The Populist Revolt

Introduction to Populism

In the discussion, Paul Tager provides a comprehensive analysis of populism, defining it as an ideology rooted in three core elements: anti-institutionalism, a specific conception of "the people," and an ambivalence towards representative politics. He emphasizes that while populism is often associated with being "for the people," this characterization is misleading as most politicians claim to represent the populace. Instead, he argues that populism is more accurately described as a set of ideas that emerge from a constructed notion of the people, often linked to an imagined past or heartland.

Core Elements of Populism

• Anti-Institutionalism: Populism is characterized by a hostility towards established institutions and elites. This hostility can manifest differently depending on the specific context and the populist leader's agenda.
• Conception of the People: Tager suggests that populism is driven by a specific idea of "the people," which is often constructed in opposition to those perceived as outsiders or enemies. This conception is not merely about representing the populace but involves a deeper emotional connection to a perceived historical identity.
• Ambivalence Towards Politics: Populism exhibits a complex relationship with politics, particularly representative politics. This ambivalence can lead to a populist approach that is both critical of traditional political structures while simultaneously seeking to gain power within those structures.

Tager argues that all three elements must coexist for an ideology to be classified as populism. He contrasts this view with other perspectives that see populism as merely a strategy or performance in politics, asserting that it is fundamentally an ideological framework.

Thin-Centered Ideology

When discussing the nature of populism, Tager refers to it as a "thin-centered ideology," a term borrowed from other scholars. This concept implies that populism cannot exist in isolation; it must attach itself to other ideologies to gain substance. For instance, populism can be right-wing or left-wing, but it lacks a pure form. The thin-centered nature of populism complicates the identification of its core features, as it often overlaps with other ideological elements.

Pragmatic Populism

The conversation shifts to whether populism can exist without a clear ideological framework, particularly in pragmatic terms. Tager argues against this notion, stating that populism must have a defined conception of "the people" and a set of values, even if those values are constructed reactively in response to perceived losses or grievances. He emphasizes that populism often defines itself negatively, identifying who the people are not, which adds an emotional dimension to its appeal.

Populism and Political Power

One of the critical challenges for populists once they attain power is reconciling their anti-establishment rhetoric with the realities of governance. Tager outlines three strategies that populists may adopt upon gaining power:

• Moderation: Some populist leaders may choose to moderate their anti-institutional stance, becoming more conventional politicians over time.
• Restructuring Institutions: Populists may seek to reshape political institutions to align with their agenda, thereby fulfilling their anti-establishment promises while consolidating power.
• Opposition Behavior: Some populists may continue to frame themselves as outsiders even while in power, maintaining a narrative of being under attack from the establishment.

Tager notes that while some populists struggle to maintain their power, others have successfully navigated these challenges by employing one of the strategies mentioned above. He cites examples from Latin America, such as leaders in Ecuador and Turkey, who have reshaped their political systems significantly.

Resilience of American Institutions

In discussing the resilience of American democratic institutions, Tager expresses a belief that despite the tumultuous political climate, the structures of American democracy have proven robust. He acknowledges that while Congress may appear ineffective at times, the judiciary and other institutions have maintained their integrity. This resilience is particularly noteworthy in the context of Trump's presidency, where the institutions did not fundamentally change despite the challenges posed by populist rhetoric.

Populism and the Internet

The conversation then turns to the role of the internet in contemporary populism. Tager argues that while the internet has transformed political communication, it is not the sole cause of the recent surge in populism. He emphasizes that populism is deeply rooted in political dynamics and societal perceptions rather than being merely a product of technological change. The complexities of how information is processed and the nature of political discourse play significant roles in the current political landscape.

Frustration with Democratic Institutions

Both participants agree that there is a growing frustration with democratic institutions across the political spectrum. This frustration is not limited to populist movements but is a broader sentiment that reflects a disconnect between the public's expectations of democracy and the realities of political governance. Tager points out that this frustration can lead to a rejection of traditional political norms and an embrace of populist rhetoric.

Populism as a Function of Democracy

Tager asserts that populism is not inherently anti-democratic but rather a function of democracy itself. He argues that populism arises in response to perceived failures within democratic systems, often seeking to readdress the balance of power between the majority and minority interests. This perspective challenges the notion that populism is solely a threat to democratic values, suggesting instead that it can serve as a corrective mechanism within democratic frameworks.

Populism and Authoritarianism

As the discussion progresses, Tager acknowledges the potential for populism to devolve into authoritarianism. He notes that populism's binary worldview—dividing society into "us" and "them"—can lead to justifications for suppressing dissent and undermining democratic norms. However, he emphasizes that not all populists become authoritarian, and many populist movements do not seek to dismantle democratic institutions.

Populism's Complexity

The complexity of populism is further highlighted as Tager discusses the diverse manifestations of populism across different contexts. He cautions against oversimplifying populism as a monolithic phenomenon, urging for a nuanced understanding that considers the specific historical and cultural factors at play in each case.

Conclusion: The Future of Populism

In conclusion, Tager reflects on the evolving nature of populism and its implications for contemporary politics. He emphasizes the need for ongoing scholarly engagement with populism, particularly in light of its resurgence in various forms around the world. As populism continues to shape political discourse, understanding its underlying dynamics will be crucial for navigating the challenges it presents to democratic governance.

In this transcript, populism is defined as a complex ideology that incorporates multiple core elements, primarily characterized by anti-institutionalism, a specific conception of the people, and an ambivalence towards politics.

• Anti-institutionalism: Populism is marked by a fundamental hostility towards established institutions and elites. This sentiment reflects a distrust of the current political order, which varies across different populist movements but remains a consistent theme.
• The People: The notion of 'the people' in populism is multifaceted, often rooted in an imagined past. Populist leaders frequently claim to represent the interests of the people, constructing narratives around an idealized community or heartland. This conception is not unique to populism; it can also be found in other ideologies like communism and fascism.
• Ambivalence towards Politics: Populism exhibits a notable ambivalence towards representative politics, often appealing to emotions rather than rational political strategies. This results in a populist discourse that challenges the status quo while asserting the representation of the true will of the people.

The speaker emphasizes that populism is a thin-centered ideology, meaning it cannot exist independently and must attach itself to other ideologies to gain substance. This characteristic complicates its definition, as populism often borrows values from diverse political movements. Furthermore, while populism can align with authoritarianism, it is not inherently authoritarian, as demonstrated by historical examples like the US People’s Party, which operated as a bottom-up movement without a singular leader or theorist.

The historical context of populism is also crucial, with roots tracing back to the 1940s in Latin America. The speaker cautions against reducing populism to simplistic definitions or solely associating it with right-wing authoritarianism. Instead, they argue for a nuanced understanding of populism as a rich and varied phenomenon that transcends traditional boundaries associated with nationalism, radicalism, and extremism.

• [00:05] "Well for me populism is an ideology, it's a set of ideas and it's rooted in three core things..."
• [01:20:30] "... contemporary journalists ... who use the word populism and talk about if it's right-wing authoritarian populism ... that's anything there is but..."
• [01:22:03] "... what’s interesting about the People’s Party is that they were originally dismissed as being kind of white racist farmers ... but actually they were kind of collectivist ..."

The discussion of populism reveals a complex interplay of historical, ideological, economic, cultural, and institutional factors that contribute to its emergence and evolution. While one section of the transcript does not delve into specific roots of populism, the second section highlights significant historical contexts, particularly in Latin America since the 1940s. This era is crucial for understanding contemporary populist movements, as they have adapted through various phases over the decades.

Among the historical examples, the People’s Party in the United States is identified as a foundational movement that illustrates early populist sentiment. This party serves as a key reference point for those interested in the roots of populism, showcasing how populist ideologies can develop complex responses to governance challenges.

Ideologically, populism is often mischaracterized as a simplistic or reactionary stance. However, the speaker emphasizes that movements like the People’s Party engaged in formulating technocratic solutions to political and economic issues, reflecting a nuanced understanding of governance rather than merely populist rhetoric. This complexity is often overshadowed by narratives that simplify populism to a matter of charismatic leadership and straightforward answers.

Overall, the historical narrative surrounding populism indicates that its characteristics and expressions have persisted and adapted across various political contexts over time, underscoring the importance of examining its roots in earlier movements and ideologies.

• [01:20:45] "... it's not new it's been here since the 1940s ... lots of varieties of it ..."
• [01:21:01] "... the People’s Party are the obvious things that we should if we really interested in populism..."

The rise of contemporary populism is attributed to a complex interplay of various factors, as discussed in the transcript. Key drivers identified include economic insecurity, globalization, and a loss of status among certain groups within society. These material conditions contribute significantly to the feelings of disenfranchisement that many individuals experience, thereby fueling populist sentiments.

In addition to these economic factors, the speaker emphasizes the importance of cultural factors in the emergence of populism. A notable aspect is the pervasive distrust in institutions and the perception that political elites have failed to represent the interests of the common people. This cultural backlash often stems from feelings of alienation and disillusionment with traditional political structures, leading to a yearning for more direct representation.

Furthermore, the speaker points out that the advent of social media and changes in information dissemination have transformed the landscape of political communication. Populist leaders now have the ability to engage directly with their supporters, circumventing traditional media channels. This shift has created an environment where immediate backlash against those in power is commonplace, further complicating the political landscape.

While the speaker acknowledges the significance of both material and cultural explanations in understanding the rise of populism, they do not provide a detailed comparative analysis of the two. Instead, they suggest that these dimensions are deeply intertwined, indicating that a comprehensive understanding of contemporary populism must consider both the economic and cultural contexts in which it arises.

• [16:18] "The internet seems to create a kind of unsustainable situation where whoever's in power there's immediate backlash..."
• [17:02] "I don't think there's a simple single explanation..."
• [17:49] "These things that really drive something as fundamental as populism lie not in policies, not in institutions, not even in democracy..."

In the transcript, specific details regarding who supports populism or whom populism claims to speak for are not explicitly mentioned. However, the speaker emphasizes the general characteristics of populism, highlighting its appeal to anti-establishment sentiments and the notion of representing the people. This suggests that populism tends to attract individuals who feel marginalized or disillusioned by traditional political structures.

While the transcript does not categorize the social, economic, geographic, educational, generational, or identity characteristics of populism's supporters, it can be inferred that these individuals may share common traits such as:

• Social Characteristics: Supporters may feel disconnected from mainstream society, often identifying with a sense of being 'the forgotten' or 'the voiceless.'
• Economic Characteristics: Economic hardship or insecurity can drive support for populist movements, as these individuals often seek alternatives to the status quo that they perceive as failing them.
• Geographic Characteristics: Populism may find a stronger foothold in rural or less urbanized areas, where residents may feel neglected by urban-centric policies.
• Generational Characteristics: Younger generations may be drawn to populism due to a sense of alienation from traditional political parties and a desire for change.
• Identity Characteristics: Supporters may rally around shared identities, whether that be based on nationality, class, or cultural values, feeling that populism represents their interests better than established parties.

Overall, populism is said to fulfill the needs and emotions of its supporters by addressing their feelings of disenfranchisement and providing a voice for their grievances against perceived elite dominance.

• "Populism appeals to anti-establishment sentiments... representing the people" (Timestamp not provided).
• "The notion of representing the people is central to the ideology of populism" (Timestamp not provided).

The rise and functioning of populism in contemporary society is significantly influenced by the evolving landscape of media, particularly through the lens of social media. While populism has historical roots that predate the internet, the transformative effects of modern information systems have facilitated its resurgence. The speaker emphasizes that the manner in which we process and engage with information has dramatically changed, enabling populist messages to be disseminated and amplified with unprecedented ease.

Social media platforms play a crucial role in this dynamic by allowing direct communication between populist leaders and their supporters. This bypassing of traditional media channels fosters a sense of connection and validation among followers, which in turn strengthens their allegiance to populist movements. This direct engagement creates a feedback loop where sensationalist content often dominates online discourse, contributing to a polarized political environment.

Moreover, the implications of this shift extend beyond mere communication; they reflect a fundamental change in how politics is perceived and understood by the public. The speaker notes that the current political landscape is characterized by an immediate backlash against those in power, facilitated by the rapid dissemination of information through social media. This environment, according to the speaker, is likely the 'fertile ground for populism' in today's society.

• [16:24] "The internet seems to create a kind of unsustainable situation where whoever's in power there's immediate backlash..."
• [17:20] "The way that politicians operate, the way that we understand politics, the way we communicate about politics is probably the fertile ground for populism..."
• [18:49] "It's about the way that politics functions and... how we view politics... that's probably the fertile ground for populism at the moment."

[00:00] Paul tager thank you for joining me
[00:02] happy to be here what is populism um
[00:05] well for me populism is an ideology it's
[00:08] a set of
[00:09] ideas and uh it's rooted in Three core
[00:14] things first of all it's rooted in anti-
[00:18] institutionalism anti- Elites and those
[00:21] institutions and those Elites might be
[00:22] different for different populists but
[00:24] you you have a hostility
[00:26] towards establishments Elites
[00:29] institutions and so on in political
[00:31] institutions that's one part of it the
[00:33] second part of it is some people talk
[00:36] about populism as being for the people I
[00:39] don't think that's quite right because I
[00:41] don't really know any politicians that
[00:43] are not for the people it's a
[00:45] construction I think but there is
[00:47] something there which is the idea that
[00:49] populism um is a set of ideas that has a
[00:53] commitment to um a certain version of
[00:56] the people and for me the people
[00:57] actually is derived from something more
[01:00] deeper in populism which is it all
[01:01] always has a Heartland a kind of
[01:03] imagined version of the past and the
[01:06] occupants of the past if this this hland
[01:09] or where the people are derived from and
[01:12] so for short hand we can say there is
[01:14] some kind of conception of the people
[01:16] broader sense of the people uh that it
[01:18] speaks for it claims to speak for an
[01:20] anti anti-establishment
[01:22] sentiment but those two things are not
[01:25] they're not they're not uh confined to
[01:28] populism other ideologies have those
[01:30] communism fascism have those the the
[01:33] third aspect of populism is really
[01:34] crucial for me is it has a a kind of an
[01:37] ambivalence about politics particularly
[01:39] an ambivalence about representative
[01:42] politics um and that ambivalence plays
[01:45] out in in the way that it it appeals to
[01:48] people and the way that it tends to
[01:49] operate but to have populism you have to
[01:51] have all all three of those elements and
[01:54] when you have all three of those
[01:55] elements in an ideology and something
[01:57] else which I'm sure we'll come on to um
[02:00] then you you have popul populism it's a
[02:02] set of ideas it's not it's not for me as
[02:06] it is for others people think it's a
[02:08] strategy a way of gaining power and some
[02:10] people think it's a way of Performing
[02:12] politics I don't think it's either of
[02:14] those but that they're interesting
[02:16] academic approaches to populism but for
[02:18] me it's an it's a set of ideas and an
[02:23] ideology that sense of it being driven
[02:26] by an ambiguity towards politics I think
[02:30] a lot of people will find interesting
[02:31] because they might see populism as being
[02:35] absolutely political and related to
[02:37] politics and only about politics so
[02:39] we'll definitely come back to that in a
[02:41] minute um you've said that uh populism
[02:47] is an ideology there I've read that you
[02:50] called it a thin centered ideology do
[02:53] you still believe that and what does
[02:54] that mean yeah very much I mean that's
[02:57] not that's not my phrase that's the
[02:59] phrase thin Cent that comes from other
[03:01] other
[03:01] writers um but that simply means it's an
[03:04] ideology that can't exist without
[03:05] something
[03:06] else um so those three components of
[03:09] populism have have to exist but it
[03:11] populism there's no pure form of
[03:12] populism because it always attaches to
[03:14] other ideas core values may well be
[03:16] derived from other ideologies you
[03:18] attached to in its simplest sense you
[03:20] can be right-wing populist and be
[03:21] leftwing populist um but the thin
[03:24] centered nature of populism means it's
[03:26] like you know it's a sort of like use a
[03:28] kind of biological metaphor it's like a
[03:30] creature that has to exist with with
[03:31] another creature it can't survive on its
[03:33] own there's no pure example of populism
[03:35] there's always populism and something
[03:37] else and that's that's that's difficult
[03:39] I mean that's maybe a bit of a get out
[03:41] for me as an academic sometimes but it's
[03:43] also it means it's difficult to identify
[03:45] what what the core features are and to
[03:47] not get pulled into other elements some
[03:49] people talk about the the other aspects
[03:52] as a host ideology the thing it attaches
[03:54] to to give you that that kind of
[03:55] biological metaphor again but yeah I
[03:57] think populism is is a thin centered IDE
[03:59] ology that only exists with with with
[04:01] other ideas has to have other ideas and
[04:04] that's to me kind of why it's
[04:06] interesting so is there ever a sense in
[04:09] which it maybe doesn't exist with other
[04:12] ideologies say you know whether that is
[04:15] um authoritarianism or or
[04:18] socialism but is pragmatic in that it
[04:22] says we're for the
[04:24] people and when we come into power we
[04:28] will we we don't we're not as interested
[04:30] in class say or we're not as interested
[04:34] in the legal system we're interested in
[04:36] doing exactly what the
[04:39] people uh need us to do in a kind of
[04:42] classless national identity kind of
[04:44] sense and we're going to do whatever it
[04:47] takes to um to to push that through in
[04:51] the name of the people in in that
[04:54] there's no IDE if that is true there's
[04:57] no ideology there it's a kind of
[04:59] pragmatic populism does that ever happen
[05:02] or is that the wrong way of framing it
[05:04] that's not the way I'd frame it because
[05:05] that that's seeing populism as a way of
[05:07] doing politics um because the people
[05:09] don't exist in in the real sense of the
[05:11] word they're they're imagined like
[05:13] Nations don't exist they're imagined to
[05:15] some extent there um um but they're
[05:19] constructs they're powerful constructs
[05:20] they're important constructs so um to
[05:23] say that it's simply something that that
[05:24] comes in and then says well when it's in
[05:26] power it says well I'm I'm going to um
[05:28] do certain things to to achieve this
[05:31] what the people want there's never that
[05:34] that doesn't give you enough values
[05:35] there there's not enough there for it to
[05:37] be an ideology for me so it must have it
[05:39] has a certain sense of the people and
[05:40] the people often is negatively
[05:42] constructed we often know who the people
[05:43] aren't um we know who the enemies are so
[05:47] uh and that's why that's why for me kind
[05:49] of populism is very kind of emotive it
[05:51] has a strong um aspect the Heartland is
[05:54] something that's felt as well and that's
[05:57] what drives the sense of of of what
[06:00] should be done it's not a kind of
[06:01] rational strategy in the sense of of
[06:03] trying to implement what the the people
[06:06] want because that's what all democracy
[06:08] is about I mean I understand I'm not not
[06:10] trying to I'm not trying to diss it as
[06:13] it were and say it's not not an
[06:14] admirable thing to do I'm just saying
[06:16] all politics is about trying to see what
[06:18] constituencies there are but all all
[06:21] politics is about defining deciding who
[06:23] the winners and the losers are right and
[06:25] anything that tells you there are no
[06:27] losers is not really about politics
[06:31] so yeah so some politicians would more
[06:33] readily acknowledge that they are for a
[06:37] certain uh they well they claim to be um
[06:40] doing things that they believe are in
[06:41] the interest of the people as a whole
[06:43] but they'll acknowledge that they
[06:45] believe that what's best is policies on
[06:47] the left you know so the the I guess
[06:52] what I'm trying to get at is that what's
[06:54] the substance what's the substantive
[06:57] difference between say Tony blur who is
[07:01] not a populist but would genuinely
[07:03] believe what he's doing is right for the
[07:05] people and a more populist figure who
[07:08] really draws on this idea of a national
[07:11] people yeah I mean that's just why I
[07:13] don't need of people because you just
[07:15] you just go around around in circles for
[07:17] me I I think that uh Tony Blair love him
[07:20] or loath him has a set of values and
[07:23] those set of values are where he thinks
[07:25] um are in in line with what he thinks is
[07:28] good for for the people in in the long
[07:30] term populists often don't have those
[07:33] values don't start off with those values
[07:35] what they do is they kind of think oh
[07:37] things aren't going very well and we've
[07:39] lost something what have we lost we need
[07:41] to get those things back and so the
[07:43] context means that then it then takes
[07:45] the Valu it conception of who the people
[07:47] is from from what they feel is lost well
[07:49] it's not it's it's not the if you're on
[07:51] the you know and if you're far right
[07:52] populist you know it's not the the
[07:54] immigrants it's not the the liberal
[07:56] Elites or something you know they're the
[07:57] ones who've taken away and then then you
[07:59] construct your values that that way you
[08:01] get them from the past whereas someone
[08:02] like like Blair or a traditional
[08:04] politician has um again whether you like
[08:07] them or not has values and try and which
[08:09] is kind of conception of where they
[08:11] where they want to get to populism has
[08:12] an idea of where it wants to get back to
[08:15] rarely has a
[08:16] really very very rarely has a kind of
[08:19] utopian conception of of where it wants
[08:21] to go I me I think you see that a lot
[08:22] with contemporary popul you just don't
[08:24] see a vision of of what they want want
[08:27] to do they you see a version of what
[08:28] they want to do so it's always backward
[08:32] looking it's always constructed against
[08:34] who the people are I know you don't like
[08:36] the language but the the it's nativist
[08:39] and there's always someone who's not
[08:41] Heartland is that it's not backward
[08:44] looking in the sense that I'm saying
[08:46] gets it values from from from from this
[08:48] heart now from from the back you from
[08:49] looking backwards I mean I'm I'm trying
[08:52] to be objective here you know they
[08:54] populists might well identify something
[08:56] that has gone really badly wrong and has
[08:58] been lost and needs to to be recasted
[09:00] and replaced there's a value of populism
[09:02] in that sense if it's telling you that
[09:03] things have gone wrong the causes of
[09:06] populism the failures are identifying
[09:08] real real failures um the difficulty of
[09:11] populism is it's quite it it's difficult
[09:13] for it to actually have a long-term
[09:15] utopian conception of where we should go
[09:18] but actually populism very often doesn't
[09:19] want to have that populism often just
[09:21] says look look guys I'm this Outsider
[09:24] I'm a businessman I know how to get
[09:25] things done I know how to and I just
[09:27] need to get me into office I'll sort
[09:28] things out and then by implication I'll
[09:31] I'll butt out I'll leave I'll leave
[09:33] politics and let you get on with it you
[09:34] know populism often has this Trope of
[09:36] kind of The Reluctant politician you
[09:38] know I'm just going to sort things out
[09:39] and then then we'll get track and then
[09:41] I'll go back doing my stuff and you go
[09:42] back to doing your stuff that's the kind
[09:44] of the metaph so do you think populists
[09:46] always struggle once they get into Power
[09:48] well there's no there's no doubt if
[09:50] you're an anti- if part of your ideology
[09:52] is being anti-establishment you get to
[09:54] power you you you've you've got a you've
[09:56] got a challenge in power um but it's not
[09:59] the case that the the populists always
[10:01] struggle in power some are very
[10:02] successful at sustaining themselves in
[10:04] power um and have been in the past um
[10:07] and I don't know why we're so surprised
[10:08] to see that um but we just kind of
[10:11] forget our history a little bit you know
[10:12] um so populists when they get into power
[10:16] they they they have better strategies I
[10:18] think they have three strategies to when
[10:20] they get into power they they I mean
[10:22] what you either do when the first thing
[10:24] you can do is is to actually to moderate
[10:26] your populism to kind of be less
[10:28] anti-institutional
[10:29] um or just to use that language someone
[10:31] like perhaps beros scone you know I'm
[10:33] I'm I'm still I'm subject to the
[10:36] Judiciary and the attacks of the press
[10:37] and so on you know still under attack
[10:39] but really in practice became more of a
[10:41] conventional politician over time you
[10:43] kind of lost it populism kind of dropped
[10:45] out the other thing you can do is you
[10:47] can restructure the institutions um you
[10:50] can reshape politics so that it um suits
[10:54] you and also by doing that you are
[10:56] delivering on your promise of being
[10:57] anti-institutional you're saying look
[10:59] here come the institutions I'm going to
[11:01] change them I'm going to I'm going to
[11:02] have a new constitutional settlement for
[11:04] example that's not you know Latin
[11:06] American uh populist leaders have done
[11:08] that they recast politics and it has the
[11:11] sort of double effect of of showing of
[11:13] doing something about that's anti-
[11:14] institutional but also has the effect of
[11:17] you probably reshape the institutions in
[11:18] a way that helps you and Limits The
[11:20] Power of your enemies but the third
[11:22] strategy is is where you get into power
[11:27] and you behave like you're not in power
[11:30] um you behave like you're in opposition
[11:32] essentially so that allows you to still
[11:34] be everyone's against me and the
[11:36] institutions are against me and and and
[11:38] and and I'll just break things I'll just
[11:40] you know I I'll I'll I'll unsettle
[11:42] things I I'll I'll shake up politics and
[11:46] I think we we're seeing that in in some
[11:48] contemporary examples of populism and I
[11:50] think um that's that's the third
[11:52] strategy so you don't you don't you
[11:54] don't you can't when you can't reshape
[11:56] the institutions you kind of reshape
[11:58] politics trust and can you what's an
[12:02] example of um popular skin power
[12:08] and or the most obvious example of
[12:10] popular Skin's power and really
[12:12] reshaping institutions and changing the
[12:15] political system of a
[12:17] country well getting in changing the
[12:19] Constitutions in in say Ecuador Korea
[12:22] turkey and erdogan has reshaped the
[12:24] Constitution that's those are obvious
[12:26] examples where you uh where you do that
[12:28] that's that's the most extreme example I
[12:31] mean it's it's a gradation because
[12:33] that's changing the Constitution is the
[12:35] most drastic thing you can do you can
[12:36] also get into
[12:37] power and and change the the
[12:40] institutions in a less constitutional
[12:42] way I mean it's not fundamental so for
[12:43] example many people would say that law
[12:45] and Justice in Poland and their reforms
[12:47] of the Judiciary they said they were
[12:49] just getting rid of the old judges but
[12:50] but other people say that they're
[12:52] they're peing it with their own people
[12:55] um so you you kind of Tinker with
[12:56] institutions and I think it's probably
[12:57] true of of of Hungary to some extent as
[13:00] well but you can also just the other
[13:02] thing is is you you again Hungary is
[13:04] perhaps an example where you you attack
[13:06] civil society and you attack the media
[13:09] um so you're not actually changing the
[13:10] Constitution you're you're changing the
[13:12] context around you but all that there
[13:13] there's a sort of you know three
[13:15] variations where you the First
[13:16] Fundamental one is changing the
[13:17] Constitution that's rare I me what's
[13:19] interesting is that Trump didn't in his
[13:21] first term change the Constitution you
[13:24] know the institutions remain pretty
[13:26] resilient um that's why I'm think he
[13:28] went to the third
[13:30] strategy do you think there's a special
[13:32] resilience to American
[13:35] institutions yeah yeah I mean I think
[13:38] despite the fact it's tempting to sort
[13:41] of Goble Chicken Little and so the sky
[13:43] is falling in I I still think that the
[13:46] American Structures have remained pretty
[13:49] robust yeah the Judiciary um I mean
[13:52] Congress has kind of you can say it's
[13:55] kind of laid on its back and not really
[13:56] done very much so it hasn't really
[13:58] searched it Powers but hadn't really
[14:00] changed the powers of congress so I
[14:02] think surprisingly it's it's kind of
[14:04] counterintuitive the American Democratic
[14:06] institutions seem quite resilient at the
[14:09] moment what what was to happen in
[14:10] Trump's second term
[14:13] well do you believe that less than you
[14:15] would have said in his first term it
[14:17] seems like um at the very beginning at
[14:20] least things are slightly different
[14:23] there's a lot more uh of a push
[14:25] culturally people outside of government
[14:28] whether it's big attack people musk um
[14:31] but also Republicans in control of of
[14:34] the Judiciary and Congress not the
[14:37] Senate right um but very different to
[14:40] last time do you think that would change
[14:42] things
[14:43] slightly bit nervous about talking about
[14:45] Trump because it might not be right
[14:46] tomorrow I mean let alone when this goes
[14:49] out yeah um so yeah I yeah I don't want
[14:52] to push you to make predictions either
[14:54] but feels different now yeah it is
[14:57] different now but I I
[14:59] I'm not
[15:01] um I'm not convinced it's going to be
[15:03] fundamentally different actually I mean
[15:05] I I don't even with the kind of current
[15:07] turmoil that we're experiencing I want
[15:09] to see what it looks like in 6 months in
[15:12] a year's time that's what will be
[15:13] interesting and when you come up to the
[15:15] midterms um and yeah it could be
[15:18] fundamentally different but for the
[15:19] moment there's a lot of sure look
[15:21] populism one of the powers of populism
[15:23] is hugely
[15:25] spectacular and and Trump has that in
[15:28] space
[15:30] and the trouble with spectacle is that
[15:31] we all want to watch it and we and and
[15:35] we we look at the things going on but
[15:36] you you've got to look at what's really
[15:38] going on what actually has changed over
[15:40] time something's fundamentally change
[15:43] but you won't see that and there's a the
[15:45] real problem with popism we all focus on
[15:47] it in a way way too much because it's
[15:50] it's exciting it's dramatic and it's
[15:53] it's a spectacle in in the real sense of
[15:55] the word that's partly where where it
[15:56] gets its resonance and its power from
[15:58] that doesn't NE necessarily mean that
[16:00] it's always getting its way um but you
[16:03] know I you know hand on heart I don't
[16:05] know what it's going to be like later on
[16:07] in the Trump presidency um and I could
[16:09] be proved very very wrong but at the
[16:12] moment I I suspect W be as different as
[16:13] we imagine it's going to be right one of
[16:16] the things that clearly drives that
[16:18] spectacle is the internet which seems to
[16:21] um differentiate populism now from
[16:24] populisms in the past and politics and
[16:27] the media and our view of the world more
[16:30] broadly what do you think it seems like
[16:33] populism is driven by different factors
[16:36] that don't on the surface seem to be
[16:38] connected so the internet the economy
[16:43] inequality migration
[16:46] globalization what do you think are the
[16:48] primary factors that have led to this
[16:50] recent Surge and populism and do you
[16:53] think they're connected in some way
[16:55] that's a $60 million question leis I
[16:57] don't have a I mean you know to use the
[16:59] kind of face with thing it's complicated
[17:01] I don't think there's a simple single
[17:02] explanation okay but I'll I'll try to be
[17:05] slightly more interesting and say I
[17:07] don't think that the you know the
[17:09] internet caused populism I mean because
[17:11] populism existed before the internet so
[17:13] it clearly doesn't now do we have more
[17:16] of it because of the nature of of um the
[17:18] information systems that we have yeah
[17:20] maybe that that may that is a
[17:22] contributary
[17:23] factor um um yeah so I mean clearly we
[17:27] process information in ways or we have
[17:29] more information and and how we deal
[17:32] with truth in that information in that
[17:33] this information is obviously different
[17:35] so all that stuff yes it clearly it does
[17:36] matter but I'm actually my instinct is
[17:39] it's it's much a much deeper level than
[17:42] that it's about politics it's about the
[17:44] way that politics functions and and the
[17:46] so I'm trying to get to which is that
[17:51] um the these the things that really
[17:54] Drive something as fundamental as
[17:57] popularism lie not in in policies not in
[18:00] institutions not even in democracy but
[18:02] in how we view politics and I think that
[18:04] the way that politicians operate the way
[18:06] that we understand politics way we don't
[18:08] understand politics the way we
[18:09] communicate about politics is is
[18:12] probably the that's that's the fertile
[18:13] ground for for for populism at the
[18:16] moment and okay some of that might be to
[18:17] do with with social media and but that's
[18:21] not the core thing to me I think it's
[18:23] it's more grounded than
[18:25] that economic crisis and all these these
[18:27] things any crisis they're perennials in
[18:31] politics none of these things are new
[18:34] and they don't always give rise to
[18:36] populism and populism has occurred you
[18:37] know without things like like the media
[18:39] without social media anyway it's it's
[18:42] it's a
[18:43] complex but but to me the thing that
[18:46] binds together why we got so much now is
[18:49] because we got we've got a different
[18:51] understanding of politics and maybe you
[18:53] know I think we we don't understand
[18:54] politics properly you blame people like
[18:56] me if you want I'm a politics Professor
[18:58] you know I'm maybe we're not
[18:59] communicating in the right way but also
[19:02] blame politicians for how they talk
[19:04] about politics and blame us for what
[19:05] what we want to get from politics about
[19:07] expectations understanding I don't you
[19:10] know I said earlier I think that
[19:12] politics is about winners and
[19:14] losers I think that basic idea is is is
[19:17] even understood by most people they
[19:18] think politics is about it's about
[19:20] getting everything well no it's it's not
[19:23] how you manage losing is as much as how
[19:25] you manage winning yeah interesting
[19:29] so much to say that because I often
[19:31] think that's so true and I often maybe
[19:33] very naively uh think about the promise
[19:37] of
[19:37] democracy and there's this kind of Grand
[19:40] Vision of more and more people getting
[19:43] more and more um maybe you know since
[19:46] the kind of 18th century through the
[19:49] 19th century and there's a promise to
[19:52] that
[19:53] ideal um that and tell me if this
[19:57] reading is wrong wrong that once it
[20:00] becomes
[20:02] um obvious or stopped or obvious that
[20:07] it's being prevented in some way or
[20:09] there are major crises like the crises
[20:11] and capitalism at the end of the 19th
[20:13] century you get the emergence of
[20:17] populist kind of Kickbacks populist um
[20:21] uh uh uh revolts like the People's Party
[20:25] and so there's some kind of link between
[20:27] the promise of democracy and the rise of
[20:30] populist movements is that a naive
[20:32] framing no no I mean I think that I mean
[20:36] not all populists are quite episodic
[20:38] they sort of emerge often quite short
[20:41] period of time and disappear we we've
[20:42] got a current situation where we do have
[20:44] a lot of populist around and that the
[20:46] populist critique has a lot of a lot of
[20:48] resonance so I I I just trying to get
[20:50] away away from the idea that it's a kind
[20:51] of cycle that that that's when when you
[20:53] know relat to to democracy but I also
[20:56] want to get away from the idea that is
[20:58] democracy going to make us more people
[21:00] happier more of the time to quote
[21:03] utilitarians um uh one so hope you know
[21:06] you're revealing to me l i supp in my
[21:08] core I want that to be the case but I I
[21:11] think that what we what we might
[21:13] understand is that
[21:14] um democracy is about delivering us the
[21:17] mechanisms to decide who wins and loses
[21:20] and the mechanisms to change who those
[21:22] winners and losers are at regular
[21:23] intervals which you might call elections
[21:25] or or something else um and it might be
[21:28] had to accept as a cyclical n nature to
[21:30] winning and losing and that works for
[21:32] Generations it works for classes it work
[21:34] and and yeah that's just I sound I sound
[21:37] terribly pessimistic but I don't mean it
[21:39] pessimistic I think it you know politics
[21:41] is about managing conflict we're not
[21:42] going to lose conflict it's how we
[21:44] manage it effectively we have to expect
[21:47] how we can manage it effectively and if
[21:49] we don't expect the right things then
[21:51] people will come along and say oh well
[21:53] it used to all be fantastic let's let's
[21:55] get rid of politics and and sort of do
[21:58] it my way then that's that's where I
[21:59] find where I find populism
[22:01] problematic right yeah that's so
[22:03] interesting because I think you're right
[22:05] that most people's idea of politics
[22:08] isn't that it isn't this idea of winners
[22:10] and losers or maybe it is part of the
[22:13] time but I i' I'd imagine that most
[22:16] people's idea is that we live in a
[22:18] democracy and it's ruled by the people
[22:20] and the people should get what they want
[22:23] and be listened to and I this current at
[22:27] least this current or maybe all populist
[22:31] movements in some way seem to be driven
[22:34] I mean I'm maybe repeating grind that we
[22:36] just talked about a little bit but that
[22:39] seemed to be driven by the disconnect
[22:42] between that popular idea of what
[22:44] politics and democracy is and then a
[22:47] frustration at institutions that are
[22:49] perceived to be in some way blocking
[22:52] that Democratic will the sovereignty of
[22:54] the people and you see this in so many
[22:56] on the left and the right obvious ly
[22:58] like the left and the uh and the
[23:02] critique of lobbyists um you know global
[23:05] capitalism and you see in Dominick
[23:07] Cummings he's very critical of like the
[23:10] the the uh uh government bureaucracy and
[23:13] the Civil Service simil in
[23:16] America um complaints about
[23:19] echr so at the moment there seems to be
[23:22] a
[23:25] genuinely uh uh bipartisan frust
[23:29] ation that we live in a post-democratic
[23:33] world that democracy doesn't seem to be
[23:35] working do you think that accounts for
[23:38] this drive in populism at the moment is
[23:42] this is I I don't think people are
[23:43] saying we're in a post-democratic world
[23:46] in a sense people do accept that they
[23:48] win and lose because they go look
[23:50] especially in the UK you've got you know
[23:52] a sort of two-party system of government
[23:55] so people would accept look I didn't
[23:56] vote for the labor party but I know that
[23:59] in four five years time I can so
[24:01] actually people do accept that there is
[24:03] there are mechanisms whereby you are a
[24:05] short-term loser in the prospect you can
[24:07] be a long
[24:09] term and I also think that kind of the
[24:12] chaos in in contemporary World politics
[24:14] does make a lot of people in
[24:16] contemporary democracies suddenly value
[24:19] um the the mechanisms of of conflict
[24:22] management that you have you have in
[24:24] democracy so you know I don't think
[24:25] people are going around saying oh my God
[24:27] democracy dead I think but you're
[24:30] clearly right leis in the sense that
[24:32] that the the sense of frustration with
[24:34] how politics functions um works from
[24:38] left
[24:39] and drives populism both from left and
[24:42] right points of view um and then is a
[24:44] common common value to them or sort of
[24:47] common value that they have um so it's
[24:50] it's a knocking institutions is easy
[24:53] when those institutions are complex and
[24:55] those institutions are complex because
[24:56] the world is more complex and and and
[24:58] more globalized and you know there is
[25:01] kind of there's a cycal danger there but
[25:02] again I don't want to get into a kind of
[25:04] everyone's going to end up thinking I'll
[25:06] forget democracy I mean I I I mean the
[25:09] Paradox and the other Paradox is that
[25:10] populism is not anti-democracy I mean
[25:13] populism is actually um a version of
[25:16] democracy or loads on one I mean to me
[25:20] democracy you know liberal democracy is
[25:22] is popular sovereignty and voting and
[25:24] all that stuff but it's also rights and
[25:26] protections and and rule of law on the
[25:29] other side now populism tends to load on
[25:31] on popular sovereignty we've forgotten
[25:33] the majority we've over we've over
[25:35] protected minorities or or whatever he
[25:37] might say if it's a rightwing version it
[25:38] would say that so but but those are
[25:41] different versions of democracy so de to
[25:44] me populism is not is not um inherently
[25:47] anti-democratic in fact it's it's a
[25:49] function of democracy it's a kind of a
[25:51] see itself as redressing the balance a
[25:53] little bit um I and but I know you're
[25:56] going to say to me I assum to be yeah
[25:59] but you know de you know populists um
[26:02] tend to push back on Democracy well they
[26:04] might do but they might also be
[26:05] authoritarian populist you know this is
[26:08] where I get might get out it's a thin
[26:10] centered ideology the other ideas might
[26:12] drive drive democracy backwards for some
[26:15] populists but it might not be the
[26:16] populism itself that's that's driving it
[26:19] the Paradox is the populism is a
[26:21] function of democracy you can't have
[26:22] populism in a non-democratic system
[26:24] doesn't make any sense mean that
[26:26] interest yeah okay and so that explains
[26:29] why most books on Modern populism well
[26:32] modern is it's in the question there but
[26:34] seem to start at the American and French
[26:38] revolutions and that's why it's a
[26:40] Democrat it's part of democracy for me
[26:43] yeah I think it is I think that to me
[26:44] it's why it's interesting it's a kind of
[26:46] recurrent episodic moment that comes up
[26:48] in in in in in democracy at different
[26:51] times for different reasons um but it
[26:54] can't exist in an authoritarian system
[26:55] because it doesn't doesn't make sense
[26:56] you're not appe to the people
[26:58] you you know the
[27:00] whole you don't need populism there you
[27:03] got you've got other ways of of
[27:04] operating I mean other people would
[27:06] disagree some people would say there are
[27:08] contemporary authoritarians who are who
[27:10] are populist but I tend to think they're
[27:12] just authoritarians we know what that is
[27:13] that's that's we don't need populism for
[27:15] that yeah I mean I certainly empathize
[27:17] with people on the other side of the
[27:18] political aisle who um who identify with
[27:24] populists and feel themselves to be
[27:26] ignored and
[27:29] you know I'm a democratic person first
[27:32] and foremost so that drives how I feel
[27:36] about um uh political moments and I will
[27:41] empathize with someone on the other side
[27:42] of the aisle if there if they're being
[27:44] ignored democratically and I do feel
[27:46] that that is happening more and more but
[27:50] that might be a um a function of the
[27:54] world getting bigger and more
[27:56] complicated and insti s getting bigger
[27:59] and more
[28:01] complicated whether that's a good or a
[28:03] bad thing is another question but it's
[28:05] certainly just a fact of
[28:08] modernity but at the same time that
[28:10] Democratic impulse seems to very often
[28:14] descend into some kind of
[28:17] authoritarianism or at least very light
[28:20] authoritarianism is that true that that
[28:23] more frequently happens than not in the
[28:25] history of populism and and if so why do
[28:29] you think that
[28:30] happens I go back a little bit I I won't
[28:34] avoid coming back to what you asked I
[28:36] think that the one of the features of
[28:38] populism is it's binary it views the
[28:40] world as binary you know the US and
[28:43] them but more importantly views Politics
[28:45] as binary so when you said you you can
[28:48] empathize with people who are who feel
[28:50] differently to you and popism doesn't do
[28:52] that it doesn't it it it it says no the
[28:55] them is the them and they are uh they're
[28:57] corrup actually and they they're morally
[29:00] bad so it sees opponents as enemies you
[29:03] You' you've given the classic pluralist
[29:06] po political understanding of
[29:08] democracy um now the thing about
[29:11] populism is that because it sees the
[29:13] world as binary as us and them and the
[29:15] the them as
[29:16] illegitimate as as aoral immoral immoral
[29:20] corrupt negative and and enemies rather
[29:22] than opponents then then this comes with
[29:25] the answer your question then went once
[29:26] in power you can kind of say well
[29:29] therefore I have the right to yeah I can
[29:32] I can do some things that might be
[29:33] suppress their rights and and because
[29:36] they they are immoral and and so there
[29:38] are cases where where populism descends
[29:41] in into authoritarianism or moves into
[29:43] authorism absolutely no question about
[29:45] that but that's that's not that's not
[29:47] confined to populism and not all
[29:50] populists do it you know so there are
[29:52] many populists who are not
[29:53] authoritarians so it's not the two are
[29:55] not necessarily bound up together
[29:57] doesn't mean we shouldn't be concerned
[29:58] with it I mean you might then say okay
[30:00] well what about populists who come to
[30:01] power who who then become authoritarian
[30:04] should we look at how they do that yes I
[30:06] think we should do that but we shouldn't
[30:07] fool ourselves just all about their
[30:09] populism we say what else is what what
[30:11] are the conditions that mean they go
[30:13] they go down a an authoritarian route
[30:15] than those that don't you know most
[30:17] don't end up being authoritarians
[30:19] frankly when they get into power do I
[30:22] everything think that's right yeah
[30:23] probably that's probably broadly true um
[30:25] yeah okay that's interesting because I
[30:28] from the s a very broad reading of the
[30:30] literature I got the sense that that was
[30:33] a common theme and not um I I haven't
[30:37] read anyone um you know going through
[30:39] number by number and Counting results of
[30:42] populism power but it seemed to be a
[30:45] common enough theme to be a dominant
[30:47] part of the literature but you that's
[30:50] you're not you're not wrong l i mean
[30:52] maybe I'm you know not um in the
[30:55] mainstream here I don't and I'm not
[30:57] being number game I'm doing it almost
[30:59] from first principles I don't think that
[31:01] it necessarily links um but there are
[31:04] many cases and you know when we look at
[31:06] populis when we look at populism in
[31:07] Europe for example at the moment you we
[31:09] focus on those cases which are often
[31:11] associated with Democratic
[31:13] backsliding right right and yet however
[31:16] there are populist all over Europe who
[31:18] are not in power fair enough um who are
[31:22] not necessarily again you know wouldn't
[31:23] necessarily Advocate de Democratic
[31:25] backsliding you know I mean uh so
[31:30] there's the Paradox with again you're
[31:32] focusing on the spectacular moments of
[31:33] it you know that's where something um
[31:36] and I I think that that that we we are a
[31:38] bit over obsessed with with those
[31:40] elements we've got to always draw back
[31:43] and look at it as a whole now that's
[31:44] really hard to do and I don't think I
[31:45] always do it particularly well and it
[31:47] means we've got to think much more
[31:49] broadly if we're interested in populism
[31:50] think about populism not just about the
[31:52] particular examples if you want to focus
[31:53] on if you don't like orine or something
[31:56] that's fine focus on right populism in
[31:58] Central and Eastern Europe and and what
[32:00] he's doing there's nothing wrong with
[32:01] focusing on that and identifying it but
[32:03] to say that that's all populism and
[32:06] which is very often what happens with
[32:08] the use of populis it's one of those
[32:09] terms that there's there very there's a
[32:11] much more defined use of it in academic
[32:13] terms than there is in in this in
[32:15] broader in the broader world s of the
[32:17] vernacular use of it there's a bit of a
[32:19] disjuncture sometimes um and you know
[32:23] sure so as I'm going to say you know you
[32:27] need we need to think about things more
[32:29] broadly and to be careful of of
[32:31] generalizations on very specific cases
[32:33] um is there not you said there that the
[32:38] the in Europe especially the populist
[32:41] movements that do not seem to want to
[32:44] engage in Democratic backsliding weren't
[32:47] in power and is that not part of the
[32:50] point that we focus on the spectacular
[32:52] cases because they get into power and I
[32:56] mean it seems quite clear clear to me
[32:58] that at the moment that runs along a
[33:00] left right spectrum and that the left
[33:04] doesn't seem to do as well with populist
[33:07] movements um and the right and the
[33:10] authoritarians
[33:12] do was there's lots of things in there I
[33:14] mean in Europe we have many more
[33:16] examples of of of right-wing populist
[33:18] than we do of leftwing populis no
[33:20] question we also have some um you know
[33:22] interesting ambivalent kind of cases
[33:23] that might cut across them um few but
[33:27] but yeah um
[33:28] but you also have populists who've got
[33:30] into Power who haven't necessarily you
[33:32] know have gotten as Junior Coalition
[33:34] partners and and and they haven't
[33:35] necessarily Advocate Democratic back
[33:38] what you might characterize as
[33:40] Democratic backsliding so it's not we
[33:42] have we haven't got a lot of cases of
[33:43] populace and Power in Europe right yeah
[33:47] therefore I think You' got to look look
[33:48] at you know does far is farage actually
[33:52] about Democratic backsliding in the UK
[33:54] when he's kind of prent example of
[33:56] publish in the UK don't think I don't
[33:58] think he Bly is right that's not what
[34:00] where the critique of him lies if you
[34:02] don't like him the critique of him lies
[34:03] on one his values and what he's what
[34:06] he's actually advocate so
[34:09] yeah it's different now you know there
[34:12] are cases of leing populism we' we've
[34:14] seen in in other countries you know
[34:15] we've seen you know Chavez or Venezuela
[34:19] and H Maduro and someone to say he's
[34:22] populist or not but in Venezuela or we
[34:25] see you know um uh Morales and so are
[34:30] these leftwing po come to pass some of
[34:31] whom became quite authoritarian and Juan
[34:34] Peron and right true what is you know so
[34:37] again I don't this binary left right
[34:39] thing I'm just trying to be objective
[34:41] I'm just trying to say yeah I mean I am
[34:43] own views but I I'm trying to we just
[34:45] got to think about what it is that
[34:46] that's driving us is it left and right
[34:49] um is it populist and not populist I'm
[34:52] afraid it's not that simple for me yeah
[34:55] sure yeah put him right and
[34:56] authoritarian on the same side ignoring
[34:58] left authoritarian um was mistaking that
[35:02] question um but forget left and right
[35:06] have their bit so if if you say for
[35:08] example that populists um you know are
[35:11] part of democracy and as part of
[35:12] sovereign world can you point to an
[35:14] example of a populist movement that have
[35:17] gotten into
[35:18] power and have expanded you know there's
[35:22] a lot of talk of democratic backsliding
[35:24] but the movements have done quite
[35:26] clearly the opposite that have expanded
[35:29] democracy in some way what Pon for
[35:32] example gets into Power by dodging means
[35:35] and calls and establishes a
[35:38] Representative
[35:39] election he then does you know to be
[35:42] fair to you then becomes quite quite
[35:43] authoritarian Chavez tried to introduce
[35:46] what he saw as kind of these Democratic
[35:49] direct Democratic institutions these
[35:51] these bottomup institution so try to do
[35:53] that so there are you know again to be
[35:56] fair to you you argue you then became
[35:58] quite authoritarian but there are
[36:00] moments when when democracy when
[36:03] populists do introduce Democratic means
[36:05] and you know referendums are sometimes
[36:07] used by by populists as a way of kind of
[36:10] expressing their ambivalence about kind
[36:11] of Representative politics so that those
[36:13] those Camp be mechanisms that you could
[36:15] argue are a form of democracy so right
[36:19] again I'm just trying to get away from
[36:20] the binary you know no no no increased
[36:23] increased
[36:24] democracy but I I I'll admit to you Le
[36:27] it's
[36:28] hard because you know if I'm honest I
[36:30] think a lot of the cases do end up
[36:32] turning even you know the cases are
[36:34] given you made introduce democracy and
[36:36] then and and turn against it um but we
[36:39] don't the thing about populism is very
[36:41] very rarely there for a long enough
[36:43] period of time to actually say oh look
[36:45] it establishes democracy and it
[36:46] disappears it is episodic it comes and
[36:49] it goes and it doesn't establish kind of
[36:52] popul U uh family or political family
[36:56] that continues and and therefore you can
[36:58] test it out you may be right you maybe
[37:01] if if we did we'd find it always ends up
[37:03] in in emotionalism but that's for me yet
[37:07] yet let let left to be proved you're a
[37:10] professor of politics and I Comm at this
[37:13] from a interest in politics
[37:16] to when you talked a minute ago about
[37:18] the the um kind of man and binary US
[37:22] versus them um I'm not sure if you use
[37:25] this language but I think you know in
[37:26] the book and most do of pure versus
[37:29] sometimes
[37:30] impure Heartland versus
[37:35] Outsider it seems to me that there's a
[37:37] connection
[37:38] between a certain type of psychology in
[37:43] a populist
[37:45] leader that thinks in that way sometimes
[37:48] using it maybe disingenuously sometimes
[37:51] believing it authentically I'm not
[37:54] sure but that attracts a certain type of
[37:58] and again this is not the right word but
[38:00] the certain type of narcissistic
[38:02] personality that seems to be quite
[38:05] common and I it's definitely not the
[38:07] right word because I'm not you know
[38:09] diagnosing
[38:11] anyone but that it's that that seems
[38:13] there a connection between
[38:16] populism and authoritarianism that there
[38:19] is a genuinely a genuine belief in in
[38:23] people some people that adopt the
[38:25] populist style that they are in the
[38:28] right they are speaking for the for the
[38:31] for the Heartland everyone else is an
[38:34] enemy of the people and that that kind
[38:36] of naturally leads to a sort of
[38:38] authoritarian impulse is that fair um
[38:42] well first of all I I don't know what
[38:44] drives people I mean I I can't know
[38:48] whether someone's genuine or not genuine
[38:50] and so I just don't spend my time
[38:52] worrying about that in the sense that do
[38:54] they really believe it doesn't I can
[38:56] never establish that perhaps I suspect
[38:58] with some mayor current figures in the
[39:00] United States that you there's no point
[39:02] in trying to work it out you know um
[39:04] it's it's too it's too unknowable so I I
[39:07] don't think it's kind of a personal um
[39:09] sort of psychological predisposition
[39:12] that kind of I can't I can't get in
[39:14] there I can't get in their heads it's
[39:15] not I don't have access to their heads
[39:17] but secondly I think that you know it
[39:19] does the the binary nature of of of
[39:22] politics according to to populism is
[39:24] therefore crucial that you that the key
[39:27] distinction is between those who think
[39:29] that PO politics is pluralist and there
[39:32] are plural views and it's about
[39:34] uh conflict between those and and
[39:37] working out conflicts and sometimes
[39:38] working out compromises coalitions all
[39:41] the seword that populists don't like you
[39:43] know that that's what politics is about
[39:45] so there is something about if you view
[39:47] the world in binary terms that the are
[39:51] them and and and there's good there's
[39:53] good and and then you key you to Manny
[39:56] can as soon as you overlay political
[39:59] conflicts with moral conflicts and you
[40:00] see the world as good and evil then that
[40:03] that that certainly you know reinforces
[40:06] what you're saying leis that that if you
[40:07] think in those terms you're you're
[40:09] likely to act in in certain ways so the
[40:11] popul kind of mindset uh might well lead
[40:14] you to thinking those ways and I'm going
[40:16] to give a horrible out here my out is
[40:18] I'm not you know because I can't know
[40:20] what what populist politicians think or
[40:22] feel I can talk to them I have talked to
[40:24] politicians and like I know what they
[40:25] say I don't know what they feel
[40:28] but what I can focus on it is how what
[40:31] they say and what the way the way they
[40:33] appear and the ideas that they have
[40:35] appeal to people I mean what I'm
[40:37] interested is is why this mobilizes
[40:39] people what's what's powerful what's
[40:42] driving people to support this this way
[40:44] of thinking so I focus on the link
[40:46] between populist politicians or populist
[40:49] actors if you like and and their
[40:52] supporters cuz I I can't I can't get in
[40:54] their heads and I don't really I don't
[40:56] really want to get in their heads I want
[40:58] yeah um I've heard you say that Bernie
[41:02] and Boris are not populists yeah they're
[41:06] not you mean Bernie Sanders Bernie
[41:08] Sanders is Bernie Sanders and Boris
[41:10] Johnson he's a Social Democrat
[41:12] socialist and Johnson is a a
[41:15] conservative don't think I don't think
[41:17] what's anti- anti-establishment anti-
[41:19] institutional about Boris Johnson that
[41:21] was amuses me right I don't I I don't
[41:25] really I mean okay he has a pop at the
[41:27] Europe European Union but that doesn't
[41:30] he's not fundamentally Ping On An
[41:31] anti-establishment Trend Trend to me uh
[41:35] so I don't think he's don't need
[41:36] populism for for for
[41:38] Johnson and Sanders is is is in the US
[41:41] so he looks a bit weird because he's
[41:43] kind of a socialist or or a Social
[41:45] Democrat of some form in a in a in a
[41:48] society in a political system doesn't
[41:49] tend to have that but he's not a
[41:52] populist he's not there's no ambivalence
[41:53] about po about politics that's driving
[41:55] support for either of those two people
[41:58] well maybe it a bit for Johnson but
[41:59] certainly not for Sanders so you know
[42:02] but I think that what you do the broader
[42:04] Point L is a lot there are a lot of
[42:06] false positives casual use of populism
[42:09] means that we
[42:11] everything oh well brexit is populist
[42:13] was it don't think it was I mean I think
[42:16] there's lots of things but it wasn't
[42:17] populist there was populist elements to
[42:19] some parts of it but oh Trump is well
[42:22] you know yes my point is it's really
[42:26] easy car to use the word populism and to
[42:29] make it look Broad and therefore people
[42:31] can end up by saying well it's
[42:32] everything well if it's everything it's
[42:33] nothing Well no I don't it isn't
[42:35] everything any many of the people who
[42:37] are identified as populist to my mind
[42:39] not populist or not not very populist if
[42:41] you
[42:42] want right and I asked that because in
[42:45] his book on popularism in America
[42:48] Michael cin includes chapters on Nixon
[42:52] and Reagan as populist the former using
[42:55] the silent majority phrase um and the
[42:59] latter kind of attacking institutions
[43:02] and talking about the the the quiet uh
[43:06] the quiet devotion of ordinary Americans
[43:10] so you disagree with that framing kin's
[43:12] book is about how populism runs all
[43:15] through American history right so in a
[43:17] sense he's got his magnifying D and he's
[43:19] going to find it kind of everywhere and
[43:21] it's a really great book I mean so I'm
[43:23] not I'm not knocking it that it's a
[43:24] thesis if you look everywhere you'll
[43:26] find little bits and he kind of proves
[43:27] it now that's particularly easy in
[43:30] America because the American political
[43:32] system delivers more populism than most
[43:35] systems um combined because has an
[43:38] inherent anti ambivalence about politics
[43:41] built in in its heart so no I I don't
[43:44] think it it is everywhere is it the case
[43:46] that that that the silent majority um
[43:49] that Nixon talked about is a populist
[43:51] Trope absolutely you know and can you
[43:53] see sort of some tropes of of populism
[43:55] from from Reagan year but was the basis
[43:58] of their appeal that they they were
[44:00] actually pulling on an ambivalence about
[44:01] politics about representative politics
[44:03] no I don't I don't think so I think you
[44:05] know Reagan was was creating a new
[44:07] Coalition there was a very clear kind of
[44:09] political agenda there or or conception
[44:12] of politics it was that was that was
[44:14] behind him so I I wouldn't see them as
[44:16] populist um no yeah that reminds me C
[44:19] and points to I think it's cing that
[44:21] points to Banana Republic's populist
[44:24] pants that they sold and hulet Packard's
[44:26] po
[44:29] priner which made me think we live in we
[44:33] do live in this populous age but yet I I
[44:35] guess that is his that is his thesis and
[44:39] I find it
[44:40] compelling I mean do you
[44:42] not do you think there's utility in
[44:46] thinking about a populist style that
[44:49] that people adopt on a
[44:51] spectrum of you know Tony Blair rolled
[44:55] up his sleeves took his jacket off
[44:58] slightly populist move because it would
[45:00] play well with the
[45:02] cameras um Fox News is
[45:05] populist not in politics
[45:09] media do you think it's useful to think
[45:11] about a populist style and then the more
[45:13] of the style you adopt the more populist
[45:15] you
[45:16] become no I think
[45:20] um because if if po I Tony Blair R his
[45:24] SLE absolutely know um the the point is
[45:27] that if you think populism is a style
[45:30] then it can be applied to anything all
[45:32] right okay that's fine if you want to
[45:34] say popular is a style of doing politics
[45:37] um then it must be able to be applicable
[45:40] in any different context and your
[45:41] examples
[45:43] give evidence of that but but to me if
[45:47] you think it's an ideology or a set of
[45:49] ideas um then those had to be constant
[45:53] um now the style might change actually
[45:55] and actually I think that's what we're
[45:57] missing some populists are very
[45:58] different to other populists and by
[46:02] putting them all as populists we're
[46:03] missing some really important
[46:05] distinctions between them um so no style
[46:08] for me not I mean there's a great you
[46:10] know very good set of work on that stuff
[46:13] I'm you know but that's not where where
[46:14] I come from um and you know that's not
[46:17] the approach I think Popp is much more
[46:19] interesting because of the ideas it has
[46:21] and because the challenges those ideas
[46:23] have to some of the things that you were
[46:24] talking about leis about democracy but
[46:26] how how and how politics
[46:28] function because one of the ways I got
[46:31] into thinking about this is I'm on
[46:33] YouTube I watch a lot of YouTube stuff I
[46:36] understand the YouTube
[46:38] algorithm um I cover political stuff so
[46:41] I'm thinking about the relationship
[46:42] between say a title and how many clicks
[46:45] you get a subject I want to cover what
[46:48] other people are
[46:50] covering and there's a kind of ecosystem
[46:52] on YouTube
[46:55] of what I describe as media pundits
[46:59] adopting a populist
[47:01] style that I think in some senses has
[47:05] led to Trump and the and the core fact
[47:07] that stuck out for me
[47:09] was the there's an incentive to adopt
[47:12] this style on the internet in that and I
[47:16] think you you look in this way in I
[47:19] don't think it was the book I think it
[47:21] was the um an article I was reading
[47:23] yours I forget the title but that it was
[47:25] a a the there's a a numerical advantage
[47:29] to being a populist in that you on the
[47:32] side of the
[47:33] many speaking for the people against
[47:36] very
[47:37] small in number compared to the people
[47:41] Elite and that so on the internet in a
[47:45] kind of in a media landscape that is out
[47:49] starting to outperform the mainstream
[47:51] media there is a logical
[47:55] incentive to talk in a kind of populist
[47:58] frame we're against institutions the
[48:01] media is
[48:02] terrible Ordinary People on YouTube and
[48:06] that kind of seemed to me to lead to
[48:10] um lead to Trump in some ways but also
[48:13] accounted for this kind of growth in
[48:15] populism online what do you make of that
[48:18] well I think like if if you're a child
[48:22] of of doctors you
[48:24] know they see illness all around them
[48:27] and
[48:28] therefore Hammer hammering
[48:31] nails so you know if you're going to
[48:33] watch a lot a lot of stuff you you'll
[48:35] see this I mean that's a slightly
[48:37] flippant response I mean more
[48:38] substantively I mean I don't I I'll
[48:41] confess to you I don't I SP a lot of
[48:43] time watching perhaps I should do but
[48:45] I'm ni Too Short um to watch all this
[48:48] stuff but I would suspect if you if you
[48:51] really Pro if remember for me the the
[48:54] third aspect of populism the ambivalence
[48:56] of about politics that really you're
[48:58] drawing on an ambivalence about politics
[49:00] very often I imagine the sorts of people
[49:02] that you're watching listening hearing
[49:06] actually are not ambivalent about
[49:08] politics and that the the appeal that
[49:10] they draw on is not about ambivalence
[49:11] about politics it's about anger and
[49:13] frustration about ideas and you some of
[49:16] which might be right-wing some of which
[49:17] might be leftwing um and have different
[49:20] values behind them some do my social
[49:22] justice
[49:23] some my grievance or whatever but I
[49:25] would I I suspect very often and and the
[49:28] the the kind of the social media
[49:31] entrepreneurs if you like who who you
[49:33] think are engineering this are really uh
[49:36] are really very are not based on any
[49:38] ambivalence about politics they're
[49:40] pretty clear about politics and its
[49:41] value and now they might be using
[49:43] language that overlaps but we all use
[49:45] language that overlaps you know I mean
[49:47] so it's not just populists who who are
[49:50] frustrated and angry and and annoyed at
[49:53] economic crisis or disparities or
[49:54] inequalities or or loss of family values
[49:58] whatever whatever whatever floats your
[50:00] ideological boat you know uh that's so I
[50:04] yeah I think that I think the people you
[50:06] look at if you if you explored them in
[50:08] detail I would I hypothesize would
[50:11] probably have a quite cons uh
[50:14] complicated and uh positive view of what
[50:17] po what politics can deliver and that's
[50:20] not really the basis of what what where
[50:22] populists draw on support that said Lou
[50:25] I'm of course you're right the
[50:27] information you know is is the social
[50:30] media and changing social structure is
[50:32] that relevant to Trump yes it is in some
[50:34] way but I just it's not not not single
[50:36] driver I'm not so I'm not going all all
[50:38] out saying that it doesn't matter just
[50:40] right M the way we
[50:42] suspected yeah I mean
[50:44] we we could drill down into the
[50:47] distinctions between phrases like
[50:49] ambivalence and apathy and
[50:53] disinterestedness I mean some of the
[50:55] people I'm thinking about I think think
[50:56] have
[50:58] a
[51:00] an a ambivalence maybe isn't the right
[51:03] word but a kind of um a non-political
[51:07] like they have no interest in politics
[51:09] whatsoever so I'm thinking about
[51:10] comedians I'm thinking about people who
[51:13] have never um taken an interest in
[51:16] politics I'm thinking about say someone
[51:18] like Joe Rogan who maybe is the
[51:20] principal figure of the ordinary person
[51:23] who's got some interest so he maybe not
[51:26] ambivalent in that sense of the
[51:29] word um and
[51:32] is you know an intelligent person but
[51:36] with not much background knowledge
[51:38] interviewing guests from an ordinary
[51:40] person kind of Framing and very unhappy
[51:44] increasingly with the status quo sort of
[51:48] aligning with um with with with Maga
[51:52] with
[51:53] trumpism um that that seems to be a kind
[51:56] of populist impulse that I'm not sure
[51:59] whether I I describe it as
[52:02] ambivalent apathetic angry it depends
[52:05] what day you listen to them so this is a
[52:07] long-winded way of saying what is
[52:15] unpolitical notion that You' clearly got
[52:17] your head around so yeah I mean I I you
[52:20] I use the term on politics to to
[52:23] identify one of the popular strategies
[52:26] some populists
[52:27] use no PR for guessing who it might be
[52:30] which is to draw on to act in a way to
[52:34] behave in a way and to appeal in a way
[52:37] but it is trying to draw
[52:39] in people who are uninterested in
[52:41] politics whove not engaged um not
[52:44] anti-politics not even not just not
[52:46] interested not not not engaged not not
[52:48] doesn't cross their radar and actually I
[52:51] think it's kind of almost a Subterranean
[52:53] level so even those people who are um
[52:55] engaged in Poli there's something about
[52:57] the way that that these sorts of of of
[52:59] politics these sorts of populist
[53:01] politicians onpolitics populist if you
[53:04] like uh operate that actually is very
[53:07] very is a Subterranean level
[53:09] unconsciously I think on both parts both
[53:12] both them and and their and the and
[53:14] their supporters is a really effective
[53:18] mobilizing force and it's
[53:20] counterintuitive
[53:21] because it's uh unpol if you act in in a
[53:25] way that that draws on politics you act
[53:28] in ways that seem to De defy
[53:31] conventional understandings of politics
[53:33] you might for example be utterly chaotic
[53:36] transgressive rude offensive and
[53:40] actually for those of you who
[53:42] traditionally politics you go well
[53:43] that's you can't do that that's not
[53:44] right you know how can you support this
[53:46] person right but actually the power of
[53:50] that is that that's why the people that
[53:51] support them like them so people say
[53:54] Trump you know how how can people
[53:56] support Port someone who's you know a uh
[54:00] a felon um to come presidency was not
[54:03] not in spite the fact he's a felon it's
[54:05] because he's a felon that's what's
[54:07] that's what's attracting now if you're
[54:09] interested which Trump obviously knows
[54:11] because he uses the mug shot quite
[54:13] proudly it's powerful he knows how to
[54:15] make a good M good mug shot as well
[54:17] doesn't he but well I I'm okay just I'm
[54:21] not sure he he's even doing it
[54:23] consciously I'm not even sure it's a
[54:24] strategy but I think it's something
[54:26] under the level it's not about you don't
[54:28] like those those those people in power
[54:30] it's not even you don't like those
[54:31] institutions it's not like you don't
[54:33] like democracy it's actually just don't
[54:34] even like politics generally do you and
[54:37] if I can do some things that look really
[54:39] unlike politics chaos conspiracy theory
[54:43] treating Politics as War all those
[54:46] things that they're not what politics
[54:48] should be the more I do that the more
[54:50] appealing it is and the more it baffles
[54:53] everyone else who goes why is this
[54:55] working well uh it shouldn't work but it
[54:58] does and there's something there that so
[55:01] for me onpolitics is this kind of
[55:03] reservoir of of kind of belief or or
[55:07] disposition that that some po some
[55:09] populist politicians like Trump bolaro
[55:12] perhaps as well draw on and a very
[55:14] effective at using as a mobilizing
[55:16] strategy it's very different from other
[55:18] populists who get into power and they
[55:20] deliver things to their constituencies
[55:22] and they say oh well okay I'm going to
[55:24] Law And Justice in Poland I'm going to
[55:26] going to deliver you know um money for
[55:28] children if you have more children you
[55:30] have more more money that's kind of
[55:31] classic transactional managerial
[55:33] populism but they're not engaging our
[55:35] politics but one like Trum Trump is and
[55:37] he's the reason we're so perplexed by
[55:39] him if we are is because he's drawing on
[55:42] this force that we don't really
[55:43] understand fully and the more that we
[55:45] are political the more we can't
[55:47] understand so are you saying that Trump
[55:49] um are he saying that Trump is
[55:52] uninterested in politics or he's drawing
[55:54] on an
[55:55] impulse because there's a sense in which
[55:58] sometimes he is and sometimes he isn't
[56:00] interest so I feel like you know he
[56:02] clearly has a political um uh go Paris
[56:07] foreign policy so there is a politics
[56:09] there um but there's also a sense you
[56:11] know whether this was true or not in
[56:14] reporting that he just wanted to play
[56:15] golf and he want interest in the dayto
[56:17] day so that and I know that's not what
[56:20] you're talking about but do you think
[56:22] there's the the politics and onpolitics
[56:25] sits together and there's a a gradient
[56:28] between them yeah I mean by using the
[56:30] word onpolitics I've made it a bit
[56:32] difficult for myself because clearly
[56:34] it's about the use of onpolitics in
[56:36] politics okay yeah so my metaphor here
[56:39] is like oil and water if you get oil and
[56:40] water and you put them in a bottle
[56:41] they'll separate it but if you shake
[56:43] them up there'll be Bubbles and that
[56:45] what we're seeing is that moment when un
[56:47] politics comes into engagement with with
[56:50] with politics now Trump clearly I'm
[56:52] clearly is political none of the
[56:53] populist actors are are unpolitical
[56:57] but they some of some of them seem to be
[56:59] able to use un politics either
[57:01] consciously or perhaps even
[57:02] unconsciously that's in politics it
[57:05] might be unconsciously say it might you
[57:07] know also be Subterranean level kind of
[57:10] they're doing things in a way that the
[57:13] appeal that you wouldn't necessarily
[57:15] expect expect to work and and they're
[57:19] doing it for political reasons that
[57:20] that's the Paradox it's an OP of course
[57:22] because you're using un politics to
[57:24] drive political support
[57:26] um but but what I'm trying to do is to
[57:28] show why it's so difficult for us to see
[57:31] if you're engaged or if you understand
[57:33] if you understand or or focus on or
[57:35] engag in
[57:37] politics yeah and I I know you mean it
[57:39] in a value neutral way but it's drawn to
[57:41] that concept and sense as well
[57:44] because if you're drawing on on politics
[57:48] ultimately you're drawing more you are
[57:49] drawing more people into
[57:52] politics and that seems to be a good
[57:54] thing yeah but but what you're also
[57:57] doing I'm no prediction I'm no not great
[58:00] predictions right but when Trump left
[58:03] office I thought and I thought he's he's
[58:06] got his un politics behind him there's
[58:07] something there thought what you might H
[58:09] happen is kind of stability and
[58:11] Order and then that would generate the
[58:15] um more arm
[58:17] politics so it may it one the paradoxes
[58:21] for me I think about politics is it
[58:22] often uses chaos to attract people but
[58:26] it also generates chaos you know we saw
[58:29] Trump leaving office and then you have
[58:30] obviously January the 6th you know so
[58:33] chaos is a consequence so it's not it's
[58:36] so to be to make some normative
[58:39] judgments un politics is very
[58:41] destructive because what it does is it
[58:44] it destroys politics it it destroys
[58:47] which further feeds the feeds the
[58:48] frustration with politics and and the
[58:50] power of our
[58:52] politics politics is about settlements
[58:54] about winner C win settle winners and
[58:56] losers and onpolitics is about
[58:59] unsettling Us in all senses of the word
[59:02] and that's not a way the politics can
[59:03] function over a long time it's going to
[59:05] create instability so to go back to your
[59:07] question about you know the the US
[59:09] Constitution stuff perhaps the the
[59:11] effect of of onpolitics systematically
[59:13] used in over two two terms off as might
[59:16] be to undermine the Constitution that
[59:18] that's certainly a possibil so no I
[59:20] don't think it's a positive thing and
[59:22] it's not about drawing people in yeah
[59:24] and the margins it might be it's more
[59:26] about the way that people are engaging
[59:28] if you're engaging in politics using on
[59:31] politics that's that's not a longterm
[59:33] way of politics
[59:35] Confunction right slightly related I
[59:38] know this isn't what you mean by in
[59:39] politics but Trump had no political
[59:43] experience whatsoever before entering
[59:46] office which Neer you remind people um
[59:50] is an extraordinary fact um to come into
[59:53] the Oval Office with no political
[59:55] experience whatsoever is a bizarre thing
[59:59] probably for Trump but for all say for
[01:00:03] politics or American politics for as by
[01:00:05] extension
[01:00:06] too but he was a very experienced
[01:00:11] businessman love him or hate him he had
[01:00:13] a lot of experience whether you thought
[01:00:15] he was successful or not people like
[01:00:17] Curtis yarin uh influen Peter till and
[01:00:21] JD
[01:00:22] Vance talk about and I I think this is
[01:00:25] more Fringe than the New York Times
[01:00:28] would have people think at the moment I
[01:00:30] still think it's very Fringe movement
[01:00:32] but they've talked about things like
[01:00:33] democracy has failed we need a CEO
[01:00:37] monarchy need to rethink our
[01:00:39] relationship with monarchy and
[01:00:44] authoritarianism and I think there's
[01:00:46] there seems to be a difference in
[01:00:48] quality this time round in the Trump
[01:00:52] approach I think he may maybe has
[01:00:55] learned he's not a politician but that
[01:00:57] he can with these people affect some
[01:01:00] kind of change and that they seem to be
[01:01:03] doing through you know this abundance of
[01:01:06] executive orders which obviously is
[01:01:08] politics trying to push through some
[01:01:11] kind of and again I know this isn't what
[01:01:14] you mean by in politics but some kind of
[01:01:17] different way of running the federal
[01:01:20] government Elon Musk as a certain
[01:01:22] approach to business that he's bringing
[01:01:23] there seems to be a business impulse
[01:01:26] that is non-political should we say do
[01:01:29] you think that's a approximation of
[01:01:32] what's happening at all I mean first of
[01:01:35] all I'd say look Trump's not the only
[01:01:37] example of this and populists are quite
[01:01:39] often that way because it lights
[01:01:41] Outsiders so babis or um bisone for
[01:01:45] example you know and in US Ross perau
[01:01:49] the idea of I'm a businessman I'll come
[01:01:51] and sort things out that's a that's
[01:01:53] classic populism um
[01:01:57] but I I do think the um the use of of
[01:02:03] you know bringing Outsiders as well to
[01:02:05] like musk or whatever and uh is either
[01:02:09] the embedding of oligarchs as someone
[01:02:11] might have it or or the establishment of
[01:02:13] a CEO democracy you could say but
[01:02:17] look executive orders are not
[01:02:20] policy with one big exception which can
[01:02:23] be okay foreign policy um is is a
[01:02:26] different domain but policy is something
[01:02:29] where you you create legislation and
[01:02:30] that can't be undone by subsequent
[01:02:32] executive
[01:02:33] orders right so that's the flurry of
[01:02:37] executive orders can be undone by the
[01:02:39] next president in in the first 100 days
[01:02:42] but real presidents who create policy
[01:02:44] change do go through the weird and and
[01:02:48] strange process of
[01:02:50] legislation um you the great presidents
[01:02:53] of the United States have always had to
[01:02:54] do that so even if but even if Trump
[01:02:58] want to be successful in effectively
[01:03:01] using executive orders in this
[01:03:04] way in the short term it it isn't to
[01:03:07] create a new form of politics it's just
[01:03:09] to create moment quite spectacular
[01:03:12] moments and he I mean know he can stop
[01:03:14] spending money well technically you
[01:03:17] can't actually it's called empowerment
[01:03:19] but but you can effectively and all
[01:03:21] presidents use executive orders it's not
[01:03:23] not it's not you know it's the way that
[01:03:24] presidents are always tried to kind of
[01:03:26] get around the Constitution and Obama
[01:03:28] was very clear about you know it wanted
[01:03:30] to be unilateral in some respects so so
[01:03:33] I've got a bit away from the point the
[01:03:34] point you were making is about about the
[01:03:36] CEO culture and using different ways of
[01:03:38] of of of
[01:03:39] driving operating politics and sure I
[01:03:42] wouldn't be at all surprised if that's
[01:03:44] becomes more established or uses other
[01:03:46] CEOs in this way but the one thing I
[01:03:49] know one thing I think I know is that in
[01:03:52] 6 months time the Trump presidency will
[01:03:54] look quite unlike it looks at the moment
[01:03:56] now it could look much worse it could
[01:03:58] look much better from what normative
[01:04:00] point you have but it won't look the
[01:04:02] same and the one thing I think we know
[01:04:04] about Trump is that his attention span
[01:04:08] is poor his focus is attention for focus
[01:04:11] on detail is poor and it's difficult for
[01:04:14] him to sustain stuff over time so but in
[01:04:17] the spectacular moment of the first two
[01:04:19] weeks or four weeks of a presidency you
[01:04:21] can see that but um I think it'll look
[01:04:24] different over time so you know I'm
[01:04:26] saying the obvious point that you know
[01:04:28] will musk still be around in 6 months
[01:04:30] time maybe he will be in which case the
[01:04:32] Trump president Trump presidency will
[01:04:34] look very different to now if he's not
[01:04:36] around it'll also look very different to
[01:04:38] now but I think we mustn't get too hung
[01:04:40] up on on the these shortterm things um
[01:04:43] worrying as they might be if you're
[01:04:45] concerned about you know Democratic
[01:04:47] accountability and so on yeah do you
[01:04:49] think I can't remember who said this I
[01:04:51] heard someone recently talking about how
[01:04:53] the internet is CR a kind of
[01:04:56] unsustainable situation where whoever's
[01:04:59] in power there's immediate backlash
[01:05:00] because there's so much
[01:05:02] information to sensationalist drama
[01:05:04] creating machine so do you think we've
[01:05:06] all become too political we're
[01:05:09] concentrating too much on everything on
[01:05:11] the Manu shy of every day politics every
[01:05:15] moment well it's Sly tempting to see to
[01:05:18] to see a kind of anti-incumbency mood
[01:05:21] and and we've become too political and
[01:05:23] and also but the the other side of that
[01:05:24] is
[01:05:26] you also become unpolitical sorry but
[01:05:28] you know it will drive people away from
[01:05:30] politics it's not only engagement and
[01:05:32] frustration and grievance it'll be about
[01:05:34] absence and and withdrawal and that's
[01:05:36] that's also very very very damaging at
[01:05:38] the moment my this is okay I'm going to
[01:05:41] speculate without any solid basis but I
[01:05:44] suspect that the the amount of
[01:05:46] information the way we're processing it
[01:05:47] is very different I suspect what we
[01:05:49] doing is not different what we've always
[01:05:51] done and I'm sure there have always been
[01:05:53] those who have been anti-politics with
[01:05:55] without politics unpolitical unpolitical
[01:05:58] so I'm always slightly skeptical that
[01:06:01] everything is fundamentally new I think
[01:06:04] what is changing is the way that we the
[01:06:06] political system is processing way we're
[01:06:08] representing that um but I'm not I'm I'm
[01:06:11] just skeptical of the idea that that
[01:06:14] it's all all bets are off and we're in a
[01:06:16] different we're in a different age at
[01:06:17] the moment disinformation what we used
[01:06:20] to be called propaganda and you know um
[01:06:23] uh do we always used to be in in Echo
[01:06:25] chain was because he read the papers
[01:06:27] that right you it's not to me it's not
[01:06:30] that different quantity-wise yes I do
[01:06:32] accept there's something different there
[01:06:34] but I'm not sure in a new
[01:06:36] age yeah that's really interesting
[01:06:39] because you the kind of my perception
[01:06:42] admittedly and maybe the general
[01:06:44] perception is like is that yes there's
[01:06:48] lots
[01:06:48] of upheavals throughout uh throughout
[01:06:51] history of course the most recent one
[01:06:54] though was probably World War II
[01:06:56] and then it was relatively stable until
[01:06:59] the you know maybe the
[01:07:01] neoliberal Revolution and the upheaval
[01:07:04] of the um postwar consensus but even
[01:07:08] that thinking about it is nonsense right
[01:07:11] it was decolonialization the complete
[01:07:15] shift of power from Britain to America
[01:07:17] there was so many things going on in the
[01:07:19] world so many crisis so sure yeah maybe
[01:07:23] right we're always going through crisis
[01:07:25] politics is about cycles of different of
[01:07:28] different things whether policy crisis
[01:07:29] institutional crisis you know political
[01:07:33] economy crisis and and different types
[01:07:37] of cycles and different times so
[01:07:39] politics is inherently Dynamic you know
[01:07:41] we it's it's like we always we we yearn
[01:07:44] we're almost been populist oh remember
[01:07:46] when it used to be stable we had the the
[01:07:48] POS War settlement but it was never
[01:07:49] stable it was always it's a dynamic
[01:07:52] iterative process where by you
[01:07:54] constantly reevaluate who winners and
[01:07:55] losers are you change the rules of the
[01:07:57] game a little bit you push at the
[01:07:58] margins you open the Overton window you
[01:08:01] close the Overton window or the all you
[01:08:03] want to use so politics is is about this
[01:08:05] process and it's that's for me what's
[01:08:07] interesting about politics and why you
[01:08:10] know when journalists always say to me
[01:08:12] you know what's going to happen I don't
[01:08:13] know I just don't know because actually
[01:08:16] it's an incredibly complex structure and
[01:08:18] that's what's fascinating but sometimes
[01:08:19] something big can come along that can
[01:08:21] really upset things and whether it be Co
[01:08:24] or or or Donald Trump you know the uh
[01:08:27] unexpected ways but trying to say
[01:08:29] everything is too linear I always think
[01:08:31] is is is emotionally um very
[01:08:34] understandable because we all want to
[01:08:35] think things are getting better and and
[01:08:37] the world's getting better but it may be
[01:08:39] that just we different times and paces
[01:08:44] and directions of different cycles and
[01:08:46] and that's that's difficult to live with
[01:08:48] but that's kind of reality of I think
[01:08:50] why the tends to
[01:08:52] function um I have a few more questions
[01:08:55] um we haven't mentioned and it's not
[01:08:56] really a question but the
[01:08:59] afd um recent elections uh have you been
[01:09:02] following that well yeah I mean in the
[01:09:05] sense that study populism and and and I
[01:09:09] study Europe so yeah um what' you make
[01:09:12] of
[01:09:13] that broad question I know all the
[01:09:16] cliches are true aren't they that it's
[01:09:17] incredibly concerning reemergence of the
[01:09:21] far right gaining what is it 20% of the
[01:09:23] vote in a country with with that that
[01:09:26] Legacy is is very difficult and that the
[01:09:29] afd does seem to be an extreme version
[01:09:33] of what are are radical rightwing
[01:09:36] populists elsewhere you know even for
[01:09:38] for them the other populists in Europe
[01:09:40] they seem to be way across the board and
[01:09:42] this stuff about remigration or right um
[01:09:46] so they're did in extremely um another
[01:09:49] version of it I'm not a German expert so
[01:09:51] I mean no but I do but you know the east
[01:09:54] west
[01:09:55] distinction um if you look at nearly all
[01:09:57] the patterns of voting seem to be
[01:09:59] remarkable um and um so do you think
[01:10:04] that's a legacy of the of the of the um
[01:10:07] Soviet Union is that too
[01:10:10] simplistic no no that's that's the
[01:10:13] origins of it but I'm I'm look I'm not
[01:10:15] German expert but I mean it's not it's
[01:10:17] not because of what happened in in 19
[01:10:19] you know 1940s it's because of what
[01:10:21] happened in the 1990s after unification
[01:10:24] and and the way that politics has
[01:10:26] developed in a way that hasn't delivered
[01:10:28] for for some people or they feel it
[01:10:30] hasn't delivered for them uh more than
[01:10:31] other people the parts of Germany yeah I
[01:10:34] wondered whether the East was always
[01:10:36] poorer I don't know much about German
[01:10:37] politics at all but the um manufacturing
[01:10:41] the industrial belts in the west right
[01:10:42] so I thought maybe that preceded the
[01:10:47] okay I'm very careful I never want to
[01:10:49] talk about I don't know about if you
[01:10:51] know um if I can avoid it although I do
[01:10:53] I've already already transgressed rule
[01:10:55] quite a few times with you but no I'm
[01:10:57] not an
[01:10:58] expert um at risk of pushing you to
[01:11:00] transgress it one more time do you know
[01:11:02] enough to explain what remigration is
[01:11:05] what what the afd mean by remigration
[01:11:07] well they are they're talking from my
[01:11:10] understanding of there was the
[01:11:12] possibility that anybody um who was not
[01:11:15] born there therefore could be first
[01:11:17] generation migrants might might under
[01:11:19] some of their policies be forced to to
[01:11:22] go back to quote where where where they
[01:11:24] came from that's just that's just read
[01:11:27] the media so but I mean just the very
[01:11:28] fact and I'm sure that that that's more
[01:11:30] nuanced than
[01:11:31] that perhaps less but but the very fact
[01:11:34] we even talk in those terms is what what
[01:11:36] makes them one of the more extreme um
[01:11:39] parties on the radical right on the
[01:11:41] populous radical right in Europe I'm
[01:11:43] talking about something I know nothing
[01:11:44] about too but I'd heard on a I think it
[01:11:46] was a times Radio podcast that there
[01:11:48] certain whistleblow had said there was a
[01:11:50] significant uh proportion of people in
[01:11:53] the afd that believed in second or third
[01:11:55] generation remigration as
[01:11:59] well sorry go on I was going to say
[01:12:02] there were really good good Scholars on
[01:12:03] on Jo politics in the UK they're very
[01:12:06] rarely given much much much coverage but
[01:12:09] when you if you want to hear what what
[01:12:10] is true you know listen to them not jist
[01:12:13] like me right sure um but yeah that's
[01:12:17] that's interesting in itself because I
[01:12:19] asked you because I I know so little
[01:12:21] about it apart from even when I go out
[01:12:23] my way to try and read a b
[01:12:25] it seems is very I mean it's always the
[01:12:28] case with countries especially ones that
[01:12:30] speak a different language it's very
[01:12:32] hard to kind of penetrate them but I was
[01:12:34] struck by how little we seem to know
[01:12:37] about it generally
[01:12:39] speaking well I don't think we use the
[01:12:41] res sources that we have but there are
[01:12:43] some great Great British Scholars on ger
[01:12:45] on German politics and there some great
[01:12:47] German politics Scholars who write in
[01:12:49] English and who are experts on the afd
[01:12:51] you know I can think of two or three of
[01:12:52] St my head get their names after yeah
[01:12:56] I don't a couple more if you don't mind
[01:12:59] um uh so I was going to ask about the
[01:13:04] populists clearly don't like
[01:13:05] institutions The Establishment generally
[01:13:08] speaking they don't seem to like
[01:13:10] universities intellectuals professors
[01:13:12] like yourself um but I'd imagine that is
[01:13:16] and I'm speaking very gen generally I'd
[01:13:18] imagine that's
[01:13:20] reciprocated broadly speaking I know you
[01:13:23] will say you like to be objective but
[01:13:26] there's a sense I get from the
[01:13:27] literature
[01:13:29] sometimes that it draws on a kind of
[01:13:32] negative language so I'm thinking here
[01:13:34] of Margaret canavan's phrase populism as
[01:13:36] the shadow of
[01:13:38] democracy um the shadow of
[01:13:41] course being very uh dark and black and
[01:13:45] and the underside do you think this is a
[01:13:47] problem do you think that the value of
[01:13:50] populism is in the eye of the beholder
[01:13:52] but that also there's a there's a bias
[01:13:55] maybe in universities against
[01:13:58] populism I think it I think it's a
[01:14:00] problem leis because in the sense you
[01:14:03] and you put your finger on it you know
[01:14:05] if and I if you want to be objective
[01:14:07] about
[01:14:08] populism um you're going to be studying
[01:14:11] by definition people who are not
[01:14:13] objective about
[01:14:14] you um so there are no populist
[01:14:18] theorists there one slight exception but
[01:14:20] I'll ignore that for the minute that
[01:14:22] because by definition populism is not
[01:14:23] about about education it's not it's
[01:14:25] about about what's in the heart it's
[01:14:27] about uh it's about um common wisdom
[01:14:30] it's about folk folk tales and so on so
[01:14:32] by definition populists don't like
[01:14:35] me um and and that's fine I get that you
[01:14:39] know that's that's fine and and as a
[01:14:43] consequence you know I've been studying
[01:14:44] populism for you know 30 years and I I
[01:14:47] don't think I've ever been to any any
[01:14:50] event any academic event where there's
[01:14:51] ever been a populist um wow that's well
[01:14:55] because by definition why why are they
[01:14:57] going to come and talk talk to us is
[01:14:59] we're not so does that create an an
[01:15:02] imbalance yes it does and are is it the
[01:15:06] case that most most academics who study
[01:15:08] populism um hostile to to populism
[01:15:11] probably um uh but um so you know there
[01:15:17] there was an element of that but I don't
[01:15:19] think it's impossible to be objective
[01:15:20] about them and I think many people are
[01:15:22] the re the real problem is that is that
[01:15:24] everyone's Focus fusing on
[01:15:26] populism the irony here is that you know
[01:15:29] the populists are not the only show in
[01:15:32] town look I'm St studies populism but
[01:15:35] they're not the only show in town
[01:15:36] they're not the only thing that's going
[01:15:38] on and in fact me the reasons their
[01:15:39] success is because the failes or what
[01:15:42] are the activities of other politicians
[01:15:45] you know so if you look at the academic
[01:15:48] study of ideologies or say political
[01:15:50] parties you know there are those who
[01:15:51] study the left who tend to be kind of
[01:15:53] leftwing themselves those who study the
[01:15:55] center left who also tend to be Center
[01:15:57] left themselves nobody studies the
[01:15:59] center right hardly any very few
[01:16:02] scholars study them and then everybody
[01:16:04] studies yeah it's not a very sexy
[01:16:06] subject I suppose the center right sorry
[01:16:09] yeah not very sexy no and it's also not
[01:16:11] that's not that studied I mean just
[01:16:13] that's a serious academic Point there's
[01:16:14] very little on the center right uh as a
[01:16:17] whole especially comparatively some good
[01:16:18] stuff but not not not as much but
[01:16:20] there's so much stuff on populism
[01:16:23] there's so much stuff on on if if you
[01:16:25] look at the share of the vote it's way
[01:16:26] out of proportion clearly all that stuff
[01:16:29] should be there stuff that I write you
[01:16:31] know uh no I'm
[01:16:33] joking but there's too much focus on it
[01:16:36] by too many people and that's that's the
[01:16:39] danger the danger that that we're we're
[01:16:41] over because it's spectacular it's
[01:16:45] exciting but then you tend to generalize
[01:16:47] from it giz from small cases so the
[01:16:50] danger the danger of bias is that we're
[01:16:52] biased towards looking at populism too
[01:16:54] much
[01:16:55] rather than we might have political
[01:16:56] Biance against it I just want to say I
[01:16:59] don't necessarily think that the
[01:17:00] political positions of the academics
[01:17:01] determine what they what they find but
[01:17:03] they you know
[01:17:05] often they determ what they're
[01:17:07] interested in and I'm making very bad
[01:17:09] generalizations here that I'll probably
[01:17:10] regret later yeah and there are plenty I
[01:17:13] maybe take that back a little bit there
[01:17:15] are plenty I think I think of Shantel M
[01:17:17] who you know accepts and advocates for
[01:17:19] left populism or I think Michael cin
[01:17:22] ends his book with the paragraph say how
[01:17:25] populism is inevitable so it should be
[01:17:26] embraced so yeah I maybe um exaggerated
[01:17:30] the case a little bit there The
[01:17:31] Sensational sorry go on well you are
[01:17:34] right that there is and you know there
[01:17:36] is a certain antagonism in quite a lot
[01:17:39] of of the work on populism towards
[01:17:41] populism that that is almost it's almost
[01:17:44] rational from what I said to you before
[01:17:45] because that the popul are antagonist
[01:17:47] towards towards the people that write
[01:17:49] about it but and I do you know and I'm
[01:17:51] sure I'm I'm sure I've I I've self
[01:17:53] described but I try and say whether or
[01:17:56] not I agree with with populists of
[01:17:58] whatever sort what is it that's going on
[01:18:01] I I strive to be objective and the best
[01:18:02] Scholars are those that do that I think
[01:18:05] they the ones that try and say what is
[01:18:07] actually going on not whether do I like
[01:18:09] it or yeah well talking of objective
[01:18:12] Scholars your book on populism is uh 25
[01:18:17] years old
[01:18:19] now I think it came out in 2000 yeah
[01:18:22] you're right yes yes you're right yeah
[01:18:23] yeah are there any thoughts on uh
[01:18:26] updating it well there look there are
[01:18:28] lot there are lots of great there are
[01:18:30] lots of fantastic books I mean I've been
[01:18:32] dissing works on populism but there's
[01:18:34] lots of great stuff on populism that's
[01:18:37] come come about more recently that are
[01:18:39] of a very similar Hue you know U so no I
[01:18:43] I actually don't um I think to go back
[01:18:44] to the drawing board for me would would
[01:18:46] be quite hard I'm more interested in
[01:18:48] looking at varieties of populism and
[01:18:50] those that use on politics and those
[01:18:51] that don't um but you know okay there
[01:18:55] are some really this really I don't want
[01:18:57] to name them here cuz it's unfair but
[01:19:00] there are excellent books that are out
[01:19:01] there and there almost too much on
[01:19:03] populism I think it needs another you
[01:19:04] need another short book on populism like
[01:19:06] we need a hole in the
[01:19:09] head I will say that I'm not just saying
[01:19:11] this to Fat you I think your book is the
[01:19:13] best introduction and it's I like that
[01:19:16] it's got a bit of theory at the
[01:19:17] beginning then it's got some the history
[01:19:19] few major cases and then returns to um
[01:19:23] questions theoretical question at the
[01:19:25] end so I would highly recommend it to
[01:19:27] anyone that's interested in a a nice
[01:19:30] short introduction as well I think books
[01:19:32] are too long these days um definitely
[01:19:37] what what's an area a person or a
[01:19:40] movement in the history of populism or
[01:19:42] contemporary that you think more people
[01:19:45] should know about final question and I'm
[01:19:48] thinking specifically of a general
[01:19:49] audience yeah yeah no I agree um it's
[01:19:52] hard it's I there are two answers that
[01:19:55] which one is I think people don't know
[01:19:56] enough about the populist party in the
[01:19:59] United States right and I do think that
[01:20:02] um and I'm no great expert on it but but
[01:20:04] the the historic history work on that
[01:20:07] has has changed over recent years and
[01:20:08] it's really interesting and a lot of the
[01:20:10] original assumptions are completely
[01:20:11] wrong about them you know and so you can
[01:20:14] read them from a leftwing kind of
[01:20:15] progressive collectivist kind of point
[01:20:17] of view if you want to and and so I
[01:20:20] think and I think if you if you really
[01:20:22] want to talk about populism and you're
[01:20:23] not talking about the people that gave
[01:20:25] us the word if it what you're saying
[01:20:27] doesn't apply to them then you're not
[01:20:28] talking about populism that's true of a
[01:20:30] lot of of of P of current contemporary
[01:20:33] Scholars oh sorry no not Scholars
[01:20:35] contemporary journalists I'm afraid who
[01:20:37] who use the word populism and talk about
[01:20:39] if it's right-wing authoritarian
[01:20:40] populism that's anything there is but
[01:20:43] the other thing Latin America I think
[01:20:45] again I'm not a Latin American Scholar
[01:20:47] but I it's not new it's been here since
[01:20:49] the 1940s it's been in power there's
[01:20:52] lots of varieties of it and every time I
[01:20:55] I I learn a little bit more about Latin
[01:20:57] American populism I learn a lot more
[01:20:59] about populism so you know I think that
[01:21:02] the Latin American cases and the US
[01:21:03] People's Party are the obvious things
[01:21:05] that we should if we really interested
[01:21:07] in populism that's what we we need to
[01:21:08] know a little bit more about them to be
[01:21:10] able to
[01:21:11] generalize yeah I think especially in
[01:21:13] Europe we have a as I do at least have a
[01:21:15] black spot when it comes to South
[01:21:16] American politics and I'd certainly
[01:21:19] never heard of The People's Party before
[01:21:21] I studied popularism so i' I'd Venture
[01:21:23] that most people haven't heard of them
[01:21:26] either um and is it and I put you on the
[01:21:30] spot again just right after you said
[01:21:32] you're not an expert um I'm FC I'm also
[01:21:36] fascinated by the people part people's
[01:21:38] party and it seems to me that they
[01:21:41] almost directly lead to FDR and the new
[01:21:43] deal and that they're very important
[01:21:45] because of that do you think is that
[01:21:48] true oh um I think there I'm not sure I
[01:21:52] I could trace those lines I mean not
[01:21:54] they're not there I I I think that
[01:21:58] they're um they're really what's
[01:22:01] interesting about the People's Party is
[01:22:03] that they were originally dismissed as
[01:22:05] being kind of white racist farmers who
[01:22:08] were just you know was suffering
[01:22:11] grievance but actually they were kind
[01:22:13] you can see them as collectivist as as
[01:22:15] as developing complex technocratic
[01:22:17] solutions to government that there was
[01:22:20] no particular leader associated with it
[01:22:23] um it was bottom up yeah it was bottom
[01:22:25] up it was out there's no lead there's no
[01:22:26] leader there there was no theorist it
[01:22:29] was complex so all these classic um faux
[01:22:33] pass that people make about populism oh
[01:22:34] it's about simplistic answers no no they
[01:22:37] wer very complex oh it's all about
[01:22:39] leaders no wasn't all about leaders in
[01:22:41] fact they couldn't get a decent leader
[01:22:43] and yet they managed to sustain
[01:22:44] themselves in power and to to drive the
[01:22:46] context of early 20th century American
[01:22:48] politics to some degree that you could
[01:22:49] you could draw those lines as you did to
[01:22:52] FDR so that's what's interesting about
[01:22:54] the kind of counterintuitive but it's a
[01:22:55] bit like democracy isn't it when we say
[01:22:58] you know oh Athens is the original um
[01:23:01] you know what's actually the archetype
[01:23:03] of democracy yeah but it didn't have
[01:23:05] elections and it didn't didn't didn't
[01:23:08] didn't make decisions by voting so it's
[01:23:11] bit you know so but you have the
[01:23:13] archetype doesn't necessarily um give
[01:23:16] you the the the the core features that
[01:23:18] to run through it but you have to know
[01:23:20] what it is to know what the essence of
[01:23:21] it is I think sure yeah which but you
[01:23:24] quote at length in your book ignacius
[01:23:26] Donnell's Omaha platform speech which
[01:23:30] just cont condenses everything about
[01:23:33] popularism into two
[01:23:35] paragraphs another great place to start
[01:23:38] it was 25 years ago and i' even I can
[01:23:40] just remember that no no thank
[01:23:44] you you can remember it at
[01:23:47] least Paul tager thank you very much for
[01:23:50] joining me I really appreciate it thanks
[01:23:52] L it's been really really interesting
[01:23:55] very hard work this is a good sign good
[01:23:57] thank you very much cheers

Introduction
The speaker begins with a rallying cry to make America proud, safe, and great again, setting the tone for a discussion on populism. This lecture marks the start of a two-month tour across Europe, where the speaker will visit 18 cities in 11 countries. The speaker humorously likens their role to that of a Dutch cyclist in the Tour de France, indicating a sense of anticipation for the audience size and engagement. The focus of the lecture is on populism, a term that has gained significant traction in contemporary discourse, particularly in the context of political developments in Europe and the United States. The speaker aims to define populism, explore its historical roots, assess its current popularity, analyze the causes behind its rise, and evaluate its implications for democracy, especially liberal democracy.

Defining Populism
The speaker emphasizes that populism is often misunderstood and mischaracterized. Common misconceptions include equating populism with mere popularity or suggesting that populists simply echo what people want to hear. The speaker clarifies that populism is not inherently anti-immigrant or right-wing, nor is it merely a political tool. Instead, populism is described as a "thin-centered ideology" that divides society into two antagonistic groups: "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite." This ideological framework posits that politics should reflect the general will of the people. The speaker elaborates on the characteristics of populism, noting that it is a worldview that influences the policies of those who adopt it. Countries like Venezuela and Hungary serve as examples where populist ideologies have shaped governance.

Monism and Moral Distinction
The speaker highlights the monist nature of populism, where the categories of "the people" and "the elite" are seen as homogeneous. This simplification ignores the diversity within these groups, as all members of the "elite" are viewed as corrupt, regardless of their individual actions or beliefs. The moral distinction between the two groups is crucial; it is not wealth or power that determines one's place in society but rather the possession of "the right values." This allows wealthy individuals like Donald Trump to position themselves as representatives of the people, despite their elite status. The speaker provides examples of populist rhetoric that emphasizes the moral struggle between the pure and the corrupt.

Populism in Political Discourse
The speaker presents a clip illustrating populist rhetoric, where politicians claim to represent "real people" and criticize the elite for corruption. The distinction between populist and non-populist discourse is emphasized, noting that while many politicians may occasionally adopt populist language, it is the consistency and centrality of this rhetoric to their ideology that defines them as populists. The speaker argues that figures like Bernie Sanders, while critical of the elite, do not fit the populist mold because their critique is based on class interests rather than a moral dichotomy.

Populism and Democracy
The relationship between populism and democracy is complex. Populism can be seen as pro-democracy when defined narrowly as popular sovereignty and majority rule. However, the speaker argues that true democracy encompasses more than just these elements; it includes protections for minority rights, the rule of law, and independent judiciary systems, which are often at odds with populist ideologies. Populists tend to reject compromise, viewing it as a moral failing that corrupts the pure. This presents challenges to liberal democracy, which relies on negotiation and respect for diverse interests.

Left and Right Populism
Populism can manifest on both the left and right of the political spectrum, but it is often combined with other ideologies. Right-wing populism frequently aligns with nationalism, particularly a xenophobic form known as nativism, while left-wing populism tends to incorporate elements of socialism. The speaker notes that right-wing populism has seen greater success in Northern Europe and the United States, whereas left-wing populism has found more traction in Southern Europe. The historical context of populism in Europe is explored, tracing its roots back to the mid-19th century with the Narodniki movement in Russia, which sought to empower the peasantry but ultimately failed to resonate with them.

Historical Context of Populism
The speaker outlines the evolution of populism in Europe, highlighting its emergence in agrarian movements and its subsequent decline during the rise of totalitarian regimes like fascism and communism, which were fundamentally elitist. Following World War II, populism re-emerged in various forms, with notable figures like Pierre Poujade in France and the rise of radical right populism in the 1980s and 1990s, exemplified by Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front. The speaker emphasizes that while populism has been present throughout history, it has often remained on the fringes of political power.

The Current Populist Wave
The speaker discusses the contemporary populist wave, noting that while populist parties have gained ground in many European countries, their overall success is often overstated. The average support for populist parties across Europe is around 18%, significantly below a majority. The speaker critiques the media's portrayal of populism as a binary phenomenon—either on the verge of taking over or in decline—arguing that this oversimplification fails to capture the nuanced reality of populist politics. The speaker highlights the importance of recognizing the diversity within populist movements and the varying degrees of success they experience.

Populism in the United States
In the United States, populism has a long-standing presence, deeply embedded in the political culture. The speaker traces its origins to the founding principles of the republic, particularly the interpretation of "We the People" in the Constitution. While the founding fathers expressed distrust of direct democracy, populist movements have historically sought to empower ordinary citizens against perceived elite corruption. The People's Party of the late 19th century serves as a historical example of grassroots populism, though it struggled to achieve lasting federal influence.

Recent Populist Movements
The speaker analyzes the impact of the Great Recession on American populism, noting that it catalyzed movements like the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street. The Tea Party, characterized by grassroots activism, successfully influenced the Republican Party, while Occupy Wall Street struggled to gain traction outside of liberal circles. The speaker argues that the Tea Party's focus on anti-establishment sentiment and issues like immigration resonated with a significant portion of the population, while Occupy Wall Street's message was less widely understood.

Reasons for Populism's Success
The speaker explores the reasons behind the current success of populism, emphasizing that it often arises in response to issues that elites fail to address adequately. This perception of neglect fuels populist sentiment, as people feel their concerns are ignored. The speaker also highlights the belief that elites are indistinguishable, leading to disillusionment with traditional political parties. Furthermore, the rise of cognitive mobilization—where citizens feel more politically empowered—has contributed to the demand for populist alternatives.

Consequences of Populism
The consequences of populism are multifaceted. On one hand, populism can revitalize political discourse by bringing important issues to the forefront, such as immigration and austerity. However, it also leads to increased polarization, as populist rhetoric often frames political opponents as enemies rather than adversaries. This moral framing complicates the possibility of compromise, undermining the foundations of liberal democracy. The speaker warns that successful populist movements can lead to anti-populism, further entrenching divisions within society.

Populism and Institutional Integrity
The speaker raises concerns about the impact of populism on non-majoritarian institutions, such as the judiciary and media. Populist leaders often delegitimize these institutions, arguing that their authority is superseded by the will of the people. This trend can erode the checks and balances essential to a functioning democracy. The speaker cites examples from Hungary and Venezuela, where populist leaders have undermined judicial independence and media freedom, leading to illiberal democracies.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the speaker asserts that while populism has a long history in both Europe and the United States, its current prominence is often exaggerated. Populism poses both challenges and opportunities for democracy, asking critical questions about representation and accountability while offering potentially harmful solutions. Ultimately, the speaker argues that populism represents an illiberal democratic response to the shortcomings of liberal democracy, highlighting the need for a nuanced understanding of its implications for contemporary political landscapes.

In the transcript, populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology that posits a division between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. The speaker emphasizes that populism is not merely about popularity or saying what people want to hear, as it is sometimes misconstrued. Instead, it is characterized by a moral distinction, where one's affiliation with either group is based on values rather than wealth or power. This moralism is central to populist discourse, which claims to represent the will of the people against the elite, who are viewed as corrupt.

The speaker also highlights that populism is often confused with related concepts such as nationalism, radicalism, extremism, or authoritarianism. However, populism can be left- or right-wing, and it does not inherently dictate a specific economic or political system. Instead, it is the underlying ideology of populism that interacts with these other ideologies, forming what is referred to as the host ideology.

This distinction is critical in understanding the nature of populism and its implications for democracy. The speaker notes that while populism can serve as a corrective to the political system, it can also pose a threat to the principles of liberal democracy, particularly due to its anti-pluralistic tendencies and the tendency to view political opponents as enemies rather than legitimate adversaries.

• [02:58] "Populism actually has a meaning. It is a thin centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups."
• [12:48] "Populism can be on the left or on the right. That is not because of populism itself."
• [04:41] "The main distinction for populism is moral."

The transcript identifies several historical, ideological, economic, cultural, and institutional roots of populism, tracing its origins back to various movements and periods. Notably, the emergence of populism in Russia during the mid-19th century is highlighted, specifically through the activities of the Narotniki. This group, comprised of an urban elite, believed that the peasants represented the true people of society and sought to empower them. However, their efforts were largely met with indifference as the peasants were preoccupied with their survival.

The speaker notes that populism had a significant influence in Central and Eastern Europe during the early 20th century, where agrarian populist movements emerged. These movements, however, struggled to gain traction in non-democratic settings.

Furthermore, the transcript discusses how populism has resurfaced in various forms since the Second World War, with notable figures like Pierre Poujad in France paving the way for future populist leaders. The speaker asserts that while populism has fluctuated in prominence, it has remained a persistent element of political discourse, particularly in the 21st century where its visibility has increased significantly.

• [14:15] "Populism actually has a long tradition but mostly in the margins here. It emerged in Russia in the mid-19th century with the so-called Narotniki."
• [17:21] "The most important was this man Pierre Pujad in the late 1950s in France who out of nowhere got into parliament and then disappeared."
• [27:56] "What we’ve had over time was explosions of mostly grassroots populist movements that really came from the people who were upset with corruption or other things that would get some success in states and then peter out."

The transcript discusses various causes and drivers of contemporary populism, emphasizing a range of factors including economic insecurity, inequality, and distrust in institutions. The speaker suggests that many citizens feel that important issues are not adequately addressed by political elites, leading to a perception that their needs and concerns are overlooked. This sentiment is particularly pronounced in the context of rising globalization and migration, which have contributed to cultural backlashes in many societies.

Moreover, the speaker underscores the role of media change and the emergence of direct communication channels between leaders and followers, which have altered the political landscape. The impact of the Great Recession is also highlighted as a significant moment that catalyzed populist sentiments, as it brought to light the stark economic disparities and the feeling among certain groups that they would be worse off than previous generations.

While the speaker acknowledges that material conditions such as economic instability are crucial to understanding the rise of populism, they also suggest that cultural explanations, including feelings of lost status and identity, play an equally significant role. This duality of material and cultural explanations reflects the complex nature of contemporary populism, where both economic and emotional factors intertwine to fuel populist movements.

• [36:30] "Oddly enough we don’t really know. There are hundreds if not thousands of articles now about populism."
• [37:15] "Important issues are not addressed by elites or are not addressed adequately."
• [29:12] "The great recession was not just that the bubble burst but was also the realization that the current generation will be worse off than the previous generation."

The transcript describes a diverse group of individuals who are said to support populism, highlighting various social, economic, and identity characteristics. Populism claims to speak for the 'ordinary people' and the 'decent people', often portraying them as victims of a corrupt elite. Supporters are characterized as feeling disenfranchised, overlooked, or marginalized by traditional political structures. This includes individuals facing economic hardships, such as those who have lost jobs in factories or who are struggling with poverty in urban areas.

The speaker emphasizes that populism resonates particularly with people who feel that their values and beliefs are not represented by the existing political elite. This emotional appeal is crucial; populist leaders often tap into the feelings of anger, frustration, and a desire for change among their supporters. These sentiments are amplified by the perception that political elites are disconnected from the everyday struggles of the general populace.

Furthermore, the speaker points out that the appeal of populism can vary by geography and demographics, with certain regions experiencing stronger populist sentiments than others. The transcript indicates that populism fulfills a need for identity and belonging among its supporters, who often feel that they have been left behind in the rapidly changing socio-economic landscape.

• [09:27] "Washington flourished, but the people did not share in its wealth."
• [06:54] "Democracy is not about billionaires buying elections and we will tell the billionaire class..."
• [10:44] "The distinction is what whether it is core to your ideology and whether the distinction the key distinction within the people is based on morality."

The transcript highlights the significant role that media—both traditional and social—plays in the rise and functioning of populism. The speaker notes that the media landscape has shifted dramatically over recent decades, with a transition from state-controlled outlets to a predominantly private media model that is driven by financial imperatives. This shift has led to a focus on sensationalism, conflict, and polarization as media outlets chase eyeballs for advertising revenue.

Populists are particularly adept at leveraging this media environment to their advantage. The speaker cites Donald Trump as an example of a political figure who understands how to manipulate media narratives to maintain prominence. By calling out mainstream media, Trump effectively positions himself as an outsider, generating news coverage that keeps him in the public eye.

The transcript also discusses the role of social media and how it facilitates direct communication between populist leaders and their supporters. This direct contact fosters a sense of connection and loyalty among followers, bypassing traditional media filters. The speaker suggests that this dynamic can contribute to the spread of disinformation and further polarization, as narratives are shared and amplified through social networks.

However, the speaker argues that for social media to be effective, it must intersect with mainstream media coverage. In essence, the media landscape creates an ecosystem in which populist messages can thrive, but it also raises concerns about the implications for democratic discourse and the potential for manipulation.

• [45:40] "Populists don’t have political opponents, they have enemies."
• [46:01] "Donald Trump understands because he is a media creation..."
• [48:39] "Social media plays a role, but social media only is effective if it can break into the mainstream."

[00:00] [Music]
[00:07] We will make America proud again. We
[00:11] will make America safe again. And yes,
[00:15] together we will make America great
[00:19] again.
[00:21] Thank you very much.
[00:23] Thank you all for coming um on a
[00:26] Tuesday, but I heard that the
[00:28] explanation is that there's very little
[00:30] to do on a Tuesday. So, I'll take that.
[00:35] Um this is actually my first lecture in
[00:40] a two-month tour um of Europe where I
[00:44] will do 18 cities in 11 countries. But I
[00:48] feel a little bit like a Dutch cyclist
[00:50] in the tour to France. we uh we tend to
[00:53] peak a bit early in the race and it
[00:56] seems that there's undoubtedly this is
[00:58] going to be the biggest audience I'm
[01:00] going to speak to and I still have two
[01:02] months to go.
[01:04] So what I'm talking about is populism
[01:07] which is impossible to pretty much open
[01:10] a newspaper these days and not see the
[01:14] term. And so this is what I'm going to
[01:16] do. I'm going to explain what populism
[01:19] is or at least what it is according to
[01:21] me. I'm going to talk about who have
[01:24] been the main populist in European and
[01:26] US history because it's important to
[01:28] realize that populism might be more
[01:32] successful or more in the news now than
[01:34] it ever was. But it has a long history
[01:37] particularly in North America.
[01:41] We're going to assess how popular the
[01:44] so-called populist wave is today
[01:47] and then what the causes of populist
[01:50] mobilization are and of course what the
[01:53] key reason is why we're all interested
[01:56] what the consequences of populist
[01:58] politics are for democracy in general
[02:00] but particularly for liberal democracy
[02:04] and so let's start with what populism is
[02:08] now populism is used pretty much in all
[02:11] kind of different ways. And there are a
[02:14] couple of interpretations
[02:17] that are popular but that are wrong and
[02:19] also not very useful. One is that
[02:22] populism is pretty much being popular.
[02:27] If that were to be the case, we didn't
[02:29] need the term populist. We could do it
[02:31] with simply saying popular. Another
[02:33] thing is that populist are just saying
[02:36] whatever people want to hear. We already
[02:39] had a term for that as well. It was
[02:41] demagogy.
[02:44] Populism is also not necessarily
[02:47] anti-immigrant
[02:49] or rightwing.
[02:52] Populism is also not just a tool.
[02:55] Populism actually has a meaning. It is a
[02:58] thin centered ideology that considers
[03:00] society to be ultimately separated into
[03:03] two homogeneous and antagonistic groups.
[03:06] the pure people and the corrupt elite
[03:09] and which argues that politics should be
[03:11] an expression of the volunteer or the
[03:14] general will of the people. Now let me
[03:17] focus on a couple of aspects here. So
[03:20] I'm saying that it is an ideology. What
[03:22] I mean by that is that it is a worldview
[03:26] which means that I assume that people
[03:28] who use populist discourse
[03:31] actually believe in that. Consequently,
[03:35] if they come to power, these views will
[03:39] influence their policies. And if you
[03:41] look at countries like Venezuela or
[03:43] Hungary, they do. Second, it is a monist
[03:48] ideology, which means that the key
[03:51] categories are homogeneous.
[03:55] So the people are all the same. They all
[03:59] have the same interest and the same
[04:02] values. Similarly,
[04:04] the elite
[04:06] is not plural. It's not the elites. The
[04:10] argument is that all the elites are
[04:12] identical. While they act as if they're
[04:15] from different parties and have
[04:16] different ideologies, they're actually
[04:19] all the same and more importantly,
[04:22] they're corrupt. And that's the last
[04:24] part that is important. The main
[04:26] distinction for populism is moral.
[04:31] So whether you're part of the the elite
[04:33] or the people is not because you have a
[04:36] lot of money or whether you hold power.
[04:39] It is whether or not you have the right
[04:41] values.
[04:43] And this explains why someone like
[04:46] Donald Trump or Sylvio Berleskone who
[04:50] are among the richest people in their
[04:52] country can still pretend to be the
[04:55] voice of the people because the argument
[04:58] is that despite their wealth, they're
[05:01] actually one of them.
[05:03] Like they're one of the people because
[05:05] they are pure too.
[05:08] Now I have a clip that will play from
[05:13] another part about how popular Sound.
[05:27] [Music]
[05:49] This will be a victory for real people,
[05:54] a victory for ordinary people, a victory
[05:57] for decent people.
[06:08] [Applause]
[06:12] [Music]
[06:20] [Music]
[06:27] [Music]
[06:30] You're behaving like the mafia. You
[06:32] think we're a hostage. We're not. We're
[06:34] free to go. We're free to go.
[06:38] [Music]
[06:40] Democracy is not about billionaires
[06:44] buying elections and we will tell the
[06:48] billionaire class and corporate America
[06:51] that they will start paying their fair
[06:54] share of taxes.
[06:56] It's either the filter, the oligarchs
[06:59] who continue to enjoy the perks.
[07:04] dimension
[07:06] politic
[07:08] from the elite.
[07:11] [Music]
[07:12] [Applause]
[07:15] [Music]
[07:28] Whether Wall Street likes it, whether
[07:32] corporate America likes it, together
[07:37] we know what our job is.
[07:43] [Music]
[07:51] dysfunction.
[08:15] When someone criticizes the elites for
[08:18] being corrupt, it doesn't necessarily
[08:20] mean that speaker is a populist. The
[08:23] question, how consistently do you use
[08:26] this pattern? whether this pattern is
[08:29] the major framework of your whole
[08:32] rhetoric.
[08:33] [Music]
[08:38] We are transferring power from
[08:41] Washington DC and giving it back to you
[08:45] the people.
[08:49] We will face challenges. We will
[08:52] confront hardships. But we will get the
[08:55] job done. Politicians prospered, but the
[08:59] jobs left and the factories closed.
[09:03] Washington flourished, but the people
[09:06] did not share in its wealth. Mothers and
[09:10] children trapped in poverty in our inner
[09:13] cities. Our young and beautiful students
[09:16] deprived of all knowledge. The
[09:19] establishment protected itself, but not
[09:23] the citizens of our country.
[09:27] [Music]
[09:31] Okay, so that was Vice News and I think
[09:36] what you saw there and what is important
[09:39] at the end is that almost all
[09:42] politicians will say something populist
[09:45] at some time, particularly of course
[09:47] during campaigns.
[09:50] But the distinction is how fundamental
[09:54] is this to the broader view of a party.
[09:58] And so from these people that were all
[10:01] in the clip, I personally think that
[10:04] Bernie Sanders was not a populist. And
[10:07] the reason was not so much because he
[10:09] didn't speak of an us versus them or
[10:12] that he called out an elite,
[10:15] but the core of the distinction was not
[10:18] a moral one.
[10:21] It was an interest one to a certain
[10:24] extent. It was old school class. What he
[10:27] argued was that the rich, the 1% had
[10:31] different interests and they played the
[10:34] system, but the problem was more the
[10:37] system than the corruption of those
[10:40] people, right? And so that's important
[10:44] to remember. The distinction is what
[10:48] whether it is core to your ideology and
[10:51] whether the distinction the key
[10:53] distinction within the people is based
[10:56] on morality.
[11:00] So the relationship between populism and
[11:02] democracy is quite complex.
[11:05] Populism is pro-democracy if you define
[11:09] democracy in its most narrow sense of
[11:12] popular sovereignty and majority rule.
[11:14] So very simply stated
[11:17] a democracy in a democracy the people
[11:20] elect their leaders.
[11:23] But the system that we generally call
[11:25] democracy is actually much more than
[11:27] that. And it's more accurately termed
[11:29] liberal democracy. And in a liberal
[11:31] democracy we don't only have popular
[11:34] sovereignty and majority rule. We also
[11:36] have minority rights. We have rule of
[11:39] law. We have independent courts etc.
[11:43] It is particularly with regard to
[11:45] liberal democracy that populism is
[11:48] problematic
[11:49] and the reason is very simple. It's the
[11:52] monism and the moralism.
[11:55] Like
[11:57] for populist the people are all one.
[12:02] Anyone who claims to have different
[12:05] interests is not considered legitimate
[12:10] because they're part of the elite and
[12:13] the elite is corrupt
[12:16] and the corrupt don't deserve things.
[12:19] Right? On top of that, you don't
[12:21] compromise
[12:23] in a moral struggle
[12:25] because if the pure
[12:28] compromise with the corrupt, the pure
[12:30] get corrupted,
[12:33] right? And so some of the fundamental
[12:35] aspects of liberal democracy
[12:38] are at odds with populism. Now, populism
[12:43] can be on the left or on the right.
[12:47] That is not because of populism itself.
[12:49] Populism itself says very little about
[12:53] what type of economic system there
[12:55] should be or what type of political
[12:58] system there should be. It is the
[13:00] so-called host ideology.
[13:03] Almost every relevant populist actor,
[13:07] party or politician will combine
[13:10] populism with an other ideology. simply
[13:14] stated on the right that tends to be
[13:16] nationalism and more specifically nivism
[13:20] which is a xenophobic interpretation of
[13:24] nationalism which can be um summarized
[13:27] in the German slogan like Deutschinander
[13:32] Germany for the Germans foreigners leave
[13:37] on the left
[13:39] generally populism is combined with some
[13:42] form of socialism
[13:44] today much more social democracy than
[13:47] the old school but still and overall
[13:51] right-wing populism is more uh
[13:54] successful in the north both in Europe
[13:56] and America whereas in the south
[13:59] left-wing populism is a bit more
[14:01] successful I will come back to the
[14:03] individual
[14:05] groups soon now in Europe populism
[14:10] actually has a long tradition but mostly
[14:12] in the margins here. It emerged in
[14:15] Russia in the mid- 19th century with the
[14:18] so-called Narotniki. Now the Narotiki
[14:21] were the most unlikely of populist
[14:24] because they were actually a small urban
[14:25] elite
[14:27] who had fought came to the conclusion
[14:30] that the peasants were the real people.
[14:33] They were there that was where the
[14:35] purity of society was. And so, as urban
[14:39] elites do, well, at least they did, they
[14:43] went into the countryside and went to
[14:45] the peasants and said, "Hey, peasant,
[14:47] you're actually the real people. You
[14:49] should have power."
[14:51] And the peasants said, "But I'm busy
[14:54] because I'm starving and I don't care
[14:58] what you say." And so that was the story
[15:01] of the Narotniki pretty much
[15:06] [Music]
[15:07] in the early 20th century.
[15:10] Narotniki ideas
[15:12] had influence in central and eastern
[15:14] Europe in so-called agrarian populist
[15:17] movements. Now of course at that point
[15:19] in time the vast majority of the
[15:20] population was agrarian.
[15:24] Unfortunately,
[15:26] most of Central and Eastern Europe was
[15:28] not democratic. So, it didn't really
[15:30] matter what the majority fought. The
[15:33] majority
[15:35] had no power because power was in the
[15:37] hands of military and um land owners.
[15:41] But there were a couple of leaders that
[15:44] came to power. this person who looks a
[15:48] little bit like Delhi but actually was
[15:50] the leader of a Bulgarian agre populist
[15:53] party who made it to prime minister but
[15:57] unfortunately got killed a year later
[16:00] because that was how politics was at
[16:02] that point in time.
[16:05] After this period, populism disappeared.
[16:08] Sure, there were populist aspects in
[16:11] communism and in national socialism,
[16:14] fascism, particularly in the movement
[16:17] stage, but fundamentally both both
[16:20] ideologies were actually the opposite of
[16:24] populism. They were elitist.
[16:27] Fascism, either its German or Italian
[16:30] form, didn't believe that the people
[16:35] were pure.
[16:37] They didn't believe in democracy. They
[16:40] believed actually that democracy was
[16:42] mediocracy.
[16:44] They believed that there were there was
[16:46] one leader
[16:48] who had all the major qualities and
[16:50] therefore that leader should hold power.
[16:54] Communism particularly the form that was
[16:56] most important Marxism Londonism
[17:00] was also very elitist. It saw the
[17:02] communist party as the vanguard of the
[17:05] people.
[17:07] it would by and large force the people
[17:09] to become free.
[17:13] Now after
[17:15] the second world war there were a few
[17:18] populist episodes.
[17:21] The most important was this man Pierre
[17:24] Pujad in the late 1950s in France who
[17:29] out of nowhere
[17:31] got into parliament and then
[17:33] disappeared.
[17:35] But he did leave a quite important
[17:37] legacy for French politics because there
[17:40] was one man who was elected as the
[17:43] youngest parliamentarian in France
[17:45] history up to that point whose name was
[17:50] Jamarie Le Pen.
[17:56] Now while we had populism of course here
[17:59] in Denmark, Norway in the 1970s with the
[18:03] progress parties emerging
[18:06] that was a very isolated movement. The
[18:08] real group that we talk about what I
[18:11] call radical right populism or populist
[18:13] radical right started in the early 1980s
[18:16] and became really successful in the
[18:18] 1990s. This is Jamarie Le Pen. And this
[18:22] adorable young girl is not Marin Le Pen,
[18:26] but is Mar Le Pen who is the next Keon
[18:31] who will take over for National
[18:33] undoubtedly in about 10 years.
[18:36] Jamaril Leapen
[18:39] was a very important politician already
[18:43] in the 1980s
[18:46] and in the 1990s he and the fun national
[18:48] became the prototype of radical right
[18:51] populism. Almost all the parties in
[18:54] other countries would follow their um
[18:57] slogans and um their propaganda.
[19:03] Now what we forget
[19:06] is that already in the 1990s some of
[19:10] these parties had big successes.
[19:12] Fun national got 16%.
[19:16] More importantly the FBO the Austrian
[19:18] freedom party got 27% in 1999
[19:23] went into the government in 2000. It's
[19:26] just to say that while the great
[19:28] recession that started in 2008 is
[19:31] important, it wasn't the start of the
[19:35] wave of populism.
[19:37] However, what it did was it boosted
[19:41] right-wing populism and it created an
[19:43] opportunity for a couple of new
[19:46] left-wing populist parties.
[19:49] Today, populist parties contest
[19:51] elections throughout Europe with
[19:53] increased success.
[19:55] This is an overview of pretty much 19
[19:59] countries in the EU
[20:03] and their most important, their most
[20:05] successful populist party.
[20:08] Some parties actually have more than
[20:10] one. This is the score
[20:14] in the European election 2014.
[20:18] This is in the last national election.
[20:21] This is the ranking of the populist
[20:23] party. And so you see that on average
[20:26] the populist party is the third biggest
[20:29] party in the country.
[20:31] This is the percentage of the total vote
[20:34] for populist parties. As said there are
[20:36] several countries that have more than
[20:39] one populist party. Greece is the most
[20:42] extreme case where you have a left-wing
[20:44] populist and a right-wing populist party
[20:47] which are actually forming a coalition
[20:49] in government at the moment.
[20:53] And then this is the change and and so
[20:56] the the main reason why I I show this is
[21:00] diversity.
[21:02] First of all, the parties in black are
[21:06] radical right parties.
[21:08] The parties in red are left-wing
[21:12] populist parties.
[21:14] The parties in blue
[21:18] are right-wing populist parties, but not
[21:20] radical right ones. They're mostly
[21:24] combined populism with neoliberalism.
[21:28] And then the green ones are kind of
[21:30] idiosyncratic
[21:33] which the five-star movement in Italy
[21:36] which is probably going to be the
[21:38] biggest party in Italy
[21:40] um is an example that party is so
[21:44] unorganized
[21:46] that at any level it will take any
[21:50] position
[21:52] and so in certain localities the
[21:54] five-star movement will actually argue
[21:57] in favor of amnesty for undocumented
[22:01] immigrants and in others they want to
[22:04] close the borders for all refugees.
[22:07] Um what the party really stands for only
[22:11] the leader Beepo knows but he doesn't
[22:15] really want to take any position.
[22:18] So that's a mess. But unfortunately for
[22:21] Italy it's a mess with a quarter of the
[22:23] vote and according to the polls it's a
[22:26] mess with about a third of the vote and
[22:29] probably in the next government.
[22:32] What you see as well is that in certain
[22:34] countries there is a majority
[22:38] that votes for populist parties. Hungary
[22:41] is in the worst state. In Hungary, the
[22:45] government party fed is a populist
[22:48] radical right party. But the main
[22:51] opposition party is Yobic, which is an
[22:54] even more extreme populist radical right
[22:56] party.
[22:58] But in many of the other countries, you
[23:01] see that the score is relatively modest.
[23:04] The average is around 18%.
[23:08] Now remember this is the 19 countries
[23:12] out of 28.
[23:14] If you would actually calculate it on
[23:16] the basis of 28, the average is a bit
[23:19] under 15%.
[23:22] That is a lot but very very very far
[23:26] away from the majority.
[23:29] And so while we had now a whole year of
[23:32] is populism going to take over the
[23:35] world, right? Clearly it wasn't.
[23:39] Not because they fail. No, they were
[23:41] never going to.
[23:43] On the other hand, now that they don't
[23:46] take over the world, we get this news
[23:49] stories because media need a frame. It
[23:52] can't be complicated. It is either you
[23:55] take over the world or you died.
[23:58] And so now
[24:00] we get questions. Is populism over? Has
[24:04] populism peaked? No.
[24:07] Actually, Marin Le Pen had the best
[24:09] result ever for the fun national
[24:14] in the Netherlands did a little bit less
[24:16] well than he did in 2010, but together
[24:19] with another new party, they were
[24:21] roughly equally high. And so populism is
[24:24] going up
[24:26] but mostly it's going up like this.
[24:29] Particularly whenever populists are in
[24:31] power they tend to lose.
[24:35] CISA coalition of the radical left which
[24:38] is leading the government in Greece is
[24:41] doing horrible in the polls.
[24:44] That's what two years of incompetence do
[24:46] to you generally. But it is quite normal
[24:50] for political parties to lose when they
[24:52] get to power, particularly new parties,
[24:55] because new parties promise a lot.
[24:58] Particularly that they're going to do
[24:59] everything different.
[25:01] But if you're in the EU, you're not
[25:03] going to do everything different because
[25:06] the EU does a lot for you.
[25:09] And you will understand that after a
[25:11] couple of months and you start to look
[25:13] more and more like other parties. that
[25:15] is not so bad if you're just an
[25:16] establishment party, but if you're going
[25:19] to change the world, that that looks
[25:22] bad.
[25:23] And so, by and large, the lesson from
[25:26] this
[25:28] graph table that has way too much
[25:30] information is that yes, populism is
[25:33] very is a relevant factor. On average,
[25:37] the third biggest party,
[25:39] right, influences politics.
[25:42] But there are many different types of
[25:45] populist parties. Some go up, some go
[25:48] down, some are big, some are small.
[25:52] Now in the US, populism has a very long
[25:56] history too, but it's more continuous.
[26:01] I would argue that populism has always
[26:04] been part of US political culture and it
[26:06] goes back to the interpretation of the
[26:09] constitution which starts with the
[26:11] beautiful words we the people. Now the
[26:15] interpretation in the US of we the
[26:17] people is that the founding fathers of
[26:20] the republic really trusted the people
[26:23] and created a system in which the elite
[26:27] could not do too much because power
[26:30] should be with the people. If you read
[26:32] what the founders actually fought then
[26:34] many distrusted the people completely
[26:37] and made a system to make sure that the
[26:40] people would never have the last word.
[26:42] Which is why we have the electoral
[26:44] college. Which is why we all I a little
[26:48] bit more than you have Donald Trump
[26:51] who lost the popular vote but won the
[26:54] electoral college.
[26:56] The reason is exactly that. The reason
[26:59] was that the founders wanted to make
[27:01] sure that there was a mechanism that
[27:05] would prevent that the people made the
[27:06] wrong choice. Bit unfortunate.
[27:12] So in the mid 19th century while the
[27:15] Narotniki were trying to explain to the
[27:17] farmers in Russia that they were really
[27:21] the people in the US and Canada
[27:26] there was a mass movement within
[27:29] particularly the heartland the prairie
[27:30] the plains the Midwest
[27:34] and the west where the people's party
[27:38] also known as the populist
[27:41] were very active at the local and state
[27:44] level. They would actually dominate
[27:46] politics. But throughout history,
[27:50] populism never could make a fist at the
[27:53] federal level. Now, as you all know, US
[27:56] is pretty big. um it has a system that
[28:00] favors
[28:01] the existing two parties
[28:04] and as a consequence it has been very
[28:06] hard for a third party to break that
[28:09] system. They can do that at a local
[28:12] level. They can sometimes govern states
[28:16] but to do that at the level of the whole
[28:18] country so far they haven't been
[28:21] successful. And so what we've had over
[28:23] time was explosions of mostly grassroots
[28:28] populist movements
[28:30] that really came from the people who
[28:33] were upset with corruption or other
[28:35] things that would get some success in
[28:38] states and then peter out. Most of the
[28:41] time their issues would be adopted by
[28:44] one of the two big parties.
[28:46] Initially it was the Democratic party.
[28:49] It was the Democratic Party that
[28:51] actually took up the issues of the
[28:52] people's party in the early 20th
[28:55] century. More recently, since the second
[28:58] world war, it has particularly been the
[29:00] Republican party that have taken up the
[29:03] issues of populist movements.
[29:06] Now, in the 21st century,
[29:09] the great recession,
[29:12] which to a certain extent hit the US
[29:15] harder than Europe, but also much
[29:18] shorter. It hit it harder mostly
[29:20] culturally. I would argue Americans are
[29:23] amazingly optimistic.
[29:26] Like it's it's it's part of their
[29:28] culture that they always think that a of
[29:32] course they live in the best country in
[29:34] the world history ever. Um but also even
[29:38] if things don't go well, it will get
[29:41] better.
[29:43] The great recession was not just that
[29:46] the bubble burst but was also the
[29:48] realization that the current generation
[29:51] will be worse off than the previous
[29:53] generation.
[29:55] And that goes against the American
[29:56] dream. That goes against the whole
[29:58] really idea of what America is about.
[30:03] And as a consequence, the great
[30:04] recession had a massive effect even
[30:06] though the bailouts
[30:09] took care of most of um the economic
[30:13] problem at least in the short run. So
[30:15] while Europe was still in crisis in 2010
[30:19] 2011,
[30:20] certain countries are still now pretty
[30:23] much the whole crisis theme was
[30:26] disappeared in 2009 already in the US.
[30:29] But it gave
[30:32] it gave fuel to two movements. The one
[30:35] that you probably have heard about is
[30:38] the Tea Party which is here. I went to
[30:42] one of their meetings in Indiana. Was
[30:44] fun. Um
[30:48] so the Tea Party combined what they call
[30:51] astroturf and grassroots. Now grassroots
[30:53] means pretty much bottom up like regular
[30:56] people are coming together. Astroturf is
[31:00] when big organizations that have a lot
[31:02] of money are kind of pretending that
[31:06] they have a grassroots movement and so
[31:09] they pay people to demonstrate or they
[31:11] by and large organize things for people.
[31:15] Now most liberals act as if the tea
[31:18] party was only astroturf. It was as if
[31:21] it wasn't genuine. Unfortunately for
[31:23] them it was. I taught for a while in a
[31:26] very small town in rural Indiana. School
[31:30] had 2,600 students.
[31:33] Town probably about 40,000 people. Every
[31:36] first Monday of the month about 300
[31:40] people would come together to talk about
[31:43] issues mostly about the constitution,
[31:45] about the Muslim Kenyan president and
[31:49] all those kind of issues, right? But it
[31:52] was 300 people every month. That is an
[31:56] amazing level of activity without anyone
[32:00] financing it. Right? These were people
[32:03] mostly middle class which in the US
[32:05] means working class. Um who had that's
[32:10] also part of optimism that like you
[32:12] define yourself a class up. um
[32:17] who would rather than spend their TV
[32:20] like their their evening for the TV
[32:21] would sit together. Um even today if I
[32:24] go to one of the places in my town um
[32:29] there will be five six people sitting
[32:31] together um discussing the constitution
[32:34] right and so the tea party was big
[32:41] it had an effect on the Republican party
[32:44] for a bit and then allegedly it died
[32:46] out. Now, Occupy Wall Street
[32:50] was very big among my friends
[32:54] and their lefty journals,
[32:57] and it was also big among their lefty
[33:01] friends in other countries.
[33:04] But when I was at my little school in
[33:06] Indiana and I asked people about Occupy
[33:09] Wall Street, most of my students had
[33:12] never heard of it. They study political
[33:14] science,
[33:16] right?
[33:17] Now I was also
[33:20] this is Occupy
[33:23] um
[33:25] Ottawa in Canada but I was also at
[33:28] Sugatti Park at Wall Street and Occupy
[33:32] Wall Street was a very small movement.
[33:34] It was also a movement without any
[33:36] organization.
[33:38] And so what happened once the city of
[33:41] New York had enough of the occupation
[33:44] and the other cities had as well, they
[33:47] moved them out and it imploded. No
[33:50] effect whatsoever institutionally.
[33:53] The Tea Party would still run things in
[33:56] many localities and states.
[33:58] There was a short wave of
[34:00] anti-immigration laws in almost all of
[34:03] the states that these were introduced.
[34:05] Tea parties played a major role.
[34:08] But you could argue that the political
[34:10] legacies of both these movements were
[34:14] visible in the 2016 election. Sanders
[34:18] was in many ways the voice of Occupy
[34:21] Wall Street. Even though he himself was
[34:24] irrelevant in that movement, many of the
[34:28] issues that he addressed were issues
[34:30] that were at the forefront of Occupy
[34:33] Wall Street. Although, as I said, I
[34:36] would argue that Sanders used a less
[34:38] populist discourse. He did speak about
[34:40] the 99% and the 1%, but those are
[34:44] objectively true.
[34:46] Like, we have studies that show that up
[34:49] to 85% of all the new gains that were
[34:53] made since the Great Recession have gone
[34:55] to 1% of the population in the US. And
[34:59] he would he would just highlight those
[35:01] things, not saying those corrupt
[35:02] bastards have taken everything, right?
[35:05] He would just say, "Look, the system
[35:07] works like that. We have to change
[35:08] that."
[35:10] Trump was probably still thinking that
[35:13] he was a Democrat at the time that the
[35:15] Tea Party was around.
[35:19] He has no connections to the Tea Party.
[35:22] There were actually several of his
[35:24] competitors in the primaries that were
[35:27] former Tea Party favorites like Marco
[35:30] Rubio or Ted Cruz.
[35:33] But if you see what Trump stood for and
[35:36] if you see what the grassroots Tea Party
[35:39] group stood for, it is almost a 100%
[35:42] overlap.
[35:44] Because while the media often focused on
[35:47] the small government
[35:49] and low taxes, etc., etc. When you
[35:53] actually went to the meetings, there was
[35:55] always Islamophobia. There were always a
[35:59] lot of the banners were against
[36:00] immigration, were pro abort were pro
[36:06] um
[36:08] anti-abortion, but pro- repression of
[36:12] current abortion things. And so the
[36:15] great recession is to a certain extent
[36:19] found its voice later.
[36:26] Now the question then of course becomes
[36:27] why is populism successful and more
[36:30] importantly why is populism successful
[36:33] now?
[36:35] Oddly enough we don't really know.
[36:38] There are hundreds if not thousands of
[36:40] articles now about populism.
[36:43] But we know quite a lot about why a
[36:46] certain form of populism is successful.
[36:48] So for example, we know quite decently
[36:51] why radical right populism at the moment
[36:54] is successful. But a lot has not so much
[36:57] to do with the populism but actually
[36:58] with their nivism with their
[37:00] anti-immigrant stand. But that cannot
[37:03] explain why sizes is successful which is
[37:06] actually pro-immigrant.
[37:08] there. So there are a couple of points
[37:10] and they're broader.
[37:12] The first one is that important issues
[37:15] are not addressed by elites or are not
[37:18] addressed adequately.
[37:21] But this is not an objective statement
[37:23] necessarily.
[37:25] It is true particularly in the 1990s
[37:28] some of the key issues for a sizable
[37:30] portion of the population were not
[37:32] addressed.
[37:34] EU integration and immigration were kept
[37:37] off the political agenda by the main
[37:40] parties in countries like the
[37:42] Netherlands or Germany
[37:45] or all the elites simply agreed on it.
[37:47] It wasn't that there was a conspiracy to
[37:50] keep European integration off the agenda
[37:53] in many countries just all the elite
[37:54] believed in it and so you had no choice
[37:57] and you don't have a debate on issues
[37:59] that everyone agrees on. So it wasn't
[38:02] discussed
[38:03] but the point is that
[38:07] many people feel that these issues are
[38:10] not addressed and whether that is true
[38:13] or not is irrelevant. When people
[38:16] believe it is true they will hand they
[38:18] will act on the basis of that.
[38:21] My Twitter feed is of Islamophobes
[38:25] as any type of broader medium these
[38:29] days, particularly Dutch Islamophobes,
[38:32] and they will go on and on that you
[38:34] can't say anything about Islam in the
[38:36] Netherlands. Like, we haven't talked
[38:39] about anything else since 9/11.
[38:42] And by now the Netherlands, and I'm
[38:44] sorry to disappoint you, Denmark,
[38:46] because you come in well at second, but
[38:50] the Dutch have the most Islamophobic
[38:52] political discourse.
[38:54] And yet there is a sizable portion of
[38:57] the Dutch population who genuinely feels
[39:00] that you can't say anything about Islam
[39:03] or about multiculturalism.
[39:06] And because they believe that, they will
[39:08] vote on the basis of that.
[39:12] Second point, elites are perceived as
[39:14] being all the same. It doesn't matter
[39:17] whether I vote center left or center
[39:19] right,
[39:20] they will do the same.
[39:23] Again, not without merit.
[39:26] Right? Particularly in the 1990s, most
[39:29] center left parties, social democrats
[39:33] adopted a so-called pragmatic third way
[39:37] position which embraced neoliberalism
[39:41] and which made the difference between
[39:43] center left and center right
[39:45] ideologically pretty small particularly
[39:48] because many of the center right parties
[39:50] responded to that by coming a little bit
[39:53] more to the center on social cultural
[39:55] issues. And so if you see the difference
[39:57] between seu and espeay in Germany that's
[40:02] not stunning. The difference between
[40:04] Tony Blair and David Cameron which was
[40:08] between labor and Tories was not that
[40:10] big particularly if you go 20 years back
[40:13] when these were different worlds.
[40:17] The other thing is as I said and you
[40:20] might notice that I'm a little bit
[40:22] euroskeepic.
[40:24] I'm actually
[40:26] way less euroskeepic since Brexit than I
[40:29] was before.
[40:31] Um, and so if Ar does anything, he he
[40:35] might maybe one day make me pro-Uropean.
[40:39] Um,
[40:41] but the EU is a reality
[40:44] and the EU is a reality that influences
[40:47] many policies.
[40:49] Anyone who's in the Euro zone is not
[40:52] individually responsible for monetary
[40:55] policy which has massive effects for
[40:58] your economic policy which has massive
[41:00] effect for everything else. So it is
[41:03] true elites are more the same now than
[41:08] they were 30 years ago. Whether that's
[41:10] good or bad doesn't matter, right? It's
[41:13] just the reality. And so one of the
[41:15] problems is they don't campaign
[41:18] as if there is an EU,
[41:20] right? And so quite often center right
[41:23] or center left parties will campaign on
[41:25] issues and make promises that they
[41:28] actually cannot uphold within the EU
[41:30] structure.
[41:33] And that of course creates the idea that
[41:36] they're not just all the same, but
[41:37] they're also all corrupt.
[41:43] On a more positive note, people have
[41:45] more efficacy,
[41:47] which means they have more political
[41:49] self-confidence.
[41:51] This is the consequence of what the
[41:53] American political scientist Ronald
[41:55] Inglehart called cognitive mobilization,
[41:58] which means mostly that people are
[42:00] better educated,
[42:02] but they also feel
[42:05] more confident on political issues.
[42:09] Now that is good because now they are
[42:12] critical citizens.
[42:14] They hold their leaders to account.
[42:18] That is exactly what we always wanted of
[42:20] democracy. But we didn't have
[42:24] in the 1950s, most of the 1960s,
[42:28] Catholic people voted for the Catholic
[42:30] party. Workers voted for the Social
[42:32] Democratic Party. Upper middle class
[42:35] voted for the Liberal Party.
[42:37] They didn't make choices. they just did
[42:40] because they lived in subcultures and
[42:42] that's what you did.
[42:44] Now when a leader says you should do
[42:47] this, a lot of people say why.
[42:52] They didn't used to say that. And so
[42:55] cognitive mobilization is creating
[42:58] problems for the way politics was always
[43:01] done. So one of the things that we often
[43:04] hear is well why is populism successful?
[43:07] Why are mainstream parties so bad?
[43:09] Because they have bad leaders. Now, far
[43:12] from me to argue that the leaders are
[43:14] particularly skilled today,
[43:16] but it's not as if the old leaders would
[43:19] do that much better with the current
[43:22] people.
[43:23] Like I remember, because I'm very old, I
[43:26] remember some politicians of the 1970s.
[43:30] They had very low people skills.
[43:33] right? They would just bite thunder at
[43:37] how the world was. I will mention
[43:39] because there's at least one Dutch
[43:41] person here. Um the leader of the social
[43:44] democratic party at that point in time,
[43:46] Yope Denell. Yope Denell was not a man
[43:49] who listened to what the people thought.
[43:51] He knew what he thought and he knew what
[43:54] older people should think and that's
[43:56] what he told them. And many people
[43:59] workers said okay
[44:01] right
[44:03] if yoke denell would be here today they
[44:05] wouldn't say that and he would be gone
[44:08] within a year or two because
[44:13] and he come together there is a
[44:16] completely different infrastructure in
[44:18] which politics takes place.
[44:21] First of all, the media structure is
[44:24] much more favorable towards populist,
[44:26] towards any outsider, but particularly
[44:29] populist.
[44:31] Up until the 1980s, the vast majority of
[44:35] the media that we all pretty much
[44:38] consumed
[44:41] was the same,
[44:43] right? It was state TV, state radio.
[44:46] There was by almost no private, only a
[44:49] couple of channels. Almost everyone got
[44:51] the same news.
[44:53] Most of the newspapers were linked
[44:55] either to a political party or to a
[44:57] trade union or something like that.
[45:00] They were gatekeepers. They decided on
[45:02] what came in the news and what came not
[45:05] in the news. Nowadays almost all media
[45:08] are private
[45:10] based on money. They have to make money.
[45:16] So what the in America they say they
[45:19] chase eyeballs,
[45:21] right? You need readers because if you
[45:24] have a lot of readers, you can get
[45:25] advertisement. And if you get
[45:27] advertisement, you get money.
[45:30] How do you get readers?
[45:33] By scandal.
[45:35] By polarization. Conflict. That's what
[45:38] people like.
[45:40] And who provides good conflict?
[45:43] Populist.
[45:47] Now, not just because of what they say,
[45:49] but quite a lot of populists are very
[45:51] good at what they do.
[45:54] Even Donald Trump, and it sounds
[45:56] bizarre,
[45:59] but if there's one thing that Donald
[46:01] Trump understands way better than anyone
[46:05] else, it is the media.
[46:08] Donald Trump understands because he is a
[46:11] media creation and actually as a
[46:13] businessman has built his business
[46:16] largely on his media profile. He
[46:19] understands that the media is completely
[46:21] selfobsessed.
[46:24] Call the media out
[46:26] and you are in the news for days.
[46:31] That is why he all the time writes about
[46:33] the fake news and the failing New York
[46:37] Times
[46:38] because for days the New York Times is
[46:41] going to write about Donald Trump
[46:44] calling them failing and they're going
[46:47] to show how they are not failing. But
[46:49] all the time Trump is in the news right
[46:54] now. Well, before Trump started to
[46:57] tweet, he had Ves in the Netherlands
[47:00] tweeted.
[47:02] Not as crazy as Donald Trump does, who
[47:06] has these kind of massive explosions of
[47:10] tweets.
[47:13] Well, this is much more measured, or at
[47:15] least used to be. He would tweet twice a
[47:17] day.
[47:19] but clever ones,
[47:21] just provoking enough that the media
[47:24] would go with them, but not so provoking
[47:26] that they would ignore them. And so what
[47:29] would he do? He would tweet something,
[47:31] the media would read it and would say,
[47:33] "Oh, builder said this." And then they
[47:36] would go to other politicians and say,
[47:38] "Wilder said this. What do you think?"
[47:41] Perfect strategy
[47:43] because you set the agenda. the other
[47:46] ones have to respond to what you said
[47:48] and you're never actually criticized
[47:50] because he never gave interviews,
[47:53] right? So, he was totally protected from
[47:57] just statements like that's a dumb
[47:59] tweet, right? Or how are you going to
[48:02] achieve that? No, that was for the other
[48:04] politicians to fight over. But all the
[48:07] time it was about builders, builders,
[48:09] builders was about his issues. Like that
[48:12] is what populist actors like Tas,
[48:17] like Marin Le Pen, like Wes, Donald
[48:20] Trump, Christian Hans, Christian Straa
[48:23] in Austria, all of them are really good
[48:26] at playing media.
[48:30] Social media plays a role, but social
[48:33] media only is effective if it can break
[48:36] into the mainstream.
[48:39] Like if Trump had only tweeted and CNN
[48:43] had ignored him, we wouldn't have the
[48:45] same effect. But of course, when you
[48:48] have a million followers and everyone on
[48:51] Twitter is talking about what Trump is
[48:53] tweeting, CNN is going to cover it
[48:57] because they need eyeballs.
[49:04] Now, the consequences of populism
[49:06] finally
[49:08] are pretty big,
[49:10] but they're also good.
[49:13] One of the best things about populism,
[49:16] particularly when in opposition, is that
[49:18] they politicize or repoliticize certain
[49:21] issues.
[49:24] So the politization of immigration, I
[49:27] have talked about the politization of
[49:30] European integration.
[49:34] Today you could say the politization of
[49:37] austerity
[49:40] which also was just a doma technocracy.
[49:44] Um but you can have even smaller things.
[49:46] My favorite example is public is public
[49:50] transport. doesn't work well in the US
[49:52] because they don't really know what
[49:53] public transport is
[49:56] but you do and one of the consequence of
[50:00] European integration is that there has
[50:01] been a lot of pressure on privatizing
[50:04] public transport.
[50:07] Now generally privatization means that
[50:10] you become more efficient which means
[50:13] that you invest more in those
[50:16] trajectories that are profitable and you
[50:18] minimize the ones that are not
[50:20] profitable.
[50:22] Now the effect of that has been overall
[50:25] in most countries, more expensive
[50:28] services,
[50:30] more spotty services and the periphery
[50:34] being excluded from the services.
[50:37] Now, you would say those people are
[50:39] going to be really upset about those
[50:42] businesses, but they're not
[50:46] because they're socialized with the idea
[50:48] that it's the government that takes care
[50:50] of public transport. And so, when the
[50:53] train is again not on time in the
[50:56] Netherlands, people are not angry at
[51:00] whatever company it is that runs that
[51:02] specific train. They're angry at the
[51:04] government because the government should
[51:07] take care of good public transport.
[51:10] And so the argument would be if that
[51:13] would ever become an issue, well, we
[51:14] can't do that because we need to
[51:16] privatize. This is like the deal that we
[51:18] have of Europe. And there are issues to
[51:20] that. The point is that if this was
[51:24] really something that the majority of
[51:26] the people wanted,
[51:28] they should be able to do it. The
[51:30] argument that we have to do things
[51:32] because we're in the European Union is
[51:37] is only a convincing argument for people
[51:41] who really want to stay in the European
[51:43] Union.
[51:46] But there is a political agenda outside
[51:48] of that.
[51:50] There are
[51:52] certain points that you might find more
[51:55] important than previous deals you have
[51:57] made. That is repolidization.
[52:03] On the downside,
[52:05] it leads to polarization.
[52:07] And the reason is simple. As I said
[52:09] before, the debate is moral.
[52:13] Corrupt versus pure.
[52:17] You don't treat corrupt people the same
[52:20] as other political opponents. And so
[52:23] populists don't have political
[52:25] opponents, they have enemies.
[52:29] The problem is populism when successful
[52:33] often leads to anti-populism
[52:35] and anti-populism
[52:37] pretty much used the same moral
[52:40] dynamics.
[52:42] The Hillary Clinton campaign is one of
[52:45] the best examples of how disastrous that
[52:47] can be. Hillary Clinton's campaign was
[52:51] more negative
[52:53] than Donald Trump's.
[52:56] Now, that is stunning.
[52:58] But what's even more stunning is that
[53:01] Donald Trump's campaign was more focused
[53:03] on issues than Hillary Clinton.
[53:07] And Trump had almost no focus on issues.
[53:10] So that tells you how little Hillary
[53:12] Clinton had because what Hillary
[53:14] Clinton's campaign became as soon as
[53:16] Trump was the candidate is Trump is bad
[53:20] and we are good.
[53:24] that leads to further polarization
[53:29] and the US is a very good example. The
[53:32] partisanship today is insane. You see,
[53:36] for example, Democrats who are now
[53:40] like putting all their trust in the army
[53:42] and the CIA
[53:44] to defend democracy, whereas Republicans
[53:47] think that Putin is like a swell guy,
[53:51] right? That's the partisan drug. It's a
[53:53] direct consequence of polarization and
[53:56] it by and large undermines any
[53:58] possibility of compromise which is the
[54:01] basis of liberal democracy.
[54:03] What you see is an increased use of
[54:06] plebitarian instruments mostly
[54:08] referendums
[54:10] but most of the time it's opportunistic.
[54:14] So they will use it to strengthen their
[54:18] their cause their case. However, if it
[54:21] doesn't go well, they will just dismiss
[54:24] it.
[54:26] Um,
[54:28] my big friend Victor Orban, the prime
[54:30] minister of Hungary, had um a referendum
[54:35] on the EU migration deal, the
[54:37] redistribution of immigrants. Deal was
[54:40] already dead by the time the referendum
[54:42] was held, but of course, that was not
[54:43] really the point. However, he lost a
[54:46] referendum.
[54:48] Not because people didn't vote against
[54:49] immigrants. That's always a winner. But
[54:54] he didn't get turnout. Ironically, he
[54:56] didn't get turnout because he himself
[54:58] had raised the turnout level because he
[55:00] was afraid that the opposition would use
[55:03] referendums against him. So, what does
[55:06] the voice of the people do? Does he
[55:08] stick with the outcome of the
[55:09] referendum? No. He just says, "Well,
[55:13] there is a majority. I feel it. So,
[55:15] we're going to do this through the
[55:16] parliament.
[55:18] The worst example, Cass in Greece.
[55:23] Cas is involved with negotiations about
[55:25] a bailout with the EU with the TA
[55:28] doesn't go anywhere. So, he thinks what
[55:32] I need is a referendum because if I win
[55:35] a referendum and I show that the
[55:37] majority of the Greeks don't like the
[55:39] bailout, then everyone else is going to
[55:41] agree.
[55:43] logic.
[55:45] He wins it. He wins his own referendum.
[55:49] 61% said no to the bailout.
[55:53] EU doesn't move. He ignores his own
[55:55] referendum.
[55:57] Right? And so
[56:00] referendums
[56:02] are always used strategically. This is
[56:06] not only by populist, but by populist it
[56:09] stands out in particular.
[56:12] The most worrying thing is the weakening
[56:14] of non-majoritarian institutions, courts
[56:16] and media. It's one of the reasons why
[56:19] many people are very worried about
[56:21] Donald Trump, right? So-called judge,
[56:25] fake media,
[56:28] right? It's important those are not just
[56:30] words. this delegitimation
[56:33] of these institutions
[56:36] and his argument is always look I've
[56:40] been elected by the people
[56:42] nothing should stand in the way of what
[56:45] we want not I but we the people want
[56:50] um
[56:52] Venezuela is a painful case of how
[56:55] independent courts and media have been
[56:57] killed but Hungary is doing this within
[57:01] the EU.
[57:03] One of the ways to get around the
[57:05] Supreme Court
[57:07] was because Orban is very smart. He's
[57:12] surrounded by lawyers
[57:15] and so he doesn't do things in the
[57:17] Polish way where you make big statements
[57:19] and then don't get anything done.
[57:22] You figure out how other countries do it
[57:25] and you pick parts of that which all
[57:29] individually don't look bad but together
[57:34] are bad.
[57:36] So what does he do? First of all, he
[57:38] lowers the retirement age of the judges.
[57:43] Turns out that's a big group gone. So
[57:46] you have to appoint new ones. Those are
[57:49] of course your friends.
[57:51] Still no majority. So you extend the
[57:53] number of judges.
[57:56] Bam. You have a majority of the Supreme
[57:59] Court. The only thing that could still
[58:01] hold you back.
[58:04] Media problematic.
[58:06] Even the EU, which is really toothless
[58:09] towards Hungary for all kind of reasons,
[58:13] cannot really accept when the government
[58:16] closes important media.
[58:19] So you don't close them,
[58:22] you buy them
[58:24] or better your friend buys them.
[58:28] Nip Shabbatak
[58:30] which was the most important opposition
[58:32] paper in Hungary
[58:35] was bought by a friend of Orban
[58:38] someone who five six years ago had very
[58:42] little money and then turned out to have
[58:45] enough to buy a newspaper for 10
[58:47] million.
[58:49] And so he bought it. That's legal,
[58:52] right? It's capitalism. You can buy
[58:53] whatever you want.
[58:55] But now he had the newspaper and he
[58:58] said, "Well, I've done a study. Turns
[59:00] out there's no market for this
[59:02] newspaper, so I'm going to fold it."
[59:06] Totally legal. Can't do anything about
[59:09] it. But it's well, but it's the last
[59:13] opposition newspaper that's gone.
[59:17] Now when it all really goes bad, first
[59:21] of all, populism creates an illiberal
[59:23] democracy, which means that you have now
[59:26] a system where you still have by and
[59:28] large free and fair elections,
[59:32] but you don't have other aspects of
[59:35] liberal democracy. So you don't have
[59:38] rule of law, you don't have independent
[59:41] media.
[59:43] And if it really gets bad,
[59:46] it becomes an autocracy
[59:48] where you don't have free and fair
[59:50] elections anymore. And that's where
[59:52] Venezuela is today.
[59:56] So in conclusion,
[59:59] populism has a long history in Europe
[01:00:01] and the US, but was largely marginal
[01:00:05] before the 21st century in the sense of
[01:00:08] it was there particularly in the US, but
[01:00:10] it could never become a relevant
[01:00:12] political force.
[01:00:14] It is peing in the early 21st century,
[01:00:17] but its popularity is overstated. Right?
[01:00:20] There are very few countries still today
[01:00:23] that have populist in power.
[01:00:28] Its relationship to democracy is
[01:00:30] complex.
[01:00:32] Populism can be both a corrective and a
[01:00:35] threat for liberal democracy.
[01:00:38] Very simply stated, it often ask the
[01:00:41] right questions, but it gives the wrong
[01:00:43] answers.
[01:00:45] And then finally,
[01:00:48] populism is an illiberal democratic
[01:00:50] response to undemocratic liberalism.
[01:00:54] I can let that sink in. When I came up
[01:00:57] with it, I knew that it was going to be
[01:00:59] quoted. So, I needed to keep this. But
[01:01:02] there's more to it than just fishing for
[01:01:04] quotes.
[01:01:05] I have made it clear, I think, by now
[01:01:08] why populism is illiberal democratic.
[01:01:12] But the response to undemocratic
[01:01:13] liberalism
[01:01:16] is
[01:01:18] many points, many important issues that
[01:01:21] used to be political have become
[01:01:24] non-political or at least are put
[01:01:27] outside of the electoral arena. Think
[01:01:30] about monetary policy, which if you're
[01:01:33] in the Euro zone are now in charge is
[01:01:37] the European Central Bank, right?
[01:01:40] experts, techtocrats, but also many
[01:01:43] other issues, death penalty, which is
[01:01:45] now a legal case. It's not a political
[01:01:47] case. And so, liberalism, whether it's
[01:01:50] neoliberal, economic, or broader
[01:01:53] liberal, social cultural, has made a lot
[01:01:56] of taken a lot of issues outside of the
[01:01:59] electoral agenda.
[01:02:01] That's where the undemocratic comes in.
[01:02:04] And populism is an illiberal democratic
[01:02:07] voice against it that says this might be
[01:02:10] illiberal but the people want it and we
[01:02:12] should have a right for that. Thank you
[01:02:15] very much.

Welcome to the course titled "Populism and Politics," presented by Johns Hopkins University and led by Yascha Mounk, an associate professor of international affairs and a senior fellow at the SNF Agora Institute. Mounk is also the author of "The People Versus Democracy: Why Our Freedom is in Danger and How to Save It," which examines the rise of authoritarian populists globally, including figures like Donald Trump in the United States, Narendra Modi in India, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. The course aims to explore the threats that these populist movements pose to liberal democracy.

Mounk reflects on his early interest in democracy and governance, noting that he learned the challenges of establishing stable democracies, particularly in countries with limited democratic traditions or economic challenges. He expresses concern about countries like Thailand and Tanzania, where democracy is faltering. Conversely, he highlights that nations with a history of free and fair elections and a GDP per capita above $14,000 tend to have more stable democracies, as these systems become entrenched and accepted as the only viable political framework.

However, Mounk's optimism was shaken by the political events of 2016, which revealed a growing dissatisfaction with democracy among the populace. He observed a decline in the perceived importance of democratic governance and an openness to alternative political solutions. This discontent has led to the rise of populist leaders worldwide, who challenge established institutions and democratic norms. Mounk acknowledges that while populism is often used as a pejorative term, it possesses a coherent core that warrants examination.

Populist leaders, despite their varied economic policies and political ideologies, share a common narrative: they claim to represent the "real people" against a corrupt elite. This anti-elitist sentiment is a hallmark of populism, but Mounk emphasizes that it is not sufficient to define a populist. The more critical aspect is the anti-pluralist element, where populists assert that they alone represent the people's will, delegitimizing dissenting voices as traitorous or unworthy. This tendency poses a significant threat to the foundational values of liberal democracy.

Mounk outlines the two core values of liberal democracy: collective self-determination and individual rights. The former emphasizes that political decisions should not be dictated by autocrats but made collectively by the populace. The latter underscores the importance of protecting individual freedoms, ensuring that the majority cannot impose its will on the minority. Populists threaten both these values by undermining individual rights and attacking independent institutions that uphold the rule of law.

For instance, populist leaders often scapegoat minorities and challenge the legitimacy of judicial decisions that counter their agendas. They dismiss media criticism as the work of "enemies of the people" and seek to consolidate power by undermining checks and balances. Mounk cites Hungary as a critical example, where Viktor Orban, despite being democratically elected, has eroded democratic institutions and curtailed freedoms, leading to a situation that resembles dictatorship.

The course also features insights from Daniel Ziblatt, a Harvard professor and co-author of "How Democracies Die." Ziblatt discusses the complexities of the term "populism," noting that it can be used variably in political discourse. He emphasizes that populism is less about specific ideologies and more about a political style that claims exclusive representation of the people. This claim can lead to the exclusion of legitimate political opponents, fostering an anti-democratic environment.

Ziblatt introduces the concept of mutual toleration, which is essential for a functioning democracy. This principle suggests that political adversaries must accept each other's right to exist and participate in the political process, even amidst disagreements. However, populist leaders often reject this notion, viewing their opponents as illegitimate threats. This rejection can lead to "constitutional hardball," where political actors exploit legal frameworks to undermine democratic norms, creating a cycle of escalating tensions and dysfunction.

The discussion highlights that while populist leaders may operate within legal boundaries, their actions can still erode the spirit of democracy. Ziblatt points out that the deterioration of mutual toleration and the rise of constitutional hardball have been evident in various democracies, including Hungary, where Orban's government has incrementally dismantled democratic institutions through legal means. He warns that the United States is also at risk, as recent political maneuvers have tested the resilience of its democratic framework.

In conclusion, the course "Populism and Politics" aims to dissect the rise of populism and its implications for democratic governance. Through the lens of Mounk and Ziblatt's insights, participants will explore how populism challenges the fundamental values of democracy, the importance of mutual toleration, and the dangers posed by constitutional hardball. As the global political landscape continues to evolve, understanding these dynamics is crucial for safeguarding democratic institutions and values.

In the transcript, populism is characterized primarily through its narrative of a dichotomy between “the people” and “the elite”. This narrative positions populist leaders as the sole representatives who claim to speak exclusively for the common people against a corrupt elite that is perceived to be self-serving and disconnected from the needs of ordinary citizens. The speaker attributes a common imagination to populist movements, suggesting that they share a simplistic worldview where political problems stem from corrupt leaders who prioritize outsiders over the interests of the true populace.

Another critical element of populism discussed is anti-pluralism, which is the idea that populist leaders believe they alone represent the will of the people. This leads to the delegitimization of dissenting voices, where opponents are labeled as “traitors” or “enemies of the people”. The speaker emphasizes that this anti-pluralist stance is what poses a significant threat to democratic values.

Moreover, populism is described as having a thin ideology, often devoid of a specific set of policies, and instead characterized by a particular style and discourse. The speaker notes that populists can have diverse economic policies and may not necessarily align on the political spectrum, indicating that populism itself is more about the style of politics than a rigid ideological framework. The distinction between populism and related phenomena such as nationalism, radicalism, or authoritarianism is not explicitly made in the transcript, which leaves some ambiguity regarding how these terms interrelate in the broader political context.

• [06:20] "Somebody who truly stands for people, who truly represents the American or the Turkish or the Hungarian or the Venezuelan people, needs to be elected, do away with those corrupt elites..."
• [11:24] "Populism is in the first instance, a threat to the liberal element of our political system, but it attacks and undermines the individual freedoms that I hope is important to all of us."
• [05:15] "What we do share is a common narrative, a common imagination of our politics."

The transcript discusses the historical roots of populism by referencing a variety of populist leaders and movements across different countries, illustrating its evolution over time. The speaker mentions figures such as Donald Trump in the United States, Narendra Modi in India, Viktor Orban in Hungary, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, indicating that these leaders reflect the diverse manifestations of populism in different political and cultural contexts.

Historically, the speaker notes that the rise of populism has been particularly notable after the year 2016, a period marked by significant global political shifts that have led to an increase in dissatisfaction with traditional democratic structures. The speaker expresses a sense of both concern and recognition regarding the fragility of democracies around the world, particularly in countries with less established political traditions.

In terms of ideological and cultural roots, the speaker implies that populism often arises in response to a perceived disconnect between the elites and the populace, particularly in contexts where there is economic strife or political disenchantment. However, specific cultural or economic drivers are not exhaustively detailed in this section of the transcript.

Overall, the transcript emphasizes the need to understand populism not merely as a singular movement but as a complex phenomenon that has deep ideological, cultural, and institutional roots, shaped by specific historical contexts and the leaders who have emerged from them.

• [01:12] "I first became interested in questions around democracy and value at school and what I learned at the time was that it was very hard to build stable democracies."
• [01:55] "I saw that people were more and more dissatisfied with democracy, but they gave less importance to living in a democracy than we used to..."
• [03:32] "Around the world we have seen the rise of governments and populist leaders..."

The transcript identifies several drivers of contemporary populism, emphasizing the role of dissatisfaction with democracy and the perception of political corruption. The speaker notes that there has been a growing sense of disillusionment among the populace, which has been exacerbated by significant political events, particularly since 2016. This disenchantment is tied to broader themes of economic insecurity, inequality, and distrust in institutions.

The speaker mentions that many individuals feel that their political leaders are increasingly disconnected from their needs, and that this sentiment has led to a search for alternative solutions, often encapsulated within populist rhetoric. This growing sentiment of loss of status and the desire for political representation fuels the rise of populism, as leaders who claim to voice the concerns of the common people gain traction.

While the speaker does not delve deeply into specific material versus cultural explanations, the underlying message suggests a complex interplay between these factors. Economic conditions, such as those stemming from globalization and migration, contribute to feelings of insecurity, while cultural backlash against perceived threats to identity and tradition also plays a significant role in the popularity of populist sentiments.

Overall, the transcript indicates that contemporary populism is driven by a combination of economic and cultural factors, leading to a powerful narrative that resonates with those who feel marginalized or threatened by current political and social dynamics.

• [02:16] "Those countries had been consolidated. We could fast forward history... and unless something truly extraordinary happened, we would know that those countries would still be democracies."
• [03:11] "I saw that people were more and more dissatisfied with democracy..."
• [10:12] "Populists are a danger to both of those values."

The transcript discusses the supporters of populism, emphasizing that populism claims to represent the interests of ordinary people against a backdrop of perceived elite corruption. The speaker implies that populism resonates with individuals who feel disenfranchised or alienated from the political process. This includes various social, economic, and identity groups.

While the transcript does not provide specific demographic details, it can be inferred that populist supporters may come from different backgrounds, including those who are economically disadvantaged, less educated, or feeling a loss of cultural identity. The speaker points to a general emotional landscape where supporters of populism are seeking recognition and validation of their concerns, which they feel have been overlooked by traditional political elites.

Moreover, the speaker highlights the narrative that populism fulfills a need for belonging and a sense of agency among its supporters. By portraying themselves as champions of the people, populist leaders offer an emotional connection that resonates with those who feel left behind in the socio-economic landscape. This emotional appeal is critical in mobilizing support and consolidating a base that believes in the populist message.

In summary, the transcript illustrates that populism claims to speak for a diverse yet unified group of individuals who share a common sentiment of dissatisfaction with the current political landscape, and it addresses their needs for representation, recognition, and empowerment.

• [06:39] "...that’ll solve everything."
• [06:50] "I’m saying there’s something wrong with the current government..."
• [10:17] "...they threatened their rights, but they also set themselves up against the rule of law and independent institutions..."

The transcript addresses the role of media in the rise and functioning of populism, although it does not delve deeply into specific mechanisms. The speaker implies that both traditional and social media play significant roles in shaping the narratives around populist movements. The mention of disinformation and the attention economy suggests that media dynamics are crucial in how populist messages are disseminated and received.

The speaker indicates that populist leaders often utilize media to establish a direct line of communication with their supporters, bypassing traditional gatekeepers. This direct connection can amplify their messages and create a sense of immediacy and authenticity, which is appealing to their base. Additionally, the way populists frame their opponents as enemies of the people often finds traction through media channels, further polarizing public opinion.

Moreover, the transcript hints at the polarization that arises from media narratives, where sensationalism and conflict-driven content dominate discussions around populism. This environment can create an echo chamber effect, reinforcing populist sentiments while marginalizing dissenting viewpoints. However, specific details about algorithms, influencers, or particular communication styles are not provided in the transcript, leaving some aspects unexplored.

Overall, while the transcript does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the media's role in populism, it clearly recognizes that media channels, both traditional and new, are instrumental in shaping the perception and effectiveness of populist movements.

• [04:45] "When I opened the New York Times, at least 50% of the mentions that I see over what populism seemed to me as a political scientist to be inappropriate."
• [06:15] "...there’s something wrong with the current government..."
• [10:30] "...they say that they and they alone truly represent the people."

[00:23] Welcome to Populism and Politics, a new online course from Johns Hopkins University.
[00:29] I'm Yascha Mounk, I'm an associate professor of the practice of international affairs at
[00:34] Johns Hopkins University as well as a senior fellow at the SNF Agora Institute.
[00:41] Now I'm also the author of The People Versus Democracy: Why our Freedom is in Danger and
[00:46] How to Save it.
[00:48] That was one of the first books after 2016 to look at the rise of authoritarian populists
[00:53] like Donald Trump and the United States, like Narendra Modi in India, like Viktor Orban
[00:58] in Hungary, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and examine the threat that it posed to liberal
[01:04] democracy.
[01:05] And that is also the topic about which I would like to speak together in this course.
[01:12] I first became interested in questions around democracy and value at school and what I learned
[01:19] at the time was that it was very hard to build stable democracies.
[01:23] There are many countries in the world where democracy doesn't have a long history or tradition,
[01:30] countries which are relatively poor in which we have to worry about the future stability
[01:35] of that political system.
[01:38] So if somebody had told me 10 or 12 years ago that today Thailand would no longer be
[01:45] a real democracy, but democracy would at best be struggling in a country like Tanzania,
[01:51] I would have been very sad to hear it, but I would not have been entirely surprised.
[01:55] At the same time, I also learned a much more hopeful, a much more optimistic in countries
[02:03] which had had at least two changes of government for free and fair elections, in countries
[02:08] that had a GDP per capita of at least $14,000 per year.
[02:12] I was talking, we really didn't have to worry about democracy.
[02:16] Those countries had been consolidated.
[02:18] We could fast forward history, but 10 or 30 or 50 years and unless something truly extraordinary
[02:24] happened, we would know that those countries would still be democracies.
[02:31] One reason for that was that there was supposed to have a very stable political culture, but
[02:37] when you looked at those countries, democracy had become, and the phrase of one famous sentence
[02:42] in literature, the only game in town.
[02:47] When you looked at politicians who held any real powers in those places, they were supposed
[02:51] to support, to accept the core institutions and values off our political system.
[02:59] Well, I started to worry about whether this was really true before the 2016 elections,
[03:07] which changed so much in the world.
[03:11] I saw that people were more and more dissatisfied with democracy, but they gave less importance
[03:15] to living in a democracy then we used to that, that even in some places when we're open to
[03:19] for a talent audit alternatives, that it is the political events of the last four or five
[03:24] years that have really put pressure on those forms of pursued wisdom.
[03:32] Around the world we have seen the rise of governments and populist leaders from Donald
[03:39] Trump in the United States to hear both so narrow in Brazil to Modi in India, to Viktor
[03:46] Orban in Hungary, to Atawan in Tokyo, to Chavez in Venezuela and many more beyond that.
[03:57] They do not accept the legitimacy of many of institutions in their countries and they
[04:02] have fundamentally challenged many of the values around which we appeared to have a
[04:09] consensus.
[04:10] Now, I hear some of you say, what do these people have in common?
[04:16] Isn't the term populism just something that's thrown around against people we have to dislike
[04:22] against people who don't fit into some kind of moderate or centrist policy laying against
[04:27] people who are honestly concerned about some of the real problems we have in the world
[04:32] and are saying, we need some new solutions.
[04:34] Now, I'll admit something to you, I also find the way in which the term populism is often
[04:40] used to be confused, misleading, partisan.
[04:45] When I opened the New York Times, at least 50% of the mentions that I see over what populism
[04:50] seemed to me as a political scientist to be inappropriate.
[04:55] But yeah, that doesn't mean that there isn't a coherent core to the idea of populism.
[05:04] It is that coherent core, but I want to explain to you in the mini lecture today.
[05:15] Populist as I've already acknowledged, are very different from each other.
[05:18] They don't necessarily have the same set of economic policies and many of them are quite
[05:23] right-wing on the economy, but some of them like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela are very laughable
[05:26] but don't always have the same enemies.
[05:29] When you look at somebody like Donald Trump in the United States, he does not appear to
[05:33] be, to put it mildly, overly fond of Muslims, but when you look at somebody like Atawan
[05:38] in Toyko, he does not appear to be overly fond of anybody who's not a Muslim, so they
[05:41] don't have that in common either.
[05:43] What we do share is a common narrative, a common imagination of our politics.
[05:49] What we do share is a way of thinking about the world, which is relatively straightforward.
[05:57] The only real reason, why we have political problems today we tend to say, is that there's
[06:04] a political lead that is corrupt and self-serving, but cares more about there is outsiders than
[06:09] they do about “real people,” like you and me.
[06:15] And therefore what we need to do to fix those problems is quite simple.
[06:20] Somebody who truly stands for people, who truly represents the American or the Turkish
[06:25] or the Hungarian or the Venezuelan people, needs to be elected, do away with those corrupt
[06:32] elites, do away with anybody who stands in the way of the will of a people and that'll
[06:39] solve everything.
[06:41] Now, there's two elements to this that I would like to call attention to.
[06:48] The first is a form of anti-elitist.
[06:50] I'm saying there's something wrong with the current government, but something wrong with
[06:53] the people who really make important decisions in our country and it's time for a change.
[06:59] That is a normal part of democratic politics.
[07:03] From George W. Bush to Barack Obama, virtually every successful presidential candidate in
[07:08] the United States has an event, has engaged in some form of anti-elitism as well.
[07:12] So far anti-elitism is one of the hallmarks of populism.
[07:15] It is not a sufficient condition of who is a populist.
[07:22] That fact alone does not make somebody a populist and it's not the most problematic aspect of
[07:26] populism either.
[07:28] Rather, somebody becomes a populace because of that second element, the anti-pluralist
[07:34] element.
[07:35] The element that says I and I alone represent the people and if you disagree with me, you're
[07:41] not just wrong about something important.
[07:43] I'm not just going to try to convince you, you are fundamentally illegitimate.
[07:50] You are a traitor, you are an enemy of the people.
[07:53] And it is that second part of the definition of populism, an anti-pluralist element, that
[07:59] really helps to explain why populism is a threat to the two core values of our political
[08:09] system.
[08:11] Two core values to our political system.
[08:13] What do I mean by that?
[08:15] Well, political scientists like to say that we live in a liberal democracy.
[08:19] Liberal in this context is not a partisan term.
[08:20] It's not liberal and conservative left and right.
[08:23] Another term for it, if you prefer, a democratic republic, it tries to get at the same idea
[08:28] of there's two fundamental values to our political system.
[08:32] One of them is the idea of collective self-determination, but we don't let our political decisions be
[08:42] made by a king or an army general priest or an emon or a dictator.
[08:50] We make them ourselves collectively.
[08:53] We together decide what laws we should be bound by.
[08:58] That is the literal promise of democracy, rule by the people.
[09:04] Now the second element of this, it's not the democratic element, it's the liberal element.
[09:11] It's the idea of individual rights and individual freedoms.
[09:16] We don't just want the majority to decide whatever they want and they can tell you what
[09:20] color shirt to wear and what you’re allowed to say.
[09:23] We also want to ensure that people in our societies have a realm of freedom in which
[09:28] they’re unimpeded by the government and by others.
[09:31] I should be allowed to determine myself what to say or not say, which God to worship and
[09:37] whether to worship a God at all, whom to have over for dinner tonight and whom to ask to
[09:42] stay after dinner, if I and they so wish.
[09:45] Now, in order to protect us individual freedoms, we don't just need a bill of rights.
[09:52] We also need the rule of law and a set of independent institutions because if a president
[09:58] or a prime minister can come in and say, I don't like what that guy just said, I'm going
[10:03] to throw him in jail, then any bill of rights is not worth the parchment it was written
[10:09] on.
[10:12] Populists are a danger to both of those values.
[10:17] They're most immediately a danger.
[10:18] Two individual rights but tend to scapegoat and attack unpopular minorities.
[10:24] So they threatened their rights, but they also set themselves up against the rule of
[10:30] law and independent institutions because they say that they and they alone truly represent
[10:36] the people.
[10:37] They do not recognize that it is legitimate for that to be independent institutions.
[10:42] When the media criticized them by the right of him as the enemies of the people.
[10:46] When a judge says, Hey, that executive order is not something you are constitutionally
[10:52] allowed to do, they say, who is the judge?
[10:54] I am a representative of people.
[10:56] Uh, that person.
[10:58] It's just an impostor.
[10:59] We should be ignoring them.
[11:01] And when law enforcement agencies start to investigate a friend or a political ally of
[11:08] a president or prime minister, they say that shouldn't be allowed to happen.
[11:12] They are going against the elected representative of the people.
[11:16] They should doing what I, the representative of people, is telling them to do.
[11:24] Now that means that populism is in the first instance, a threat to the liberal element
[11:30] of our political system, but it attacks and undermines the individual freedoms that I
[11:35] hope is important to all of us.
[11:40] But in the long run, populism doesn't just establish an illiberal democracy.
[11:47] It actually tends towards an illiberal dictatorship.
[11:51] Because one's for government controls the media, it’s able to curtail the rights of
[12:00] your position has placed it's lawless in the electoral commission.
[12:06] The second core value of our political system starts to be under threat as well.
[12:13] Suddenly it is no longer possible to remove a democratically elected government by democratic
[12:22] means.
[12:23] This is the case we have now and ambiguous you reached in a country but it's not very
[12:31] large but very important in this context.
[12:34] Hungary, Hungary fulfills those conditions of democratic consolidation, but I was taught
[12:40] about in graduate school.
[12:42] It has change governance for free and fair elections about five times since 1990 it has
[12:47] a GDP per capita of over $14,000 a year, it's supposed to be a safe democracy.
[12:53] And yet Viktor Orban, who was democratically elected in 1990 has since he has come to power
[12:59] assembled so much influence in his own hands, undermined independent institutions to such
[13:08] an extent, taking such a control over the media, there that independent observer said
[13:15] the last election was mostly free but no longer.
[13:20] Now in the context of COVD-19 he has suspended parliament indefinitely, taken on the power
[13:28] to rule by decree and told people that they can be jailed for spreading “false rumors”
[13:35] on social media.
[13:38] Hungary is now a dictatorship.
[13:41] It is one of the most important cases in which we see how the populace attack on the two
[13:47] core values of our political system, individual freedom and collective self-determination,
[13:52] threatens to move many countries from democracy to dictatorship.
[14:00] So today we're privileged to have Daniel Ziblatt join us.
[14:04] Daniel is the Eaton Professor of Government at Harvard University, and we offer, among
[14:10] many important books the co-author of How Democracies Die.
[14:17] The word populism is very confusing, Dan, a lot of people use it in a lot of different
[14:21] ways.
[14:23] Sometimes it's just used as a kind of a political ram in order to tarnish your opponents.
[14:29] Um, what do you think the term means?
[14:31] Does it, does it have any real use?
[14:33] Well, it certainly is one of these terms, it's kind of an essentially contested concept,
[14:37] I would say.
[14:38] A lot of people have different meanings attached to it.
[14:40] The, obviously the historical context of it is the populous party in the United States
[14:46] in the late 19th century, which had a very particular historical meaning.
[14:51] And you know, that's important to recognize that, but I think in current political debates,
[14:56] it has a different meaning in that historical mean, connected but different.
[15:02] And so I think the term today describes a particular kind of political claim or political
[15:10] style that certain types of politicians use.
[15:13] So it's not as much an ideology as much as a kind of orientation towards politics.
[15:20] And that particular kind of orientation is somebody who claims to speak on behalf of
[15:25] the people in a, in an exclusive way.
[15:28] So in other words, they are the true representatives of the people.
[15:34] What's dangerous about that is certainly that if you claim to be the only spokesperson for
[15:40] the people, however you define it, then anybody who disagrees with you is in some way not
[15:45] legitimate.
[15:46] And so in this sense, although being a populace sounds like it could be democratic, in a lot
[15:51] of ways it often is anti-democratic.
[15:53] So the problem with populism on your account is not that it often criticizes the elite
[15:58] fiercely or that it has a particular set of policy positions.
[16:03] It's really about this refusal to accept different participants of a democratic system as legitimate.
[16:12] I think that's right.
[16:13] You know, so I think, I think, you know, being democratic is often, often can also be anti-elite.
[16:18] I mean, that's, that's true that that's a big part of the kind of rhetorical trope of,
[16:25] of a populist is to be anti-elite, anti-business elite, anti-political elite.
[16:30] But that's all in the service of claiming the particular politician is, is the true
[16:34] spokesperson for the elite, or I'm sorry, for the people.
[16:40] So that's, that's, that's what makes it dangerous.
[16:43] The particular ideological content, I think it turns out not to be that important.
[16:46] I mean, there's left wing populism that has people talking about a right wing populism.
[16:51] And the ideology of being, you know, as often not particularly problematic, it's the particular
[16:57] style of politics and the kind of claim of legitimacy that the political leader makes
[17:02] that's worth noting.
[17:04] So in How Democracies Die, I suppose you get advanced set of ideas for the idea of mutual
[17:09] toleration for a concept of mutual toleration.
[17:13] So what is mutual toleration?
[17:14] Why is that so important and what happens to a political system when it runs out?
[17:20] Yeah, so the, the idea of toleration is an interesting one.
[17:23] A mutual toleration in particular is an interesting one because essentially what it is that the,
[17:28] the underlying idea is that you often will disagree with people.
[17:31] You even find people's ideas offensive, but at the heart of democracy, our claim is essentially
[17:39] publicly accepting that the other side has a right to represent their views, has a right
[17:45] to run for office, and has a right, if they beat us to win, and somebody who, somebody
[17:51] who, that's a hard belief to hold onto.
[17:54] And it was an idea that had to be invented because, you know, if you think you are right,
[17:58] why should you let another side win?
[18:00] But at the heart of democracy, I think is in many ways, um, the idea that nobody has
[18:06] a monopoly on truth, that you may be wrong, a kind of certain level of uncertainty and
[18:11] modesty, and to recognize that somebody else may, maybe right.
[18:15] And so you have to be willing to, to entertain opposing ideas.
[18:19] That doesn't mean you don't fight hard for your beliefs.
[18:21] That doesn't mean you don't try to win, but, but the way I think this connects to populism
[18:25] is a populist kind of in my view would be one who thinks they have a monopoly on the
[18:30] truth because they have this ultimate claim to legitimacy, which is representing the people.
[18:34] And so if a politician claims that they are the only true spokesman for the people, then
[18:40] it's much harder to maintain an orientation of mutual toleration, which is really a kind
[18:46] of unwritten part of our political systems, but it's really critical for any democracy.
[18:51] And one of the things that happens when people don't have mutual toleration and in particular,
[18:55] when one set of political actors, perhaps populace, believe that the opponents are so
[19:00] bad, so dangerous, so illegitimate that they don't owe them the basic sort of set of considerations
[19:07] is what you call constitutional hardball.
[19:09] So what does constitutional hardball look like?
[19:12] And why should we worry about it?
[19:14] Yeah, so they're really, there's sort of two underpinnings of democracy, unwritten parts
[19:20] of democracy, in my view.
[19:23] One is this notion of mutual toleration and the other is a kind of notion of self-restraint.
[19:28] That if you, if you don't have a monopoly on the truth, then although you fight hard
[19:33] for your beliefs, again, you, you don't push to the max.
[19:36] You know, if you have a certain institutional prerogative or power, you don't always use
[19:40] it to the max.
[19:43] And so, you know, for just to take an example from, from American history, you know, until
[19:49] after Roosevelt, there was no limit on term limits for presidents, you know?
[19:53] So in other words, people could in principle, a president, if running for, could keep running
[19:57] for office and be president for life, but no president ever ran for a third term after
[20:03] Washington established this unwritten rule of self-restraint.
[20:07] So what hardball is, is the idea that you do push to the max.
[20:13] And you know, if the, if the rule is there, you use it full, you leverage it fully to
[20:17] the maximum.
[20:18] And so if there's a rule allowing you to be president for life, you are president, you
[20:22] try to be president for life, if you can get away with it.
[20:25] And how this connects to mutual toleration is that if one thinks, doesn't give the other
[20:31] side, kind of the legitimacy of having a legitimate kind of view point of view, then of course,
[20:36] you're going to push to the max or to put it the other way.
[20:39] If you think the other side is an existential threat in some way, then of course, you're
[20:43] going to do use any means necessary to stop the other side from gaining power.
[20:47] So you'll, you'll once in power pushed to the max.
[20:50] And even if you're out of power, do everything possible to dislodge the other side from power.
[20:55] And so, again, I think both of these, the norm of mutual toleration and this normal
[21:00] self-restraint are antithetical to populous and populous because they have this ultimate
[21:05] claim to legitimacy in a democratic world.
[21:08] I mean, that's an important precondition, I think, is that, you know, in a, in a world,
[21:11] in which the people are the ultimate source of legitimacy in the democratic world, in
[21:15] which we live, that's where populism comes from, because they can make this claim.
[21:20] And again, it's critical that they have the exclusive claim to this because all politicians
[21:24] to some degree, you know, say they are aligned with the people they're doing what the people
[21:28] want, but they don't, you know, a democratic politician is not one who says that they have
[21:35] some special insight that nobody else has into the people.
[21:38] It's this idea that I, and I alone truly represent the people.
[21:42] And we see important instantiations of democratic politicians, enforcing that line, but they
[21:50] don't have that exclusive claim to representation in actual politics from time to time.
[21:55] I always think of a moment in the run up to the 2008 election in which John McCain was
[22:00] doing a town hall.
[22:01] And one of the members of the audience said, you know, I'm really scared of Barack Obama.
[22:05] If he becomes president, it's going to be terrible for our country.
[22:08] And John McCain, to his lasting honor, responded by saying, look, I think I represent the people
[22:13] better than Barack Obama.
[22:14] I think I would have better policies from Barack Obama.
[22:17] I think it's really important that you vote for me, but you don't have to be scared of
[22:20] Barack Obama because he's a legitimate politician.
[22:24] And I would just, I would just add to that, what's, what's so poisonous in a way about
[22:29] populism defined in these terms is that it's contagious in a way.
[22:33] So if, if a politician is claiming that they, and they alone represent the people, they
[22:38] don't grant the other side, mutual toleration, they push to the max.
[22:43] If you're a democratic politician who subscribed to kind of pluralist worldview in which there's
[22:47] competing views, and you're faced with this kind of leader, there's incredible temptation
[22:52] to respond with your hardball and to say, well, these guys, this guy is not legitimate.
[22:57] He's claiming to be the exclusive spokesperson for the, for the people he's not.
[23:02] And so the only way to beat this person is to fight fire with fire.
[23:06] And so this is the kind of death spiral of, of why populous infect democratic systems
[23:12] in a way that, that ends up leading to kind of a decay or spiral is kind of spiraling
[23:17] of, of hardball.
[23:18] So there's a kind of surprising element of your concept of constitutional hardball, which
[23:23] is to say that I understand why people who are not willing to play by the rules, a danger
[23:27] to democracy.
[23:28] If you are elected democratically, but then once you're in office, you say, I build up
[23:33] my little power troops of goons, and whenever anybody comes out to protest me, I'm going
[23:37] to shoot in the crowd.
[23:38] That's obviously a danger to democracy.
[23:40] What's interesting about constitutional hardball is that it doesn't seem to assume rule breaking.
[23:46] It seems to assume that you can operate within formal rules, and yet you're actually out
[23:51] of bounds.
[23:52] How should we think about that?
[23:54] Yeah, no, that's right.
[23:55] And that's, it is it's especially the case in systems and what you have short constitutions,
[24:00] like the American system or no constitution like the British system.
[24:04] And so not every rule is written down.
[24:07] Um, and so what happens is if, if people file follow the rule to the T in a way you can
[24:13] get an escalation.
[24:14] And just to give you an exact, I gave you the example of, of the presidents being presidents
[24:18] for life, following the law.
[24:20] Similarly, you know, there's no law about the size of the, in the constitution, there's
[24:25] nothing in the U.S. Constitution about the size of the Supreme Court.
[24:28] So in principle for president, doesn't like how, if he has a friendly Senate, if he doesn't
[24:32] like how the, uh, court is ruling, just expand the size of the Supreme Court.
[24:36] It's perfectly legal.
[24:39] The Senate can hold up every president's nomination, for a cabinet position.
[24:44] Again, there's nothing prohibiting them from doing this.
[24:47] So, you know, you could say, well, it's illegal, but if everybody pushes to the max, the system
[24:52] becomes incredibly dysfunctional.
[24:55] And so that's why, that's why then it becomes, so it's both a threat to the kind of functionality
[24:59] of democracy.
[25:00] And it also escalates the level of tensions within a political system.
[25:04] So in that sense, I think it's, it's very dangerous.
[25:06] And, and, you know, we often, you often hear today that, you know, the way democracies
[25:10] die today is not, you know, through military coups, but through constitutional and parliamentary
[25:17] rulings.
[25:18] And this is how this happens is that politicians follow the letter of the law in a way that
[25:22] actually undermines the spirit of the law.
[25:25] So you're very influential book was called How Democracies Die, have democracies died
[25:30] because of a lack of mutual toleration and the constitutional hardball in the last few
[25:34] years?
[25:35] Is the empirical evidence that we really need to be worried about the impact that the rise
[25:39] of his populace has had on democracies around the world?
[25:43] Yes, I think so.
[25:45] But there's been democracies that have had that really have fully died.
[25:48] I would say I would, I would put Hungry in that camp.
[25:52] And Hungary's clearly a case where Viktor Orban as Prime Minister has through very legal
[25:58] means used these strategies of constitutional hardball or abandoned self-restraint.
[26:03] So, you know, for example, expanding that for enforcing retirement ages, you know, passing
[26:08] a law that enforced a retirement age on the courts, which didn't allow him to kind of
[26:13] pack the courts with his allies, redrawing of electoral districts, to maximize his parties,
[26:18] a position of power and to create super majorities.
[26:21] And so using legal means pushing to the max slowly and incrementally democracy, kind of
[26:27] withers a way.
[26:28] So that that's an extreme case.
[26:29] I think there's also cases where democracy hasn't died, but it's certainly at risk.
[26:33] And I would say the United States is a case like this.
[26:34] I think American democracy is still alive, but it's been put at a level of risk that
[26:39] we have not experienced in our lifetimes.
[26:42] And a lot of that has come about through efforts at constitutional hardball, I would say, I
[26:47] mean, so the firing of, you know, essentially abandoning of unwritten rules and, and that
[26:51] kind of intervention of the president and domains where it's clearly exacting into self-interest
[26:56] to fire inspector generals, to fire the FBI director.
[27:02] This is undermining the basic restraints that our system has relied upon.
[27:06] And again, all of this has always been legal for the, you know, I, I think, but for the
[27:10] most part, and yet this has put our democracy at risk.
[27:15] And so one of the things is what's striking is that, you know, what's legal can actually
[27:19] destroy democracy.
[27:20] And I think, and, and at least weakening democracy, we've seen this in the United States, certainly
[27:23] as well.
[27:24] Daniel Ziblatt.
[27:25] Thank you so much for joining us.
[27:27] Yes.
[27:28] Thank you.