell you why. - You don't rocket your neighbor.[04:35:50] You rock your neighbor, expect consequences. - I'll tell you why. - Expect consequences. - But that works both ways. - I know. I expect that.[04:35:58] - Professor Morris. - Works both ways. - I'll tell you why. Because every human rights, humanitarian[04:36:05] and UN organization in the world has said- - Nobody cares about amnesty. - That the blockade[04:36:11] is a form of collective punishment- - Nobody cares about amnesty - Which is illegal under international law. - Forget illegal.[04:36:17] - You think a blockade which- - You don't understand the way the world works. These things are irrelevant.[04:36:23] - And you think confining, because that's the blockade. - [Benny] Yes, you don't shoot rockets at your neighbor.[04:36:29] - Confining a million children. - That's the choice of Hamas. - Confining. Confining a million children- - That's Hamas' choice.[04:36:36] - In what "The Economist" called- - Okay. - A human rubbish heap. - "The Economist" supported Israel in this war[04:36:43] and continues to support Israel. - What International Committee of Red Cross called[04:36:48] a sinking ship. What the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called a toxic slum, you think-[04:36:55] - It is a slum, of course a slum. - You think- - But it's caused by Hamas. - Under international law, you think it's legitimate.[04:37:01] - [Benny] Forget the law. - Hey, I know you wanna forget the law. - What about morality? - It's the one thing that every Is- - What about morality?[04:37:07] - It's whatever Israeli fears the most. - What? - The law. - No, no, no. - As Tzipi Livni said,[04:37:15] "I studied international law, I oppose international law." Of course you don't want to hear about the law.[04:37:21] - That's got nothing to do with anything. - Okay, so here's the thing. - [Benny] Yeah. - Then don't complain about October 7th.[04:37:28] If you don't want to- - You hear me complaining? - [Norman] If you wanna say forget about the law- - What I said was they acted like barbarians. - Then there is no international humanitarian law,[04:37:37] there's no distinction between civilians and combatants. - There should be. - And so-[04:37:42] - There should be but- - Now you're doing what Mouin said. You're becoming very selective about the law.[04:37:49] If you wanna forget about the law, Hamas had every right to do what it did. It had every right to do what it did.[04:37:55] According to you. Not to me. 'Cause you want to forget the law. - Do you still support the Houthis shooting random ships?[04:38:01] - Absolutely. - Okay, that's a violation of international law so you play the same games. - Absolutely.[04:38:06] And were there a power during World War II who had the courage of the Houthis,[04:38:13] were there a power that had that kind of coverage- - So courageous to be bombing merchant ships[04:38:18] while tens of thousand people died of actual starvation. Not the starvation that exists in the Gaza Strip where people before October 7th don't die of starvation.[04:38:25] Not the concentration camp at the Gaza Strip- - What about starvation in Yemen? Don't they have something better to do?[04:38:30] - Hey, that was the Houthis. - Yes, I know. - That was the Houthis. - [Benny] Don't they have anything better to do? - And you know in three years they lost 180,000-[04:38:37] - Shouldn't they be feeding the Yemenis? - 60,000 Yemenis died- - Why fight- - [Norman] In starvation?[04:38:42] - Why fight the Western powers in Israel when you should be taking care of your problems at home? The Houthis.[04:38:47] - Often the only allies of the dispossessed are those who experience similar circumstances.[04:38:53] - Don't you think that they should take care of the Yemeni problems? - As I said- - I'm very happy,[04:38:59] I'm very happy they're helping out the Palestinians. Anyone who helps the people- - It's at the expense of the Yemenis.[04:39:04] - Anybody- - They'll pay for it. - Anybody who comes to the aid of those suffering genocide half of whom- - There's no genocide.[04:39:09] - Half of whom are children. Yeah, according to the most current UN reports, as of of today, one quarter of the population of Gaza-[04:39:18] - Is starving. - That means 500,000 children- - Are starving. - Are on the verge of famine.[04:39:25] - They keep saying on the verge of- - On the verge of- - I have not seen- - Didn't you recall that they said it was unlivable? - I have not seen one Palestinian die of starvation[04:39:33] in these last four months. Not one. - There have been- - They're always on the verge. - Documented cases. - On the verge. - There have been documented cases.[04:39:38] - [Benny] I haven't seen it. - Yesterday Al Jazeera said six and the day before that they said two. So those are the two.[04:39:43] - That number probably died in Israel of starvation also. - I don't think there's famine in Israel.[04:39:49] - There isn't. There isn't in the Gaza Strip either. - You're so laid back. - That's something which is produced for the Western-[04:39:54] - There are infants dying due to a engineered lack of access to food and nutrition.[04:40:01] - I don't think it's engineered, I think the Hamas stopped shooting perhaps or- - Unfortunately- - As you said, engineered.[04:40:08] - I think Amnesty Inter, excuse me, Human Rights Watch called it using starvation as a weapon.[04:40:14] That's called engineering. - Okay. - That's what they did but you were pushed on this by Coleman Hughes to bring up an example of why is the Gaza strip, by what metric are they starving?[04:40:22] By what metric is it so behind the rest of the world? - [Mouin] You know, if we're gonna bring up- - [Steven] I wanna hear an answer that,[04:40:27] 'cause he didn't answer it before. - I'm happy to answer it. I just quoted you from the humanitarian organizations.[04:40:33] They said one quarter of the population of Gaza is now verging on famine. - Before October 7th. - Okay. - Before October 7th.[04:40:38] - [Norman] I'm not going before October 7th. - You use that as justification for Hamas fighting. You say the conditions were unlivable. They had to fight.[04:40:44] - I said to him- - So my question is what made it unlivable prior to October 7th? What are the metrics that you're using?[04:40:49] - There were about five, six or seven reports issued by UNCTAD, issued by the World Bank,[04:40:57] issued by the International Monetary Fund, and they all said that's why, that's why-[04:41:03] - Why did they say why? Why did they say that? - That's why "The Economist," not a radical periodical,[04:41:09] described Gaza as a human rubbish heap. - So tell me by what metrics.[04:41:15] If you're a historian, if you do all this work, then tell me what they said. Don't just tell me a sentence. - Mr. Bonnell.[04:41:20] - Tell me by one metric. - Mr. Bonnell. - He's not gonna answer again. - I don't think I've avoided any of your questions.[04:41:25] except when they breached the threshold of complete imbecility.[04:41:31] - So you're about to tell me by what metric the Gaza Strip is a humanitarian crisis. - You remember what I said a moment ago[04:41:36] I said to Professor Morris, I deferred to expertise? I look at what the organizations say.[04:41:44] I look at what the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said. - You're saying more words that you don't know. You don't know or you don't care. - And I don't know. - Okay, that's fine.[04:41:49] - You know how complicated, have you ever investigated how complicated is the metric for hunger,[04:41:56] starvation, and famine? It is such a complicated metric they figured out.[04:42:02] If you asked me to repeat it now, I couldn't do it. - And yet we have a human development index where we rank countries[04:42:08] that we can still measure infant mortality, life expectancy. We could measure all of these things.[04:42:13] - Mouin, I'm holding out for you here. You still didn't answer the hope question. What gives you a source of hope about the region?[04:42:22] - Well, first of all, I would agree with Benny Morris and Norman Finkelstein,[04:42:29] that the current situation is bleak. And I think it would be unreasonable to expect it[04:42:37] to not get even bleaker in the coming weeks and months. And we now, this conflict really,[04:42:46] it originated in the late 19th century. It's been a more or less active conflict[04:42:54] since the 1920s, 1930s. And it has produced a tremendous amount of suffering[04:43:02] and regional conflict and geopolitical complications and all of that.[04:43:09] But what gives me hope is that throughout their entire ordeal,[04:43:14] the Palestinian people have never surrendered. And I believe they never will surrender[04:43:20] to overwhelming force and violence. They have taken everything that Israel has thrown at them.[04:43:27] They have taken everything that the West has thrown at them. They have taken everything[04:43:32] that those who are supposed to be their natural allies have on occasion thrown at them.[04:43:39] But this is a people that never has and I believe never will surrender.[04:43:45] And at a certain point, I think Israel and its leaders[04:43:53] will have to come to the realization that by hook or by crook, these people are going to achieve[04:44:03] their inalienable and legitimate national rights.[04:44:09] And that is going to be a reality. As I was-[04:44:14] - Well, what do you mean by that? You mean all of Palestine? Is that what you mean? - No and- - From the river to the sea?[04:44:20] - Well, ideally, of course, yes. And what I was- - Those inalienable rights?[04:44:25] - No, what I was saying earlier, and then the discussion got sidetracked, is that I did believe that a two-state settlement,[04:44:36] a partition of Palestine along the 1967 boundaries[04:44:43] would've been a reasonable solution because I think it also[04:44:49] would have opened pathways to further-[04:44:54] - But now you believe what? - Further nonviolent engagement between Israel and the Palestinians that could create other forms of coexistence[04:45:03] in a federal or binational or other- - What do you think about refugees in regards to that? Do you think there has to be a resettlement[04:45:09] of the five or 6 million, whoever wants to claim to be the sentence of- - Return. - I think there has to be an explicit acknowledgement-[04:45:19] - Of responsibility. - Of the responsibility - And the return. - And of the rights.[04:45:24] I think that in the framework of a two-state settlement, I think a formula would need to be found[04:45:32] that does not undermine the foundations[04:45:38] of a two-state settlement. And I don't think it would be that difficult because I suspect that there are probably large numbers[04:45:47] of Palestinian refugees who, once their rights are acknowledged,[04:45:53] will find it exceptionally distasteful. - [Benny] To return from Canada. - Exceptionally distasteful to have to live[04:46:00] among the kind of sentiments that we've heard around this table today, to be quite frank.[04:46:06] I was previously unfamiliar with you and I watched one of your preparation videos.[04:46:14] Very disconcerting stuff, I have to say. You were explaining two days ago in the discussion about apartheid and how absurd it was[04:46:21] that in your view, Jim Crow was not apartheid. Jim Crow was not apartheid,[04:46:27] but Arab states not giving citizenship to Palestinian refugees is apartheid.[04:46:32] - My position- - That's what I meant with my earlier comments about white supremacy. - So my issue. That's great, the white supremacy comment.[04:46:38] - And if I- - Hold on. Let me respond. My issue is that I feel like we have jumped on this euphemistic treadmill.[04:46:44] And I think that's part of the reason why this conflict will never get solved. Is because on one end you've got a people[04:46:50] who are now convinced internationally that they're victims of apartheid, genocide, concentration camp conditions, ethnic cleansing,[04:46:58] they're forced to live in an open air prison with all of these things that are stacked against them, all of these terms that are highly specific[04:47:04] that refer to very precise things. And then when people like you said that they should- - I would expect nothing less[04:47:10] from someone who doesn't think Jim Crow is apartheid. - I don't know if Jim- - But who does think the Arab states- - The problem is - Is not giving- - You're morally loading.[04:47:15] For you, apartheid is when racists do bad things. - [Mouin] No, no. There's definition of apartheid.[04:47:21] - That's great. - [Mouin] There's a very clear definition of apartheid. - Specific top-down racial domination enacted through top-down,[04:47:26] like federal legislative policies or whatever, means that I don't know if Jim Crow[04:47:32] would've qualified for apartheid. That doesn't make it any less, excuse me. Finkelstein, I'm talking right now. - Have you ever heard- - Excuse me, excuse me.[04:47:37] Twinklestein, I'm talking to your friend over here. I don't know if it would've qualified as the crime of apartheid.[04:47:42] Just like if Israel were to literally nuke the Gaza Strip and kill 2 million people, I don't know if that would qualify for the crime of genocide- - In your eyes, probably not.[04:47:48] - I don't, well, yeah, but because genocide requires special intent. I think the issue is instead of, and I think this conversation actually,[04:47:54] is emblematic of the entire conversation. I don't think anything- - But let me finish answering Benny Morris' question. - But you accused me of[04:48:00] supporting racism, so yeah. - Well, you did and you are. - Do you think I support Jim Crow laws?[04:48:06] - Look, when- - The fact that you can't even answer that honestly, right? - It doesn't matter what- - You could say that 800 civilians were killed by Hamas,[04:48:12] you said, "Well, maybe 400 were killed by Israel." - No, I didn't say that. No, I didn't say that. - You said 400. - No, I didn't say that.[04:48:17] - You co-signed the opinion. - No, I didn't. No, I didn't. - Well, wait, how many, I think the word was some.[04:48:23] That's what I heard. - Well, you weren't listening. - How many people do you think approximately, if you had to ballpark it,[04:48:28] how many do you think were killed by Hamas on October 7th? - I think it's pretty clear that the majority of civilians[04:48:35] that were killed on- - 51% or 90%? - Don't ask me to put a number- - I just want a ballpark. - On something I don't know.[04:48:41] - Two very different intuitions. - First of all, are you, when you say Hamas, do you mean Palestinians or do you mean Hamas specifically? - I mean the invading Palestinian force.[04:48:47] I don't like to say Palestinians because I don't think all Palestinian civilians were involved. - No. - In fact, I'll say Hamas, Islamic Jihad, whatever-[04:48:53] - But that's how this discussion started. You said Hamas and I began to answer that and then Benny Morris said,[04:48:59] "Actually, he means Hamas in addition to Jihad and the others," so. - So of the invading Palestinian force,[04:49:06] how many do you think killed civilians versus the IDF? What do you think the ballpark, the percentage? - Well, the figures we have are that about a third[04:49:12] of the casualties on October 7th were military. - That's not what I asked- - Two third were. What's your question?[04:49:18] - What percentage of civilians do you think were killed by the invading force? A ballpark. - I think a clear majority,[04:49:23] but I can't give you a specific figure. - If you thought it was closer to 51% or 99% were killed by-[04:49:29] - Why would he he know that. How would he know that? - Because it's interesting to actually stake out a position. - It's interesting- - If you wanna be completely[04:49:34] and totally agnostic on it, that's fine. - Based on complete ignorance, because we don't know. Professor Morris doesn't know. Mouin Rabbani doesn't know.[04:49:40] - And yet you can speak with absolute certainty that the IDF is targeting and murdering Palestinian children intentionally.[04:49:46] Do you see the double standard? - No, I don't. You see- - I know you don't. That was a rhetorical question. Obviously you don't don't know. - You know why? Because-[04:49:52] - You're uneducated on the matter. - I looked at the UN report, I looked at the- - The Goldstone report? - No.[04:49:58] The UN report on the Great March of Return in 2018.[04:50:03] And they said that the snipers were targeting children, medics, journalists, and disabled people.[04:50:11] - Just as they are now in this context. - Exactly. - More journalists have been killed[04:50:17] in the last several months in Gaza than in any other conflict. - [Steven] Do you acknowledge that Hamas- - In all of the World War II. Than in all of World War II.[04:50:23] - [Steven] That's great, the comparison is fun. - Hamas is not killing journalists in Gaza. - Do you agree that they operate in civilian uniforms?[04:50:29] That their goal is to induce that confusion? That that's the way that they conduct themselves militarily? - Let me finish my point. More journalists-[04:50:36] - I understand- - Have been. More UN- - [Steven] Children and the- - He doesn't wanna hear, it's so boring. - No, because you're not having a material,[04:50:42] - Virtue signaling. - A substantial- It is virtue signaling. - Yeah. - Yes, like when you say children over and over again, that's virtue signaling. - We're talking about[04:50:47] - You have this- - Talking about how many Israelis were killed, that's not virtue signaling[04:50:53] 'cause that's human life. - I don't care about, I don't care if a hundred are killed or a thousand. - You just said- - I'm curious who you're assigning blame to.[04:50:59] - 51%. 90%. - I'm curious who you're- The question, yes. - And then Mouin- - That's not the number, that's the responsibility, Norm.[04:51:05] - And then Mouin mentions that more journalists were killed in Gaza[04:51:11] than in all of World War II. - [Steven] That doesn't further any part of the conversation- - And more medics were killed.[04:51:16] - No, no, that's silly. Journalists- - And then he says it's virtue signaling.[04:51:21] But when Israelis get killed, that's serious. - I never said, it's serious on both sides.[04:51:26] I didn't say respectfully- - You're calling it virtue signaling. - I'm not virtue signaling. - You're virtue signaling. - I'm asking a substantive question[04:51:32] of who do you assign blame to or do you play into Norm Finkelstein's conspiracies that the ambulances should have known[04:51:37] immediately who was dead, that the numbers were changed 'cause they were faked- - Mr. Burrell- - Or that maybe 51% of the people were killed. - Mr. Burrell.[04:51:43] - By Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but 49% were killed by IDF helicopters. - You asked me a direct question[04:51:49] and you got a direct answer. - I didn't. I got majority, which could be 51- - I said a clear- - To 99- - A clear majority- - What percent[04:51:55] is a clear majority as opposed to- - [Steven] They live in ambiguity. - A clear majority, in my view, is well over 50%.[04:52:01] Please don't ask me to be more precise because I- - You could say 80, 90, 95%.[04:52:06] - [Mouin] If I knew that, I would say it. - I think it's reasonable. - Perhaps it is, but I- - Professor Morris,[04:52:11] you're not the best person to be asking that question. I read when you described Operation Defensive Shield[04:52:20] and you said a few dozen homes were destroyed. - You're talking about what happened in Jenin Refugee camp. - And you said- - No, the Arabs said 500.[04:52:27] You guys said 500 Palestinians were killed in Jenin. - I never said that. - And then the, no, but that was the statement of the PLO,[04:52:34] the Palestinian Authority. - You said a few dozen homes - And that there were massacres there. - A few dozen homes-[04:52:39] - Yes, a few dozen homes. - Well, it turned out 140 buildings were destroyed,[04:52:44] 5,000 people were left homeless. - How many were killed? - 5,000.[04:52:50] You described it- - How many were killed? - No, I'm talking about homes destroyed. So you're not the best person to be criticizing[04:52:57] what Mouin says when he says clear majority, but he can't say more. You know why he can't say more?[04:53:03] - He doesn't know. - Doesn't know. - [Benny] Yeah, yeah. I understand that. - I hope as a historian- - If I was trying to belittle,[04:53:10] I would give you a very different answer. I would just say, I don't know. I do know that some were- - You know what the right phrase there would be?[04:53:16] The overwhelming majority were killed by Arab gunmen and very small number were killed by Israelis,[04:53:23] by accident or whatever. - You're not speaking- - That's probably true. - You don't know that. - That's probably true.[04:53:28] - I can state with confidence a clear majority, overwhelming majority. You may be correct, but I can't state that with certainty.[04:53:35] I think there's a very easy way to find out is to have a independent- - Forget independent.[04:53:41] - [Mouin] Of course you forget independent. - Forget that doesn't mean anything. - [Norman] Forget the law. - Independent means UN High Commission[04:53:46] for Human Rights, whatever it's called. - Not necessarily. - Just repeat the numbers. - They're all from barbaric countries.[04:53:53] Syrian was the head of the UN Commission for Human Rights. - But if it wasn't Israeli, it would've been okay?[04:53:58] - He certainly would've been more honest than a Syrian. - Of course. Oh yeah, from your perspective. - Well, to disagree with Steven,[04:54:03] I thought this was extremely valuable and at times really like the view of history, the passion.[04:54:13] I'm really grateful that you would spend your really valuable time.[04:54:19] And just one more question, since we have two historians here.[04:54:25] Well, just briefly, from a history perspective,[04:54:30] what do you hope your legacy is as historians, Benny and Norm, will be of the work that you've put out there?[04:54:37] Maybe Norm you can go first and try to just say briefly. - I think there's a value to preserving the record.[04:54:44] I'm not optimistic about where things are going to end up. There was a very nice book written by a woman[04:54:51] named Helen Hunt Jackson at the end of the 19th century[04:54:56] describing what was done to the Native Americans. She called it a century of dishonor.[04:55:02] And she described in vivid, poignant detail what was done to the Native Americans.[04:55:09] Did it save them? No. Did it help them? Probably not.[04:55:15] Did it preserve their memory? Yes. And I think there's a value to that.[04:55:20] There was a famous film by Eisenstein, Sergei Eisenstein.[04:55:26] It was either "Battleship Potemkin" or "Mother," I can't remember which one. The last scene was the Tsar's troops[04:55:35] mowing down all the Russian people. And he pans the scene. - [Benny] Not all the Russian people, just a few of them.[04:55:41] - Yeah. Well he pans the massacre. He pans the massacre. - But he could have killed a lot more.[04:55:48] - And the last words of the movie were, "Proletarians" exclamation point,[04:55:55] "Remember," exclamation point. And I've seen it as my life's work to preserve the memory[04:56:02] and to remember, I didn't expect that anyone would read my book on Gaza.[04:56:08] It's very dense. It gives me even a bit of a headache to read at least one of the chapters.[04:56:14] - You wrote a book on Gaza? - But I thought that the memory deserves to be preserved.[04:56:21] - Amen. - Well, I would just say very briefly, unlike my colleague, I think writing the truth about what happened in history[04:56:30] in various periods of history, if I've done a little bit of that, I'm happy.[04:56:36] - Thank you, Norm. Thank you Benny. Thank you Steven. Thank you, Mouin. Thanks for listening to this conversation[04:56:42] with Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, Mouin Rabbani, and Steven Bonnell.[04:56:48] To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now let me leave you with some words[04:56:53] from Lyndon B. Johnson. "Peace is a journey of a thousand miles[04:56:58] and it must be taken one step at a time." Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.